CULTURE AND POLITICS IN THE NEW MIDDLE EAST



The Arab-Turkish Congress of Social Sciences

CULTURE AND POLITICS IN THE NEW MIDDLE EAST

Edited by
Yasin Aktay
Pakinem El-Sharkawy
Ahmet Uysal

Institute of Strategic Thinking
&
Center for Civilization Studies and Cultures Dialogue, Cairo University



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Çetin Emeç Blv. Aş. Öveçler Mh. 4. cd. 1330Sk. No 12
06460 Çankaya / Ankara, TURKEY
Tel: 0312 473 80 45
Fax: 0312 473 80 46
www.sde.org.tr
sde@sde.org.tr

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About SDE

The Institute of Strategic Thinking values contribution to the development of the relations between Turkey and the states in the region. Within this framework our strategic goals are producing policies that give priority to co-operation and economic, political integrations with a mission of peacekeeping and problem solving for Turkey; removing the prejudice between Turkey and Muslim world and the Western world; and creating grounds for mutual understanding and dialogue; developing the cooperation networks among the civil society and think-tanks in the region.

Within the frame of these strategic goals, we organized this congress in cooperation with our partners in Osmangazi University and Cairo University. The contributions of the distinguished scientists participating in the Congress will have crucial prominence in accomplishment of these aims. We thank you for your contribution to this Project that we intend to traditionalize. We hope that the ATCOSS will be a means for the rapprochement of Turkish-Arab communities and for an intellectual accumulation.

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Introduction

Editörs

Social sciences have a peculiar history and problematic in the academia. Differently from the natural sciences, they directly deal with human being and society. Thus, ethnicity, gender and geography of the human beings as the experiment object have a great significance. In social sciences people are both the subject and object of their knowledge. It is well known that social science people are also influenced by the knowledge they produce because they define themselves through the knowledge they produce and each definition has a relative influence on the defining individual. It is difficult to find a scientific way to define the human being because each definition of human being turns into a project concerning the human being and began to work as a normative principle concerning what the human being must be instead of what the human being is.

This side of social sciences obstructs the knowledge produced to be freed off an ethnocentric and historical nature. Some schools in social sciences ignore their historical and cultural nature and begin to draw templates their own society and for other different societies as if the knowledge they produce is universal and meta-historical. On one hand, scientific disciplines emerged in the West, implying that their society is a perfect and universal model for humanity. On the other hand, they define other societies within the same framework of a ethnocentric world view. Therefore, it is relatively difficult to achieve an objective level of analysis in social sciences more than other concrete sciences. One of the characteristics of social sciences is the responsibility to think above one's self, to recognize his limitations and to try to overcome these limitations.

It is obvious that in both Arab and Turkish communities social sciences have reached a certain acquis. However, the academia of both worlds seems to be unaware of each other due to interruption for most part of the last century. For example, in order to make an analysis on the issues in a

neighboring country such as Syria as a neighbor of Turkey, Turkish social scientists refers to western sources such as English and French, because in Turkey there are not so many people who follow the social sciences in Syria as much as to make research on Syria. We have already distanced from the language of the Muslim world, i.e. Arabic language, and from a community that we shared the same history and neighborhood. The scholars of Istanbul, Damascus, Cairo and Medina did understand each other through Arabic or Ottoman Turkish. However, the scholars of our time faced serious difficulties to understand each other.

All scientific disciplines in social sciences are the disciplines of knowledge and each must define their fields of interest through a peculiar method. In that respect they adopt a tendency to determine which problems they will address, which concept they will think by, which topics they will handle and the criteria concerning which kinds of knowledge are correct and which are wrong. With this consideration, most of the social sciences are the disciplines trying to define and understand the new social relations created by the experience of industrialization-urbanization or modernization-globalization coming out of Europe in last two centuries.

However with the spread of westernization to the rest of the world through colonization, imperialism and modernization efforts, the Western oriented model of thinking was somehow internalized by other countries. This means that particular problems coming out within the Western context began to be thought as the problem of the whole world. Knowledge systems and scientific disciplines do not only have a descriptive function but they also build the world view and define our mental maps. As Edward Said also put it, all sociological theories emerging in a Western context have the capability of building a world based on Western perspective. This side of knowledge is not something easily avoidable. Michel Foucault shed the light very precisely on this aspect of scientific disciplines.

While these disciplines perceive the problems coming out in the west as the problems of the whole world, they put the humanity into the frame of their questionable frame. When we adopt these scholarly frameworks without thinking over them, we loose our ability to diagnose our own problems. However, these scientific disciplines should be adopted after a critical review with a special attention to ethnocentric perspectives. Otherwise we cannot see ourselves outside an Orientalist perspective. Today unfortunately we cannot overcome this well internalized problem of Orientalism in adopting the critical approach to social sciences. Our Western oriented look at ourselves distorts our self-perception.

Many Western thinkers also attracted attention to this restricted side of Western social sciences. Within this frame, the problems stemmed from the fact that sociology, history and political sciences function in a West-centric approach. The Eurocentrism dominating social sciences created an interesting barrier before the non-western communities' efforts to create their own social sciences. In this context, discussions on "local social sciences" has been done and it has been thought that these will contribute to the general social science framework for each community being aware of their own uniqueness to develop the conceptual tools for themselves. Undoubtedly here the models will keep its essence because in order to go beyond a discipline once consolidated you should perhaps go to the beginning. However, it should not be cast out that it is not possible to take the experiences back. This issue in fact needs deep philosophical discussions.

All of these concerns perhaps constitute deep epistemological and philosophical answers for the question of "Why Arab-Turkish Congress of Social Sciences?" The ATCOSS can create a ground for overcoming this epistemological problem via sharing the academic acquis between Turkish and Arab world. There is no doubt that the world is witnessing a big process of transformation through which the globe became a small village. New Communication technologies and new techniques are the main factors of this process. It became easy to follow what is going on and new developments appeared in any part of the world from the other part. The movement of knowledge, money, human beings and goods speeded with the developments of transportation and communication technologies, requiring the world to adopt.

While the globalized world brings people closer to one another physically does not provide make us more knowledgeable about each other, guarantee the rapprochement of mentalities or solve our problems of stereotypes and misunderstanding. The more people get in contact the more they may get closer to one another in terms of mentalities. Instead of understanding and recognizing the differences people prefer closing down themselves and develop prejudices and antipathies against the other. Unfortunately, globalization has such paradox as well. It is not to overcome this paradox because it signifies a problem coming at the very same time with the abundance of knowledge. Social scientists should carefully focus on this and deal with these kinds of problems. This Arab Turkish Congress of Social Sciences is distinguished from other congresses as it has a vision and mission. The vision of ATCOSS is to fill the academic and intellectual gap between Arabs and Turks, explore common and different interpretations to the new outcomes in their societies, their region and the big globe.

