The motion is an action at the limits of diplomacy

The AK Parti's 4th Ordinary Congress was an important event that, in many respects, deserved to be discussed for a long time. But the shells that fell on Akçakale from Syria just three days after this event cut this agenda short.

From the very beginning it was clear that the crisis in Syria was not a foreign problem Turkey could remain indifferent to, but an utterly domestic one. Precisely for this reason, Turkey did not, and could not, see this problem as one it could stay out of. For those who criticize Turkey's foreign policy today, especially in the Syrian context, answering just one question is enough to show how groundless their criticisms are. The question is this: Apart from the policy it has followed since the Syrian crisis began, what else could Turkey have done?

No policy that could be proposed would have had any sustainable aspect, nor any chance of bringing Turkey to a better place than the present one. It could not have been sustained, because this policy is not shaped solely by Turkey's preference. While civilians in Syria, children, women and all, are being subjected to massacre, and people fleeing these massacres for dear life are pressing up against the border, you cannot look at the sky and whistle.

No, let us correct that: if you like, you can whistle shamelessly, but then you cannot possess the quality of a state with historical and cultural depth governing a society with humanitarian values in this country. And in that case not an iota of your standing will remain among the peoples of a geography that has been reshaping itself in the region over the last year or two.

The messages given by leaders at the AK Parti 4th Ordinary Congress, from Muhammad Morsi to Khaled Meshaal, from Almazbek Atambayev to Mesut Barzani, were not messages given merely as lip service. The political weight and value of those messages were far greater than could be imagined, and Turkey's Syria policy has had a very important place in these messages being voiced so openly. In order not to lose one Assad, we could easily have lost this whole geography.

The opposition of grown men, still on the level of "what happened that we suddenly turned bad when we were so close?" on behalf of Assad, is not a level of criticism that Turkey deserves. Even if it is to be opposed, we have the right to hope to encounter questions at a more advanced level and more in-depth analyses.

The path Turkey has followed toward Syria has never been a path aspiring to go to war with Syria. Syria's problem is not with Turkey but with its own people, and therefore in fact with the whole world. A forward step that Turkey would take on its own here, without sufficiently carrying the problem onto the world agenda, while turning the problem into an ordinary problem between Turkey and Syria alone, could become a kiss of life for the Syrian regime, which has entirely lost its legitimacy. That is why Syria's wanting to drag Turkey into a war is nothing but an adventure that has no chance of creating a worse situation for itself at this hour...

Yet one does not need to be a prophet to see that Turkey's loss from such an adventure would be far greater. That is why Turkey has never been in a pro-war posture, both in order not to give the Syrian regime a new opportunity for legitimacy and because it does not disregard the possible harms for the region as a whole and for humanity. But it also had to prevent these concerns of its, which have gradually become known, from being perceived as a weakness.

Responding immediately to the Syrian shells that fell on Akçakale, and continuing afterward with warning artillery fire, was very important in this respect. While the passing of a motion in the TBMM on the morning after the day of the attack, regarding sending troops abroad, was perceived as a show of resolve, the apology expected from Syria was not long in coming. Drawing Turkey into war in order to gather a little more legitimacy for itself may at first sound like an attractive idea, but it could not be ignored that this gave Turkey the right to attack further. Indeed, no one in international public opinion objected to Turkey's right of retaliation. On the contrary, it was accepted as Turkey's most natural right. Yet the motion is not a declaration of war, only a declaration that one is prepared for every eventuality. That this declaration alone even set the whole world in motion shows that it is a move within the limits of diplomacy. While a general call for restraint was made against the passing of the motion, the CHP opposed both the motion and the retaliation. In this opposition, is it really opposition to war, or the instinct to protect Assad, that predominates?

Meanwhile, let us proceed with a question of the same kind as our simple question at the beginning: What should Turkey have done if it had not responded with retaliation to Syria's attack on Akçakale? Should it have swallowed the attack merely for the sake of not deepening the crisis further?

Then would Kılıçdaroğlu not suddenly come out with something like "Turkey must absolutely have retaliated immediately against those who shot down our plane," just as he did when asking questions about the Turkish jet shot down a few months ago? Or would he have declared a total jihad on Syria?

Kılıçdaroğlu, who earlier criticized the government because no retaliation was made against Syria for the Turkish jet, now cries out "why is retaliation being made, why is a motion being passed!"

Really, if this attack too had not been answered immediately, and above all if a motion had not been passed, what would the CHP have done?