The strategic rivalry in the Eastern Mediterranean basin and the sigh of the oppressed

In our previous articles we stressed that Russia's intervention in Syria is largely aimed at measuring NATO's defense strategies and reflexes, and is a result of the wrong policies NATO has followed. It can be said that the global dimension of the matter is greater than its regional dimension. Of course this approach does not mean that Russia does not aim to change the current situation in Syria. But if the matter is interpreted by ignoring the fact that Syria has become a global arena of encounter, a healthy conclusion cannot be reached.

The timing of Russia's intervention in Syria is of course meaningful. Russia's harsh involvement in the civil war in Syria, through military initiatives such as Russian warplanes bombing the locations of the opposition together with DAESH positions and missiles launched from the Caspian Sea, came at a time when the Assad regime had weakened significantly and Assad was admitting that he had difficulty finding soldiers to fight in the regime's ranks. For the opposition had by now begun to fight directly against the military presence of Hezbollah and Iran. The intervention therefore came at a time when the regime's need for outside support had risen considerably and opened the way for Russia to institutionalize its influence over Syria.

On the other hand, Russia, which thinks that Syria is entering a process that could end in fragmentation after a destructive civil war, also seems to be aiming, by strengthening its position in Syria, to build a location where it would preserve its influence should the partition scenario materialize. Moreover, it can be said that this intervention will trigger a fragmentation not only in Syria but also in Iraq and Lebanon, and could pave the way for developments that may cause violent civil wars to emerge.

The institutionalization of Russia's influence in Syria will make Russia's sphere of influence in the region distinct in every scenario. In this framework it can be said that Russia's most important expectation in Syria in the medium and long term is to have a base that would balance the US regional presence. It is seen that it has largely achieved this aim. So what does this base, and moreover the beginning of the institutionalization of Russia's influence in the region, mean in terms of global politics?

Perhaps the issue least dwelt upon in this process is Russia's energy security. As is known, particularly since the 2000s, in the person of Putin, with the nationalization of energy companies inside the country and the coordination of this policy with foreign policy, Russia tried to become an important actor again in international politics both economically and politically. It can be said that Russia, having largely achieved this, fortified its position by becoming the energy supplier of the European Union, that is, of a significant part of the industrialized Western countries.

It is known that Russia, which does not want to lose this position, has been effective in the failure of certain projects that emerged as a result of the European Union's efforts to diversify its energy sources. For the state apparatus Russia has recently built uses energy resources as the most important input in populating its vast geography and in moving the economic wheels. Therefore, in the event of a drop in demand that could occur in the supply of energy resources, or, as a catastrophe scenario, a halt of this energy demand, Russia could have problems populating this vast geography and, moreover, its economic wheels could come to a standstill.

The effort, which has recently been expanding in the Eastern Mediterranean basin with the encouragement in some form of the European Union and the US, to explore for oil and natural gas and to offer them to world markets brings with it the possibility, for the Russian state, of the scenarios mentioned above coming to pass. For Russia, which could not cover serious ground in industrialization in the post-Cold War period but obtained a very large export item by increasing its energy supply, staying out of the developments that will take place in the Eastern Mediterranean basin may produce strategically risky results.

It is worth looking at Russia's intervention in Syria also from this facet of global politics.

Russia has not entered Syria this directly until now, but it can be seen that it has put Iran and Hezbollah to work badly in line with its own strategic goals. That is, the entire struggle of Iran, which speaks of the "line of resistance against the Zionist regime" and which has no meaningful sacred value left, at some point comes and is added to Russia's strategic calculations. And the children who died in their cradles and the sighs of millions of innocent Muslims whose homes have been shattered bear witness to where it falls within the big calculation.