Why does Israel want Turkish soldiers?

Until now, no relevant party, directly or indirectly, has expressed opposition to the idea of Turkey sending troops to Lebanon. The Prime Minister of Lebanon invites [Turkey] very explicitly. Although Hezbollah does not appear overly eager, it expresses on various platforms that it would not be uncomfortable seeing Turkish soldiers. Iran and Syria also share a similar positive attitude.

On the other hand, the fact that the US and Israel also specifically demand Turkish troops in the UN Peacekeeping Force casts suspicion among the Turkish public. Perhaps the most important source of opposition among the Turkish public to sending troops to Lebanon is the suspicion of a "hidden agenda" felt beneath this eager demand of Israel and the US. This suspicion, as always, leads to the thought that whatever Turkey does, it cannot escape being part of the plans of the US or Israel.

As I have said before, the ways these thoughts are expressed—perhaps unintentionally—reveal a grave description of "Turkey": a "Turkey" that has no policy of its own, is under the control of the US and Israel, is considered naive and easily fooled, whose administrators are easily bought off, can never calculate its own national interests, and acts in line with daily calculations. Even if it is at a level that somehow resembles this, the situation is truly much more grave than we think.

It is believed that the state might conceal the truth in order to fulfill certain demands of the US and Israel that would be considered unacceptable by the Turkish public. Indeed, relationships that cannot be hidden in this matter suggest that what is hidden might be even more grave. It is not clear to what extent Turkey's defense cooperation agreements with Israel bind Turkey. At the very hours when Israel rains bombs on Lebanon, Israeli jets can still fly freely over Konya as part of routine training flights. Turkey, unable to stop this, can ground scheduled Iranian passenger planes passing through its airspace and search them on behalf of Israel over the possibility of arms shipments to Hezbollah.

It is also another reality that there is no unity among institutions and organs regarding the policies conducted on behalf of Turkey. No matter how much the Ministry of Foreign Affairs views Hezbollah as the legitimate representative of the Lebanese people, according to a meeting report conveyed by Nasuhi Güngör, key units of Turkey expected to be influential in a potential involvement in Lebanon continue to view Hezbollah as a terrorist organization—that is, directly through the eyes of the US and Israel.

We actually witness this difference in perspective on various occasions. Delayed data regarding Turkey's own Hezbollah, which descended upon Turkey like a nightmare seven years ago, is now beginning to be decrypted with the contributions of the FBI after all this time and taking its place alongside news about the Lebanese Hezbollah.

On the very day I wrote about this trust issue Turkey experiences with its own public in the context of the Lebanese problem, Fehmi Koru presented much more striking examples of Israel's untrustworthiness. Israel turned a blind eye to Hezbollah rockets hitting civilians to the extent that it allowed for victimization propaganda. If this is not another kind of propaganda to cover up its own defense weaknesses, Israel remained a bystander and did not lift a finger, even though it could have prevented it, while its own civilian population was being bombed and killed. Moreover, it was also Israel that secretly arranged a meeting between Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül and the families of captured Israeli soldiers, only to expose it to the public. Furthermore, the request for confidentiality came from Israel, not from Gül.

One wonders whether there are traces of a similar mindset in Israel's insistent demand for Turkish soldiers, given that it could do such a thing? It is known that Israel secretly supports the PKK, and this has mobilized a great deal of popular anger toward Israel in Turkey. Due to their actions in Northern Iraq and Lebanon, an unprecedented amount of suspicion and anger toward the US and Israel has accumulated in the Turkish public. Of course, it cannot be thought that these feelings have not affected the Turkish military. Under these circumstances—that is, when the distrust of the Turkish soldier toward Israel has reached the highest possible level—what would Israel do with Turkish soldiers in Lebanon?

Or has Israel found the way to keep Turkish soldiers out of the region by persistently inviting Turkey? Is what it truly relies on the reaction it expects the Turkish public to give to this persistent invitation?

Isn't it worth asking?