The Iran War, geopolitical reality and the new equation facing Turkey

The new environment created by the war that the US and Israel launched against Iran with theo-political or petro-political imperialist motives requires us to revisit not only the military balances but also the conceptual frameworks we use to understand the region. The picture of how we should understand Israel and the US is in fact not that complicated. Their motivations are occupation, Zionism, exploitation, and a lust to keep the Middle East under control.

The geography and demography we call the Middle East, however, is of course not of a single piece. With its Gulf, its Iran, its Turkey and its peoples, it lies in tatters between the full or semi-colonial conditions that took shape after the First World War, states of actual or mental occupation, and the power struggles between those who have embraced this state of occupation and those who resist it.

Until only yesterday there was an Iran that supported, with the so-called axis-of-resistance-against-Israel fiction, the Syrian regime that was carrying out a relentless genocide against its own people. On the other side is the story of the pressure and oppression suffered at the hands of this axis of resistance by a people who could potentially mount every kind of resistance against Israel and its supporters, not like Assad but the genuine article.

Isn't it a thoroughly tangled situation? With what mind, and how, can one get out of this? Let us not give up again. Let us not hold back from trying to understand everything and everyone on their own terms, in their own context.

How Iran and its foreign policy should be understood in this complicated picture is not a simple question. At this late hour, explaining everything Iran does solely by its Shiism gets us nowhere, and does not suffice to explain what is happening either. Iran cannot be explained solely by the Islamic Revolution carried out in 1979 and the ideological motivations that shaped it; that is clear. In the processes we are going through, we may be too fond of those who give us the simplest and most clichéd forms for understanding the parties, but this can keep us from grasping the real nature of the issues and the actors.

On how Iran and historical Shiism should be understood, Abdülkadir Şen's recently published 482-page "Bir Mit Kurgulamak: Şii Hilali ve İran'ın Teopolitikası" (Constructing a Myth: The Shiite Crescent and Iran's Theopolitics) lays out a quite illuminating picture for understanding the origins of Iran's struggle, particularly within the Islamic world. It is a labor-intensive, strong, documentary-quality study that must be read. However, the origins of Iran's foreign policy cannot be based only on Shiism and only on theo-political motivations. In the final instance (is that too Althusserian?), there seem to be other factors that determine (overdetermine) that this theo-political factor too is decisive.

What has invited me to this thought these days has been the article by political scientist M. Hakan Yavuz, published not long ago on atlasthink.org, titled "Iran's Strategic Logic: Fuller, Nasr and the Consequences of the 2026 War." Yavuz takes a different and important approach to understanding Iran's strategic behavior by considering the works of Graham Fuller and Vali Nasr together.

The point Yavuz draws attention to is simple but important: explaining Iran's behavior by ideology alone is insufficient. In Western analyses Iran is often presented as an irrational actor driven by revolutionary ideology. Yet Iran is essentially a state acting within historical and geopolitical necessities.

This perspective neither exonerates Iran nor lets one blame it; but it makes understanding it possible. Because explaining an actor by ideology alone often produces a facile narrative that veils the real strategic motivations.

IRAN'S STRATEGIC LOGIC: BEYOND IDEOLOGY

The first point Yavuz draws attention to in his article is that the "revolutionary rupture" narrative widespread in the West is exaggerated. According to this narrative, the 1979 Iranian Revolution completely changed Iran's foreign policy. Whereas Iran in the Shah's period was an ally integrated into the West, after the revolution it turned into an ideological regime.

Yet the geopolitical analysis Fuller put forward years ago and Nasr's recent work show that this narrative is incomplete. Iran's foreign policy is not determined by ideology alone. The geopolitical realities faced by the Iranian state are independent of regimes.

Iran lies at one of the world's most critical geopolitical crossroads. This position, at the intersection of Central Asia, the Caucasus, South Asia and the Middle East, has given Iran throughout history a sense of strategic centrality.

The legacy of the Persian empires has led Iranian elites to see themselves as a natural regional power. For this reason Iran's pursuit of regional influence is not a policy peculiar to the Islamic Republic alone. In the Shah's period too, Iran aimed to be the leading power of the Gulf. Yavuz's article particularly emphasizes this continuity.