The Question “Why ATCOSS?” has practical answers as well. It is inevitable for the commercial and cultural rapprochement between Turkey and the Arab world to find correspondence. The strengthening impact of the regional integration with the abolition of visa requirements and the trivialization of the borders which divided these communities for centuries on the all parties is obvious. The borders caused regional separation for centuries did not only remain as physical borders but they built thick mental walls as well. On one side of these walls were the Turkish perceptions about the Arabs and Arab views of the Turks have been produced and processed on the other side.

Indeed, the increase in regional exchange has enriched people of the region in all terms. Today visa requirements among countries are cancelled. A treaty of free-trade zones is signed by four countries of the region and it is expected that this free-trade zone will contribute to the total economic development of the region and even now this contribution can be observed. This exchange in economic and social areas gains prominence in spreading to a more comprehensive area such as academia. In fact, another dimension of these relations that concerns academia specifically should also be referred to. The scholarly world is shaped by activities aiming the universal search for knowledge. Both the tension between locality and universality and the solution of the tension can be diagnosed during this search.

The ATCOSS represents a big umbrella through which Arabs and Turks could meet, communicate, and learn from each others. This mission can be facilitated in annual meetings to be repeated in a different country each year. Specialists and theoreticians from both sides can sit on one table and let their mentalities to speak. Thus by time they could fill in the gap between them and share a common understanding to social and economic developments in their societies. Intellectuals from Arab societies and Turkish societies gathered to share their knowledge, experience and seek proper analyses for their social realities and seek solutions for problems in their societies.

From this starting point, an international academic group of the Arab Turkish Congress for Social Sciences insisted on collecting the fruits of a three-day meetings and sessions between Turkish and Arab intellectuals through this volume. Meetings of intellectuals are classified into pivots through which sessions were held, specialists in this aspects are brainstorming, talking, bargaining, defending their points till they reach common understanding and explore communalities between them. This book consists of nine pivots selected from the papers presented during the Arab Turkish Congress for Social Sciences in 2010. They range from Family studies to Media and Virtual Society to History and Development etc.

The first section is revolving around *Multiculturalism, Education and Family Studies* in this new Middle East. *Maha Bali & Andrew Bossone*'s paper discusses the ethical imperative of multiculturalism and interculturalism in today's media environment and explores what role multicultural education can play in media and communications studies through a study based on foreign students in the American University in Cairo. In his article "Multiculturalism and the Fall of the Subject Object Divide" Samir Abu-Zaid explores crucial reasons behind the fall of object subject divide by giving information on situation of contemporary social sciences. Nevine Soliman analyzes the deep roots of cultural heritage in the Middle East, namely, Egypt, Turkey and Syria. She highlighted the similarities and differences in their system of antiquities protection, particularly in aspects of cultural property definition, protective legal provisions, as well as their approaches to restitution. In her paper on gender equality comparing between Egypt and Turkey *Sherine El-Alaily* argues that gender issues have emerged as concerns of priority about development, arguing that gender equality is one of the signs of development in eastern societies as well. Also in this section, *Ayşe Fildis* wrote a paper on a phenomenon of honor violence that seems exclusive to Middle Eastern societies or Muslim societies. She tries to view the formative phase of religio-legal ethical codes for disciplining of female sexual conduct, which marks the boundaries of the institution of family in Muslim and Non-Muslim societies.

The second section is about *Virtual Society and the (new) Media*. Academicians try to explore what is new in their societies, the new developments that affected their culture, behavior by the (new) Media. In his study *Mr. Saddek Rabbah* shedding light on how social network platforms are representing an alternative avenue to the elitist public sphere. He tries to explore the potential of social networking platforms in the Arab world to form a virtual public sphere, thus fostering democracy and empowering citizens to transcend the different kind of paternalism they have been experiencing since many decades. This study is drawn on examples from some Arab countries where social networking platforms are intelligently used to revitalize the political and social life in significant ways. *Aida Muhammed* analyzes the impact of the Turkish soap operas (*musalsalaat*) on the Arab TV viewers. The popularity of this series is rising day after day and thus it is representing a phenomenon that needs a deep study. *Bahadir Ileri* also examines the impacts of Turkish soap operas among Arab populations by emphasizing the success of these soaps with audiences all over the Arabic countries. About the development of a cultural bridge between Turkey and the Arab world, *Ahmet Uysal* tries to establish the media depiction of why the Turkish soaps

became so popular from the sociology of culture perspective. He elaborates what effects they seemed to have on Arab societies, especially on Arab youth and women. He elaborated the perceived socio-cultural bases of the production and reception the Turkish soap operas.

The third section deals with *Development and Public Policies*. Seeking the ways in which the corruption would be reduced, *Amr G. E. Sabet* suggests collective punishment and sanctions and "modified vendetta" as conceptual tools or mechanisms that may help in reducing the untenable problem of bribery among corrupt individuals. In the same context, *Hamid E.Ali* presents background on power of state and corruption and discusses the main contours of evolution of corruption, as well as movement from pre-modern to Post-modern corruption and possible ways to reduce the problem.

The fourth section deals with the most popular and major issue of *Islam and Politics*. The issue became more visible after the coming of the so-called 'Arab Spring' and the emergence of new Islamic elites in the Arab societies. *Yasin Aktay* sheds light on Turkey's journey with political Islamism and how it managed to maintain its Islamic culture within a secular political system. He tries to elaborate on the transformation of Turkish society in a theoretical framework, a framework that can be model for the new rising Islamic elites in the Arab world. He outlines the contours of the Turkish experience and explores the specialties of the Turkish societies and the dynamic relations with Islamic and secular forces in Turkish society. In this section *Birol Başkan* also seeks to answer the question whether Muslim agency could play a key role in democratization by discussing the compatibility between democracy and Islam. The other contribution in this section is written by *Hüseyin Çaldak & Kubilay Akman.* In their articles, they discuss basic Sufi norms for ethics and moral values and their potential to offer answers to the challenges of modern societies, stressing that Sufi ethics would be benefit for people in modern life.

The fifth section focuses on *International Relations and the Middle East*. *Heba El-Sayed* studies the cultural neighborhood of Turkey as a fertile field for its new foreign policy. With a cultural perspective in studying international relations she focuses on studying the relations between nations and countries from there inherited civilizations. Also in this section, *Ashraf Abdul Aziz Abdul Kader* focuses on the Iranian role in the Arab-Israeli conflict as a the third party that affects its course directly and indirectly. *Omair Anas* tries to study how Turkey made use of its soft power in Middle East as a foreign policy tool by discussing is how Turkey's soft power changed with the Justice

and Development Party. In another important paper, *Javier Albarracín Corredor* elaborates the importance of cooperation between Turkey and Middle East in terms of social and economic aspects by focusing increasing trade and social contact between Turkey and the Arab world.

