← All articles · Law and justice
The possibility of opening a new page

Until recently, a greater willingness on the part of the so-called "public" could be observed regarding the necessity of settling accounts with Turkey's coup-making tradition, its style of governance and its conception of administration. When the Ergenekon case reached the stage of covering the Council of State case in particular, it became plain and clear that the conspiracy in Turkey was not merely a theory but a real practice that had penetrated the country to its very marrow.
When this came to light, it was assumed that, apart from those within the circle of the conspiracy's operatives, no one would object to this judicial process, and that indeed everyone would greet it with great enthusiasm.
After all, what kind of support and pressure had come from society for the judicial process that began some ten years ago over the Susurluk affair, had it not? What an impression of a demand for a "Bright Turkey" had arisen, one with almost one hundred percent consensus. Yet today it is not hard to guess that this consensus could never have advanced in the face of a genuine investigation. In the Susurluk case back then, because there was boundless confidence that the whole of it could never be reached, the way was safely kept open for the impression that the demand for a "clean Turkey" was a matter of complete social consensus.
In the end, this occasion also revealed how far from the reality of Turkey, and how naive, the good faith regarding today's cases was. For it was also seen that intriguing coup-making has a large social base, beginning with those who came to the fore with slogans such as transparency, law and clean government in the Susurluk case.
One must speak frankly. The absence in society of an indisputable consensus against the rule of law, intrigue and coup-making shows that the road back to coup-making times is not entirely closed in Turkey, and that we are still not safe in any way. This is a sign of how important it is to take the ongoing cases seriously.
As I said in my previous article, at some stage of a change of this scale in terms of democratization and the rule of law in Turkey, leaving the matter at a certain point and drawing a sponge over the past could be an alternative path. This path could be opened all the way after the "parties reconciling with one another" in society and everyone agreeing on new rules for a new period. For as the cases drag on, it emerges that the number of people involved in such intrigues is far greater than had been supposed. Because the crimes committed were not regarded as crimes in the past; with a corporatist mentality, duties were assigned to everyone from soldiers to police, from journalists to judges, from prosecutors to businessmen, from civil society administrators to members of foundations.
This corporatist structure kept many more people within a certain system than was supposed, in order to secure the order of "permanent coup". That is why the Ergenekon formation is not a simple organization, but the very order itself, one that, as the case may be, includes the very top of the state, or from there permeates all the levels of administration and society. Wherever one probes, similar things come out. Not only were many illegal activities participated in by all hierarchical levels almost as the routine work of an institution. Moreover, whatever the nature of these activities, a serious investment was also made in the reflexes of an important social base that would support all of their consequences.
The yields of that investment are being collected even now. What is reflected as the loss of faith in the Ergenekon case is exactly that. In reality there is no such thing as a loss of faith in the case. The matter is nothing but the defense strategies of those who regard this coup order as normal being at work. This is the natural consequence of reaching the end of the state having been structured like a secret organization instead of an open contract for all its citizens. The point that now must be reached is the fact that this secret organizational structure cannot carry the new mission of the Republic of Turkey in the world of our age.
To some extent this point has been reached. However, the new period also requires a new consensus. That everyone who has been involved in the Ergenekon formation be tried, arrested and sentenced may be desirable from the standpoint of absolute justice, but if we are to be realistic, this is not easy. Compared with similar experiences in other countries, there are other ways as well. Since it is not possible to find new citizens for the new Turkey or to import citizens from outside, the old citizens will have to be brought to agree to a contract around the new values and rules of the new Turkey. But for even this to be secured, first there must be a minimum of confronting the past, and second, depending again on the first, it must be ensured that the old conception of governance or its positions have been completely abandoned.
The problem is that there is sufficient intention and will neither to show that a minimum of confrontation has yet been achieved nor that the will for old-style intrigue and conspiracy has been abandoned. While there are such organized campaigns that still try to present the crimes that are the subject of Ergenekon or other coup cases as "nonsense", opening new pages fits neither conscience nor the possibility of a new society.