Is Putin proving NATO's prophecy?

Before this question, of course, comes the question to be asked after the latest situation that has emerged: is everything NATO has done in the end a matter of making prophecies that will fulfill themselves and thereby confirm themselves?

As is well known, Russia's first step toward the invasion of Ukraine, awaited for months and even years, came last Thursday from a completely unexpected place. When it announced to the world its decision to recognize the Donetsk People's Republic and the Luhansk People's Republic, which had unilaterally declared independence from Ukraine, it was also seen that for Putin diplomacy was nothing but a deception. Although the first step of the invasion thus came from an unexpected place, its continuation is coming in the expected way and proceeding so. Russia launched attacks not only from Donetsk and Luhansk but from all over Ukraine and reached the borders of Kyiv. This speed alone gives enough idea of where it will stop.

From this point on, there is of course no meaning in putting forward the thesis that what drove Russia to this action was a "necessity" for its security. In invading an independent country, Russia does not rely only on the threat it perceives from NATO weapons stationed in that country or in other Eastern European countries. It does not shrink from declaring that it sees Ukraine in its entirety as its own property, its own right. The theses of history and culture that Putin put forward as the justification for the decision he took on Thursday also show that Russia's possible aggression has not been a mere delusion until now.

Of course, it would still not be entirely meaningless to ask the following questions here. NATO, founded against the Warsaw Pact, continued to see Russia as a potential threat even after the Cold War ended and the Warsaw Pact led by the Soviet Union dissolved. As a result of this threat perception, NATO expanded, with the memberships of Romania, Poland, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, in a way that almost encircles Russia. This expansion by itself constantly reminded Russia that it would pose a threat, perhaps not today but tomorrow, in the end, by returning to its historical role. Even if it was not in Russia's mind, and how possible that is is debatable, this perspective and this NATO policy in a sense practically provoked Russia constantly to return to its historical role.

Of course, Russia, perceived as a threat, also sees the measures taken against it as a threat, and has long been saying that this threat surrounding it would reach a point it could not tolerate if Ukraine were also to become a NATO member.

The US threat perception regarding Russia was also always influential in its approach to the Nord Stream 2 Project, built to carry gas to Europe via Germany. Because of this project the US thought that Russia's position in Europe would grow too strong and make Europe unable to stand up to Russia.

The fact is that one of the things Putin relied on in embarking on such a mad move in Ukraine is that all of Europe, Germany first of all, has its hands and arms tied. This is one of the most important reasons why, despite all the provocative-level support given to Ukraine from the start, no reaction beyond condemnation has come from Europe and, very probably, none will.

But without doubt another important reason is NATO's own weakness, its unreliable structure, the contradiction between its rhetoric and its deeds, the disagreements among its members.

NATO cannot go beyond making prophecies with its rhetoric and policies. Moreover, with its prophecies it also summons future disasters. It signs off on a kind of self-fulfilling prophecy and sits down to weep for the victims of its prophecy.

We can understand that Putin read this weakness within NATO and Europe very well. But his reading this weakness well does not ultimately mean that he has also read well the consequences of his own policy. In the end, with the operation he has launched against Ukraine, he is also paving the way for what is likely to be a long period of instability in the world.

In this new situation there is no chance that Russia, which has shown its unreliability to the whole world, will become the king of the new world it intends to build. Europe and NATO may have had their hands and arms tied in the face of these aggressive policies, but there is no chance that the gains he will obtain from this will make him prosper.

In the end, although it has made Europe dependent on itself with natural gas, it must itself sell the natural gas it holds, and this is its most important source of income. The search for alternatives to a seller who plays this card so recklessly whenever it wishes may develop further. Moreover, this adventure it has embarked on makes it unreliable in the world and opens the way to its isolation, which would expose it to a new great closure after the Soviet experience. Just as the end of the Soviet experience was a fiasco for Russia, there is no sign at all that this new adventure will take Russia to a better place. Whatever measures it has taken, it may be thinking of the Chinese market as an alternative to the European market. Indeed, early this month it signed a hefty natural gas agreement with China. But none of this is of a kind to make up for what Russia loses in embarking on such an adventure.

In the end Russia showed its teeth, its strength, and this show of strength also exposed the wretchedness of those facing it, but this show or proof of strength at the same time does Russia even greater harm. This too must be seen.

7TH ÜSKÜDAR BOOK FAIR: At the traditional 7th Üsküdar Book Fair organized by the Üsküdar Municipality, I will sign my books today at the Vadi Publications stand between 15:00 and 17:00. On Sunday, after a talk titled "The Human Being Is the Other of the Human Being," I will also sign my other books, first of all the 20-volume "How Should One Look as a Muslim?", at Beyan Publications.