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The responsibility of applying the Constitution

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The annulment decision that led the Constitutional Court to use an authority not stemming from the Constitution has no legitimacy. It is understood that by acting in this manner, the Constitutional Court implicitly expressed its infinite confidence in a "protection of military power" that is even more illegitimate than its own decision. Indeed, the Chief of General Staff, whose first reaction to the decision was "a declaration of the obvious," disclosed not perhaps the authority of the Constitutional Court, but where it derives its power.

This declaration, which is "not obvious" on any legal ground, shows at most the existence of a secret protocol, a secret agenda that is "obvious" between the Constitutional Court and certain unauthorized but "deal-maker" figures.

It appears that the Constitutional Court associated its annulment decision with the characteristics of the regime that "cannot even be proposed to be changed" in the laws in question. Moving from this, believing that the Constitutional Court acted with a protective reflex on behalf of the state or the regime is, believe me, an unnecessary luxury. There is no place for engaging in lengthy evaluations of "protecting the regime." None of the characteristics of the Republic of Turkey that cannot even be proposed to be changed have remained effectively unchanged.

None of the state's republican, legal, social, unitary, or democratic characteristics have survived the destructive and corrupting effect of this decision. Using authority not derived from the constitution pours bleach on the roots of the regime. Even if all this is done in the name of saving the regime, what is preserved under today's conditions is nothing more than a highly organized illegitimate structure, not the regime itself.

There is no need to attribute a more historical, more mystical, or "deep" role to this illegal organized structure than necessary. What needs to be done is to constantly emphasize the "criminal" nature of this structure and, of course, for those who are in a position not to remain spectators and who derive their power and authority from the laws, to intervene.

By making a habit of using powers not derived from the constitution, the Constitutional Court has unilaterally terminated the constitution, that is, the "social contract" as Mustafa Karaalioğlu so accurately expressed, thus paralyzing the operation of the legislature and the executive. By abusing the final and definitive nature of its decisions, it has exceeded limits and effectively obstructed the "harmonious operation" of all institutions of the state.

This precise point actually creates the most natural and legitimate area of intervention for the head of state, that is, the President. The President, described as the "Head of State" in Article 104 of the Constitution, "In this capacity represents the Republic of Turkey and the unity of the Turkish nation; ensures the implementation of the Constitution, and the regular and harmonious functioning of the state organs." When the Constitutional Court uses an authority it does not derive from the constitution, the President's duty and authority to "ensure the implementation of the constitution" comes into play, and moreover, this authority relies on the Constitution far more than what the Constitutional Court relies upon. This is an authority that can stop even those who dare to judge the President by ignoring explicit restrictive Constitutional commands.

Furthermore, the President has the authority to ensure the harmonious and regular working of state institutions. Authorities weaken when they are left unused. Bureaucratic or political mafias fill the voids created by weakened authorities.

Great duties also fall upon Parliament and the government against this illegal structure. First of all, one must abandon the approach that gives credit to judicial absolutism, as if nothing can be done against the judiciary. Politics has limitless possibilities, but these possibilities exist first and foremost through a belief in this, and by not succumbing to feelings of helplessness and surrender. The fact that the opposition relies on such an illegitimate organization opens a wide space for politics that derives its power from legitimacy.

Additionally, judicial moves aimed at politics and legislation must be confronted in the person of the GNAT, making the Parliament the addressee of these moves. No less duty falls upon the MHP, DTP, and BBP wings of politics than the AKP in terms of protecting the honor of this legislature.

The most important condition of right politics is proper timing. Until the Constitutional Court's decision, perhaps there was no suitable ground for a Constitutional amendment, but now, going beyond that, re-establishing and rapidly prevailing a civilian-libertarian, progressive, and universalist constitutional vision is the most appropriate time and path for rescuing the political sphere.