Are we aware of what is expected of Turkey?

Yeni Şafak · Yasin Aktay - Are we aware of what is expected of Türkiye?

After the Turks withdrew, at the end of the First World War, from their historical role of ensuring Islamic unity for centuries and of representing it on the world stage as a culture and civilization, the Islamic world de facto fell into disarray. Muslims, who de facto make up nearly a third of the world's population and who exist in every part of the world and turn toward a single qibla, cannot establish a cultural presence either, since they have no possibility of political representation.

The articles of the Maghrebi thinker Dr. Kamal al-Qasir, titled "The Collapse of Closed Cultural Paradigms: What Role for Türkiye?" and "What Does the Islamic World Need from Türkiye?", published in Al-Quds al-Arabi and referred to in our last article, together with his other writings, express that the current state of the Islamic world expects from Türkiye a broader opening for an Islamic discourse squeezed between two closed paradigms. According to him, because the Islamic claims that Iran has put forward with state sponsorship remain stuck in the narrow sectarian perspective of the Shiite population alone, there is today no possibility that it could gather the scattered Islamic world or put forward a cultural vision that would represent the whole Islamic world. In history too, although Safavid Iran always had a cultural and ideological claim, rather than unifying the Islamic world it did nothing but disrupt and weaken the unity that existed. The Islamic Revolution, which emerged today with a different discourse, has turned back and again remained stuck in the narrow sectarian discourse.

On the other hand, according to al-Qasir, the obvious feature of the Islamic discourse represented in Saudi Arabia, which after the Ottomans took on the role of apparent servant of Islam, was an exclusionary closedness. While it already lacks a vision that would see and respond to the needs of the modern world, the openness experienced recently is taking the form not of a claim to represent Islam better but of shedding altogether this responsibility that it had, for better or worse, undertaken in the past.

Before this, the principal Arab cultural capitals, which from Cairo to Baghdad and Damascus represented a center of cultural attraction, have unfortunately lost these characteristics as well. Being a cultural center requires first of all the state's patronage of freedoms and, to some extent, pursuing serious cultural policies.

At the same time, because of the burdening of the fields of idea production and the siege of culture from the narrowest places, especially while cultural policies are fed only with the crumbs and remnants of budgets set aside for running public affairs, an attractive and influential Arab cultural model is not being formed today.

According to al-Qasir, there is currently no Sunni power or center at the summit of Islamic culture, but we must accept that the Turks brought Dar al-Islam to its present borders until a century ago.

In the light of the cultural impasse, Türkiye has much to offer the region, especially in terms of its political culture and Islamic democracy, which have reached their present state by passing through extremely complex conditions. Merely believing in the possibility of an Islamic democracy is in itself a very important matter for the political culture of the region.

The Turks' Sunni affiliation placed upon them many obligations toward the region in the past, and places this responsibility on them today and in the future. Especially at the critical moments faced by the Sunni world, Türkiye must, in order to ensure balance in the region with Iran, Russia and the West, fulfill its obligations as time passes, not only as a military power but as a cultural center, with its distant and recent history. Indeed Türkiye's power will not be obtained only through the performance it will show in defense technologies. The motivation that it needs even to become a power in this field is also provided by its affiliation with, and investment in, this culture. For carrying weapons is necessary and suitable for spreading, but carrying culture ensures survival and the continuation of influence, just as in the past.

That Türkiye has today become a zone of attraction for many Arab and Islamic elements is a datum that must be taken into account. Together with all the other data, it inevitably leads to the existence of a center of attraction toward that region that is growing and that must be turned into a common cultural vision. But the contradiction and weakness lie in the Turks' not having so far met with a similar movement the movement and favor directed toward them.

At this point al-Qasir invites the Turks to be more visible in the Arab world, to travel more and to make themselves heard more. For according to him culture is transmitted through visits and travel.

Al-Qasir, saying that the Turks have proven themselves to have the greatest reach and influence in the region in terms of historical media production, also notes that this is a very effective datum when it comes to similar achievements reflecting the common relations and ties between them and the components of the Arab region.

According to him, the Sunni ideological vacuum now allows the emergence of a great (supranational) Sunni idea, and encourages a very important matter, the making of Istanbul into a cultural capital and a center of cultural attraction in the region.

If the Turks do not decide to build an ideology themselves in the region, or cannot do so, they can at least provide the environment and space for the development of Islamic cultural growth, which in fact is what is already developing today de facto, perhaps unplanned, spontaneously.

But al-Qasir also notes, as another limitation, that the movement of translation from Arabic into Turkish and from Turkish into Arabic is at a very low level. According to him, there is a need for Türkiye's interest in the Arabic language as an element of attraction for the region, and for a common culture industry that draws societies into its own orbit. Türkiye, which finds it difficult to be a center for exporting culture and ideology, can be a center for the assimilation and redistribution of its outputs.

According to al-Qasir, in the long term Türkiye can become the "center of the Muslim mind," and this would be a factor strengthening its geostrategic position. The Mamluk state, by the nature of its military structure, did not produce culture, but after the fall of the centers of Baghdad and Andalusia it made Egypt a center of cultural influence and redistribution.

Looking at this picture drawn by al-Qasir, is not the first question that comes to mind this: Are the Turks aware of this historical responsibility?