The possibility of normalization in Turkey–Israel relations and Egypt's unease

There is a process, however sluggish, under way to normalise relations between Turkey and Israel. In truth, Turkey was not the country responsible for the deterioration of relations with Israel. As will be recalled, relations with Israel were first strained severely after the attacks Israel carried out on Gaza, in which hundreds of civilians lost their lives, and the reaction shown in Davos by Mr. Erdoğan, then Prime Minister. But even before that, despite all its good relations with Israel, Turkey, particularly since Israel's attack on Lebanon in 2006, did not refrain from sharp criticism of Israel both over that event and over the Palestinian question in general. After Davos, Danny Ayalon, then Israel's Deputy Foreign Minister, treated Oğuz Çelikkol, Turkey's ambassador to Israel at the time, in a manner that disregarded diplomatic courtesy and protocol. At a time when the effects of this development, known in public opinion as the "low seat crisis," were being debated, Israel's Mavi Marmara attack took place.

Israeli military forces intervened in international waters against the convoy that had set out to take humanitarian aid supplies to Gaza, causing the deaths of nine people, one of them also a US citizen, on the spot, and of one later. In the face of this act of Israel's, which according to international law would make a declaration of war legitimate, Turkey downgraded the level of relations and made a number of demands of the Israeli government for normalisation. Of the demands, which can be summarised as an apology, compensation and the lifting of the blockade on Gaza, the demand for an apology was met. We know that progress has been made on the other matters as well.

The steps taken recently toward normalisation between Turkey and Israel are causing interesting reactions at home and abroad. Among these, one of the most striking is Egypt's request for information from Israel about the details of the agreement to be reached between it and Turkey. This development, also confirmed by Israeli Foreign Ministry spokesman Emmanuel Nahshon, shows the extent of Egypt's concern over Turkey's normalising its relations with Israel.

This request in fact also sheds light on the nature of the recent course of relations between Egypt and Israel. Muhammad Morsi, Egypt's first democratically elected leader, had withdrawn Egypt's ambassador to Israel to react against the operations Israel carried out on Gaza. General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, who came to power by removing the legitimate head of state through a coup, announced in a statement in June 2015 that Egypt would again appoint an ambassador to Israel. That the steps taken toward normalisation between Turkey and Israel disturb Egypt, at a time when Hazem Khairat, appointed by Sisi as ambassador to Israel, is taking up his post, stems from the disappearance of any possibility of leaving Turkey outside the Palestinian question. More plainly, Egypt is trying to build its good relations with Israel on a basis of rivalry, specifically in such a way as to sideline Turkey in the Palestinian question. In this relationship there is no stance or attitude whatsoever in favour of the Palestinian side, especially the Gaza side. On the contrary, in this relationship Egypt has taken on the task of virtually subduing the Palestinian side on Israel's behalf, with a meddlesomeness hard to understand. In this context, the fact that Turkey's re-establishing relations with Israel has caused concern on the Egyptian side takes on a separate meaning.

Indeed, according to a report in a newspaper published in Israel, one of the things Egypt, in requesting information about the content of the agreement with Turkey, is curious about is the situation of Gaza. According to the report, Egyptian officials met with Israel's ambassador in the country, Haim Koren, asked for information on whether normalising relations with Turkey would affect the embargo imposed on Gaza and whether it would ease the blockade being applied, and expressed that they were against an easing of the embargo or the blockade on Gaza.

How interesting it is that the coup general Sisi, who imagines he rules Egypt with its 80 million population, sees the continuation of his regime in the continuation of the inhuman sanctions imposed on Gaza, which has turned into an open-air prison and a picture of humanity's shame. This situation also lays bare the pitiful state of a cardboard power imagined to be very strong. It is impossible for a regime that massacred thousands of people in Rabia Square in its own country to explain such a policy to its own people, and indeed it does not explain it. Such a policy can only be pursued as a betrayal of its own people.

Yet if the normalisation of relations between Turkey and Israel will remove the inhuman sanctions imposed on Gaza, this will be a great gain for Palestine, and a gain and a gladdening development for the Egyptian people as well. But it appears that the lifting of the iron fist over Gaza will not make the coup administration in Egypt very happy. Thus we are also measuring the size of the contribution that the normalisation of relations may make to Gaza and to the solution of the Palestinian question by Egypt's reaction. Of course, on condition that, in this normalisation process, Turkey's rights violated through the Mavi Marmara attack are somehow compensated.

Once these have been achieved, and the Israeli government has given up its occupation policies and sat down with the Palestinians at the table with a peace perspective, there is no reason for relations between Turkey and Israel not to be normalised.