The indefensible states of the TSK

The fact that the document known as the "Action Plan to Combat Irtica" was not owned up to by the TSK until the original with its "wet" signature came to light clearly means that the plans and ideas stated in the document's content are regarded as illegitimate by the TSK as well. Yet it is also very well known that Colonel Dursun Çiçek, whose signature is on the document, by virtue of his position did not and could not prepare such a document alone. Moreover, it has emerged very clearly that, by virtue of his position, such a document has no meaning at all without almost full institutional support or participation behind it.

The document was evidently put into circulation within a chain of command and filed to enter the official archives as well. Even so, TSK officials did not take responsibility for this document when they first heard of it, because the plan contained in this document has no legal basis whatsoever.

There is no logic or justification that could ground, legally or humanly, the nation's army plotting conspiracies against its nation. Those who do it, whatever their aims, whether in the name of the nation's security or of combating irtica, cannot explain such a conspiracy even to their own career supporters. When such a plan comes to light, they are caught in the act in a thoroughly shameful flagrant crime. From the most Kemalist nationalist to the most democratic liberal, no one can imagine such a plan and activity of the TSK, and no one stands by the TSK in this.

Yet these conspiracies that cannot be imputed to the TSK are nothing other than the TSK's standard pattern of behavior from 27 May to 12 September and from there to 28 February and 27 April. Even if this document had not come out, we all know that coups have never been carried out with less grave conspiracies. Did those who thought of "ensuring that weapons were found" in the homes of members of a community declared an enemy not use that mind plenty in the processes that carried them to 9 March, 12 September, 28 February?

The informant officer who sent the "Plan to Finish Off the AK Parti and Gülen" document to the Ergenekon prosecutors also sent, in addition, a second "Information Support Plan." This plan too contains the findings that form the justification for preparing the main plan in question. One of the most important justifications is the finding that "the AKP does not take into account the TSK's sensitivities, even its objections, on basic matters and continues to walk on the path it knows."

An approach that sees itself above the government, the political institution and everything is very clearly expressed, but the emergence of this expression is by no means wanted, because those who wrote this text evidently know that even the expression of this constitutes a "crime." Or perhaps they do not know, and when this text is made public they suddenly realize the situation themselves too.

And what about this finding?

"It is also important to determine what the TSK's present possibility of influencing or directing political developments is, or more precisely whether this possibility remains."

How fortunate the TSK has been, in the 28 February period or earlier periods, regarding the "possibility of influencing or directing political developments" it is concerned about, is known to all of us. However you look at it, there is no one who does not know that being in this quest or intention itself constitutes a grave constitutional crime. So much so that when a document that is a manifestation of this intention comes out, no one claims it. But on the other hand there is no one who does not know that this document and the activities planned in this document are a routine procedure of the institution. It is of course not possible for one or two individual officers to pursue the "possibility of influencing and directing political developments." However you look at it, such a "possibility" requires institutional participation and pursuit. But this participation and pursuit is at the same time a routinized "illegal" activity.

Let this also be our humble finding: that the internal discourse that members of the TSK can pronounce so easily among themselves has remained so far from the legal and open-society discourse and "illegal." The situation shows that the TSK's own routine activities have remained stuck in a narrow-community discourse, even in the language of a secret organization.

Those who prepare this kind of reports or plans notice that they are crimes only when they come to light.

Has the time not come to ask in earnest through what education an institution of the nation took up this narrow community language as its own?