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Who achieved what?

In the Arab-Islamic world, where revolutions have been stopped through extraordinary interventions and coups, the order formed after the First World War has been re-established. The most important condition of this re-establishment is the complete closure of the political sphere and the complete destruction of the masses' means of expressing their demands for change.
On the other hand, the sociological conditions that previously led to revolutions have not changed; indeed, they are developing even faster:
Urbanization is increasing even though there is no serious industrialization; unemployment among the young population, educated or uneducated, is rising still further; integration with the world through social networks on the internet is developing in parallel; and the capacity of states to provide services to their peoples is correspondingly narrowing. Governments that in no way prioritize human dignity, rights and welfare do not feel any obligation to be accountable to the people either.
Since, owing to the political sphere they have completely closed, they grant the opposition no right to life anyway, they are in fact merely postponing this obligation. The prevailing outlook is that the masses can be governed for a long time by throwing every opposing voice, indeed every person with a possibility of opposing, into prison.
What happened in Syria and Yemen should provide sufficient lessons about what may befall those who cannot bear these pressures and revolt. Syria and Yemen are places where sociology, political science and history have stopped, been cancelled. Who cares about the blood of hundreds of thousands of Muslims savagely, criminally shed, about millions of Muslims tragically forced to leave their homes and lands, and about the great human drama that has resulted? The only thing Westerners care about is how a wave of refugees from here can be prevented from hitting them. But for the non-Islamist rulers of Muslim countries, these events look merely like the fate of a rebellious people who got what they deserved.
Thus the great explosions contained in the growing discontent, stemming from their inability to respond to constantly developing social dynamics, seem to have been bought off by someone through these examples.
Looking at this treatment meted out to Arab-Muslim peoples and at the scene that emerged after the Arab Spring, some can still speak of the failure of the Islamists.
If the Islamists failed here, it must be implicitly conveyed that someone else succeeded. Then we must see a success somewhere. Who succeeded, for instance, where the Islamists did not?
The Islamists promised society, in a democratic competitive environment, a better life, an administration befitting human dignity, respectful of human rights, more open to corruption, poverty and repression, accountable, and for the Islamic world a more independent political entity standing on its own feet. These promises were accepted by the peoples, and they succeeded in coming to power by democratic means. But their initiatives, open to competition and oversight on the road to success, were savagely prevented by coups. Their rivals could not dare to compete on the same track with them.
The matter for which they can be criticized regarding success may be that they could not stay in power by "risking everything." But what they needed to risk in order to stay in power was perhaps falling into the game of their rivals. It was to resemble their rivals by again establishing governments based on despotism, not democracy. In that case, would one again be speaking of a failure of a different kind, or of a success?
Now, should we not also ask who succeeded where the Islamists did not? Socialists, liberals, more radical democrats, nationalists? Who succeeded at what?
If, for the forces that remain in power through coups, despotism and massacres with the acquiescence or direct support of Western powers, the only nightmare is still Islamism, who will measure success, and how? Especially when the cost to the Middle East of a thwarted and suppressed Islamism is the grave picture of today?
Setting aside this tragic failure of Islamism in the Arab Spring, some of the assessments of its failure in power are also made through Turkey. Evidently, on the assumption that Islamism in Turkey is represented by the AK Party government, it is said that it has written another story of failure by completely deviating from the Islamist vision, morality or mission. In fact, the identification of all the discontent voiced about the AK Party's performance directly with Islamism says a great many other things about the expectations regarding Islamism.
Yet there are a few matters they overlook:
1. The AK Party never said it was an Islamist party; therefore a few conceptual filters are needed to put it forward as an example for criticisms concerning Islamism.
2. Even if the AK Party is Islamist, what kind of failure can be attributed to it? How can failure be attributed to a movement that has been able to stay in power for 20 years, winning the people's votes in 15 elections, constantly promising the people renewed hopes?
3. What was accomplished in the 20-year period in the name of democratization, the Kurdish and identity question, human rights, the struggle against coups, good governance, services, the social state and economic justice presents an unparalleled catalogue of achievements that amply deserve to be written into the Islamism column.
4. Even if the AK Party does not call itself Islamist, those who attribute Islamism to it and identify Islamism with all the negativities they point to are not disappointed by this. Because they never dreamed of such a success concerning Islamism. The only dream they had about Islamism was a story of failure anyway. There could be nothing to convince them that Islam or Islamism is good. Had there been, they would have found plenty of convincing examples to write into the Islamism column among what was achieved in 20 years in power.