The sixth section consists of articles that elaborate *Turkish-Arab Relations* more deeply. Concerning the relations between Turkey and the Arab countries, *Magdy El-Sayed Hashish* tries to study the American reaction towards the Egyptian-Turkish rapprochement in 1957 between the leaders Nasser and Mandaris. He investigates how the American superpower was intervening in regional politics to keep a favorable political context and to secure the steady flow of oil from the Middle East. *Ragab El-Basil* tries to study the role of Turkey in the Palestinian problem, one of the most critical and sensitive issues in the Arab and Islamic world. He studies the role of the Justice and Development Party in Turkey in defending the Palestinian side and their actions towards the Israeli violations of Human rights and their behaviors since its arrival power until to 2010. Introducing the readers to the linguistic and cultural communalities between the Egyptian and Turkish societies, *Nahed Awny* tries to find common words and common threads between both societies in her paper. Finally, this book is the first book to summarize one of the scholarly meetings that will be repeated every year under the title of the Arab Turkish Congress of Social Sciences (ATCOSS) where scholars from different backgrounds presents their findings, discuss their ideas and defend their points and gain new knowledge out of these meetings.

Multiculturalism, Education and Family Studies:

Intercultural and Multicultural Education in Universities and Media Studies: A Comparison of Two Programs Implemented at the American University in Cairo

Maha Bali & Andrew Bossone

Introduction

People today have the capabilities to interact with diverse cultures at levels never experienced in the past. Technology and globalization have had a tremendous impact on communications, giving rise to an explosion in the directional flows of information (Boczkowski, 2005, p. 152). The ability of people around the world to interact as a result of the use of the Internet has brought discussions about technology enabling the sharing of ideas and exchanging information (Jeurissen & Walker, 2003, p. 114), both within traditional media and also in new media formats. As a result of the increased interaction between people from different countries and cultures, the Internet has potential to explore diversity and challenge what some criticize as the dominance of white culture in mainstream media (Gabriel, 1998, p. 12). Advocates of diversity argue that ultimately multiculturalism moves civilization forward and "freeing ourselves to forge alliances we'll find beneficial and profitable in navigating our changing world." (Graham, 2006, p. 15) This raises issues of expanding diversity in the workplace, in the media and in educational settings. This paper is primarily concerned with the need for greater understanding of multiculturalism, or the understanding of different cultures, as well as interculturalism, or inderdependent cultures growing in parallel with each other. This paper will touch on the impact of technology and globalization on interculturalism and argue for the need for intercultural programs in the university environment, particularly in communications and

media studies. It will draw on the experience of students participating in two multicultural programs through a media ethics class at the American University of Cairo (AUC). Given the rise of technology, and its impact on communications, it will be important to provide young people with the training and tools necessary to understand matters of culture.

From the standpoint of [young people's] literacy and their ability to communicate with others in our culture, what they know is ephemeral and narrowly confined to their own generation (Hirsch, 1987, p. 7).

New Communities

Technology has influenced young people in ways that have not yet been fully realized. The current generation of young people is the first to have its lives entirely influenced by technology. (Lasn, 4). Social interaction is now largely shaped by technology. The massive spread of mobile phones, the rise of social networking sites such as Facebook and Myspace, the use of email, chatting and video telephony have become an integral part of young people's lives. In the past, social networks were largely formed based on geographic proximity and existing social structures such as family and school. People are now reaching out to each other on the corners of the globe via the World Wide Web. It is now possible to think of some national and international spheres as local, based on the communities formed on the Internet. In other words, what defines local can be considered relational (Gabriel, 1998, p. 32). The ideas of Benedict Anderson's *Imagined Communities*, which contends that communities are determined more on what the individual perceives than in what community the individual actually lives, have begun to come to fruition. In *One World,* Peter Singer contends that it will be more to the benefit of the planet and its citizens if humankind begins to think of itself as a global community, rather than one based on national, ethnic and religious lines.

If Anderson is right, and the modern idea of the nation rests on a community we imagine ourselves to be part of, rather than one that we really are part of, then it is also possible for us to imagine ourselves to be part of a different community… We need to ask whether it will, in the long run, be better if we continue to live in the imagined communities we know as nation-states, or if we begin to consider ourselves as members of an imagined community of the world (p. 171).

New ideas of community engendered from technology certainly will have long reaching effects on how human beings interact and perceive one an-

other. The Council of Europe's Committee of Ministers has produced several declarations in this regard, particularly how all regions of the world have become interdependent, increasing the need for understanding of cultural diversity ("Declaration on cultural diversity," 2000). The council has also argued for the media to play a strong role in the promotion of respect for multiculturalism:

[I]n the context of global market influences on cultures and cultural exchange, modern democratic states have a new challenge: the development of policies for assuring the recognition and expression of forms of cultural diversity coexisting within their jurisdictions; Recalling the commitments of the member states of the Council of Europe to defend and promote media freedoms and media pluralism as a basic precondition for cultural exchange, and affirming that media pluralism is essential for democracy and cultural diversity.

Media Potential Still Unfulfilled

New technology has changed traditional media outlets from one-way communication–from content producer to consumer–to multiple lines of communications. Boczkowski describes the shift from gatekeeping to gateopening, or opening up editorial content to people outside the staff of the media outlet (Boczkowski, 2005, p. 158). This develops the role of a media outlet as a voice of the community, creating "new engagements between media organizations and consumers who contribute to the production process while making a living in some other way" (Boczkowski, 2005, 166). This potentially allows voices to be heard that were previously ignored, particularly minorities.

The Internet, however, has also helped groups that promote ideas such as white supremacy to connect with one another across the globe (Gabriel, 1998, p. 183). Furthermore, Gabriel describes the "backlash culture" against political correctness, particularly in US talk radio and UK tabloid press (1998, p. 128) against "more ethically diverse, equable and equitable ways" (1998, p. 77).

Far from being a voice for diverse groups and promotion of cultural plurality, Gabriel contends US mainstream media has served to enforce white interests and define what was 'white' in America (1998, p. 51). Since the 17th century anti-immigration rhetoric has taken 'common sense' themes, namely that it costs jobs and threatens living standards (1998, p. 99). These arguments persist today. They persuade people against immigrants or minority groups by simultaneously linking multicultural and economic argu-

ments, while projecting fears and anxieties onto a racialized object (1998, p. 103). In other words, the rhetoric makes a link between economic turmoil, immigration control and the presence of minorities. In other cases, the arguments connect the issues with lawlessness, because some of these immigrants live in the country illegally.

