The revolt of Shia youth in Iraq

The protest demonstrations that have been ongoing in Iraq for two months form a new wave of revolutionary winds in the Arab world. Of course, we have fresh and painful examples regarding the stages revolutions go through in the short term, and how, through whose interventions, they are derailed, broken, and drowned by waves of counter-revolution. Nevertheless, even in these examples, each of which has produced quite tragic consequences within itself, the revolutionary will of the people toward better governance cannot be completely eradicated.

Even in places where it is thought to have been drowned, the revolutionary will recurs on every occasion. Because there is a serious disconnect between the peoples and the administrations in the Arab world. Not only do governments fail to represent their people, but they also have no function other than keeping the will of their people under control and exploiting their resources on behalf of others.

Rulers who do not rely on their own people are forced to acquire other pillars of support to survive, and this leads them to offer the country's resources as bribes or in exchange for protection to foreigners whom they perceive as powerful patrons. The concessions made by the ruler of Egypt, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, who is at war with his own people, both regarding the dam issue on the Nile and the borders of the Mediterranean Exclusive Economic Zone to Greece and Israel, cannot be understood otherwise. The idea that the power he needs to survive will come from Israel, the US, and Europe rather than from his own people alienates him even further from his public.

In Lebanon and Iraq, on the other hand, it is clearly seen that there is a popular rebellion against Iran's influence and tutelage over the country, rather than against Western powers. Iranian rulers do not feel the need to hide this tutelary role anyway. For a long time, the statements proudly expressed by Iranian officials that "they dominate 4 Sunni capitals" have been on everyone's lips. By the four Sunni capitals, Baghdad, Damascus, Beirut, and Sana'a are meant.

When examined individually, it is very clear that Iran's claimed dominance in these cities has brought no advantage, goodness, or benefit to any of their peoples. On the contrary, under Iranian control, the only thing all these cities have been subjected to is destruction, corruption, instability, civil war, ungovernability, and misery. This is the only model Iran exports to these countries.

Yet, before exporting this model, Iran's influence, perception, and sympathy were at a much higher level in the Sunni Islamic world. As it established dominance, Iran got caught in a paradox that alienated others and bred hatred. For instance, when the Arab Spring process began, Iran's popularity was quite high. However, shortly after, in terms of its attitude toward these revolutions, it failed to display a more virtuous stance than Saudi Arabia or the UAE; on the contrary, it played a counter-revolutionary role by severing the Yemen and Syria links of the revolutions, playing a counter-revolutionary, conservative, and status-quoist role against the Arab world's struggle to stand on its own feet through its own will.

If the protest demonstrations ongoing for two months in Baghdad and for an even longer period in Lebanon were led solely by Sunnis, it would have been very easy to smear and suppress them. However, for the first time since the beginning of this process, these protests against Iranian tutelage are being carried out predominantly by Shiites. Although statements of support for these demonstrations have come from the US and some Gulf countries, the movements seem to be based on deeply sociological dynamics, and the protesters reject such statements of support.

It is inevitable, especially when considering the example of Iraq, that peoples, upon reaching a certain level of consciousness, demand better governance and eventually reach a breaking point of rebellion against corruption and misrule. Because since the US occupation, Iraq has simultaneously been experiencing what is virtually an Iranian occupation as well (even this simultaneity alone is a reason for serious distrust among the people). Iran has direct control over all institutions, and the rulers have so far been unable to promise the Iraqi people any decent life. Iraq, possessing some of the world's richest oil reserves, cannot use these resources productively for its people, because a significant portion of them is believed to be under Iranian control.

The rebelling Shia youth, along with all other segments of Iraqi society, defend and fight for Iraq's independence not only against the US, but also against Iran. What is interesting is that while these youth rebel against the religious-theocratic authority represented by Iran, they also direct this rebellion against all forms of theocratic tutelage in general.

That is why the protesters also rejected the statements of support that came from Shia clerics at a later stage. "Do not cast a shadow, we ask for no other favor," they said. This attitude actually demonstrates the stance that both Shia youth and other Iraqi youth have developed against any form of theocratic governance.

The secularizing effect of the religious-theocratic governance represented by Iran is primarily seen among Shia segments, but it also generates and feeds a serious attitude against the concept of an "Islamic State" in a general sense.

As the will of velayet-i fakih, which manifests itself through extreme visuality, formalism, and ceremonialism, meets the corruption, poverty, instability, and violence experienced in practice, it is only natural for it to have a secularizing effect.

This situation is actually being experienced as a brand-new, highly inspiring phenomenon to be carefully focused on in secularization debates.