İmralı's fear of the opening

Öcalan's complaining, even if only by implication, about his conditions on İmralı was enough to turn the cities where Kurds live in large numbers into battlefields. In terms of showing the DTP masses' deadly devotion to Öcalan, the events turned into a show of force for Öcalan. This reaction of Öcalan's against being sidelined in the process, or his importance not being sufficiently appreciated, may carry the cost of all the efforts for the opening going to waste.

It is no secret that an effort that takes Öcalan's influence over the Kurdish masses seriously will make it almost impossible to carry out the efforts for the Kurdish opening. The greatest pressure the AK Parti, which has dared to undertake the opening, has felt during the process is the repercussions of the possibility of treating Öcalan as an interlocutor. In this political atmosphere it is almost impossible for the AK Parti to take this risk. It is not possible that Öcalan, or the DTP members who at this stage see no role for themselves other than representing Öcalan, fail to see this. Nevertheless, the demand that Öcalan be included in the process means nothing other than the will to knowingly drag the Kurdish opening into an impossible lane.

To discuss the matter on the basis that it matters whether the conditions on İmralı are this way or that has no meaning at this point. A healthy analysis of the situation cannot be made by tying the matter to the difference between his old room and his new room, or to the dullness of the new room. Even if five-star conditions had been provided on İmralı, it would not be right to think that Öcalan's desire to create this problem at this stage of the process could have been prevented. The truth of the matter is that Öcalan has taken both the Kurdish question and Turkey's democracy hostage. Öcalan, who treats the Kurdish question with "closure," is in this way also performing "closure exercises" on Turkish democracy, and does not care what this costs.

That he uses his indisputable influence over Kurdish politics not in the direction of resolving the Kurdish question but in the direction of driving this question into a deadlock is, in my view, not Öcalan's own personal preference. It is very hard to think that he fails to see that this attitude, which has brought no result other than sabotaging the solution of the problem, has also pushed far away, even made impossible, the possibility of his own situation being reconsidered in a reasonable future.

Yet in an environment where armed actions have ended and the pain of martyrs has fallen well off the agenda of society, particularly in an environment where it is known that Öcalan played a role in providing this environment, the Turks' perception of Öcalan could have been very different from today's.

That a leader whom some Kurdish circles love to the point of worship and to whom they attribute a symbolic meaning is an object of complete hatred in the eyes of the great majority of society shows very well that Öcalan cannot use his influence over the Kurdish circles in the direction of solving the problem either. The only conclusion from this complicated situation is that Öcalan has badly adopted the most important principle of traditional Turkish politics, namely the principle that "unresolvedness is the best solution." When the existence of this problem creates a sufficiently profitable situation, who would want to take on trouble by solving it?

That the DTP feels no discomfort at the image given on the pretext of the İmralı conditions before the closure case to be heard tomorrow at the Constitutional Court, and on the contrary adopts an attitude that fans this fire, leads to the same place to which the same "impossible politics" leads. The DTP, which has not the slightest intention or effort to adapt to the political ground of Turkey and to be subject to a legitimacy on this ground, appears in this state to be making a clear effort to withdraw completely and hand the matter over to the PKK.

The DTP shows that it is looking for an opportunity to give up supporting the Kurdish opening, which is the most meaningful and possible mission that can politically be attributed to it so far. Deputy Emine Ayna declared, at a moment when no one yet understood what was going on, that "the government's policy regarding the İmralı conditions has ended the opening." What haste, what panic, what fear!

The reason for the panic is actually clear... It is very clearly seen that the opening process has considerably loosened the social base of the PKK. The solution process leaves those who had found a way in unresolvedness utterly without a way. That is why İmralı's wish to attract attention and interest is not incomprehensible, even if it has the effect of driving the solution of problems into a deadlock.

Let it not be thought that locking the democratic opening in a cell on İmralı will carry no cost for the DTP or Öcalan. As this confinement continues, it is seen that the gap between the Kurdish people and İmralı, which attempts to establish tutelage over this people, is gradually widening.

The increasing aggressiveness on the streets is a sign and a cause of the diminishing interest at the grassroots in parallel with the opening process. That is why the name of the fear reflected in the street demonstrations is plainly "fear of the opening."