For the last several decades, media images of Arabs and Muslims have been persistently stereotypical. Edward Said noted images like the Arab standing behind the gas pump (1978, p. 285) or the menacing Muslim and Arab who want to take over the world through *jihad* (1978, p. 287). Such examples are commonplace in US media, such as a show on Fox News in July, 2009, in which host linked a US Islamic school to Al Queda, describing the local community as 'fighting back' against the threat of *jihad.* Many of the themes associated with stereotypes of Arabs and Muslims send messages of nationalism, and how terrorists "threaten our way of life."

Journalists have sometimes defended the notion of sensitivity to material offensive to certain groups. Under the banner of editorial control and press freedom, journalists have maintained a right to publish such material. This was the principle argument used by journalists and politicians following the publishing of the caricatures of Islam in Denmark in 2005 (Belien, 2006). The chief criticism of this argument is that while freedom of the press is a treasured democratic ideal, with that comes responsibilities in impartial reporting (Wilson, 2008) that includes respect for all parties.

There has also been attention brought to the conspicuous absence of minority voices in American newsrooms. According to the Radio-Television News Directors Association, the minority workforce in broadcast newsrooms fall short of the percentage of minorities in the general population (Papper, 2007). In 2007, the minority population (classified as African American, Latino, Asian American and Native American) constituted 34.5% of the American population, but only 21.5% and 6.2% of television and radio staffs respectively. In positions of authority in newsrooms, the numbers show a greater disparity. In television, minorities represented 10.9% of broadcast news directors and 6.4% of general managers. Radio had similar numbers, with 12% of news directors and 5.5% of general managers being minorities. As a result, the Radio-Television News Directors Foundation provides stations with a "Diversity Toolkit" to evaluate how they address diversity in their newsrooms and in their coverage. It "encourages journalists to broaden the definition of diversity to include a variety of voices and groups" and has "instructions for holding a diversity workshop, strategies for achieving diversity in hiring, retention, advancement and content" (Papper, 2007).

Despite the persistence of ethnocentric themes in the mainstream media, there is hope that new media can serve promote multiculturalism. Gabriel describes the type of thinking based on homogeneity as "at odds with the transnational, trans-cultural pressure of new communications technologies" (Gabriel, 1998, p. 23). In order to have broad-based appeal and reach out to the citizens of the world, media outlets in the coming years will need to have reporters, presenters and decision makers that come from a diverse background and are sensitive to issues of multiculturalism. This is the crux of the argument of instituting intercultural programs in communication and media studies programs at the university level. Doing so will create a class of journalists and media leaders who are sensitive to the wide array of issues affecting ethnic groups around the globe. Kang Dai-geun, director of the Seoul-based UNESCO educational organization Asia Pacific Center of Education for International Understanding (APCEIU) told the Korea Herald about the importance of intercultural understanding: As we begin our journey in the era of globalization, unstoppable multiculturalism calls for an education that reflects intercultural understanding and human rights (Bang, 2005).

Multicultural education not only provides the opportunity to understand different cultures, but also one's own. [Multicultural education] is indeed valuable in itself; it inculcates tolerance and provides a perspective on our own traditions and values (Hirsch, 1987, p. 18).

The practice of learning about different cultures, inculcating values of tolerance and respect and growing side-by-side is invaluable for those in the media profession, whose chief role is to observe and analyze society.

Business Adopting Diversity

By reaching out to people of different ethnic backgrounds, media outlets can greatly expand their base of consumers. This certainly has economic implications. Driven largely by financial concerns and an increasingly diverse workplace, businesses outside the media have been early adopters of multicultural training (Gabriel). In an increasingly globalized world, businesses and organizations that "demonstrate an understanding of the differing cultural, linguistic, and religious requirements of existing and potential customers will have a natural advantage over those that don't" (Graham, 2006, p. 15). Graham argues that international commerce does not discriminate based on race, creed, gender or sexual orientation (2006, p. 21). In other words, a paying customer is a paying customer irrespective of his or

her lifestyle or background. Although the percentage of people in the US who are minorities is slightly above 30%, the demographics will shift in the coming years. Half of all consumers under the age of 40 are minorities as are 75% of all US children under ten years old (Graham, 33-34) Businesses have certainly picked up on this trend, adopting spokespeople from minorities, and using minorities in television commercials, "which allegedly had a more 'global,' 'multi-ethnic' appeal" (Gabriel, 1998, p. 187). If for no other reason than economic well-being, it would serve media outlets to adopt a greater policy of diversity and understanding of multiculturalism.

Incorporation of Interculturalism in Media Ethics 400

Instituting a multicultural/intercultural program in a media class can align with the goals of a university media studies program. They match one of the learning outcomes of AUC's department of Journalism and Mass Communication department: "demonstrate an understanding of the diversity of groups in a global society in relation to communications." If interculturalism is a part of a communications curriculum, the question is how to institute it. Should it be its own class or should it be incorporated into the syllabi of individual courses? In regards to the former, many universities offer classes on cultural matters, and such courses are sometimes offered to fulfill core requirements. While such courses serve as a valuable survey into matters of race, ethnicity, gender and other similar topics related to culture, they often only provide an introduction into the central issues without explaining how they can be applied to the students' future professions. As a stand alone course, these topics are just one of many that students study that they might not necessarily see as valuable because they will not apply them in their lives. For these reasons it could be worthwhile to incorporate interculturalism into class curriculums. Many communications and journalism text books include a chapter on sensitivity to minorities, lending credence to the value of understanding issues of diversity.

In the Media Ethics 400 course discussed in this paper, interculturalism was introduced as one of four central areas of ethics beside law, theory and practice. In this case it affords the opportunity to explore interculturalism at length. Intercultural lessons primarily were activities, discussions and lectures, as well as readings and videos discussing the positive and negative roles the media serves in culture matters. Students also participated in one of two multiculture programs (which will be described in the following sections), and so the topic was explored throughout the semester.

Multiculturalism was related to the three other ethical topics by exploring how they intersected. For example, human rights law connected to the legal aspects of it, while explorations of the media related to the practical aspects of ethics. As a theoretical ethical principle, multiculturalism and interculturalism were introduced as most closely related to empathy. Using a working definition of interculturalism as interdependent cultures growing in parallel with each other, the concept matches closely with Benjamin Broome's defition of relational empathy.

Empathy, as defined in this essay, is part of an on-going, corrective process that is dynamic and circular. In this way, it reflects the interdependence of participants and the transactional nature of communication (1991, p. 241). Broome also explains that empathy is often described as a an ability or skill in introductory communications courses (1991, p. 239) and is important to general communication competence (1991, p. 235). Furthermore, Broome describes empathy as "a central characteristic of competent and effective intercultural communication" (1991, p. 235). Like the interdepence and parallel growth in the definition of interculturalism, Broome describes relational empathy as more than individuals developing a deeper understanding of one another: it leads to the genesis of a unique whole that reflects a merging of each individual's construction of the other (1991, p. 242.

