The Arab awakening and the sectarian heedlessness

The expression "Arab awakening" is like a summary of the process of revolutions that began about twenty months ago. That this process can today be described as an awakening is, in a way, also a picture of the fact that the goals of the Islamic movements that began much earlier in Tunisia and Morocco, goals true to their names, have been realized. Although the movement led by Rashid al-Ghannushi is the Tunisian extension of the Muslim Brotherhood, its name is the Nahda (awakening) Movement. In the Maghreb countries, attempts at an Arab-Islamic renaissance had been named with the same word much earlier. The Arab Awakening is a shaking-off against the mukhabarat regimes that continue their dictatorships by proxy for a colonialism that disregards the people, their history, their values and their beliefs; it is a realization of having a mind and a will, after a centuries-long inertia entered into for one reason or another.

This awakening was realized successfully, with some problems, in Egypt, Libya and Tunisia, and has shown its effect in Yemen, Jordan and Morocco. Indeed, even the Gulf countries and even Saudi Arabia cannot remain indifferent to this awakening, and, though not in the same way as the others, they are obliged to awaken to this process.

This awakening, which had no sectarian emphasis whatsoever until it came to Syria's turn, unfortunately came face to face with a complete sectarian fitna with the developments in Syria. Assad, who responded in the most unjust and harsh manner to the most legitimate and mildest demands of his people, put forward the sect as a shield to protect his own bloody rule. Yet neither did the people's demands have anything to do with sect, nor in fact does he himself have a belief in any religious sect. The meanings that Iran too attributed to Syria, which in our view were entirely unnecessary, served to drag the event onto a sectarian axis. Yet earlier, the dictatorships of Mubarak, Qaddafi, Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, Muhammad Salih and even Saddam Hussein had all been opposed together, and all of them were Sunni. In the process of their overthrow there was no serious dispute between Iran and Turkey. Turkey did not shrink from standing side by side with Iran in its stance against these dictators, nor did it regard this consensus as an event that would serve Shia leadership against Sunni leaders.

Yet today the Arab Awakening is subjected to a sectarian distortion in Syria because of Assad's exploitation of Shiism and, unfortunately, Iran's playing along with it. In fact, drawing the event onto a sectarian axis would be of benefit neither to Shiism nor to Iran. It is unbelievable that the thousand-year-old Iranian diplomatic tradition fails to see this. This situation alone could be considered a sufficient indication of what kind of myth Iranian diplomacy is.

Yet the Arab Awakening must not succumb to a sectarian distortion. There is not the slightest problem in the rhetoric of the representatives of the Free Syrian Army or the Syrian National Council on this matter. They are doing everything they can to avoid it. However, as the process in Syria drags on, the inclination of uncontrolled elements toward sectarian deviations further increases the fitna potential of those who put sectarianism forward as a shield.

In response to these efforts, Istanbul has for two days been hosting a very important meeting. The conference titled "The Arab Awakening and Peace in the Middle East: Muslim and Christian Perspectives," organized jointly by the Turkish Religious Foundation (Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı)-İSAM and the Marmara University Middle East Studies Center, brings together clergy or opinion leaders of different religions and sects from 19 countries of the region. A gathering of clergy to become involved in the process on this scale regarding the problems being lived in the reshaped Middle East is probably a first. In this region, where religion is immensely influential and decisive in all the depths of society, the representatives of religion, although held primarily responsible for what has been lived or not lived up to now (such as development, progress, advancement), were never involved in the processes at all. Having these actors, who have a real sociological counterpart, speak their word in the age of awakening will change a great deal. In particular, clergy and opinion leaders play a positive role against the sectarian fitna.

The speech Prime Minister Erdoğan gave at the opening of the meeting held in Istanbul gave all the parameters of a philosophy of history needed in precisely this environment. Rather than collecting unrelated hostilities from Karbala to the present day, it was much more important to look at who is playing the roles of Karbala, and how, in what is being lived today.

Such attention is more important than anything in order truly to be on the side of Husayn against Yazid. Otherwise, while living and sleeping with Karbala, while thinking yourself on the side of Husayn, it is easy to find yourself suddenly swinging your sword in the ranks of the Yazids.

The Arab Awakening also points to a serious state of alertness about who is on which side today. It is also to realize that those who for years told their peoples tales of independence, lulling them to sleep with tales of national identity and honor against colonialism, were each a Yazid. It is to grasp that the historical roles of Husayn and Yazid are not roles bought once and for all time by certain people.

The Arab awakening is also to know that sectarianism is a fitna and that this fitna is a danger that would drag this awakening back into heedlessness.