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Not a distribution of ministries, but a distribution of duties

We can comfortably say that announcing the cabinet at a record-setting speed after the completion of the election process is a sign of great opportunity and strength for a democracy. A society's ability to carry out political processes successfully and swiftly, its decision-making mechanisms working quickly and effectively, and its social and political performance indicate that the country's resources can be used more productively in the society's favor. On top of all this there is the sense of trust and acceptance the announced cabinet has created in society. Each of the cabinet members, to whom even opponents could raise no objection, makes it very clear that they were chosen for their competence, qualification and merit in their own fields. When ministerial portfolios are distributed in coalition structures according to coalition balances, as is generally the case, what emerges is merely a picture in which resources are shared out among political groups and society's only portion is to bear the burden of that distribution.
A picture with no value whatsoever, whether ethically, aesthetically or in terms of performance. The cabinet makes an open reference, by its contrast, to such pictures from which Turkey suffered for years. Instead of a ministry for the man, the right minister for the job was sought, and this makes a serious difference. A cabinet that takes as its basis the distribution of duties according to competence and merit, rather than the distribution of resources, gets a great deal done, and instead of being itself part of the problems, it performs the function of solving problems properly.
TURKEY IN SUMMARY, IN THE CABINET
No regional or ethnic distribution was sought in the cabinet; on the contrary, as though stressing that these factors have no importance at all, a complete composition of Turkey has nonetheless emerged. Cevdet Yılmaz, who has stood out in all his previous duties for his competence, seriousness, success and humility, was of course not preferred because he is from Bingöl and a Zaza. But his being from Bingöl and a Zaza has in itself become a very important message to the whole world. In a country that appoints a Zaza as deputy to the President of the T.C. and a Kurd from Batman to head economic and finance policy, whoever talks about a Kurdish problem is merely indulging in idle chatter.
Of course Mehmet Şimşek was not appointed to this post because he is a Kurd either. But Mehmet Şimşek, who has never hidden his Kurdishness, and who on the contrary spoke a beautiful, clear Kurdish in his election work and in all his contacts with his voters, was never seen as being barred from this post because he is a Kurd.
We feel the need to say this in particular, because there is a counter-argument that Kurdist politicians cling to, especially against those who attain office in Turkey: A person cannot get anywhere in this country without denying and hiding his Kurdishness. Here are splendid examples of people who rose to the country's highest offices without in any way denying or hiding either their Kurdishness or their Zazaness, indeed expressing it most gracefully. And yet they are the people who, with their competence and merit and their successful work, have contributed the most to this country's development, progress, unity and solidarity. This profile clearly disturbs some people. Because it takes all their arguments out of their hands.
We see these same words circulating in the most wretched manner in the smear campaigns against Hüda Par as well. Even today they are in an alliance with the HDP, whose ties to the PKK are obvious. Within the alliance there are still representatives of the DHKP, TİKKO and all the other extreme and armed leftist organizations, the murderers of Prosecutor Selim Kiraz. For those sitting on top of such dirty baggage to accuse Hüda Par, which since the day it was founded has had no affiliation with any armed organization, movement or discourse, of being a terrorist organization is an instance of effrontery hard to believe.
QUESTIONING HÜDA PAR'S KURDISHNESS
But Hüda Par also faces criticism from HDP circles. Disregarding the weapons they themselves still carry, they too criticize Hüda Par for its inclination to violence, but knowing how odd this would sound, they proceed from another angle: questioning Hüda Par's Kurdishness. Since you keep your distance from the PKK, indeed since you uproot the PKK, you cannot be a real Kurd. At best you can be a traitor to the Kurds.
A former member of parliament, still living abroad, has said precisely this: "HÜDAPAR is a state organization in a Kurdish mask. Its task is to strangle the Kurdish opposition. They are descended from the traitors who guided the state in the Koçgiri, Zilan, Ağrı and Dersim massacres. This state-hitman organization should be treated like the plague microbe and should be exposed and cursed at every opportunity."
Now, if those who say these words truly had the slightest sense of accountability toward those who carried out the Koçgiri, Zilan, Ağrı and Dersim massacres, how could they be in an alliance with the CHP now? Was it not the CHP itself that perpetrated all those massacres? Since you attribute today's Hüda Par members to those who collaborated with those killers by guiding them, should you not have an even more endless grudge against the real killers? Yet we see the CHP and the HDP arm in arm together within the very imperialist plans that the US has designated for them, while Hüda Par, which sits in the Cumhur İttifakı that objects to those plans, is a state organization in a Kurdish mask.
Questioning Kurdishness is like practicing takfir in the name of Kurdishness. It is the busiest road for passing from defending a people to selling that people.
If you do not call the members of Hüda Par Kurds, will those among them who are Kurds have left Kurdishness? The odd thing is that the accusation attributed to Hüda Par is loyalty to the state. If the movement meant is Hizbullah, it existed as an influential and strong movement in the region since the seventies. It was seen as an obstacle to the spread of the PKK among young people and to its establishing a monopolistic hegemony over all Kurds. And it was not an armed or violent obstacle at that. But the PKK was disturbed by the Islamic movement, and it was the PKK that drew them into the conflict with a thousand and one tactics. Their taking action to defend themselves against the PKK oppression to which they were subjected coincided with the state's infiltrating them. In the end, the movement purged by the FETÖ-dense deep state was not the PKK but Hizbullah.
Hüda Par is a political party founded 12 years after the year 2000, when this purge took place. Because the party addresses Kurds in an Islamic language, it is impossible for it not to cause discomfort in the PKK. Because Hüda Par has a discourse and a base that can nullify all of the PKK's claims over the Kurds, that can find serious resonance among the people, and that can confront the PKK across all of its channels of socialization.
Of course it is also committed to the end to Turkey's national identity, unity and integrity. That is, not the PKK's Kurd but Turkey's Kurd, an organic Muslim Kurdish movement as authentic as can be.
Who should be disturbed if not the PKK?
Granted that the PKK is disturbed, why are others disturbed?