The end of this adventure was a fiasco

The insistence of the Iraqi Kurdistan Regional Government (IKBY) on holding, and on implementing the disputed result of, a referendum that had no legitimacy and that all regional actors except Israel opposed has left, first of all, the Iraqi Kurds, and of course the other social groups too, in a very difficult position.

As soon as a very small group belonging to the Iraqi army moved in front of Kirkuk yesterday, Barzani began to hurl disproportionate threats. The peshmerga forces he evidently trusted in these threats, however, began to abandon their positions at great speed when things got serious.

The most talked-about event of the day was the footage of thousands of people who left Kirkuk migrating to Sulaymaniyah and Erbil. The Iraqi forces posing in the office of the Governor of Kirkuk, who had defied the central government, which does not recognize the referendum, by declaring that he would fight to the end if it tried to suppress this initiative forcefully, took a sad photograph of both the legitimacy and the political power of the referendum.

That photograph requires us to ask once more the basic question we asked earlier in this column: Who determines the fate of nations?

There are countless examples of how the discourse of nations' self-determination has, in many regions of the modern world, become an instrument in the hands of certain parties to destabilize some ethnic, religious or sectarian elements. The summary of all these examples led to the conclusion that nations' fates are in fact tragically in the hands of other nations.

Of course, it is also an indisputable fact that if all conditions come together, if a national will gains the means, the power and the logistics to stand on its own feet, it will be more advantaged in this determination of fate. That the IKBY's venturing into such an adventure of self-determination under today's conditions was an adventure whose end was uncertain and dangerous, harmful not only to itself but also to its friends and neighbors, and one that would lead the region to a deeper instability, was clear from the start.

Yet everything could have been very different. Had Barzani not been headstrong and had he listened to Turkey's counsel, neither he nor the Iraqi Kurds, and without doubt the neighboring peoples, would have fallen into this situation.

The outcome of Barzani's "I did it and it's done" style has clearly summed up that international relations are a multilayered process involving balances of power, regional dynamics, sociological trends and structures. It should not be forgotten that with reasonable steps to be taken from now on, this atmosphere of crisis can be turned into an opportunity.

But, strange to say, Barzani seems not to have drawn any lesson from what has happened. According to reports in the agencies, Barzani plans to visit the 5 permanent members of the UN next week to ask for support. Assuming these reports are true, we can make the following observation: Barzani certainly does not possess the political analytical ability that some have imagined him to have.

Barzani's present helplessness, who would have emerged even stronger from this crisis had he listened even a little to Turkey's counsel, and his attempt, still persisting in error, to seek the solution outside the geography, is the clearest indicator of this. Through this strategic inexperience he has already squandered the prestige and political power that he collected for free after the US occupation of Iraq.

When you listen to the grievances of the Iraqi Kurds, it is possible to think that he in fact lacks also the capacity and competence for political representation. I say this by conceiving of the capacity for political representation as a two-dimensional concept: in one dimension, having popular support; in the other, being able to respond to the demands and needs of that people. The tens of thousands of Iraqis who left Kirkuk show that the second dimension of the matter is missing.

In the next phase, in all likelihood, the Iraqi army, having seen the weakness of the Peshmerga, will continue to advance to places strategic for itself. On the other hand, tensions and even clashes among Kurdish groups are likely to emerge from the strain of this advance. The fact that a desperate wink has been made at subcontractor terrorist organizations like the PKK strengthens this risk of clashes even more. In the meantime, it is within the realm of possibility that DAEŞ, which was thought to have weakened and receded, will re-enter the field.

In short, the picture created by the IKBY is not very encouraging.

We have also said before. Turkey has historical, cultural and legal ties with the region. It can be said that Turkey is a natural party both to the humanitarian issues and to the political issues experienced there.

It could not be expected that Turkey, on the matter of Mosul and Kirkuk, whose legitimacy has been questioned for nearly a century since Lausanne both by Turkish public opinion and by some researchers, would stand by as spectators to the implementation of such a decision, which would destroy Turkey's historical gains. A serious statesman in this situation would have preferred to have Turkey on his side rather than against him. Indeed, this train has still not left.

The place Barzani needs to go for a solution is not London, Beijing, Paris, Moscow or Washington, and certainly not Tel Aviv, but Ankara, Baghdad and Tehran.

If he ignores this reality, it will be inevitable that the enthusiastic support from Israel at the outset of the affair, or the winking approaches of the US, or the understanding (!) messages from Europe will, at the end of the day, bring disappointment.

If only those who caused it were the ones experiencing the disappointment, we would not grieve, but unfortunately the end of this adventure is also leading to heavy costs for the peoples of the region.