"The First Spring"

Wadah Khanfar wrote his sira book, which he named "The First Spring," as an invitation to "a strategic and political reading of the life of the Holy Prophet." Of course, whatever is written on this subject cannot lay out every side of the Prophet's life. Indeed, the book limits itself to trying to understand the concept of "strategy" and its manifestation in the life of the Prophet.

For some reason I consider it necessary to make this warning especially for those who expect to see in this book too the things we are accustomed to seeing in classical sira books, concerning the Prophet's prophethood and messengerhood. There are enough books that present those dimensions; this book is not a repetition of them, and perhaps should be read in addition to them.

"THE FIRST SPRING" AS A SOURCE OF INSPIRATION FOR THE ARAB SPRING

Khanfar in fact decided to think about and write "The First Spring" in the atmosphere of a time when the process called the Arab Spring was beginning to be turned into winter by counter-revolutions, that is, by coups. Perhaps strategy was one of the concepts most recalled by the difficulties they suffered in sustaining a revolution they had quickly reached, in the face of both domestic balances of power and international balances.

The lives and struggles of the first Muslims, who actually lived out, as a veritable "first spring," the possibility and prospect of a dignified, humane existence for all humanity in a different way, and who produced an exceptional model of politics, society and civilization in history, undoubtedly also contain a strategic model. What kind of strategy is needed for the new Spring that began to blow ten years ago to be able to form the just, dignified climate, respectful of human rights, that humanity badly needs in our age? Who will be the strategic allies of this road, which will obviously require completely changing the existing balances of world power, and in what way will they join this road?

History is generally and always rewritten in the light of the present. The sira of the Prophet is not exempt from this. What drives one to seek the traces of the "first spring" in that sira is today's spring that has not come to completion, and what drives one to look for clues of strategy in that sira is the strategic mind and behavior whose lack is felt in the Islamic movements of today.

From the Prophet's Meccan period onward, as he conveyed Islam to the Quraysh, it appears at first glance that from the very first step it was as if the last step had been calculated, and that a path with a clear goal and a clear direction toward that goal was followed. Undoubtedly, to determine this direction one must look at the beginning of the road starting from the goal reached. Seen in this way, it is understood that the Prophet took his steps by calculating very well the ties of lineage, the traditions and the balances of power among the Quraysh families on which he relied. Yet despite all these balances, he did not concede in the slightest from his message, from his claim and cause of tawhid.

ISLAMIC STRATEGY DOES NOT CONSIDER EVERY ROAD TO THE GOAL PERMISSIBLE

Here it is necessary to recall Sayyid Qutb's statements: "Not every road is permissible on the way to the goal. Islamic strategy is not based on an outlook that deems every road permissible to reach the goal. On the contrary, means are part of the destination and cannot be separated from the creed. Means that contradict the goal, far from bringing one to the goal, themselves undermine the cause and render the goal itself meaningless." Truly, this is one of the principles that should come to mind first in all discussions and studies about the Prophet's strategy.

The goal, of course, is not merely for a certain cadre to reach power no matter what. Seen from this framework, that the Prophet did not deviate one iota from the goals he set out with, even when he became an important element of the world balance of power, changing all the balances of power of his time, is again a feature that makes him exceptional in the history of world politics.

A second point, of course, is that the struggle the Prophet put forth while conveying his cause was a political struggle to the very end. Those who try today to put a distance between the Prophet's mission and politics, who reduce his struggle almost purely to morality and good conduct, would greatly benefit from looking at the sira from this angle as well. The claims and struggle of Islam are not about matters that remain at the level of mere personal purification; these claims are always closely related to distribution in the world, forms of administration, the way people are treated, and the relations of power and sovereignty that are produced.

The Prophet's Hijra from Mecca to Medina, his attempt there to establish a new accord as an alternative to the two great caravan route-agreements (iltilaf) that were Mecca's most important economic livelihood, his backing of the security of that route with systematic sariyyas and patrols, and all his other steps, were all actions aiming at great consequences in the future.

ISLAM WAS NOT SHAPED IN A HISTORICAL AND TRADITIONAL VACUUM

With the Aws, the Khazraj and the Jewish tribes with whom he signed the Constitution of Medina, he lays the foundations of a comprehensive constitutional citizenship established as an "ummah." In this context, by emphasizing the "Quraysh" identity of the Muhajirun in particular, the respect and charisma that this carried among all Arab tribes is claimed. Thus it is asserted that the polytheists who stayed in Mecca do not represent the Quraysh, and that the Muslim Muhajirun of Medina represent the name of Quraysh. Here one sees that the Islamic movement was not formed in mid-air, and the fine limits of how far it could walk, as a dissident, with the traditions of the society it came out of.

A third point. Of course, the Prophet's strategic mind is not entirely from himself. The whole of the sira he put forth is under the supervision, control and guidance of divine revelation. Of course not everything he did was from revelation; at times he exercised his own ijtihad, at times he consulted, and he acted in the direction of the views of his Companions as against his own. Even if not everything he did was from revelation, there is a mind to which even his actions not based on revelation were subject, and in this too there is an exemplary model for the Muslim.

Since he was not guaranteed to be informed of the unseen in every situation, he gathered intelligence against his enemies, conducted counter-intelligence, and did all of this within the limits of human knowledge and action. This situation of his is precisely so suitable for being studied scientifically by Muslims and for drawing a model of strategic behavior from it.

That is, a model that gives concrete form to precisely the description "one of ourselves," which Allah the Exalted declared as His favor in sending him to us.