Never having enough of punishing Ghannouchi!

A court ruling that came from Tunisia in recent days seems like a new link in a story that has been unfolding in Tunisia for 5 years. But there is nothing new in this link. It amounts to one more lock being slapped on the dungeon of Rached Ghannouchi, who has now reached the age of 84 after 5 years. They cannot get enough of punishing Ghannouchi, who has been convicted repeatedly in many earlier sham trials.

In the case presented as the "secret apparatus of Nahda," heavy sentences were handed down against numerous names, among them Rached Ghannouchi, the former Speaker of Parliament, leader of the Nahda Movement, and one of the best-known thinker-politicians of the Islamic world. The court sentenced Ghannouchi to thirty more years in prison in addition to a life sentence. Former Prime Minister Ali Larayedh received forty-two years, and many other defendants were sentenced to decades in prison along with life terms.

Setting aside the legal aspect of the ruling, the matter has long since gone beyond legal limits. Because what is on trial here is not just a political movement; it is also one of the most important experiences of reconciliation that has been attempted between democracy and Islam in the Arab world.

There is no one who does not know that the case has less to do with its legal aspect than with the demands of the coup of July 2021. But the roots of the file prepared for this go back to the assassinations of two opposition politicians killed in 2013, Chokri Belaid and Mohamed Brahmi. Both were fierce opponents of the Nahda government of the time. The assassinations dragged Tunisia into a deep political crisis. In fact the assassinations were typical intelligence operations. It was contrary to reason and logic to think that Nahda would benefit from these assassinations. But from that date on, Nahda's rivals began to claim that the movement had set up a secret security structure within the state, carried out parallel activities within the police and bureaucracy, and had a direct or indirect connection with these murders. These claims in any case give away the perpetrators sufficiently.

Of course Nahda rejected all these accusations. The movement argued that the file had been used for years as a tool of political struggles. Indeed, in the investigations conducted over the years, no definitive ruling establishing a direct link between the assassinations and Nahda had emerged. Even so, the file was not closed; on the contrary, it became one of the most important symbols of political polarization in Tunisia.

The rulings handed down today constitute the latest link of this long story. But to understand these developments, one actually has to return to 25 July 2021.

On that day President Kais Saied suspended the work of parliament, removed the government from office, and gathered extraordinary powers in his own hands. Later he dissolved parliament completely, had a new constitution drafted, and transformed the political system into a new presidency-centered structure.

All of this took place differently from the coups the Arab world is accustomed to. Tanks did not come out into the streets. Soldiers did not announce that they had seized power. Coup communiqués were not read on radio and television. On the contrary, the entire process was conducted with the discourse of "the will of the people," "constitutional legitimacy," and "saving democracy."

At the center of the tragedy Tunisia lives today lies this paradox that we know by the description of the "postmodern coup." What eliminated democracy this time was not an anti-democratic force but a political actor who had come to office by election.

The concepts of "electoral authoritarianism" or "constitutional coup," on which political science has long dwelt, were developed precisely to explain situations of this kind. That is, the gradual narrowing of the democratic space by using democratic mechanisms. Tunisia has today become the living laboratory of this paradox.

But what is truly striking in this story is the person of Rached Ghannouchi. Because Ghannouchi is not just any Islamist leader. He is someone who spent most of his life in exile and in prisons. He was subjected to repression under Bourguiba. Under Ben Ali he lived for years far from his country. But what makes him different is not only the hardships he endured but that he is one of the pioneers of the most serious theoretical and practical transformation toward the democratization of Islamist movements in the Arab world.

When Nahda came to power after 2011, many observers thought Tunisia would enter a path similar to Iran or Sudan. Yet Nahda did the exact opposite. It did not insist on the articles of the constitution containing an emphasis on sharia. It formed coalitions with secular parties. It preferred reconciliation to conflict. It took into account the demands of its opponents. When the political crisis deepened, it accepted the move to a technocratic government. And most importantly, it left the power it had come to by election again through election and reconciliation.

There are not many examples of this in the recent history of the Arab world. Perhaps the greatest irony of what is happening today lies here. Because the movement that was held up for years as the strongest answer to those who said no reconciliation could be established between Islam and democracy now finds itself pushed outside democratic processes.

This inevitably raises bigger questions. If a movement in the Arab world that accepts elections, defends pluralism, shares power, and withdraws from power when necessary ends up in prison again, what message does that send to the younger generations of the region? If the reward of democratic politics is prison, why should people choose democratic paths? Of course this question is not only Nahda's question but the question of the whole region.

The Tunisian revolution had given hope to the Arab world as a spring. Because for the first time in an Arab country, different ideological segments were seeking ways to live together under the same political roof. Islamists, secularists, leftists, and nationalists, despite all their shortcomings, were trying to establish a common constitutional order.

Today, the same country is again remembered for courtrooms, political trials, and long detentions. Of course states have security concerns. Of course terrorism-related claims must be investigated. Of course no one is above the law. But in times of coups, it is those who seat the judges on those benches in the name of law who speak, and the judges merely carry out their demands.

Today in Tunisia the main issue is not whether Rached Ghannouchi is guilty or not. The main issue is how the Tunisian story that began in 2011 with a demand for freedom and dignity returned once again to the axis of political exclusion and judicial struggles. Because in this process, the one really on trial in Tunisia is not Rached Ghannouchi, but the last remaining democratic hope of the Arab Spring.