A deadly determination that no knowledge can shake

The Danıştay's decision to suspend execution of the YÖK decision that removed the coefficient inequality deserves evaluation from many angles. These days we are reading many very sensible, very comprehensive analyses evaluating the decision. These analyses focus on points that find YÖK's approach to the matter, as much as the Danıştay decision, problematic with regard to the general approach to vocational high schools. In his last two articles Kürşat Bumin, while drawing attention on the one hand to the ideological stance in the Danıştay's approach, offered a thorough analysis pointing out that YÖK's approach is not without problems either.

In the end, in the process that has emerged as a kind of "battle of decisions" between the Danıştay and YÖK, Bumin says, "when speaking of the 'coefficient,' both decision-making authorities remember almost only the imam hatip high school graduates." Yet the İHLs, which make up only 8 percent of all vocational high schools, are not "vocational high schools" in the known sense either. Moreover, in this debate that cannot escape revolving around or for the İHLs, whatever the outcome, vocational high schools are affected, and as long as the matter continues this way, we will never be able to discuss the problem of vocational high schools, nor will we be able to take measures for these schools to attain the function needed of them.

Although this is one side of the matter, it is quite clear that in the Danıştay's stance there is neither a concern for legal consistency nor the slightest trace of a search for functionality related to raising the quality of vocational high schools or of education in general. Moreover, it must be noted here that the coefficient practice does not strike only vocational high schools, and therefore, even if the İHLs are taken out of the picture, the class-based structure of the coefficient practice, a product of the genius, the sharp-wittedness, of the 28 February, which aimed to cut much deeper, cannot be eliminated.

In the coefficient practice, the invention of the YÖK under the 28 February administration, there was another matter of discrimination that had nothing to do with the İHLs or vocational high schools: the success of the secondary education institution one graduated from was directly reflected in the student's score. Thanks to this incredible invention, those who graduated from a relatively unsuccessful school (guess in what part of the country such schools are) were officially punished for the failure of their own school.

Thanks to this brilliant way, more brilliant than all the scientists of the world together could find, insurmountable barriers were in fact erected between the center and the periphery. Although this approach claimed to act in the name of the State and the Republic, it tried to make the state and the republic belong only to a certain circle. As for the rest, far from ever trying to win them over, on the contrary, with attitudes of "tedip" (disciplining), "tenkil" (exemplary punishment) or "haricilik" (exclusion), it tried to expel them completely from the system. In this respect there is a close relationship between the tedip in Dersim and the haricilik in the headscarf ban and the coefficient practice.

That is why the bitter side of this debate, as in many political debates in Turkey, is knowing that no argument can convince anyone other than its own supporters. When it comes to law, of course, the situation becomes more tragic. Because it is essential that the actors who apply the law stand at an equal distance from all parties and positions, open and ready precisely "to be persuaded." But this and similar cases show that in Turkey it is essential for jurists not to be under any influence in decision processes other than their own prejudices on the matter. Prejudice, of course, may have been formed in various ways; let us not go into that matter now.

Indeed, Dr. Bekir S. Gür, in his article on the commentary page of the newspaper Zaman published yesterday, showed with striking examples how technically distant the Danıştay jurists were from the subject in the justification text of their decision on education. The judiciary of course need not be expert in every matter it decides, but because of its distance from the matter it must resort to an expert witness or to expert opinion on the subject during the judicial process. Yet in similar cases we often see that even the effect of expert opinions in the judicial process remains extremely limited.

Unfortunately our judges prefer to play the role of the "all-knowing" and to dislike expert opinions even though they know nothing about the matters they decide. Just like our soldiers, who are very determined about what they will do... They too refuse those who advise them to consult sociologists about the social impact and repercussions of what they will do, on the grounds that "when we ask sociologists they confuse our minds and spoil our determination."

What can I say; I would say "Heaven forbid your determination be spoiled," but I also know I have no right to this generosity; if this determination, this courage, arising from an extremely dense ignorance, were to keep its owners in a corner and put them harmlessly to sleep, there would be no problem, let them see to whatever they will. But if this ignorance has a genocidal effect that darkens the future of millions of people, how can it be left to itself?