NATO in the test of sincerity and necessity

After Turkey refused to allow the violation of its airspace by an aircraft of "indeterminate nationality," and it became clear that the downed jet belonged to Russia, interesting debates began in both domestic and international politics. The most important of these debates is the one over what NATO's position would be if a dispute or contention arose between Turkey and Russia.

To conduct this debate in a healthy way, and to prevent it from turning into a dialogue of the deaf, it is worth restating once more what the NATO Treaty contains.

NATO is an international organization established to develop the defense capacities of its member countries. The countries party to the NATO Treaty, invoking the right of self-defense, individually or collectively, of the states set out in the UN Charter, have formed a collective defense network.

The treaty that established NATO is a short and clear one. The most important articles of the North Atlantic Treaty are Articles 4 and 5. Of these, Article 4 provides that if any of the parties feels that its territorial integrity or security is under threat, it may call the other parties to the Treaty to a meeting for consultation, while Article 5, which gives NATO its essential character, provides that if any of the parties is attacked, the other states party to the treaty are obliged to provide automatic assistance. In other words, when any state party to the North Atlantic Treaty is attacked, NATO member countries are obliged to help the country that has been attacked.

It is also a known fact that when it comes to certain interests of Turkey, which was brought into NATO as an extension of the policy of containing the Soviets, then became a member of CENTO, one of the complementary links of this containment policy, was turned into a frontline country of the Cold War, and in short was the country likely to face the heaviest bill in the event of a possible hot conflict, the allied states and the US have been unwilling to activate Articles 4 and 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. In this context, one or two small reminders may be illuminating.

In 1964-65 there were serious policies of pressure and violence against the Turkish community in Cyprus. When Turkey, one of the three guarantor states envisaged by the Zurich Agreement of 11 February 1959, wished to carry out a landing on the island in response to the violation of the Zurich Agreement and of the London Agreement that later established the Republic of Cyprus, Turkey was reminded that it could not land on the island and that the equipment to be used was NATO's under the NATO Agreement. Lyndon Johnson, the US President at the time, reminding Turkey of the 1947 aid agreement signed between the US and Turkey, reminded the then Prime Minister, İsmet İnönü, in a letter that Turkey had to obtain the US's consent in order to use this military materiel.

NATO had left Turkey alone in the U-2 Spy Plane Crisis and the Cuban Missile Crisis that followed it. Its attitude in the face of a situation that, by taking a decision to arm, openly violated the Zurich and London Agreements and left no option other than intervening against a guarantor country, caused a crisis of confidence toward NATO in Turkish public opinion and formed the basis of views about NATO in the following years. The conviction spread in Turkish public opinion that NATO was an organization established to protect not the interests of the member countries but those of the US. This is valid not only for Turkey. At the NATO Summit held in Wales, the most pronounced demand of the European member states of NATO was that it should turn its focus back to ensuring the external security of the member countries in the face of the Russian threat.

After the downing of the Russian aircraft, eyes have turned to NATO once again. In fact, the unstable and indecisive character of US foreign policy constitutes one of the most serious causes of the crisis in Syria. Russia, taking advantage of the power vacuum created by the Syria policylessness of US foreign policy and NATO, is directly occupying Syria. The same Russia, while trying to create a precedent, a customary practice, in Turkey's airspace by exploiting the vacuum created by the US and NATO, has had its swagger scratched. In other words, the Russian Tsar Putin cannot get from Turkey the tenderness he receives from Obama and NATO. But, as it happens, Turkey's saying stop to a Russia that, with the self-confidence produced by the Obama doctrine, wants to turn Turkey's borders into a sieve is generally seen in the Western press as NATO-Russia tension. Because by remaining faithful to the NATO Treaty, Turkey is protecting not only its own border but NATO's borders against Russia.

Ukraine was a country that had developed its relations with NATO but was not yet a NATO member. Therefore the occupation of Crimea meant a strong minus point for NATO. Failing to respond to Russia's attempt to turn NATO's borders into a sieve will mean the end of NATO's deterrence and therefore of its existence as an organization. Turkey's intervention against the Russian aircraft is a step aimed also at saving NATO's future. In short, this crisis between Turkey and Russia will be a test of sincerity and competence for NATO as well. In terms of the law of alliance, NATO and the US will either determine a policy that will erase the bad memories of the 1960s and 70s from memory, or follow strategies that will turn NATO from a structure with high deterrence into a fantasy. Turkey will continue to exist in this geography, growing stronger with each passing day. But what about NATO?