So that the Mosul operation does not lead to sectarian conflict…

Mosul fell into the hands of the terrorist organization DAESH on June 10, 2014. Not only was the central Iraqi government unable to do anything as a terrorist organization split Iraq in two within a few days, but footage of forces loyal to the central government fleeing from DAESH terrorists was shown on television for days. In fact, what has given DAESH its real strength to this day was, in a sense, this helplessness shown by the security forces of the Iraqi state in the face of a terrorist organization.

However, the question of how DAESH suddenly emerged with such serious power was not taken seriously by decision-makers. Both then and today, the issue that the parties to this question dwell on least is how DAESH was able to advance so strongly and how it was able to be fed to such a degree by both local elements and foreign fighters. That is, in dealing with DAESH, the sociology that politics tried to shape under its pressure was not taken into account.

It must be remembered that DAESH took shape largely in an Iraq under US control. It must be remembered that behind this shaping lies the sociology created by the sectarian policies the US implemented after it invaded Iraq in 2003. The transformation of "de-Baathification" policies in Iraq into the Shiitization of the political system, and the pushing of Sunnis outside the system's decision-making mechanisms, created a "life-and-death anxiety" among Sunni groups in Iraq. These groups, brought to the brink of marginalization by the Shia-centered policies and pressures of the Maliki administration, encountered DAESH while looking for ways to continue their existence.

When the conditions of 2013 are recalled, it can be seen that for some Sunni groups and tribes in Iraq, DAESH opened the way for a shortcut back into the system, and therefore into the decision-making mechanisms. In other words, DAESH emerged as a compulsory form of politics for some elements, as a result of the wrong policies of the US and Iraqi governments.

That the terrorist organization DAESH has been able to administer a serious part of Iraqi territory for more than 3 years, and moreover has extended the territories it controls toward Syria, cannot be understood without analyzing the sociology that took shape up to 2013.

The elites that shape US security policy and foreign policy have, particularly in the recent period, given the oil revenues DAESH obtains from Mosul and similar regions as the answer to the question of where DAESH acquired this power. Consequently, driving the terrorist organization out of Mosul was presented as the critical turning point in destroying DAESH. This stage was also the stage at which the great Mosul Operation began to be discussed.

At the hours when this article was being written, news began to reach the agencies that the US-led coalition forces had begun the Mosul Operation. French and US warplanes bombed DAESH targets around Mosul, and DAESH terrorists set fire to the trenches they had dug around the city and filled with crude oil. The US announced that the Operation had not yet officially begun.

It is claimed that the Operation is planned in three stages. The stage currently underway is stage 2, that is, the phase in which DAESH's physical capacity is destroyed. It is stated that in stage 3 the Peshmerga and coalition forces will begin fighting DAESH directly.

At this point two important questions arise: What will the role of the Peshmerga be, and who will the coalition forces consist of? The US administration, determined not to bring its own soldiers to the region, presents the Iraqi army, consisting almost entirely of Shia elements, as the forces supported by the coalition. US sources state that, besides forces affiliated with the Iraqi army, a controversial actor called Hashd al-Shaabi, consisting entirely of Shia militias and often resorting to terror techniques, may also take part in the Mosul Operation.

Since the discussions began, the soft underbelly of the Mosul Operation has been who will carry it out. Turkey's objections from the very beginning were that the Operation should not be set within a framework that would turn into a Shia-Sunni conflict. However, the decisions taken by the US, the flagship of the operations against DAESH, may drag the Mosul Operation into a sectarian conflict encompassing the whole of Iraq. Because US policies are turning into a part of the Shiitization process by the Abadi government.

Therefore it can be said that there are two very fundamental reasons why the Mosul Operation carries the potential to create a sectarian conflict. The first is, of course, the US's excessively utilitarian style of politics that does not take regional sociology and politics seriously. The use and covert support of the organization called Hashd al-Shaabi, the Shia version of DAESH, also known as Iran's militia force on the ground, which sets Sunni neighborhoods on fire wherever it goes, is the clearest indicator of these utilitarian policies that dynamite the social and political structure in the region.

The 2nd important element is very clearly that Haider al-Abadi, at the head of the Iraqi central government, has become a follower of Maliki's policies. This is the reason why he has lately been harping on Turkey's Bashiqa Camp, which is the guarantee of Iraq's territorial integrity and the most important safety valve against sectarian conflicts.

Abadi is seeking to completely Shiitize the political structure in Iraq. What is more, he appears to have an agenda aiming to hand this political structure, once Shiitized, over to Iran's control. Turkey's presence in the region is precisely what prevents Abadi from carrying out this agenda, and prevents the fragmentation of Iraq and sectarian conflicts.

A Mosul Operation launched under these conditions can turn into a demographic engineering project all at once, and the regional crisis may deepen further. Therefore, while the Operation has not yet fully begun, Turkey's counsel and warnings in this direction should be heeded.