The sedition of sectarianism is worse than massacre

Is the Syrian problem a sectarian problem? Or can the tensions seen recently in the Middle East be read as a clash between a Shiite Crescent led by Iran and a Sunni bloc led by Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey?

First of all, muddying the Syrian problem with such an image signifies nothing other than a desperate flailing of the Baath regime and its friends. This flailing has a logic and an aim, of course. Steering events onto this line has a useful side for them, even if temporary, even if in the end it is destined to be destructive and to boomerang back on them.

Unfortunately, this is being resorted to as a cheap way, for those who practice it, of polluting, muddying and diverting from its purpose a human struggle that is continuing in Syria, but a costly one both for the sense of justice and for the world's Muslims.

Yet the reaction that has developed in the world, at the level of consensus, to what is happening in Syria has nothing whatsoever to do with sectarianism. When a state bombs its own people and the cities where its people live, conscience bleeds and rises up, wherever and in whomever it may be. Whether a Sunni did the same, or a Shiite, or a Christian or a Jew, against whomever it was done, one cannot remain silent, and it is impossible to remain silent.

Sectarianism is a great fitna. Stirring up this fitna is a graver crime than massacre. Therefore, not evaluating what is happening in that context, even if it contains some sectarian motives, is not distorting reality but a requirement of the responsibility to avoid this fitna. Yet the Baathist power can choose, as a way out for itself, to inflame this fitna as much as possible. No result that would ultimately benefit itself arises from the inflamed fitna. It rests only on the calculation that after itself comes the deluge, and that it can thus take its spite and revenge.

A picture that emerged at the meeting of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation reveals a hopeful initiative against sectarianism. The King of Saudi Arabia, regarded as the head of the Sunni bloc, took a particular interest in Ahmadinejad, seated him right beside himself during the reception, and especially announced in the talks that a dialogue effort would be launched to dispel prejudices between Shiism and Sunnism and to increase familiarity between them. This is truly a very important initiative; thus it was powerfully demonstrated that even the Saudis, who represent the strictest Sunni understanding, are not pursuing a sectarian concern in Syria or in other regional matters.

A more advanced approach was put forward by President Abdullah Gül in his speeches at the Summit, and by Prof. Dr. Ahmet Davutoğlu at the Foreign Ministers' meeting.

In his chat with journalists after the Summit, Gül recalled that millions of people died in the sectarian conflicts that took place in medieval Europe, and said that he had warned some presidents, and especially the Iranian President, about the possible consequences of fanning a sectarian conflict.

Gül, explaining in his speech and contacts at the Summit that Turkey is in no way acting from any sectarian motive on these matters, reportedly pointed out in particular that Saddam and Gaddafi were Sunni.

Indeed, if action were being taken out of sectarian concern, Sunni Turkey or the Gulf countries should not have taken a negative stance toward Saddam, a Sunni leader, in Iraq, where the majority of the population is Shiite. For it was quite obvious that in the post-Saddam Iraq that would emerge after this Sunni bloc withdrew its support, the Shiites would come into a more advantageous position. Likewise, Gaddafi, Hosni Mubarak and Zine El Abidine Ben Ali were also Sunni. Iran also supported their overthrow, but no one looked for a hidden motive behind Iran's support of this revolutionary process, nor did the countries of the so-called Sunni bloc grant these dictators any advantage from a Sunni quota.

We learn that these examples given by Gül were received very positively by the Arab leaders themselves. They are the kind of examples that have a cautionary and position-setting effect against a politics acting on sectarian motives.

Gül explained that Turkey is acting on principle in all these events. He said that it follows from this principle to oppose whoever commits tyranny, does not observe right and justice, or governs his country today with an unacceptable system, whether Sunni or Shiite. Stating that, consistent with precisely this attitude, they did not consider the Baath regime in Syria with a sectarian reference, Gül explained that this country cannot be governed this way in the present period, and that a state cannot retain its legitimacy, least of all when the people make legitimate demands and it does not listen to them and uses weapons against them.

In fact, the most important signs that Turkey has no sect-based line of policy could also be seen in the position it took in the crisis over Iran's nuclear program. Gül addressed this subject too in the context of these principles. In the UN Security Council, even Russia and China, which today stand on the same side as Iran and Syria, could not withstand US pressure and let sanctions on Iran pass, while Turkey cast a vote against that resolution.

It is quite clear that Turkey is not acting from a sectarian motive in all these events, but the line along which the events are taking place gives an opportunity for such an axis to be set in motion. Turkey's responsible behavior alone is of course not sufficient on this matter, but there is still one more fact that Gül particularly pointed out: between Iran and Turkey there is a fixed border older than the history of many countries. We may have different policies on some issues. We have them and they have them, but our relations never turn into a conflict beyond a particular dispute. On this we are very careful, and so are they.

These are, without doubt, fine, discouraging messages for the forces seeking a fitna from here. From a meeting held in Mecca on the Night of Power, the most beneficial and unifying messages possible for the Islamic world...

MAY YOUR QUR'AN FESTIVAL BE BLESSED

The end of the month of Ramadan, in which the Qur'an was revealed and in which divine mercy comes into most direct contact with the realm of humanity, is crowned with a festival.

The month of Ramadan takes its great meaning chiefly from the Qur'an's having been revealed within this month. Therefore it is very important that during this month our attention turn not to the passing time itself but to the Qur'an, which was revealed within that time and which should hold a more lasting place in our lives.

The Qur'an, with its guidance and its hidayah, is God's mercy, compassion and grace to humanity. The month of Ramadan departs and yields its place to the other 11 months, but it must once again have drawn our attention, in the most miraculous way possible, to the meaning of the Qur'an in our lives, which will also shed light on those 11 months.

Just as the blessed month of Ramadan is the month of the Qur'an, it is very important to experience its festival too as a festival of the Qur'an.

I congratulate you on your Qur'an festival and wish that it illuminate and bless your whole life.