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Entirely emotional analyses

Is it possible to detect an axis shift in the policy Turkey is following on Iran, Palestine and Israel? This is a question that has for some time been taken seriously and debated both in the Western media and in Turkey. Let this question go on being debated; are the concrete data decisive in the disagreements of opinion that form around this question, or do different opinions form from the same data? Undoubtedly, however much everyone claims to be speaking on the basis of data, it is seen that the same data stir different emotions in different people, for example leading some to fear and anxiety while moving the excitement of others.
If Turkey has said "no" to a draft that 12 UN Security Council members said "yes" to, whatever the content of the draft, why should this be regarded as a sign of its stepping outside the international community? A "no" vote is not an option outside the voting options of the council. In fact, Turkey's having said "no" can from one angle even be considered an opportunity that secures, and in a way restores, the democratic legitimacy of the UN. Because in a place where the other members of the Council, and permanent members such as China and Russia at that, were in one way or another persuaded by the US under certain conditions and forced to cast a vote they did not believe in or that was in fact inconsistent with their position, the emergence of two "no" votes from Turkey and Brazil saved the legitimacy of the democratic functioning here. Otherwise an image emerges in which the word of the strong passes without encountering any objection even if unjust, which, in any case, has constituted the UN Security Council's greatest paradox since the day it was founded.
It is of course the more tragicomic side of the matter that those who speak of Turkey's axis shift come from among those who until now have criticized the AK Parti for acting under the guidance of the US. They are not really worth taking seriously, but it is necessary to underline the interesting assumptions, the unquestioningly accepted conjectures, revealed in what those who are really engaged in serious foreign policy analysis say on the latest picture.
However pleasant the idea of Turkey's independence sounds, evaluating the opportunities for its actual implementation leads to a strange fear and anxiety. Turkey's acting independently is not a very familiar situation. What is thought fitting for Turkey is that it not derail from the axis to which it is "bound" in its foreign policy, that it do whatever these countries regarded as the axis want from Turkey. The role of obeying without objection, wherever this axis may be taking us, is more often ascribed.
One of the theories known in international relations but whose validity is constantly debated is the idea that a kind of hierarchical relationship exists among states. A world in which some countries are organically and hierarchically bound to some countries was an approach that the Cold War years strongly confirmed. Today its validity is debated, because even if every country at some period establishes very good, even dependent relations with a state, by the very nature of the nation-state structure it comes after a while to possess the potential or tendency to act on its own. The likelihood that a country's rulers will make use of these opportunities to act independently depends entirely on their manner and preferences in managing the internal and external balances they have established. Undoubtedly, the country's own level of material and social wealth also makes it easier for it to act independently.
Turkey's potential to act independently in fact exists much more than is thought. That no one has favored this independent stance until now can be attributed only to the rulers' laziness, to their guarantee-seeking attitude that dislikes taking risks, perhaps to their cowardice, or unfortunately to the relationships they are engaged in.
Both because it is not accustomed to Turkey's acting independently and because it has not at all been noticed that the power games in the world have moved to a different level, Turkey's behavior frightens some. Turkey does not have to be a country that bases all its calculations on entering the EU. This does not require abandoning that EU ideal or march. But by not waiting without doing anything for this process, which looks set to last quite long, Turkey is doing an extremely rational thing. Its pursuing new and alternative paths simultaneously, let no one worry, makes it more valuable in other areas as well.
It is also significant that the approaches holding that Turkey's displaying independent behavior will bring it big trouble are expressed from the seat of foreign policy analysis. This constitutes a typical example of exactly how an objective foreign policy analysis cannot be. After all, what is decisive in these analyses too is nothing other than people's emotionally weighted attitudes toward events.
It is more exciting to dwell on how determining emotional or ethical elements such as courage, entrepreneurship, excitement, fear, anxiety, inferiority complex, self-confidence, human values and selfishness are in foreign policy analyses.