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The world and the Islamic worldYeni Şafak

Will it snow in the provinces of Yemen too?

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Abu Dabi'de Şeyh Zayed Camii'nin havuzdaki yansıması

Climates do not merely circulate among the seasons of the year. Sometimes there are climate returns lasting several years. Droughts that last several years, or, after several years of intense winters and rainfall in a row, the snow suddenly stops. Long periods with no snow at all. We call it climate change without thinking it through, and, forgetting the circulation of climates across years, we begin to imagine that everything has changed completely. We say, for instance, that such a winter has not been seen for years. The snow reaching half a meter in city centers in many parts of the country brings to mind snows from long ago; so nothing has been left completely behind, and everything, it turns out, has a return. Our Exalted Lord, who sends down snow and rain, gives or withdraws the sun in abundance whenever He wishes and wherever He wishes. But the memory of the human being is very weak, and he himself is very impatient; he thinks the moment he is living in is permanent. The days of God circulate among people. Climates change, tyrannies thought never to end come to an end, oppressors are destroyed, the sun rises, and the surroundings grow bright from the snow.

In social and international relations the situation is no different. The established world order is supposed to be nailed to the world. In that order the tyranny of the oppressors is supposed to be lasting and the oppressed supposed to be beyond recovery. Days of arrogance and insolence for the oppressors, times of anguish and suffering for the oppressed. Yet it is only a matter of moments before that order too is caught in a flood and turned upside down. It is part of God's historical practice (sunnah) to place the oppressed and the weak, on top of the waves of that flood, in the upper layers of a new order.

The tension that emerged between Saudi Arabia and the UAE in the last days of the year caused the shaking of a worrying order that had become thoroughly frozen in this region and had led to great problems, tyrannies, deaths, displays of arrogant power, and even the expansionism of Zionist Israel. The Operation Decisive Storm Coalition, which gave rise to the formation of this order, had been established 11 years ago to repel the Iran-directed Houthis who had seized the capital Sanaa in Yemen, to re-establish the legitimate government, thereby to limit Iranian influence, and to secure Saudi Arabia's border security. But over time this coalition did not repel the Houthis; on the contrary the Houthis became much stronger and became able to launch attacks into Saudi Arabia whenever they wished. Since the Houthis could not be repelled, it was not possible to re-establish the legitimate government, and Saudi Arabia's security became more exposed to threat than ever.

In fact, at the very start the Coalition was seized by the concern that pushing the Houthis back could open the way for the Islah Party, and strayed from its founding aims. Islah, which had the only force on the ground able to deal with the Houthis, was not entirely excluded, but preventing its inevitable flourishing as an alternative to the Houthis took precedence over the mission of stopping the Houthis. It is a truth that everyone on the ground can readily accept: had the Coalition members not had an obsession with Islah from the beginning, the problem would have been solved much earlier. But the Coalition members, because of the Brotherhood phobia that formed in them after the Arab Revolutions, made things much more complicated. Thus there emerged a long-lasting deadlock, a state of chaos and a humanitarian problem. A civil war in which tens of thousands of children died of hunger and millions of Yemeni civilians were forced to leave their country.

The prolonged civil war produced new international balances. What has happened in Yemen is no longer merely a civil war among local actors or a classical conflict between "legitimacy" and "coup." The country has turned into the stage of interlocking regional and international conflicts in which military, economic and maritime interests intersect and opposing projects of influence contend.

Meanwhile, although they entered in 2015 under the same roof and with the same slogans, the calculations and policies of SA and the UAE regarding the coalition diverged considerably. The UAE began to put into effect in Yemen an entirely different program, moreover in a way that SA would regard as a threat to itself. Previously too, in the regions known as South Yemen, by supporting armed local forces outside the state structure, it built security and military apparatuses loyal to itself and a political structure under the umbrella of the Southern Transitional Council.

The following years revealed that unity of goal does not mean unity of project. From SA's point of view, this separatist project was not only threatening Yemen's unity; it perceived that the expansion of the Southern Transitional Council eastward was approaching its own strategic lines.

Truly, this separation had surfaced long ago. The UAE is stoking civil war not only in Yemen but in Sudan, and supports developments there in which the Rapid Support Forces it backs most recently committed serious crimes against humanity in El Fasher. It is no secret that the entire infrastructure of the most recent recognition of Somaliland, that is, the entire diplomatic infrastructure of the relations between Israel and Somaliland, was prepared by the UAE.

In fact, it is not hard to infer that El Fasher too is advancing today along the road leading to the recognition of Somaliland. That, with the same model, following the recognition of the Southern Transitional Council it supports in Yemen, all three would line up in the alignment of "normalizing" relations with Israel is a UAE-Israel plan.

Indeed, it was noteworthy that SA had not made a sound until now against such free-wheeling initiatives of its partner. The UAE acts as the strongest partner of all of Israel's openings in the Islamic world and in Africa.

According to one assessment, the UAE's undertaking such large affairs independently of its own coalition partner, and SA's being so silent, were attributed to both being on the same axis as the U.S.-Israel. But what is certain is that SA could have no interest whatsoever in being encircled in this way by the UAE and Israel, and it was impossible that it did not perceive a great threat.

This very threat must have been seen clearly enough, for in a note issued by King Salman bin Abdulaziz himself, SA demanded that the UAE "withdraw its forces from Yemen within 24 hours." At the same time the UAE's weapons and armored vehicles and the forces of the Southern Transitional Council were struck by SA.

That the ultimatum was given by King Salman himself showed the seriousness of the matter, so that indeed before 24 hours had passed the UAE announced that it was withdrawing from the coalition and ending its military operations in Yemen. However, there are serious doubts as to whether it will stand by this word. Because it is known to conduct operations in many countries in practice even though it does not officially take responsibility for them.

Still, that Saudi Arabia has felt a threat against Israel's expansionism, and has made this move against its having turned into a separate coalition with the UAE that was deceiving it, is a sign of a beneficial climate change. I am speaking with Yemenis; in all of them there is great joy and optimism, a belated development but better than none at all.

Of course we can also attribute this development to the winds that the Al-Aqsa Flood continues to blow.