Egypt made its Constitution and pulled ahead

The new constitution referendum in Egypt has been completed, with more than 70 percent of participants voting "yes" in the second round. Together with the 56 percent "yes" vote in the first round held a week earlier, the referendum concluded with a total approval of 64 percent. First of all, the only reason the vote was held in two rounds is that, under the Egyptian constitution, elections are required to be held with judge observers, and there are not enough judges for all of Egypt at the same time. Yet with the new constitution voted on in the referendum, the requirement of judicial supervision in elections will henceforth be abolished. Presumably we will witness faster, healthier elections in Egypt from now on.

That the referendum could be held, and above all that this result came out of the referendum, undoubtedly shows that a very important stage has been passed in resolving the crisis that has been going on for some time. Even the fact that it went to a referendum is in itself an important step in favor of the democratic forces in the process. Because the opposition front's most important concern from the start was the referendum itself, and neither the elements of the old system (the military and judicial bureaucracy) nor the opposition bloc formed against the Muslim Brotherhood and the Islamists had any hope for any text that would go to a referendum. How could they? The ultimate support that the things they demanded, the things they demanded be included in the Constitution, could find among the Egyptian people was clear. Moreover, what they wanted was ultimately not so much for the constitution to be this way or that, but somehow for the Muslim Brotherhood or the Islamists to be kept away from power.

They were seeking consensus, but this demand for consensus increasingly turned into a call for surrender. They had no text, no system or form to propose. About twenty members representing them had withdrawn from the Constitutional commission, because they had no chance of getting what they wanted accepted. Not being able to get what they wanted within the hundred-member commission, they thought they could invalidate the commission's legitimacy by withdrawing from it. Yet the commission's legal legitimacy continued, and indeed it continued its work.

Despite this, Muhammad Morsi called the opponents to negotiation and consensus. He took an extremely conciliatory stance to the effect that, although they were not sufficient in number, their just demands regarding what they wanted in the Constitution could of course be met. In fact, the sole purpose of the November 22 decrees, which were apparently seen as the reason for the opposition pouring into the streets, was to end as soon as possible the transition period that had been continuing since Mubarak's overthrow and had increasingly reached the point of exhausting the Egyptian people. The way to end it was to complete the constitution as soon as possible and take it to a referendum. Yet on June 14 the Constitutional Court had ended the mission of the Constituent Council, elected to write the constitution, on flimsy grounds, and had begun to signal that it would again dismiss, for similar reasons, the council subsequently formed which prepared the current constitution. All Morsi wanted was to prevent the Constitutional Court from obstructing this process, and the decrees said to declare his own dictatorship were temporary powers aimed solely at realizing this purpose. Indeed, with the acceptance of the new constitution, those powers too come to an end and are replaced by his limited powers defined in the constitution.

However, the opponents, proceeding from the claim that Morsi was from the start exclusively the president of the Muslim Brotherhood, a figure who did not represent all of Egypt, did not respond to the calls for consensus either. Frankly, the only thing that the consensus the opposition demanded corresponded to, in the stance it displayed from the start, was being the "final decision-maker" with the minority they had. We must remember this "consensus" concept as a magic word from somewhere. Truly there is no difference at all between what the Egyptian elitists understand by it and the form we remember.

Although it was seen with certainty that, if the resulting constitution text went to a referendum, the people would approve it, everything that could be done at this stage was attempted. Tahrir Square, the symbol of the Revolution, was this time filled by those elements who wanted to strangle the Revolution. Although crowds as strong as in the revolutionary process were never gathered, an extremely irritable and condescending language was used, with the claim that they themselves were the true owners of the revolution. In return, Morsi's supporters gathered far larger crowds, showing that the symbolism and consciousness of Tahrir cannot be tied to concrete places.

The process of resistance against the referendum, from whichever side it is looked at, resembled the events we lived through in our own country when the presidential election was approached in 2007. By coincidence, the result too turned out the same, as on 22 July and 28 August 2009. Just as the result produced on 22 July 2007 by the early election trump card the government played, against the 367 crisis fabricated in parliament, backed by the April 27 e-memorandum, with the Constitutional Court approving all of it, constituted a turning point for Turkey, so in Egypt too December 22 constituted a result crowning the parallel developments that were experienced.

Although the referendum results will temporarily end the crisis, they will not entirely end the constitutional debates in Egypt. We must not forget that there are segments with loud voices who will keep questioning the current constitution for having been presented as a fait accompli. Criticisms that this constitution does not represent everyone have already begun. The waters will not have calmed completely, but the current developments nevertheless took place within a democratic process open to everyone. It must be admitted that, for the first time in Egyptian history, Egypt made a constitution within such an open process, and this constitution was approved by 64 percent of those who participated. What comes after will again depend on the demands and participation of Egypt's political elements.

By making its constitution, Egypt has apparently outpaced us. With its constitutional experience and the political debates it will produce, Egypt will in fact have produced an important model not only for itself but also for the other Arab Spring countries that will follow it.