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Brazil, AIPAC, and Paraguay: As Israel’s Pawns, Bishops, and Knights Fall One by One

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Let those among us who constantly look for Israel as the power behind the funding crisis continue their search; recent developments in Latin America show nothing but sheer incompetence on the part of the political networks supported by Israel and Washington, making a mess of every single operation they undertake on their own turf. It certainly cannot be ignored that Israel or certain centers act with an unshakeable appetite to steer everything according to their own desires, but this notorious ambition of theirs obviously does not mean that everything proceeds as they wish.

When read especially in light of the consequences of changing global politics after October 7, we witness scenes on the ground where this entire circle of ambition entangles the feet of Israel and the powers behind it. Relations that once seemed untouchable are increasingly being tested, exposed, and held accountable before voters and societies. The election in Brazil is one of the most striking examples of this. Flávio Bolsonaro took over the political legacy of his father, Jair Bolsonaro, to run against Lula da Silva. His campaign did not rely solely on the legacy provided by his family name.

Attempts were made to leverage the influence of the former president’s wife, Michelle Bolsonaro, over female and evangelical voters, while Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu did not hesitate to publicly announce his support for Flávio via a video message. According to a report by Reuters, certain officials under the Trump administration worked for the Bolsonaro family’s return to power; sanctions openly targeting the Lula government—which had provided the most courageous support to Palestine from the beginning and had not refrained from voicing the most radical criticisms of Israel—were also part of this process of political pressure.

However, the ballot box did not allow this unprincipled support to prevail. Lula was re-elected by securing 51.79 percent of the valid votes, while Flávio Bolsonaro remained at 48.21 percent. Although the margin was not very large from one perspective, its political significance was crystal clear: external pressure, Netanyahu’s explicit backing, the alliance forged by the right, and the weight carried by the Bolsonaro name were not enough to dictate the will of the electorate. Moreover, instead of accepting the outcome following his defeat, Flávio headed to the US, which holds his strings. Reuters reported on November 13 that he was discussing his immigration status in Washington and stated he could run again in the next election.

His departure to the US was explained as an attempt to distance himself from the legal and political debates in Brazil following the defeat, but what everyone sees in this spectacle is nothing other than a political movement returning to the headquarters from which it is directed, rather than turning to its own society to give an account of itself after a loss. And now, developments in Paraguay point to the same political contraction from another front. Santiago Peña, who had close ties with Israel, had reopened his country's embassy in Jerusalem and had become one of the strong allies of the Netanyahu government. Now, a financial and political crisis stemming from the collapse of the digital bank Ueno has ousted him from office, and the court has ordered him to be held in pre-trial detention while the investigation continues.

According to prosecutors' allegations, Peña used his office to keep public funds in the bank despite his shareholding connection to the company. Peña denies the charges; the process is still in the judicial stage. In this file, rumors abound claiming that the bank was managed by Israel or that the crisis was a financial operation orchestrated by Israel. What is certain is that a leader known for his political proximity to Israel has lost power following a banking crisis that collapsed around allegations of public funds and conflicts of interest. Rather than uniting Brazil and Paraguay under a single conspiracy narrative, both should be viewed as signs of a broader political transformation.

In one, voters stopped the right-wing candidate supported by Washington and Tel Aviv at the ballot box. In the other, a president who had established close ties with Israel failed to retain power in the face of public outrage amplified by a banking crisis and corruption allegations. These developments show that pro-Israel alliances are everywhere coming to be seen as a disadvantage against those who form them, and are even being condemned from the outset because they are perceived as detrimental to local societies. The alleged advantages that alliances with Israel were supposed to offer have lost all their appeal. We had already seen that AIPAC's political decline in the US is part of this picture.

Against the candidates supported by the pro-Israel lobby organization, figures objecting to military aid to Israel and the destruction in Gaza won elections. In Michigan, Abdul El-Sayed's surpassing AIPAC-backed candidates in both the primary and general elections to become the country's first Muslim senator, along with a record number of Muslim or anti-Israel candidates winning elections at every level, became an important indicator of this shift. AIPAC's endorsement, considered a display of political strength for years, is turning into a liability for candidates in certain races.

In Europe, too, there are developments not to Israel's liking. The UK, France, and Canada have initiated the process of introducing restrictions on products coming from settlements in the occupied West Bank. Twelve countries, including Spain, Ireland, Norway, and Sweden, issued a joint statement supporting the limitation of trade with settlements. A broader consensus within the EU regarding wider measures against Israel has not yet been reached; however, in May, a decision was taken to impose sanctions on extremist settler individuals and organizations. These do not mean that all relations with Israel have been severed.

Nevertheless, they show that the diplomatic and economic costs of settlement policy are rising. For Israel, pawns, bishops, and knights are falling one by one; the rooks are shaking. Of course, saying that Israel directly manages all these pieces would oversimplify reality. The real issue is the erosion of the political networks, public support, and diplomatic habits that underpin Israel's regional influence. The historical rupture that began on October 7 led to the questioning of Israel's actions in Gaza all across the world, and to this questioning being carried to the ballot box, parliament, the street, and trade policies. Direct, armed, and crude pressure policies pursued against Colombian leader Maduro or against Iran might yield temporary results, but when democratic ground remains undisturbed, the hegemonic policies of Israel and the US stand no chance.

Using force may compel a government, but it cannot manage the memory of societies and the opinion of voters with the same ease. The ballot box in Brazil, the political crisis in Paraguay, the defeat of lobby-backed candidates in the US, the decisions taken against settlement policies in Europe... Each of these takes place in its own context. When read together, however, they show that the bells are now tolling for Israel, and that as the pieces fall one by one, the room for maneuver on the board has narrowed significantly.