Broome calls this genesis the third culture, a term often used today to describe childen of parents from mixed heritage. It could be argued that many third cultures are currently developing as a result of the many interactions occuring today between people of different backgrounds.

Intercultural Programs (Description of Soliya & Bridge)

As part of the Media Ethics 400 course, students participated in one of two multicultural programs: the AUC Bridge program and the Connect program of Soliya, a US non-profit organization. According to its mission statement,

The AUC Bridge Program aims to foster a dialogue and interactions between Egyptian and international students. The program seeks to provide a safe environment in an academic setting for students to explore cultural awareness of the other as well as the overarching differences in their societies. Through a series of readings and weekly discussions, students develop their communications and critical thinking skills while building intercultural relationships. The program therefore aims to bridge the cultural divide on AUC's campus while preparing students for lives that include greater intercultural awareness and interdependence.

The Bridge program involved a partnership between the Department of Journalism and Mass Communications and the Office International Student Affairs, which organized the weekly meetings and facilitated the sessions. The program ran for seven weeks, during which students met on campus for a period of one to one and a half hours. The program also extended into AUC's International Day, during which professors and students hosted discussions related to intercultural awareness.

Soliya seeks to create a global network of young adults and forge the gap between the "Arab & Muslim World" and the "West." Soliya's Connect Program uses video web-conferencing for group discussions between university students in the Middle East, North Africa, Europe and the United States, facillitated by a cross-cultural team of young people from over 25 different countries, according to the group's website. In addition to readings and weekly discussions on culture, identity, politics and religion, the students also compiled a video about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict provided by Al Jazeera and APTN. The programs can be compared as follows:

Area of Comparison	**Soliya**	**Bridge**
Main medium for meetings	Web-based video conferencing (but some projects used Facebook and blogs)	Face to face, one-on-one, small groups, large group (15-40 participants)
Frequency/ length of meetings	Two-hour meetings, once a week for 9 weeks	1-1.5-hour meetings, once a week for 7 weeks
Facilitation	Two Soliya-trained young facilitators, one from each "side"	Course Instructor (young American journalist)
Curriculum set by	Soliya but groups may follow different paths according to interest	Instructor in collaboration with International Student Affairs

Examples of topics covered	- Identity - Arab-Israeli Conflict - Gender issues in different parts of the world	-Global & Cultural Values -Discrimination -Media Coverage of Arabs & Muslims
Examples of types of activities	Open-ended discussions, discussions structured around readings, game-like activities to explore topics e.g. identity	-Intercultural Activities drawn from "52 Activities for Exploring Value Differences" -Group discussions
Projects/ Assessments	One video per two students and Facebook networking	One video per two students and reflection paper

Research Methods Used

To explore student perceptions of the program in which they participated, students completed two separate but similar surveys. Survey questions were created by the authors of this paper (the instructor and a member of AUC's Center for Learning and Teaching). The Soliya survey was posted online via Blackboard during the second half of the semester (27 students responded), while the Bridge survey was distributed hard-copy for students to fill out (25 students responded) at the end of the semester. Both surveys contained similar questions regarding student perceptions of the quality of the program and its facilitators, as well as how the program in which they participated influenced their understanding of multiculturalism, specifically in terms of an improved understanding of the impact of stereotypes in media and in general, as well as skills of listening to other world views, expressing one's own views and understanding one's own biases. There were also questions on the value of in-class activities designed to increase multicultural awareness. The surveys contained some demographic information to give insight into student backgrounds. Students were not asked for any personally-identifiable information and were assured their responses would be

used anonymously[1]. Students were also asked to submit end-of-semester reflections on their intercultural experiences and these reflections were also analyzed to give more insight.

Research Results

Demographic Similarities/Differences


Since demographic differences could potentially influence student experiences and perceptions, here is demographic information discovered from surveys: The Soliya group was predominantly female (85%) whereas the Bridge group was balanced (50/50).[2] Over 80% of students in both programs were majoring in one of the sub-specialties of the Mass Communication major, although three students in the Soliya group did not answer this question and three students in the Bridge group specified different majors (political science, business and undeclared). The split across high school backgrounds in both groups was similar.


The majority of participating students were Egyptian in Soliya (20) and Bridge (16). The Soliya group also had two Egyptian-Americans, one Greek-Egyptian, one Palestinian and one Emirati; the Bridge group had two Egyptian-Americans, one Egyptian-Canadian, one Greek-Palestinian, one Palestinian, one Norwegian and three who did not specify a nationality. The majority of students in both samples had lived in another country for at least a month. Although many of these experiences were in other Arab countries (e.g. Kuwait, Saudi Arabia), one can assume there was some interaction with other cultures in those contexts because of the high number of expats. The majority of students in both samples mentioned having friends from other cultures/nationalities before joining Soliya/Bridge. Only four students from Soliya and one from Bridge did not have any foreign friends/acquaintances. In terms of level of interest before starting the programs, students were similarly split in both samples in terms of excitement/anxiety about the programs (slightly more students were “not looking forward to” Soliya than Bridge).

1 Although, for example, students with unique nationalities or majors might be easy to distinguish

2 If one follows gender stereotypes here, one could conclude that having more girls in the technology-based activity might have contributed to antagonism towards the technology; however, one of the author’s experience with Soliya has been that there are no major gender differences in terms of technical difficulties with the video-conferencing software

Soliya	Bridge








Overall Perceptions


When asked about their overall experience with Soliya/Bridge, and when asked about relevance of the sessions to multiculturalism, students were more positive about Bridge than Soliya:

Soliya	Bridge









Analysis

Students in Bridge shared the same conditions (same group of students, same instructor, same activities), while students who participated in Soliya had different facilitators and different groups, and so the quality of their experiences could vary. The Soliya program is intended for students coming from various majors, and so the focus is not necessarily just on multiculturalism or just on multiculturalism in the media, and therefore the Bridge sessions were more directly relevant to what was being studied in class. Furthermore, the instructor introduced students to multiculturalism, so it is more likely that a program designed by him would better address his understanding of multiculturalism.

Several students reported technical problems with Soliya, which negatively impacted some of their sessions. Since Bridge relied on little technology, this was not an issue. Only 22% of Soliya participants did not face any major technical issues at all in any session.

Whereas the Bridge survey was conducted toward the end of the semester, the Soliya survey was conducted after students had attended 4-5 sessions but before the semester was over. As reflections at the end of the semester (see later) were more positive, it is possible that students' appreciation for the value of Soliya increased after the experience was completed.


Learning Perceptions: In-class Preparation

The figure below compares responses to the question: Which in-class preparation (done by the instructor) has helped develop your multicultural understanding? (Check all that apply)

The majority of students seemed to find in-class discussions the most useful, although the Soliya students seem to have valued it more. Soliya students also seem to have benefited more from videos shown in class. Few students in both samples perceived lectures to be as beneficial.

