2 days, 2 statements and democratic oversight of military spending

Today is 28 April. What makes today meaningful is the two declarations of five years ago, two days, two declarations. That is, the reading of the declaration that repelled, for the first time in our democratic history, by the political will, the last attempt at a military intervention, which took place on 27 April.

The declaration put on the internet at midnight on 27 April was regarded as nothing more than a routine of the tutelary disposition that the military had grown accustomed to up to then and had also accustomed society to. It was so routine that, that night, apart from very few, no one on the television channels expressed the abnormality of this declaration. For the most part, the sins of the political power that deserved this declaration were counted one by one, and the declaration was understood and presented as a necessity, as the justified and natural reflex of a higher reason and will. Yet to see with one's own eyes that it was not normal, indeed that it was something utterly perverse, it was enough that around 3 p.m. on 28 April Cemil Çiçek read the government's counter-declaration. From that hour a process began in Turkey in which military tutelage was pushed back at every level.

The declarations of 27 and 28 April in that respect represent 'two days, two declarations' that will have an exceptional place in Turkey's democratic history. One of them, as old and decrepit as it is, belongs to a political fatalism of mukhabarat regimes, while the other, as new and alive as it is, belongs to the mentality of the open society and to an understanding that revives the political will. Five years ago Turkey lived two days in which a society died and was resurrected two days apart. In that respect, it lived in all its vividness how social psychology can pass rapidly from one climate to another within a time span as short as two days, indeed in fact as 15 hours. It saw, within a short time, how what is called the turn of the times can affect the human mind, logic, intellect, state of mind and personality in an instant.

That is why these two days must not be passed over or brushed aside. On this occasion it is necessary to follow the process of pushing back military tutelage that has been under way since that day. It is necessary not to leave this work solely to the initiative of a particular political power, but to turn it into a system.

The midnight declaration, which today seems to belong to a very distant date, was a manifestation of the twisted situation of times when the military did not know its powers and responsibilities. As long as we cannot establish a strong democracy that will clearly show military bureaucrats their powers and responsibilities, the ways of returning to situations in which we encounter these problems again will not be completely closed. The only way to get rid of these stumbling blocks lies through establishing a strong civilian democratic state administration, and through subjecting the military sphere, like all spheres, to legal and civilian oversight under this administration.

Admittedly, the e-memorandum has not yet begun to be settled legally, like the other coups (12 September, 28 February, Sledgehammer), but this does not mean that 27 April has not been condemned in consciences. Some intellectuals and institutions of our country continue to settle accounts with such attempts that targeted democracy. As one of these institutions, the Strategic Thinking Institute (SDE), on a date coinciding with 27 April, made defense spending, perhaps one of the most important aspects of military-civilian relations, a subject of discussion.

At this event organized by SDE on the fifth anniversary of the 27 April memorandum, the report 'Democratic Oversight of Defense Spending in the World and in Turkey', prepared by Assoc. Prof. Dr. Hamit Emrah Beriş, one of the Institute's experts, was shared with the public in a panel. The evaluation of this analysis, prepared by Beriş, an Associate Professor of Political Science at Gazi University, was carried out by our newspaper's columnist Ali Bayramoğlu, Taraf newspaper columnist Lale Kemal and Prof. Dr. İhsan Dağı.

Beriş, who gives information about the economic size of defense spending in the world, the form of civilian oversight in democratic countries and the counterpart of these practices in Turkey, has a striking finding on civilian oversight in Turkey: 'While the budgets of all ministries are explained and shared with booklets of hundreds of pages, the budget of the Ministry of Defense goes no further than an information note of a few pages. Even in this information note, instead of detailed information about content, it may be possible to see only items such as personnel expenses and general expenses.'

At exactly this point, Ali Bayramoğlu drew attention to the concept of 'asymmetric information' between the civilian sphere and the military sphere, and said that information on military matters in Turkey is still kept within the state and the military and not shared with the public, and that one of the basic obstacles to civilian democratic oversight stems precisely from this situation. This of course constitutes an important problem that engraves military tutelage as a norm on the people of Turkey and on the mentality of government.

In almost all of the countries that lived under military juntas and military rule, three phases were experienced in the transition to civilian democracy.

The first is the complete removal of the military from the political sphere. Turkey is a country making headway on this; it is also possible to read 27 April in this respect as the military's hara-kiri. The military played the trumps in its hand and this time met a serious civilian democratic reaction. Since that day the beneficial purging of the military from politics has continued.

The second step in civilianization is getting rid of asymmetric information, so that the military can be overseen by civilians. We need to take many more steps on this. Dr. Beriş's analysis shows us that there is a long way to go and that Turkey is far behind when compared with democratic countries.

The third step in civilianization is the establishment of a structure in which, not only on military spending but on all military matters, it is the responsible political authority, not the military, that decides and governs. Historical experience showed us the same path in the democratization of both Spain and Argentina. Turkey has no other way to go than this direction, if we do not want to see new 28 Februarys, new midnight memoranda; it must cover this road, and we must build civilian democracy. Turkey, with its civil society, intellectuals and politics, can achieve this. Turkish society deserves such a country.