A blessed event

It was very clear that the purpose of the three force commanders of the TSK and a Chief of the General Staff tendering their resignations, in a manner unprecedented in the history of the Republic, was to put the civilian administration in a difficult position by giving an image of weakness at the top. It was even emphasized that in the manner or aim of its execution this act was no different from the 27 April memorandum.

But the commanders met with the very opposite of whatever they aimed at with their action. They found no great public support behind their resignations; on the contrary, they both lost their respectability with demands for what Markar Esayan nicely called a "privileged retirement disguised as resignation," and gathered more criticism and antipathy than they had encountered in any earlier attempt at a memorandum. So much so that this resignation affair was assessed, far from being a crisis for Turkey, as a "historic opportunity," "an important occasion for reforms," "a starting opportunity for restructuring."

The expression that summed up all these assessments was the characterization "a blessed event," recalling the Vaka-i Hayriye.

Undoubtedly, historically we are in a very different context from the Vaka-i Hayriye. So there is no point in getting stuck on whether the analogy fits in every detail. Historically, there are many differences in the actors, direction and form of the event. We must think of it as a simile and say that no fault is sought in a simile. There can be no error in a simile; that is, a simile is only a simile, not the same thing.

For example, there a Janissary corps was abolished in its entirety, whereas here there is a horizon of change brought about by the action of commanders who collectively "retired" of their own will in order to take a political stance.

In this horizon of change there is a structuring of the TSK that is stronger, more efficient, more respected and suited to a democratic level. For years one of the most important obstacles to both Turkey's development and its democratization was the level of civil-military relations. This level of relations, which no one even dared to touch, is made touchable by such blessed events. We say "such events"; one was the 27 April e-memorandum.

What was hoped from that memorandum and what was found? These were excellent examples of how the unintended results of planned actions can be more decisive, and of how blessed outcomes can come out of such evil events. Undoubtedly the blessedness of the event shows neither the good intentions of those who caused it nor the correctness of their actions.

Looking at the justifications of the generals who resigned by asking for retirement, they do not see planning and attempting a coup, and, to that end, trying to set up smear websites to discredit by trickery and intrigue, when necessary, the government under whose command they serve, as a crime worth pursuit, trial or investigation. They consider the trial being conducted on these charges unnecessary. For they already see doing these things as their routine work. They find it odd to be tried for these routine tasks. This understanding is clearly put forth.

In this state of theirs they are in fact committing a series of crimes one after another. First of all they deviate from the oath they took. For the Internal Service Law of the TSK, which always comes up with its Article 35, also has Article 37, which contains the text of the oath. This oath commands, first of all, loyalty to the nation and obedience to one's superiors. The understanding that dictates "loyalty to the army" to everyone as a "measure of honor" cannot be reconciled with this oath. What is essential is not loyalty to the army but the army's loyalty to the nation and obedience to its orders, and the nation conveys its orders to its soldiers by making those it elects its superiors.

The soldier has no right or authority to make a distinction between governments with which he will work well or badly. Yet for those who produced the superstition of loyalty to the army and impose it, it is not just a matter of distinguishing between good and bad governments; when they find in themselves the power to make this distinction, even good governments they will not obey, let alone direct them.

While we are at it, let us note again that the structure of the YAŞ is odd. As stated in the report "YAŞ and Military-Government Relations" published some time ago by the Institute for Strategic Thinking, no area is left to the prime minister in the Council regarding the promotion, appointment and arrangement of the personnel under his command. Since decisions are taken by majority vote, it has been calculated that, when he is in dissent, the prime minister, that is, the government, that is, the will of the nation, would have no influence on the shaping of the command echelon. The vote of the prime minister, who attends the Council with 15 four-star generals and his own Defense Minister, has no effect; in the event of dispute, it is always what the military says that prevails.

For that reason, the only role assigned to him until now was to sign with his eyes closed all these transactions the soldiers had settled among themselves. Yet from the beginning Erdoğan did not consent to this position of his in the YAŞ being imposed on the ground of "custom." He turned his chairmanship in the YAŞ from a symbolic one into an actual and valid chairmanship. But this structuring requires that the authorities in the YAŞ and the ineffectiveness of the civilian will be placed on a legal basis. This could actually be corrected with a law, even with a decree having the force of law. This latest event should be regarded as a blessed occasion for making this arrangement, which no politician has dared to make until now.