The US's strategic partnership

The US's support for the PYD is plainly support for terror. This support also exposes an inconsistency and pragmatism the US displays in defining terror and the terrorist as it pleases, according to its own calculations. This inconsistency also drags US foreign policy into a state of open unreliability toward its "strategic partners." It reveals that it holds no commitment or loyalty to its previously declared policies, its strategic goals, its friendships and its enmities.

The support it gives to the PYD, which everyone knows is hostile toward Turkey, which the US calls a strategic partner, shows that it has unilaterally made changes to plans it had previously agreed on in the region with Turkey and its other strategic partners. For if agreement was reached with the US, indeed almost under US leadership, on Assad's departure, then supporting the PYD, one of Assad's most important forces, plainly means supporting Assad. Indeed, with the PYD's advance, the Assad forces are breathing very easily and are resettling together with them in the positions captured. Instead of defining terror and the terrorist in its own way and pressuring the world with the accusation of "supporting terror," all that falls to the US is to account for this inconsistency to its own strategic partners.

Iran too supports the PYD very openly. In that case the US also needs to explain when it switched sides so sharply and entered the war on the same side as Iran.

No, under normal conditions we would never have any objection. We ourselves, first of all, wish and demand that the US not be at war with Iran or with any element in our geography. All we want is for our own region to turn into a basin of peace and for the peoples' problems with one another to be resolved. Unfortunately, all these interventions from the outside contribute not to solving the problems of the people of the region but to deepening them.

Looking at what has happened, one cannot help asking this question: when and on the basis of what strategic assessment did the US decide to move to the same side as Syria and Iran, which it counted until only yesterday in the axis of evil, and to become an accomplice in the serial massacres carried out against the civilians and the oppressed of the region? Did it also share this change of strategy with Saudi Arabia and the Gulf countries, its most important partners in the region?

Today in Syria and Iraq the US is openly on the same side as Iran, and also against Saudi Arabia. Yet for almost forty years the reason Iran has put forward most in its enmity toward Saudi Arabia has been Saudi Arabia's close, allied relationship with America. Indeed, in all the wars, cold or hot, between Iran and the US, the US's strongest ally was Saudi Arabia. Yet in these days when Iran openly arms and supports the Houthis, a very small minority in Yemen, and poses a threat to the security of Saudi Arabia, the US not only leaves this strategic ally alone but does business with their chronic common enemies. This is a partnership that would not be believed even if seen in a dream.

All of these situations show that for the US the concept or relationship of "strategic partnership" has no value or reliability whatsoever. It sets up whatever strategic game it wants in its own way, and in the meantime looks upon the allies it has acquired merely as actors to be used up to the road it will travel. It appears that one should not attribute great meanings to the concept of "strategic partnership" and establish exaggerated trust from this form of relationship. It is also seen that, during the period of its enmity, the US has come to resemble very closely its chronic enemy Iran, which practices both diplomacy and friendships with a complete "taqiyya" concept.

It can be said that what forces the US to behave this way may not be a bad intention decided beforehand. The changeable nature of the dynamics of US foreign policy and politics as a whole may be preventing the formation of consistency or continuity in friendships or enmities, in strategic goals and processes, in the country's politics. The difficulty in decision-making displayed by the US today, governed by a leader like Obama, drags it both into behaving inconsistently and into deviating entirely from its strategic goals. The relationship of members of Congress with the lobbies, and the open role that money and lobbies play in elections in the US, essentially make democracy quite fragile with respect to the determination of such long-term, lasting and reassuring goals. These realities also reduce the possibility of continuity and predictability in the state in which US politics finds itself today.

Returning to the US's support for the PYD: if its justification is the war against ISIS, everyone knows that the very last thing the PYD, Russia, which entered here on the same grounds, Iran, and even the US are doing in Syria or Iraq is fighting ISIS. The support given to the PYD is being spent not on the war against ISIS but on the war against the Free Syrian Army, which is ISIS's primary enemy. Doesn't this sufficiently show that ISIS is in fact part of this entire alliance?

What kind of division of labor is this; those who understand, of course, understand.