← All articles · The world and the Islamic world
Public opinion in the shadow of war: what are the peoples of Turkey and America saying?

Societies sometimes speak not with long speeches but with short answers. The options ticked in a poll often say more than what politicians explain for hours. For there it is not embellished sentences but direct feeling.
POLLS DO NOT LIE, PROVIDED THE RIGHT QUESTION IS ASKED
The answers given to polls are often the shortest way and the best way for societies to express their feelings. Of course, provided that the polls are properly conducted and the questions properly asked. You will say, what have we understood from this? Is a properly asked question not also somewhat a guide to its answer? In that case, is it the people who speak, or the polling firms?
If the intention is really to know what the people say, what they feel, and what they truly say without any discomfort or disappointment, there are sound methods of analysis that will bring out this information. Sociological methods exist for this.
HE'S TRUMP, EVEN POLLS MAKE HIM SPEAK
The mighty US, following Israel's lead, has a "feeling," for example, that the barbarity it has displayed in the Middle East has an effect that humiliates the US in the eyes of many US citizens and is slowly erasing it from the stage of history. Many polls conducted in this direction show this. Under the effect of the war, in the poll conducted by Reuters/Ipsos, Trump's overall approval has fallen to the lowest levels of his second term. In the Economist/YouGov poll, while approval of Trump has fallen to 37%, the share of those who disapprove is 56%. In CNN/SSRS the results are harsher; around 35% approval in some measures. The RCP average shows roughly 41% approval against a 57% disapproval band.
Of course, these are what the more neutral, or perhaps opposition, polling firms say. Against all this, the results Trump announced in recent days say the exact opposite, of course. In surveys he had commissioned from firms close to himself, Trump said his approval rate is in the 44-46 percent band. The most realistic and healthiest poll will of course be the ballot-box results. In the midterm election in November it will be seen more clearly whose wishes the poll results reflect.
IN TURKEY THERE IS AN AGENDA BIGGER THAN THE ELECTION
The war of course affects people's thoughts and feelings not only in the US but all over the world. In the undemocratic countries of the Middle East, what the people think rarely matters. No one asks the people anything anyway, and even if they did, they could not get a healthy answer. Turkey, however, is a democratic country, and what the people say and feel always matters, because in the end the people have the power and the means to have the last word about the course of events. For that reason both the rulers and the opposition need to keep a very good finger on the people's pulse. Of course, if the opposition really has the intention of being in power, and if the government too has a plan and intention to continue.
The March 2026 data of AREDA, under the direction of Prof. Dr. Ömer Çaha, presents an interesting picture at precisely such a moment: a moment when Turkish society is repositioning itself along the axis of war, state, justice and security.
The picture that emerges at first glance is this: AK Parti leading with 34 percent and CHP in second place with 29.2 percent (in GENAR's March 2026 Turkey Picture, AK Parti appears as 34.2 and CHP as 31.8) shows that the classical balances in politics have been largely preserved. But what makes this data truly meaningful are the other tendencies forming around it. Because this picture reflects less an "election moment" than the sociology of a moment of crisis.
IN TURKEY THE NATION WANTS NEITHER BASES NOR CHAOS
One of the most noteworthy headings is society's attitude toward the war. That 63.8 percent of participants think Turkey should remain neutral in the war shows that Turkish society's reflex is not to become involved but to strike a balance. This is a historically strong tendency as well. But that 54 percent of the same society finds the government's stance in the Iran war successful reveals a noteworthy balance: while society defends neutrality as a principle, it also thinks that the current policy preserves this balance.
Even more striking is the sensitivity on matters of security and sovereignty. That the share of those who think American bases should not be permitted in Turkey has reached an almost absolute level, such as 98.1 percent, shows that there is a strong sovereignty reflex in society. This data reflects not only a foreign policy preference but also a deep historical memory and a sensitivity about independence. At the same time it reflects the feelings of the Turkish people toward the US and Israel, separately or together. I have never been able to tell whether there has ever been another element in the country that is so unifying.
THE PEOPLE WANT JUSTICE, WITH TRANSPARENCY
Alongside this, society's assessments about the direct parties to the war are also quite complex. For example, the share of those who find it right that Iran struck the Gulf because of the US bases is at a high level such as 73.2 percent. This shows that Turkish society approaches events not through classical "ally-enemy" categories but rather with a reactive sense of justice. That is, the question of who starts it, who provokes, becomes decisive in society's assessment.
When it comes to domestic politics, an interesting "parallel reality" emerges. That the share of those who want Ekrem İmamoğlu's judicial process to be broadcast live on TRT is 69 percent shows that a significant part of society openly expresses a demand for transparency. But at the same time, that a segment of 62.1 percent thinks İmamoğlu and his circle will be found guilty suggests that this demand rests on the desire for "truth to become visible" rather than on the "presumption of innocence."
A similar two-sided structure is seen in the debate between Özgür Özel and Akın Gürlek. That the shares of those who find each side persuasive are very close to one another shows that in such debates society stands in an undecided and cautious position rather than being divided into definite sides.
TRAFFIC AND THE ECONOMY IN GEOPOLITICAL TURBULENCE
Society's reflexes about daily life are harsher. That penalties for aggressive behavior in traffic are supported at a rate of 87.9 percent, and that even harsh reactions such as "beat up whoever gets out of the car" have entered circulation, show that the need for security is rising not only in foreign policy but in daily life as well. This is something often seen in times of crisis: as the perception of external threat increases, the demand for internal order hardens too.
Economic data are another dimension underlining this picture. The share of those who say the effect of the war is felt most in fuel prices is 50.3 percent. But more important is that a segment of 47.3 percent thinks the Turkish economy cannot withstand a prolonged war. This shows that society has a serious awareness of the economic cost of the war.
When all this data is read together, the picture that emerges is this: Turkish society today is neither fully divided into ideological camps nor entirely in a rational balance. It acts rather within a pragmatic consciousness shaped by conditions of crisis. This consciousness, on the one hand, wants to see the state as strong, and on the other prefers to stay out of the war; on the one hand it demands justice, and on the other it carries prejudged opinions about the outcomes.
Perhaps what best sums up this picture is society's capacity to be both cautious and reactive at the same time. This is not a contradiction; on the contrary, it is the typical sociological condition of times of crisis.
In conclusion, Turkey today is less in an election atmosphere than in the social reflection of geopolitical turbulence. In such periods societies redefine not only their preferences but also their fears, expectations and limits. This data tells us exactly this: Turkish society is a society that tries to establish its own balance even in the midst of war, but is trying to sustain this balance under increasingly difficult conditions.