History repeats itself for the United States, which draws no lessons

The expectations and assumptions that guided the US attack on Iran, launched by trailing after Israel, can be seen as a typical example of its never having drawn a lesson from history. In its history the US has examples that ended in fiascos and failures, and in fleeing, without even looking back, from the quagmire it finally fell into. Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan have evidently not been instructive enough. In all three, first came the dangerous games of legitimizing manipulation it played on its own public, and then the great debacles that followed when the occupation and aggression it carried out on the pretexts it had fabricated collided with realities and with sociology.

Although in Trump's now distinctive "peace" rhetoric he boasts of being the one who ends wars rather than starts them, his entering on a path that will inflict a new trauma on US history cannot of course be explained simply by his inconsistency or the crude mismatch between what he says and what he does. It is very clear that there are conditions forcing him to venture into this adventure. The Epstein files, the war lobbies within the US, and the Israel lobbies can make Trump do the exact opposite the next day of what he said the day before, and he can adapt quickly to the new situation too.

His rhetoric is extremely far from reality, and his foresight is incapable of seeing two hours ahead. Within the first few hours, saying he had won and ended the war by killing Iran's religious leader and all the senior command and leadership cadre around him, he quickly fell into the delusion that he had destroyed Iran's military infrastructure and triggered regime change. It soon became clear that he was fully aware of neither the sociology behind the regime nor Iran's military capacity. Although he was confronted with the reality that the war he thought he could wrap up in a few days was growing longer with every hour, yesterday he spoke of carrying out a ground operation and invited the regime to surrender unconditionally. On the day he made these calls he had been blessed like a new savior Messiah at an Evangelical service, thoroughly motivated for war and extraordinary victories.

THE VENEZUELA EXPERIMENT HAS TURNED TRUMP'S HEAD

If he were to turn to history a little to see what a ground operation inside Iran could cost the US, Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan, as fresh and instructive examples, would tell him a great deal. But I think that if he turned to Iran's own peculiar sociology, it would tell him even more in addition to history.

Venezuela, as a prior experience that whetted the appetite for the operation against Iran, must have made the US forget history and lost its head. Seizing Maduro, who had largely lost popular support, and dangling this operation as a threat over the administration cadre that replaced him could be counted as a relatively great success. But thinking that this success could be repeated in the same way in Iran turned into a trap the US set for itself. When it eliminated Khamenei and the senior cadre, it assumed it could reach the result at the same speed through the opposition it had been supporting for years. It could not see what kind of power Shiism is in Iran, and what even a very significant part of the opposition can turn into at the moment of a foreign attack. However estranged the regime in Iran may be from a significant part of the people, a significant part of even the opponents (not all of them, of course) are still more inclined to suspend their opposition and stand with their own state when they see enemy aircraft in their skies.

THE FALSE ASSUMPTIONS THAT TEMPTED THE US

The assumption that Iran, left headless by Khamenei's killing, would see its administration paralyzed and lose its capacity to fight at once is in itself a great failure of foresight. The institution of Velayat-e Faqih in Iran has a very disciplined, top-down and deeply rooted institutional history that is not limited to the revolution. Although it is true that Khamenei, at the age of 87, carried weight on account of his experience, his death may, in just the opposite of what was expected, give the system an opportunity to renew itself. The old and experienced religious guide may perhaps have been playing a restraining, balancing role on the younger and more radical elements. While he himself was a more predictable and conciliable figure, there is also a very high probability that an uncertain-phantom administration, in which it is unclear who has come or will come in his place, takes over.

Thinking that, with Khamenei's death, Iranian Shiism, with its tradition spread over centuries, would be left headless is the most absurd assumption that tempted into this war. The more important problem for the US is now who the head is and the uncertainty about what he will do. Moreover, it seems certain that the culture of mourning and revenge concerning the guide, who has risen in the eyes of his Shiite followers to the rank of the wronged and the "martyr," will motivate the Iranian people far more strongly against the invasion. This will have created a very great disadvantage even against the opposition that exists inside Iran. In this situation, is the US helping the Iranian opposition, or has it provided the regime with a radical opportunity to consolidate itself?

Of course we are not implying with this sentence a new tiered conspiracy. On the contrary, one of the most valuable tenets of sociology now is that the unintended consequences of actions are far more decisive than their intended results. Social engineering aims at one thing; the projects actually implemented produce other, unwanted consequences. In this war too, it is already not difficult to foresee that results entirely different from what both the US and Israel aimed at will emerge.

Indeed, today the war is not limited to Iran. Iranian missiles and drones have targeted US bases and infrastructure in the Gulf; attacks have occurred in Bahrain, Oman and other countries; oil and port facilities have become targets; and energy transport in the Strait of Hormuz has been seriously disrupted. Israel's attacks on Lebanon and on energy infrastructure in Iran are also widening the geography of the war.

THE REAL DANGER HAS NOT YET EMERGED

Today three critical thresholds have formed. First, owing to the Strait of Hormuz crisis, the heart of global energy trade is at risk. Second, within the US, the unforeseeable consequences of this war, the coming onto the agenda of a ground war, the fact that even the America First slogan has within a short time been melted into Israel's priorities, and of course such great "displays of heroism" in the shadow of the Epstein files may cause very serious earthquakes. Third, with Iraq, Lebanon and Yemen being drawn more deeply into the war, the activation of regional networks is on the agenda.

When these three developments occur at the same time, it is child's play for the largest regional war in the Middle East since 1973 to emerge. The aim of the US and Israel was to change the regional balance, but the picture that has emerged is that this war will change them more. Of course Iran too seems set to change, but probably not as they wish, in a much different direction.

Of course we do not ignore that, owing to the crisis the war will cause in oil and gas flows, US-China rivalry will be affected, restrictions on Russian oil may be lifted, and all this will create new situations in international balances. Whether the outcomes of these were planned amid this turmoil will always be asked as well.

Moreover, the likely effects on Turkey of oil prices, which are bound to rise, and of other probable scenarios should be our greatest concern in all these assessments.