Modernization, the Constitution and Turkey's exceptionalism

The modernizationist understanding in vogue at the beginning of the 20th century assumed that all the developments experienced in the West could be applied, indeed ought to be applied, as a model to the whole world.

Viewed from today, this appears at best a very naive, even ignorant understanding, incapable of grasping the importance of social differences. Today's modernist approaches are far from shouldering such ignorance and naivety. On the contrary, social differences are appreciated under headings such as "different modernities," "the originality and specificity of countries" or "different paths to modernity," and it is accepted that a sociological experience cannot be lived in the same way in two geographical regions. Indeed, this general acceptance has now entered even among the most basic premises of sociology. Yet in the first stages of modernizationism the approach is this simple.

The naivety contained in this simplicity concerned those who believed in it and served to convince them, of course, but the political consequences arising from it functioned as the reconnaissance arm of Western imperialism. Among those convinced by it, an intellectual segment had formed that had fallen into heedlessness and was alien to its own culture, faith and traditions. They had turned into the voluntary activists, the meddlesome agents, of Western imperialism in non-Western societies.

The real modernization, progress and development of other lands was in fact never something the Western countries truly wanted. Just as, today, Western democratic countries do not really want Muslim countries to democratize. For them democracy is a system that can be applied only in their own countries, to the extent that it can be applied honestly at all. But the real democratization of non-Western countries would require that they rely on their own peoples and hence feel an inclination toward independence, which they, ontologically, cannot possibly want.

One of the most important emphases in Said Halim Pasha's analyses of the Kanun-u Esasi is his emphasis on the originality of countries and societies, with particular reference to Turkey. This originality constitutes the greatest obstacle to transferring an experience in one country to another as it is. The deep differences between Western societies and Ottoman society in particular made it impossible to transfer a constitutional experience as it was.

Starting from this basic principle, the Pasha enters into the differences between Ottoman and European societies on the basis of concrete examples. First of all, Ottoman society is a society founded on boundless differences within itself. In terms of religion, language, race, culture and level of development, every kind of difference is encountered in the Ottoman geography. Perhaps this situation led Western sociologists to describe it as a "mosaic society."

This description was developed by the first Western sociologists with orientalist motives, in order to attribute a weakness to Ottoman-Islamic society. The term in itself contains a negative characterization implying that Islam is not strong enough in creating a homogeneous culture. Yet the fact that Islam has no policy of creating a homogeneous culture shows not its weakness but, on the contrary, its strength and self-confidence, and of course how suited it is to cultural-religious freedom and pluralism. That is why it is a historical reality that in Muslim society there have almost always been non-Muslim elements, equal in number to Muslims or even more numerous than them, with all their differences, and that they have lived in security and freedom.

In contrast, the cultural and religious homogeneity that characterizes the West is not a result and indicator of its strength but of the intolerance and bigotry it displays toward differences. Although there is no tolerance for different religions and cultures in the West, there are deep class differences within it. In European societies there is an aristocracy and a bourgeoisie that hold great authority and influence over the destiny of the nation, and both of these strata either do not exist in the Ottoman world or are a completely insignificant social factor.

Said Halim Pasha emphasizes the influence of a very powerful class of officials in contrast to the aristocracy and bourgeoisie that do not exist in Ottoman society. Officials constitute the most active class and the intelligentsia of Ottoman society. Because officialdom represents the power of the state, it has a very brilliant status and influence in the social stratification system, and for this reason it is everyone's ideal. The greatest ideal of educated intellectuals, too, is to become an official.

Yet the state of mind peculiar to officialdom, consisting of indifference, resignation, submission and avoidance of responsibility, deprives officials of any spirit of sacrifice and personal initiative. In contrast, members of the aristocrat and bourgeois classes are free and independent in their actions, possess civil courage and are enterprising persons. They seek and love work and responsibility, and they have feelings of sacrifice.

At this point in the comparison of European and Ottoman society, it is quite clear that the balance tips against Ottoman society. Indeed, similar analyses flowing from Max Weber's pen have even been recorded in the ledger of the orientalist discourses of Eurocentric sociology. But Said Halim Pasha's analyses try to shed light on the gravity of imitating a constitution and trying to implement it while ignoring the sociological conditions and social strata on which it rests.

In fact we have no information that Said Halim Pasha read either Weber or Marx, but the sociological power of his later analyses displays very strong parallels with the sociological literature of the age.

Of course, he does this not to say that we have no other path than Europe, but to show the originality of Ottoman society and the unsuitability of the blind imitation of Western institutions.