Hassan al-Banna and the Brotherhood identity

The Hasan al-Banna and the Muslim Brotherhood Symposium organized in Ankara by the Genç Birikim Association took place as a feast of ideas and emotions, with 28 papers presented over two days from 8 countries. The remarkable oratory in the presentations of the Arab participants frequently led to emotional moments in the hall. When the subject came to the Palestinian cause in particular, this enthusiasm reached its peak. After all, Hamas, which leads the Palestinian cause today, is in a way the Palestinian branch of the Ikhwan, and from the very beginning Hasan al-Banna declared the unity of the fate of the Palestinian cause and that of the Muslim Brotherhood.

This is the first time a meeting on this scale has been held in Turkey about Hasan al-Banna. This lack of interest in academia toward the movement that is today the most organized and most widespread in every corner of the Islamic world, and that forms the strongest social ground behind the winds of spring experienced recently, is truly very telling. Today, at least dozens of doctoral dissertations on the Ikhwan movement should have been written in Turkish academia. Yet at one time even academic interest in the Ikhwan was made grounds for blacklisting and exclusion from academic life.

In the end, in the coming years the Ikhwan movement will probably have become the most influential and decisive force in all Middle Eastern countries. Its spread can at the same time be seen as a harbinger of a spontaneous integration among all the countries the spring has passed through. The goal of "regional integration," which Turkey has strategically kept in view in its foreign policy for years, finds a very natural and favorable ground for an alliance in the Ikhwan's perception of international relations. It would not be an exaggeration to say that the Ikhwan's rise is also in the background of the interest and affection recently directed toward Turkey in Arab countries. In Tunisia, Egypt and Libya the Ikhwan is already taking over the government.

At the symposium, emphasis was placed, in this spread of the Ikhwan, on the importance of the fact that the Ikhwan recognizes nothing other than being Muslim as its identity and nothing other than the Qur'an, which is valid among all the world's Muslims, as its reference. This identity and reference correspond to the wish and desire for unity among all the world's Muslims. For that reason, the Ikhwan identity is not a distinguishing identity among Muslims; on the contrary, it is an identity that emphasizes commonality and unites. This identity is also, to some extent, a positive identity that makes itself forgotten, that does not need to remind others of itself when it meets other Muslims.

The last speaker of the symposium, Prof. Hacı Duran of Adıyaman University, underlined that this fluidity in the Ikhwan identity enables it to be articulated very easily with Muslims in other parts of the world. For example, a participant from the Ikhwan, in describing the Ikhwan's relationship with other Islamic movements in the world, said that they feel very close both to the Nurcu movement in Turkey and to the Milli Görüş movement.

Meanwhile, one observation that must be underlined is that the Ikhwan's organization in so many different societies has given it a very interesting vision about the possibility of displaying different fiqh and Islamic practices under very different social, cultural and political conditions. This vision, which it has gained spontaneously as a structure with a global organization, needs to be especially noted. Because some Islamic movements can generally be criticized for remaining too entrenched, too local. The Ikhwan's difference, however, is that, in the name of a mission such as supplying fatwas to all the organizations, communities and life practices around the world, it has been able to assess the margins within which the principles of Islam can be applied differently to all the different conditions. At the very least, it is a community that has constantly faced this serious problematic.

The importance of this stems from the following. This vision of cross-cultural permeability has brought with it the ability to produce, at least in its own distinctive way, through the community, the Islamic fiqh tradition that was interrupted after the abolition of the caliphate. This has also given it a very strong notion of realism. That is, on the one hand it has found a way to make use of the power it holds in different countries, and on the other hand it has been burdened with the responsibility of a community that constantly has its hand under the stone. That is, this cultural horizon has in one respect also prevented it from veering into a cynical radicalism.

But it can also be said that this side of it, which gives no premium to radicalism, has at times led it to fail to meet sufficiently the demands of some groups that emerged from within its own community. Thus, in a way, it has been unable to close the road to the radicalization of groups that emerged from within it. For this realism or realpolitik attitude that the Ikhwan had to adopt has led it from time to time to take on an appearance of being too soft and conciliatory toward more radical elements. (Of course, the sole reason for this realism is not geographic or cultural spread, but also its historical depth, which holds very heavy costs and experiences.)

Of course, in one respect its being so has also ensured that it is longer-lived and more durable. Because the great majority of the communities that criticized it in this direction remained very conjunctural and, within a short time, in a way expired and joined those who come and go.

Today this movement, which our academic world neglected for years, has become one of the most important realities we live.