May it be for the best…

Some time ago Deputy Prime Minister Prof. Besir Atalay gave the first signals of the new process we are going through: "Every initiative can be, and is being, undertaken so that the bloodshed stops, terror stops, and the process that drains Turkey's energy and morale ends." Atalay's words were perceived as a sign that a new process had begun, and this perception was not wrong. In fact, in this lecture Mr. Atalay was trying to explain that the AK Parti's politics of opening was not simply a process that began in 2009.

Indeed, on the part of the matter concerning the Kurdish question, the AK Parti already had its own program, and this program was based, to a great extent on its own political philosophy, on the demands of the Kurds, who are its own base. That is why in the party program published when it was founded in 2001, the AK Parti declared that it recognized the Kurdish question and stated that the solution of this question lay through a broader cultural, social and political reform program that could not be reduced to securitarian policies. For this, promises were made regarding opening the way to Kurdish-language education, freeing the written and visual press, and even having it done by the state. In fact all the steps the AK Parti has taken today regarding the Kurdish opening are a result of its own political understanding, and are still not complete.

The process that begins today, apart from the Kurdish matter, concerns the PKK and armed terror dimension of the problem, and in the approach to this problem too the AK Parti displays an approach consistent with the political style it declared in 2001. There are clear statements that approaching terror only with security measures, without understanding its sociological ground, its relation to the Kurdish question and its psychological foundations, will only enlarge the problem. In the course of the process every path and every method was sought and tried for resolving this problem apart from weapons. But we also witnessed that this road is full of mines, and that from time to time these mines were detonated in ways that caused great losses and disruptions.

Perhaps it is not the place at this stage to blame anyone by looking at who is detonating the mines. Frankly, such a huge problem continuing for 30 years always creates large economic and political interest areas. When you set about restoring these areas again, you may not be able to determine well enough who is how effective and authoritative. At present it is not very clear who is how effective or authoritative over the PKK. The statements of Murat Karayilan, the Kandil official, who made a statement upon the start of the new process on Imrali, interestingly draw the limits of Ocalan's authority even in this situation.

"If it is thought that only the DTK members meeting with Leader Apo will solve the problem, that is wrong. Of course the inclusion of the political sphere in the process is very important and necessary. It is conceivable for the delegation that meets to assume a role like that of an intermediary, which is also appropriate. The people in the current delegation are trustworthy people. But convincing the fighter structure is a separate matter, a situation that goes beyond us as well."

To what extent even the BDP or PKK circles, who in all their discourse are determined to present Ocalan as the sole interlocutor, accept or can accept Ocalan as authoritative confronts one in the process with realities other than at its beginning. Indeed, within a very short time after Ocalan was somehow taken as an interlocutor, it was understood that Ocalan is someone who is accepted as an unquestioned leader as long as he continues the war, but whose authority is at risk the moment he gives signs of ending the war. It was therefore understood that Ocalan, who is authorized to continue the war, is not authorized to end it. On the other hand, it continued to be a fact that Ocalan is an unquestioned leader among the PKK/BDP base. The social ground of the PKK is to some extent now fed by Ocalan's symbolism, so Ocalan is extremely functional for holding the base together. The organization badly needs Ocalan, but this does not mean that the organization has entirely left to Ocalan the symbolic capital based on Ocalan. This is so somewhat by the nature of the matter.

The PKK's new wave of violence, which began with the Silvan attack, had developed in spite of Ocalan. In fact with this wave a period was entered in which Ocalan's words had no meaning at all. The organization in a sense entered an effort to prove its maturity against its leader, and thought it would get results this time with the aggressive policies it pursued in spite of Ocalan. The isolation thought to have been applied to Ocalan in this process actually stemmed largely from Ocalan, whose authority had been damaged and whose words had been left hanging in the air, being unable to find ground on which to play. However, the organization, whose eagerness to turn the year 2012 into a final year with a revolutionary people's war came to nothing, was seen to have been put in a thoroughly difficult position before its own base as well.

This created a situation that restored Ocalan's authority. Paradoxically, as the policy of violence the PKK plunged into reached failure, Ocalan's importance increased still further. Even today, despite the negative possibilities that Karayilan has displayed, Ocalan's status as the most influential figure over the organization and its base, which has become impossible to run from a particular hand, has been further consolidated.

There is certainly a possibility that the known forces will sabotage the process from now on, but these efforts will not be able to produce a result as in the past. In this regard I wish that the new process bears auspicious results.