US foreign policy between the Pentagon and the White House

We said that the balances of power within the US give its foreign policy an inconsistent and unreliable appearance. When the time comes, this inconsistency and unreliability strikes each of its allies in one way or another. For that reason, the way to protect oneself against it comes down to getting close to one of the balances within the US or playing on it, which is a path with heavy risks that is never guaranteed.

In Saudi Arabia, for example, all of the princes whom the current administration has arrested and is preparing to confiscate the assets of have close relations and alliances with various circles in the US. The expectations and delusions that determine these alliances are the delusion that power exists only in the US and that relations with it will secure their own existence and future. But there can probably be no better example than the situation in Saudi Arabia to show how little salvation this offers, or how little this power can be trusted.

It is seen that differences between the White House and the Pentagon in their approach to security and foreign policy issues have fully surfaced. In the statements made after the phone call between US President Trump and our President, it had been said that the US had decided to review the aid given to the PYD/YPG and that weapons would no longer be sent to these terrorist organizations.

But before a day had passed, news came from the Pentagon denying this approach of Trump. In other words, the US President, that is the executive, makes a decision, but the military bureaucracy resists implementing the decision the executive has made.

This is nothing other than the outward manifestation of an unnamed crisis in the decision-making mechanisms in the US. Time will tell whether the Trump administration will fulfill the commitment it gave to Turkey, but it is already possible to say that the crisis between the White House and the Pentagon has the potential to grow even larger in the coming period.

For this disagreement in the decision-making mechanisms stems not from certain conjunctural developments but from much more structural matters concerning US foreign policy. Perhaps many secondary matters could be mentioned, but with regard to Trump's foreign policy perspective, two headings in particular can be brought to the fore.

The first heading causing the differences of view that have emerged between the White House and the Pentagon is the US's Iran policy. As will be recalled, throughout the election campaign Trump criticized Obama's Iran policy and declared that, if he took over the office, he would withdraw from the nuclear agreement Obama reached with Iran. Indeed, for this reason Trump's election campaign had been supported with great excitement by Israel and Saudi Arabia.

But the Trump administration cannot be said to have been very successful in convincing the US military bureaucracy on Iran. For the Pentagon in particular is of the opinion that more aggressive policies to be pursued against Iran could weaken the US in the fight against DEAŞ in Syria and Iraq.

These reservations are based on the assessment that Iran is stronger than the US on the ground in both Syria and Iraq. The Pentagon administration warns the Trump administration that, because of aggressive policies to be pursued against Iran, Iran-backed groups in Iraq and Syria could attack US forces and the US could suffer more serious losses. Moreover, it is observed that they are reacting by not implementing, or slowing down, the decisions the White House has taken on this matter.

Another of the points of disagreement between the White House and the Pentagon is relations with Europe. During his presidential campaign, Trump stated that the European countries' contribution to NATO's expenditures was not at a sufficient level and that a review of NATO could come onto the agenda. The EU, wanting to turn Trump's harsh statements in this direction into an opportunity, had restarted debates on an autonomous military force.

In fact, a similar process had been experienced in the early 1990s too: the EU had conducted work on a military force that would be within NATO and published various documents, but after the conviction in the US, or more precisely in the Pentagon, that the EU's having an autonomous force could create a weakness in NATO became dominant, the EU's autonomous military force project was shelved.

At the present point, a distinct difference of opinion stands out between the White House and the Pentagon over the present and future of Transatlantic relations. In fact there are quite simple reasons for this. Tens of thousands of US soldiers are stationed in Europe within the framework of the NATO Treaty. For example, there are more than 50 thousand US soldiers stationed in Germany alone. Likewise, there are dozens of NATO bases spread across Europe. In particular, the former Eastern Bloc countries say that NATO and the US should take more responsibility in Europe. For example, last year Polish President Andrezj Duda spoke of the need to arm all NATO bases in Europe.

In short, the Pentagon thinks that a highly strategic military presence is being wantonly squandered by Trump. The military bureaucracy does not think the same as the elected officials on the loss of military gains of this kind that the US obtained as a result of a long process, or on measures that could put the Pentagon in a difficult position militarily in Syria and Iraq. And therefore the potential for crisis between the Pentagon and the White House is growing stronger.

How much can the influence that the Pentagon, which represents a military presence and effectiveness of this scale in the US, naturally holds in US foreign policy be changed by a president who has been elected by chance?

Trump, who probably when first elected was not sufficiently aware of this influence of the Pentagon within the US reality, can be watched with curiosity as to how long he can insist on policies that run counter to the Pentagon's, or when exactly he will surrender to it.