The academy and friendship

The concept of the academy, like many concepts related to science, comes from ancient Greek, from an olive grove named Akademeia near Athens. This olive grove is the place where Plato, one of the greatest philosophers of ancient Greece, gave his philosophy lessons. It is thought to be the first place where philosophy, whose root is the love of wisdom, was thus taught systematically to others through lessons.

Is that really so? Were there no such places at that time elsewhere in the world, in India, in China, in Egypt? We skip these questions. In fact, the relationship of the Buddha, absorbed in contemplation under the fig tree, with the people around him has probably not been dwelt on enough in this context. Once, with a Eurocentric understanding of history, it was decreed, like many other things, that the love of truth also began in Greece. That is how it goes.

The relationship of the academy with friendship is, above all, that the love and passion for wisdom of the people who came together in these lesson circles or councils of thought bound them to one another in a friendly relationship. Philosophy, composed of the words philos (love) and sophia (wisdom), is above all an expression of friendship toward wisdom, truth, knowledge, and truth itself.

Aristotle said that people choose their friends either for their interests, or for their pleasures, or for their virtues, and sustain their friendships on that basis. Philosophy, as a love of truth, is the most important virtue that brings together the people who share in this pursuit and forms unparalleled friendships among them. That is why philosophy requires friendship in every case, takes place among friends, and produces friendship.

The relations of people who come together in the pursuit of truth are of course more lasting than the others. Leaving aside friendships that end when interests end and friendships that are exhausted when shared pleasures are exhausted, the loyalty, solidarity and sincerity of people who come together on the basis of the love of truth are altogether different.

So, as an environment where people who love truth and seek what is right and knowledge meet, how far can the academy be thought of together with friendship today? Although academy and friendship should, by origin and by the nature of the matter, be very closely tied to one another, how decisive is friendship in our academic practice today, how much room is there for friendship? How much of academic activity gives the appearance of an activity among friends, or does academic activity have an effect that increases and strengthens friendship?

The bitter enmities and the fierce races and rivalries we see within the academy today make it difficult to give an optimistic answer to such a question. If such conflicts that we witness in the academic world occur out of love of science, out of love of truth, and in the form of a clash of ideas, we say "the spark of truth is born from the clash of opinions" and move on. That is no problem; on the contrary, it is in favor of truth, it is preferable for people who have founded their friendships out of love of truth, and it does not spoil friendship but strengthens it. After all, love of truth does not require that what everyone sees as truth be seen as truth by the other, even if there is friendship between them. Those who are friends with one another because of their love of truth do not sacrifice truth to friendships.

But, alas, not every dispute among academics arises out of love of truth. For there is no seyr-ü süluk (spiritual path) that thoroughly teaches those who join academic life that being an academic requires a love, is the result of a love, or gives birth to a love. There should be, but there is not. Most disputes do not arise in the name of a more correct knowledge, a better truth; very often what gives rise to these disputes is that the academics do not love one another and cannot stand one another.

Even the pursuit of truth does not draw such people to one another, does not form familiarity between them. This envy, this lack of familiarity, intimacy and affection can in some cases actually be a trigger of very creative ideas. The birth of the spark of truth need not come from the clash of the ideas of friends. Sometimes a hostile gaze sees the shortcomings and flaws that a friend would not see in a friend's idea or academic production, and by showing them contributes to the development of the idea and of science.

Thus we have pointed out a weakness of friendship in the academy, and, on the contrary, a positive side of envy or contention, even if we do not like it. In fact, long theoretical debates have even been held on this subject. In philosophy of science debates, there have been those who view the history of science generally as a sum of activities carried out to verify a theory. According to this view, routine academic activity is carried out to verify existing paradigms and theories. This precisely describes the routine academic activity of those who do science on the basis of friendship. Yet here the orientation of those who act to verify the existing theory is not an expression of friendship, reverence and affection toward the master who owns the theory.

Perhaps this is precisely the unreckoned effect of philosophy's transformation into the academy. Did the real great deviation begin when Plato transformed the love of wisdom he had learned from Socrates, that is philosophy, into an academic activity? From that point on, did the relationship established with knowledge cease to be a love of wisdom and turn into an instruction that people transmit to one another within the framework of a certain discipline?

Academy and instruction cannot of course be thought apart. But in instruction there is a condition of necessity that goes beyond friendship. The necessities in instruction bring the relationship between teacher and student, or among those taking the lesson, to a level that eliminates friendship. Now, rather than the tranquility of people seeking truth together, what is at issue is the transmission or acquisition of a ready-made knowledge being taught within a certain discipline.

When philosophy, with all its disciplines, turned into a profession, a tool in the hands of the sophists, the first thing sacrificed was friendship, the love of truth and the love of those who seek truth for one another. In today's academic world, the love and pursuit of truth has been entirely replaced by the training of people who have acquired, in a certain package, the knowledge determined, sought and demanded by market conditions. At this level, one must ask how much need there is for friendship, how much friendship can arise.

Meanwhile, is routine academic activity really always carried out to verify existing paradigms and theories? There is another dimension to which Karl R. Popper draws our attention precisely against this famous assumption. On the contrary, according to Popper, the routine activity of science consists not so much of people verifying one another as of constantly trying to refute by finding one another's deficiencies and gaps.

What is the motivation of such an effort and how does it affect friendship in the academy?

Thinking about the academy and friendship, thinking about ourselves as academics in these first days of the new academic year, may perhaps enable us to understand ourselves a little.