Learning Perceptions: Soliya/Bridge

The next figure below compares responses to the question: "Which of the following do you feel you have been able to do via Soliya/Bridge? (check all that apply)"



Responses were abbreviated to facilitate placing them on the chart… detailed responses are:	SOLIYA (n=27)	BRIDGE (n=25)
1.Improved my ability to listen and learn about other cultures	**63%**	**68%**
2.Improved my ability to express my opinion to people of other cultures	**74%**	**48%**
3.Improved my understanding of the use of stereotypes in the media	**41%**	**56%**
4.Improved my understanding of the impact of stereotypes in general	**52%**	**48%**
5.Improved my ability to understand my own biases	**26%**	**40%**
6.Improved my ability to understand different worldviews	**67%**	**68%**

The figure shows that both programs seem to have helped students improve their understanding of different world views and their ability to listen and learn about other cultures (60%). Soliya seems to have been more successful in developing students' ability to express their opinion to people of other cultures (74% vs. 48%), possibly because Soliya sessions had a more balanced number of international/Arab students as compared to Bridge. On the other hand, Bridge seems to have had a better impact on improving understanding of use of stereotypes in media (56% vs. 41%). This could have resulted from the Bridge program being designed specifically for a

media ethics course, while Soliya is more general. Bridge also fared better in developing students' abilities to understand their own biases, although this latter is the least developed of all the skills we asked about (40% vs. 26% in Soliya).

In response to the open-ended question: "Please describe an instance during the program in which you gained greater multicultural awareness," here are some sample comments from both programs (spelling and some punctuation corrected), organized by relevance to the above skills.

Category	Soliya	Bridge
1. Listen and learn about other cultures	"When we were discussing stereotypes, we learned a lot about each others' cultures and how each person sees the others."	"When the foreigners talked about how the[y] saw Egyptians" "When the students from North Florida University came to campus and we hanged out with them, we learned so much from each other."
2.Express my opinion to people of other cultures	"When we all shared with each other events that changed th e way we view life."	"When we played the game of have you ever done? as it showed the different background and experiences of other culture."
3.Use of stereotypes in the media	"When I realized through an extremely offensive video how Muslims and the Islam is portrayed and manipulated by those who oppose it." "When someone discussed a movie stereotyping Muslims and Arabs but she didn't agree with it even though it was produced by her country."	No comments.
4. Impact of stereotypes in general	"When we discussed the stereotypes of each country and when each one of us said his opinion about that"	"The game in class where different groups of people represent a stereotype on Egyptians or Americans. I've never been aware of some of these stereotypes."
5. Understand my own biases		"During the last meeting the game made me realize that i have many things in common with the rest of the class, and even when i didn't [want?] i was urged to go in the front. (courage is something i partially learned from the doctor)."

6. Understand different world-views	"Discussing the danish cartoons, and how everyone saw it from his point of view" "When we were discussing the West vs Arab, and all that revolved around it...the readings, and the discussions (different points of views of Americans, Europeans and Arabs)"	"While we were talking about the conflict between Palestine and Israel. It showed how different people look at this invasion" "Even people within my society are different."
Aggregation of popular responses	Discussion of stereotypes (6 students), Palestinian-Israeli conflict (3 students), hearing views of Westerners on Arabs (2 students)	Discussion of stereotypes, especially via skits (6 students), Palestinian-Israeli conflict (3 students), hearing views of Westerners on Arabs (2 students), visit from Florida colleagues (3 students)


Student Perceptions of Improvement from Soliya/Bridge

Students were asked to rate the improvements in the level of their multicultural understanding, where 44% of Soliya participants and 79% of Bridge participants reported an improvement. In terms of improvement in level of comfort with expressing themselves in culturally diverse groups, 45% of Soliya participants and 58% of Bridge participants reported an improvement. See table of pie charts below:

The differences between Bridge and Soliya in this respect may again be due to the common experience all Bridge students shared versus Soliya participants who joined different groups and may have had different quality experiences. Bridge also used the more familiar medium of face-to-face interaction versus Soliya where video-conferencing, which can add a layer of discomfort in communication.

Some Notes from Student Reflections on Soliya

Student reflections on Soliya expressed appreciation for the opportunity to interact with peers from all over the world they would not otherwise have had the chance to meet. Several students reported personal growth and learning despite initial misgivings and anxiety about the program. They often mentioned specific activities that helped them learn, specific friendships



with individuals who were very different from themselves from whom they learned, and that some of them have even decided to now have a positive role in improving intercultural understanding beyond Soliya.

For example, one student who had had the experience of living in both Egypt and the US still learned a lot from the program, saying that Soliya "provided me with an idea of how other people around the world view certain important issues that affect our world today" and made her realize that "sometimes the media ignores the truth and is very biased when presenting information to its audience." On the impact of Soliya beyond the class, she wrote:

It really opened my eyes to how complacent we have become to the society we live. I hope to do my part in creating more awareness further down the line in my academic career, and not just because I am forced to take part in a program for a class but because I want to do something.

She is not the only one who feels this way. Another student said "I was really grateful that although I am still young and we all are, but we have the opportunity to change the minds of the future leaders" and credits Soliya with the following:

I learned that when we take more space to explain the good intentions, we have better opportunities to show up the thing that will never be achieved

in narrow-mindedness discussion. I believe that such experience will not be achieved without this sort of programs like Soliya.

One student had requested not to be placed in a politically-minded group but ended up in one anyway. She reported having some difficulties at first, but to have learned and grown:

I've learned more about politics and learned how to expand my knowledge through listening to other people's view and opinions. I have become more tolerant and respectful to others point of view even though I disagree with them. I plan to read more about politics to widen my knowledge and get more involved in activities that include politics in the future.

Students often reported the benefit of learning to listen to different world views, and discovering differences and similarities. For example, one student said, "I was surprised to be proven wrong about many ideas I had about Italy and its culture, and at the same time realizing that there are as much similarities we share as there are differences." Another student talked about how despite her initial shyness, she later learned a lot from the program, because "Soliya allows anyone to get out of his own box, be opened to dissimilarities and comprehend and respect divergence."

One student mentioned how the final joint project improved his understanding of his own culture:

I found the experience of sharing videos was not only about discovering a new exciting culture; it was about understanding my own culture as well. I realized that living in the same place every day may give you a greater understanding about your own culture, but it allows you to take certain things for granted, things that you consider ordinary that other societies may perceive as unusual.

Some students directly praised the technology that allowed this interaction, for example one said, "Millions of thanks to the technology that made life easier for us to communicate and interact with each other." Others recognized the problems technology could cause to dampen the benefits from this experience:

It was one of the most useful experiences in my life. I was able to talk to people from different countries. I was able to understand many concepts in different cultures and civilizations and to make new friends. However, there were a lot of technical problems that sometimes stop us from continuing the conversations. Sometimes we could not hear each other well that made communication difficult.

