Iran's Gulf impasse: striking its neighbours when it cannot find the enemy

Despite the ceasefire agreement reached in the war that began with the US and Israeli attacks on Iran, Israel imposes the continuation of its attacks as a natural right. Trump, while boasting of having secured the ceasefire, has normalized this right in his own way by treating Israel's continued attacks as being in the nature of things.

Yet when Iran shot down an American helicopter, Trump considered this to be outside that nature and launched a major attack on Iran "in the name of the right of retaliation." The immoderation, lawlessness, and untrustworthiness of the word of the US and Israel was once again demonstrated.

That is their state, we understand, but what are we to say about the fact that Iran's first reaction to every Israeli and American attack is to target a Gulf country?

Indeed, after the latest Israeli attack, Iran struck Kuwait's airport. There are no American planes there, no soldiers. What is Iran's expectation and calculation in striking Kuwait? That Kuwait or the other Gulf states will pressure the US into stopping its attacks on Iran? Does Iran not know that neither Kuwait nor the other Gulf states has such influence or power over the US and Israel?

Moreover, the target of the attacks is not US bases, as was announced at the outset. If Iran's target were really US bases, there is the American navy wandering there as an open target. Most of the attacks are now carried out from there rather than from the bases in the Gulf countries. Or directly from Israel itself.

At first, it was understandable for Iran to strike the US bases in the Gulf countries, but it is increasingly seen that these bases have turned into a pretext for Iran to strike these countries. Iran is not striking the US bases in the Gulf; it is striking the Gulf countries themselves.

Wars are evaluated not only by military logic but by their political outcomes. Striking a target does not always render it strategically ineffective. Indeed, one of the most important realities that the latest war has revealed is that Iran's targeting of the Gulf countries has neither inflicted notable damage on Israel nor brought Iran a lasting gain.

On the contrary, this strategy is more likely to serve Israel in the long run.

Because the fundamental point being overlooked here is this: Qatar, Kuwait, Oman, and even, in recent years, Saudi Arabia are not actors that stand with Israel in the struggle between Iran and Israel. Even though most of these countries did not give Gaza the desired level of support in the Gaza war, they openly voiced their criticism of Israel, took into account the sensitivities of Arab public opinion on the Palestinian issue, and made diplomatic efforts to keep the region from being dragged into a bigger war.

Kuwait still has no diplomatic relations with Israel today.

Qatar has been at the center of the negotiations conducted between Hamas and the West on the Gaza file, and has remained one of Israel's harshest critics.

Oman has been mediating between Iran and the West for years.

Saudi Arabia, for its part, has taken significant steps in recent years toward normalizing its relations with Iran.

Taking all this into account, does the following question not come to mind: Whom is Iran actually punishing? Israel? Or its neighbors who try to stay neutral toward Israel, and who even keep their distance from Israel on many issues?

The answer to this question is hidden in the political outcomes the war has produced. Iran's attacks on the Gulf did not affect Israel's decision-making mechanism. They did not eliminate Israel's air superiority. They did not stop Israel's military operations. They did not narrow Israel's international room for maneuver.

In return, they strengthened the perception of a threat from Iran in Gulf capitals. In other words, the outcome was not the weakening of the enemy but the alienation of neighbors. The paradox of the strategy emerges precisely here.

While fighting Israel, Iran runs the risk of producing with its own hands a result that Israel has been trying to reach for years. Because one of the fundamental goals of Israel's long-term regional strategy is to build a shared security perception with the Arab Gulf states. In other words, Israel has long been trying to give the region this message: "I am not your problem. The real threat is Iran."

For many years this discourse found no resonance in Arab public opinion. The Palestinian issue and Israel's occupation policies were the biggest obstacle to this discourse. However, Iran's attacks targeting the Gulf countries, even if unintentionally, provide material for this narrative of Israel. Because every missile that falls on Qatar, Kuwait, or Bahrain strengthens the "common threat" perception that Israel has been trying to build for years.

More importantly, this situation pushes the Gulf countries toward seeking more security. And because the region's security architecture still rests largely on American protection, the natural result of this search is to move closer to Washington and, indirectly, to security cooperation with Israel.

That is precisely why the biggest impasse of Iran's Gulf strategy is not military but political. The Tehran administration still reads the region largely through a binary scheme of an "American axis" and a "resistance axis." From this perspective, every country that hosts an American base is seen as being on the opposing front, regardless of its intentions.

Yet the present reality of the Middle East is far more complicated than this. Qatar is not Israel, Kuwait is not Netanyahu's government, and Oman is not a strategic partner of Tel Aviv. We cannot say anything about the United Arab Emirates, of course; let that one stand aside.

These countries act within the framework of their own security concerns, economic interests, and social balances. Therefore, by striking the American bases on their soil, Israel is not punished, and no real harm is done to them either. Besides, contrary to what is assumed, these bases have no effect against Iran in this war anyway. On the contrary, such attacks often produce the result that Israel wants to reach.

Perhaps behind Iran's insistence on this strategy lies a psychological and ideological logic more than a military calculation. When it cannot punish Washington or Tel Aviv directly enough, it thinks it is establishing a balance by targeting their military network in the region.

But the great difference between this symbolic satisfaction and strategic success deepens the losses of both Iran and the oppressed peoples of the region.

Strategic success is measured by reducing your enemy's friends and isolating it. Yet what the latest war has shown is the exact opposite. Some of the steps Iran has taken, far from isolating Israel, are pushing the Gulf countries even further away from Iran.

Moreover, there is another cost to this for Iran. The normalization process conducted in recent years with the Gulf countries, Saudi Arabia above all, was perhaps one of the most important diplomatic gains Iran has achieved recently. This process offered the possibility of reducing regional tensions and establishing a new balance.

Today, every step that raises the Gulf countries' security concerns again erodes this diplomatic ground that Iran built with its own hands.

While waging the struggle against Israel, it may be easy to target Qatar, Kuwait, or Bahrain instead of the US and Israel, whom it cannot beat. But striking these targets hurts neither the US nor Israel; on the contrary, they are very pleased by it, and the ones who are really hurt are, once again, Muslims.

By striking Muslims instead of its real enemy, Iran ends up serving the regional alliance architecture that the Zionists have been trying to build for years.

This is the greatest tragedy of Iran's Gulf strategy.

While trying to punish Israel, it faces the risk of producing the very thing Israel needs most.