IRAN'S SECURITY PSYCHOLOGY

The element that brings Vali Nasr's analysis to the fore in Yavuz's article is the trauma created by the Iran-Iraq War in the shaping of Iran's strategic mindset. The war of the 1980s taught the Iranian state two important lessons.

First, Iran saw that it could be left alone in the international system. At that time many regional and global powers supported Iraq.

Second, Iran realized that it could not compete with the great powers in terms of conventional military strength.

For this reason Iran developed a different strategy: proxy forces, asymmetric warfare and "strategic patience." Hezbollah, the militia networks in Iraq or the relations in Yemen, which in the West are often presented as ideological expansionism, are in fact a security strategy from Iran's point of view. Iran is building a regional deterrence network against actors it cannot fight directly.

THE WAR'S REAL EFFECT: THE DISSOLUTION OF THE REGIONAL ORDER

However, the war being waged today is not limited to discussing Iran's behavior. The real question is how this war will change the balances of power in the Middle East. That is, Iran's weakening may not automatically make the region more stable. History shows the opposite.

The overthrow of Iraq in 2003 did not bring stability to the Middle East. On the contrary, it began a period in which state structures dissolved, militia networks gained strength and regional rivalry deepened.

A similar scenario is possible for Iran. Iran's weakening may not produce a pro-Western Iran. On the contrary, a more nationalist, more militarized Iran dominated by security elites may emerge.

That is, at the end of the day, a strong Iranian nationalism may replace revolutionary Shiite ideology in Iran. This does not eliminate regional rivalry; it only changes its ideological form.

THE TRANSFORMATION IN US STRATEGY

Another important point that draws attention here is the change in American strategy. The US no longer wants to carry out large occupations as in Iraq and Afghanistan. Instead it is applying a "remote warfare" strategy based on drone strikes, cyber operations and targeted military interventions.

This strategy may reduce costs for Washington. But it carries a serious risk for the Middle East: it weakens states but does not build in their place a new order that would be of use even to itself.

In the long run this situation may accelerate regional fragmentation and open new spaces to actors such as China and Russia.

WHY IS TURKEY INCREASINGLY COMING TO THE FORE?

At this point, what draws attention and is especially important for Turkey is a new debate that has emerged in Israeli strategic circles.

Some Israeli security circles have begun to discuss that, if the Iranian threat weakens, Turkey could be "the next strategic rival."

There are several reasons for this view.

The first is the regional room for maneuver Turkey has gained over the last twenty years. Turkey is no longer merely a country on NATO's southeastern flank. It has a broad sphere of diplomatic and political influence extending from the Balkans to the Caucasus, from Africa to the Gulf.

The second is Turkey's pursuit of an independent foreign policy. While remaining within the Western alliance, Ankara pursues a policy that tries to increase its own strategic autonomy.

The third is Turkey's explicit stance on the Palestinian issue. This stance has kept relations with Israel tense for a long time.

For this reason, some Israeli strategists are discussing Turkey as a new challenge in the post-Iran period.

STRATEGIC CONSEQUENCES FOR TURKEY

First, Turkey's policy of strategic autonomy will gain even more importance. In a region where great power rivalry is intensifying, it is becoming increasingly difficult to pursue a policy dependent on a single axis.

Second, Turkey's diplomatic capacity will be decisive. Iran's weakening or the dissolution of its regional networks may give rise to new conflict lines. In this process Turkey can play a balancing role.

Therefore, Iran's policies have been shaped not only by ideology but by geopolitical necessities and historical experiences. Today, however, the matter is larger than understanding Iran.

A new geopolitical era is beginning in the Middle East. In this new era Turkey's role is becoming increasingly central.

Turkey will be not merely a spectator of this transformation but also one of its shapers. For this reason the real question is this: will Turkey be the balancing power of the new Middle East, or will it accept the role assigned to it in a strategic game set up by others?

It appears that the answer to this question will determine the future not only of Turkey but of the whole region.