Some Notes from Student Reflections on Bridge

One student started out not willing to listen to different viewpoints, but feels Bridge has changed that:

Overall, I believe that the Bridge program did its main goal by "bridging" different people with different backgrounds, cultures, life experiences and even different political views together, into one community, in which I am sure we all went out from this class with new enriching experience.

Another student notes how the Bridge program made her realize how little Egyptian students try to befriend international students, although she also puts part of the blame on the international students "It's not as if they bend over backwards to befriend us either, although I didn't mention this in the discussion." To prove her point, she cites the low number of foreign students who participated in the program (She did not note that they would have been volunteers vs. the Egyptians who were doing it as a class requirement), but still found the program useful, especially in showing diversity within Egyptian society:

What I found interesting was the different points of views among Egyptians themselves, because I for one, thought we all shared and perfectly understood almost the exact same culture and, although not necessarily beliefs, but our understanding of the predominantly existing beliefs in our society and as it turned out, on a number of issues…we were in disagreement.

One student noted the advantage of the personal interaction in the Bridge program:

I thought that of course the face to face program is much better because I always wanted to meet people from different cultures and backgrounds to know what they think about us.

Although she initially would have preferred spending International Day with her friends, after attending the intercultural awareness lectures/panels, she said she:

Wanted to bring the whole campus that was singing and dancing outside the classroom to listen to what we were discussing." She cited her best experience as the visit from students from Florida, and that after their initial meeting; they socialized separately from campus and became friends who remained in touch afterwards. "It was one of the greatest experiences in my life; I have never known that there could be that understanding and bond between that and us we could build very good friendships with Westerns.

There was a student who found Bridge program interesting but it "didn't come as a new experience to me since I have been living my whole life with people from different cultures, races and backgrounds." Another student said he has been interacting with foreigners from an early age found the major benefit of Bridge in "activities that I would never do outside the program with more honesty and openness," such as a game addressing stereotypes. Another student found the program fun and interesting, but also did not feel he got as much of an intercultural benefit due to the low number of international students in the sessions, compared to his previous experience in high school via the Model United Nations hosted by AIS (American International School). Strangely enough, this same person said that "for the first time in our lives [we found out] that there are some people who don't think of us as pharoahs living in tents or terrorists blowing up innocent people" (referring to one session in which there was a good number of international students).

Discussion

The survey results and student reflections show that for the majority of students, whether or not they were interested in the program to begin with, and whether or not they felt they had intercultural experience before this course, their level of intercultural understanding improved via Soliya and/or Bridge. Their understanding of the impact of stereotypes and the value of tolerance, respect for diverse views, and their ability to express themselves in culturally diverse groups have all benefited from Soliya/Bridge. Several students report unexpected personal growth and gratitude for an experience they would not have had of their own volition.

The Bridge program seems to have addressed course content more directly, and surveys indicate it was more successful than Soliya, but the major drawback of the experience was the lack of international student participants. This can be attributed to the fact that, unlike students enrolled in the course, participation was not part of course credit for them. Despite this, students still felt they benefited from Bridge, even in terms of uncovering diversity among Arabs and even among Egyptians.

The Soliya program appeared more positive in student reflections than in survey results. This is possibly because the survey took place in the middle of the sessions but the reflections took place at the end where the benefits were clearer, and any initial barriers such as technology or shyness may have been overcome. The major issue with Soliya for students seems to have been technical problems affecting quality of communication.

Conculsion & Further Research

In many ways students at AUC in particular are well prepared to engage in an intercultural program. Many Egyptian students attended international schools, are well-traveled, are multilingual and (at least in the experience of the authors) eager to engage in interaction with foreign cultures. International students cannot be easily generalized as a single group because they come from diverse backgrounds, but it could be said that their decision to study in a foreign country (in this case, Egypt) is an indicator of their willingness to open up to new ideas and cultures. According to Broome, this is a necessary component for the emergence of a third culture.

The third culture can only develop through interaction in which participants are willing to open themselves to new meanings, to engage in genuine dialogue, and to constantly respond to the new demands emanating from the situation. The emergence of this third culture is the essence of relational empathy (1991, p. 243).

Although the topic of interculturalism and empathy could be researched and discussed at length, this paper will only advocate that intercultural programs at the university level, particularly in media studies, are a necessity in a climate of increased global interaction and interdependence. Exploring interculturalism and empathy with students has the potential to form a group of future leaders with a necessary understanding of diversity.

There are many further avenues to explore in teaching these concepts, and further research should incorporate feedback from students not enrolled in the course (e.g. International students who attended Bridge; partners of AUCians in Soliya), as well as instructor reflections on Bridge sessions. Another possible avenue for research is to have students keep reflective journals throughout the semester, possible submitting a journal at beginning, middle and end of the semester, to track changes in attitude and progress in learning against the objectives of Soliya/Bridge.

Further exploration of barriers and difficulties could be done. For example, the majority of sessions were conducted in English and the quality of students' written English was not of native-speaker quality. Did they face language difficulties in discussions? Also, did the less shy have difficulties, or did the more eloquent students intimidate others in discussions? Some of these issues can be explored via interviews and (recorded or live) observations of sessions.

The best measure of success of these programs is to see longer-term effects of Soliya/Bridge on alumni of this course. Would they become advocates for intercultural interaction at AUC? Would they take this into their careers and advocate for multiculturalism in the workplace and in their social life? Would they become honest, ethical and culturally-respectful journalists, advertisers or marketers?

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Multiculturalism and the Fall of the Subject/Object Divide: The Search for the New Paradigm of Social Sciences

Samir Abuzaid

Humans acquire knowledge through two basic faculties, direct unconscious belief, and rational conscious methodology. The first is represented by forms of knowledge such as religion, worldview, Culture, beliefs and values. The second is represented by forms of knowledge such as logical inference, sense experiences, and experimental reasoning. The first is relative to the person, community of persons, cultures, or, in general the 'subject' (the self) of knowledge. In the second, knowledge acquired is shared between persons, communities or cultures, hence, inter-subjective in nature. On such a basis it has been a convention to call the first type 'subjective knowledge', and the second 'objective knowledge'. However, these two basic forms of knowledge are intertwined in our life. We continuously use these two basic faculties at the same time. Each of us has his own 'subjective beliefs, infers new findings rationally, and perceives experiences through his sensory faculties.

Modernity, as a philosophical thought, has added a new element to such a picture: a basic distinction, separation or divide is placed between these two basic forms of knowledge. In this new picture, true knowledge (or truth) is attained only through 'objective' forms of inquiry: philosophical logical reasoning and scientific experimental methods. People generally agree that the modern era has started in Europe around the seventeenth century, but they disagree about its nature as well as trans-formations through which it has been passing. However, we may say that Modernity, since its inception, has passed through three stages, classical modernity, postmodernism, and a current reconstructive stage.

