Here is your Turkey model

Those among us who have followed what has happened in Egypt in recent days must often be gripped by a sense of déjà vu in the face of developments that exactly resemble what happened in Turkey. The fact that the revolution in Egypt, which followed the developments that began in Tunisia, was so quick and in a sense "easy" had naturally raised many suspicions among people at the time.

The overthrow of Mubarak and the subsequent transformation of the revolution's gains into a symbolic value that everyone trembles over had given many people the impression that things were suspiciously easy. The suspicion was that all of this, once again, had been planned and controlled from somewhere by the push of a button.

Of course, that what happened was developing spontaneously or had not been planned by hidden centers did not mean that the usual suspects were watching the process from the stands or were not trying to control it. Indeed, the interventions that have emerged over time show, in an edifying way, both what the roles of those centers in the process were and what they can do to increase those roles.

Those who objected most to calling the debates in Egypt's revolutionary process a "Turkish model" are today literally imitating the Turkish model, but the model that Turkey has been trying to leave and has largely left behind.

In fact, one of the most popular concepts in the Egyptian media, the "deep state", used to refer to the forces trying to undermine the revolutionary process, does not go without a reference to Turkey. The ways in which the "deep state", in its Turkish usage, manifests itself in Egypt also match those in Turkey exactly.

At times the military authority directly tries to control the situation through directly tutelary interventions. It tries to make everyone feel that it is above the constitution and above everyone. Where this could be questioned, it does not neglect to prepare the ground. It abruptly annuls, by a decision, the constitution-drafting body formed after the revolution. In the incidents at the stadium, in which more than 150 people died, the military council immediately announces an invitation to descend onto the field.

In places where the military council's direct intervention might not be fitting, the Constitutional Court, all of whose members were appointed by Mubarak, stepped in and played the legal card. Just two days before the presidential elections it dissolved the parliament; in doing so, of course, it found a pretext, but none of the pretexts was any less legal than the one in our 367 crisis. Their way of trying to close off, through functional institutions of tutelage, the space that, as they saw from the outset, the path of democracy left them none of, shows that Turkey's outdated model, which has begun to be left behind, is being applied with no small effectiveness.

From the beginning they could not stomach Morsi's presidency and the Brotherhood's capture of a majority in parliament. They knew that the constitution that would emerge would never let them relive their old days in power, and they tried to block the process. That is why they withdrew from the constitution-drafting work, because their demand for a privileged treatment of their own minority was not being met. In their minority state they are trying to obtain majority privilege and are looking for the formula for it, but since they cannot find it they turn the matter into raucous shouting. Most recently, upon the information that the Constitutional Court would annul the constitution being prepared despite their boycott, and the constitution-drafting body, Morsi, as a precaution, issued the law increasing his powers, valid only until the constitutional referendum of 15 December. The stance displayed against this also took the form of a sort of republic rallies. The sullying of Tahrir Square with the logic of republic rallies is truly a tragic situation, but it is edifying in showing how blindly Egypt is imitating the Turkish model, and moreover at the hands of those who objected to this model out of nationalist concerns.

Perhaps it would be fitting for someone today to say, in the Egyptian context, about Turkey what Marx said in the 19th century about India, "the place to look for those who want to see England's past." Let us conclude by giving this example, which is enough. Those who criticize Morsi for establishing a dictatorship also use as a pretext, particularly of late, his embrace of the Palestinian cause. "With all of Egypt's problems, what is this, being so concerned with Palestine?" they say.

Perhaps one difference between Egypt and Turkey in this context is that the changes and model events that took decades in Turkey are being experienced very intensely and quickly in Egypt. Another difference, adapting Marx again: what was first experienced as drama in Turkey has a tragicomic flavor as it is repeated in Egypt.

WHAT WAS DONE TO HİLAL KAPLAN IS ANOTHER EXAMPLE OF THE TURKISH MODEL

The publication of a photograph taken by our newspaper's columnist and principled, esteemed friend Hilal Kaplan at a church she stopped by to visit during a trip, together with a series of immoral messages, on an internet site whose name we no longer even wish to mention but which, unfortunately, makes claims to Islam, also constitutes another example of the typical Turkish model. One cannot believe that an Islamic language has been wedged in among the values said to have recently set in motion campaigns targeting people of similar principle and worth, such as Ali Bayramoğlu and Cengiz Çandar. To me this seems like a joke, albeit a filthy one.

In fact, we often encountered such examples during the Kemalist operations against Muslims at the time of 28 February. This typical working style of the deep state media was carried out frequently both before and after 28 February. That today people who make claims to Islam are doing this style truly indicates that we have a long way to go within the framework of the relations among Islam, morality, politics and the media.

Look at it: I too have made, many times, in both my articles and my speeches, statements similar to those on religion classes that made Hilal Kaplan a target. I too have written many times that the parental right must not be violated in religion classes, and that forcing on those who do not want their children to receive the belief of another religion or sect is oppression.

I wrote it under the title "There can be no compulsory religion class." I based the justification for this entirely on Islam as well, because I explained that in Islam, which says "there is no compulsion in religion", just as no religion can be imposed on anyone by force, the parental right is an Islamic principle in religious teaching.

Could my own visits to churches during my trips abroad perhaps have had an effect on this stance of mine? Here you have two denunciations about me, do what you will.