← All articles · Law and justice

Law and justiceYeni Şafak

Shackles on the opening by "intent"

5 dk okuma
Adalet heykeli ve tokmak

First of all, it must be stated that in a state governed by the rule of law, no one has a privilege to commit crimes. The democratic opening process has confronted us with situations that require crime or legal codes to be interpreted differently, but even these situations do not give anyone the right to perform, with an impunity lasting forever, certain acts defined as crimes.

The KCK, whose Kurdish name is Komala Civaken Kurdistan, that is, the Union of Communities of Kurdistan, is the PKK's urban structure and enables the cities to be thrown into turmoil as fields of action whenever desired. It is also known to operate over the municipalities as a kind of shadow municipal administration, as it pleases. The PKK's regime of military tutelage over regional politics is implemented through this organizational structure. Whether the elected municipalities are under this organization's pressure or are a part of this organization has ceased to be a meaningful question. Since they in any case owe their existence to the military, logistical or propaganda support this organization provides, they are in an excessively intertwined, inseparable relationship. That the "open voting, secret counting" goal it applied to the ballot boxes, especially in local elections, was achieved to the letter in many cities such as Batman, Siirt and Diyarbakır is known to everyone in the region.

It is a fact that in the democratic opening, even if it is not an interlocutor in the Kurdish question, it is an element that must certainly be taken into account in resolving the terror problem. But, contrary to what is supposed, who the power behind this structure is is not clear. Even if, for a moment, we accept taking Öcalan or the PKK as an interlocutor today, how far the word of these interlocutors can be trusted, how far they can stand behind the promises they give, is not at all clear. We saw in recent days how statements made in Öcalan's name, after a series of censorships, were reproduced and delivered to his base as an entirely different text. Which unit of the KCK or the PKK is involved in what kind of business is also unknown. When the unaccounted-for actions of these actors confront the policy of the opening, which has reached the point where, in ending terror and silencing the weapons, those in the mountains must certainly be taken into account and offered satisfactory options for the post-solution period, heads get thoroughly confused.

Unfortunately, the problem is far from being handled on a simple axis (simple, of course, but not at all easy even so) such as government versus PKK or state versus Öcalan. There is neither a uniform government or state will nor a uniform PKK or Öcalan persona. The street actions and the Tokat attack that came along just as the will for the opening had fully crystallized certainly belong to a plan or will darker than it appears. In Öcalan's own words, the Ergenekon finger in the matter is no longer even a mere possibility, but how even Öcalan has come to such a point at this stage needs explaining.

Although DTP officials insistently, even in a threatening tone, point to Öcalan in person or the PKK as the interlocutor, the strange behavior and unreliability of these interlocutors must be giving the politics of the opening ever more to think about. But this unreliability also makes it more necessary to find and bring out the real power behind these shadow actors.

Even if we see the PKK's having found mass support in the region today as a reality, this must not show that it cannot be criticized. Recently a strange intellectual tendency has begun to form that tries to impose that accepting this reality almost requires a kind of exemption from criticism for the PKK. If we were to give credit to this tendency, everyone would have to hail the PKK, with all the methods of violence it applies and all the armed tutelage order it tries to impose on regional politics, as the only political movement representing the Kurds. Why should respecting the will of the millions of people who supported the DTP with their votes despite its tie to the PKK require turning a deaf ear to Kurds or non-Kurds who did not vote for them? If everyone who got there early and hung their sign over certain political issues is to be given a representation monopoly over that field, would we not then have to say farewell to democratic debate and pluralism?

That we can reach an utterly consistent picture of the oddities emerging from the PKK-KCK-Öcalan front only when we consider them together with the oddities on the opposing front, that is, on the state's side, must tell very well to what desert of truth we are welcome. The Tokat attack, the flood in 17 cm, the street demonstrations, the Constitutional Court's closure case against the DTP, the remaining deputies' returning from the "bosom of the nation" on Öcalan's advice... All these events, each strange in itself, how they complete a picture when thought of together, don't they?

And where, in this picture, do you think the manner in which elected mayors were detained in the KCK operation, their hands handcuffed, and the broadcasting to the media of the images of them in a single line with hands cuffed fit? Frankly, in the detention conditions and procedures that have more or less settled into order in recent years, a violation of this magnitude can happen only through special effort, that is, "with premeditation."

Whoever is responsible for this effort, there is no doubt that they have a special place in this picture.