Raymond Lee describes such a chronology as follows: "The emergence of postmodernism in the 1980s challenged modernity as the reigning paradigm of world development. According to the postmodern view, the world merely constituted a play of differences and society could be reduced to a

text. Postmodernism could not go beyond its criticisms of modernity, rendering itself vulnerable to accusations of relativism and nihilism. Since the mid-1990s, dissatisfaction with postmodernism has prompted a return to modernist themes (Alexander, 1995: 86). Several new approaches to the changing nature of modernity have been proposed. They include 'reflexive modernization', 'liquid modernity' and 'multiple modernities'. …". "The new approaches to modernity constitute theoretical positions that dispute the emergence of a new era marking the end of modernity. At the same time, they address the continuity of modernity as requiring new concepts that can meet the challenges of postmodernism[1]."

In addition, we may say that these three stages are directly related to the way we perceive the relation between subjective and objective forms of acquiring knowledge. In the classical stage, as mentioned above, there exists a strict divide between the subject and object. Postmodernism is viewed generally as a relativist movement in which knowledge is essentially subjective. Hence, there is no divide or distinction between objective and subjective aspects of knowledge. In the third reconstructive stage, there is in different forms, as we shall see, a partial acknowledgement of the 'subjective' effects on our knowledge.

Multicultural Modernism

The current era, which is not fully crystallized yet, can be viewed as a 'reconstruction' process. In such an era the main categories of modernist thought, such as rationality, advancement, objectivity, optimism about truth, scientific reason… etc, are saved through a process of reconstruction that responds to the criticisms that has been raised against modernist thought. The focus of such criticism is its formal logical reasoning (*logos*) as well as the logical objective self that pursues such reasoning. So, despite its interaction with reality through its scientific nature Modern reason, according to such criticisms, constructs in the different fields of inquiry some form of a logical picture that ignores to a large extent variety and complexity of reality.

Contemporary phase of modernism responds to such a critique by advancing reconstructive concepts and terms, such as 'post-Enlightenment'. In such a concept the Enlightenment reason has been replaced by the post-Enlightenment' one[2]. Notions such as post-secularism, reflexivity, participa-

1 Raymond L.M. Lee, 2006, "Reinventing Modernity: Reflexive Modernization vs Liquid Modernity vs Multiple Modernities", in *European Journal of Social Theory*, V. 9; 355 – 356.

2 For example, see discussion of Gerald Gaus of such a situation in his Gerald Gaus, 2003,

tion, holism, pluralism, complementarity, diversity, relativity, etc, have been introduced in order to establish the new modernist 'post-Enlightenment' reason.

This new reason finds rationality not in formal constructions but in reality itself with all its complexity, varieties, and evasiveness. Rationality, despite its basic logical nature, is related to the context of inquiry, laden by values, subject to our end beliefs, interwoven with our worldview, and incomplete due to our limitations as human beings. In other words, rationality as an 'objective' means of inquiry is limited by different forms of our 'subjective' conceptions of reality.

Such a phase, then, combine the central 'rational' elements of modernity, such as rationality, logical analysis, development, etc, with the different forms of subjective understanding of reality, such as beliefs, worldviews and cultures. Considering that subjective differences between individuals reflect their culture, this new phase of modernism is best described as a Multicultural Modernism[3].

Multicultural Modernism and the Arab/Islamic Worldview

One of the major human civilizations, which possess a unique and specific worldview, is the Arab/Islamic civilization. Here, the term 'Arab' refers to the 'ancient' language of such a civilization, whereas the term 'Islamic' refers to the source of its worldview. Today Islamic countries extend over a wide area of the planet. Due to centuries of historical, political and ethnographic variations, such a worldview may differ in some secondary respects within a general framework of what we may call the Arab/Islamic worldview. So, the Arab/Islamic worldview can have Arabic, Iranian, Turkish, Malaysian… etc, versions.

Within this general understanding of the term 'the Arab/Islamic Worldview', such a view, as one of the major human worldviews, is part of contemporary new multicultural phase of modernism. As such, within the common ground of the achievements of modernism, the Arab/Islamic worldview can participate in formulating such a new phase in all its philosophical, scientific and social manifestations. In addition, since the central problematic behind the

"Contemporary Theories of Liberalism -Public Reason as a Post-Enlightenment Project", *SAGE*, Pp. 19-26.

3 For a discussion of such a multicultural phase of modernism, see, Heikki Patomäki, 2002, "From East to West: Emergent Global Philosophies - Beginnings of the End of Western Dominance?", *Theory, Culture & Society*, Vol. 19, no.3, Pp. 89–111.

crisis of modernism revolves around its view to the relation between subjective and objective aspects of reality, the Arab/Islamic worldview would also share humanity in formulating the alternative relation of such aspects.

Method and Division of the Paper

In this paper, we introduce the 'separation/connection principle' (مبدأ الفصل والوصل) as an Arab/Islamic contribution to the problem of the subject/object relation within the contemporary multicultural efforts to formulate the new phase of modernism. We have introduced such a concept previously in several works that countenance the current state of science (natural and human) from the Arab/Islamic view[4]. Due to the generality of the topic and the wide scope of the covered issues, we will be forced to refer the reader to those works in order to support the picture we present as well as the results we conclude. However, we will endeavor to keep the logic of the paper clear and sound so that the reader who is not interested to refer to the detailed study will find the views we introduce here logical and justified.

With respect to terminology, we use the terms 'subject' (and subjective) and 'object' (and objective) to represent the most general form of the subject/ object relation. Therefore, the concept of the subject (and subjective) subsumes concepts such as, the self, the mental, belief, religion, worldview, culture, values, and so on, whereas the concept of the object (and objective) subsumes concepts such as, the logical, scientific, experimental, analytical, and so on.

The paper will be divided into three sections. In the first, we introduce the principle of the subject/object divide as well as its different manifestations. In the second, we review the challenges that face such a principle, in natural as well as human sciences. In the third section, we introduce, in brief, our own view of such a relation, as well as how such a view helps to introduce new creative solutions for different problematic in different domains of inquiry. Finally, we present a short example of application of such a methodology.

4 We introduced this principle in several woks (in Arabic), see, Aubzaid, Samir, 2009, "Science and the Arabic Worldview – The Arabic Experience and the Scientific Founding of the Arabic Renaissance" (in Arabic), Center of Arabic Unity, Beirut. and, Aubzaid, Samir, 2007/2008, "The Theory of Nazm of Abdoulquaher Aljurjani, the First Application of the Scientific Method in Human Sciences?", (In Arabic) in *Almawaqif*, Department of Human Sciences, University Center at Mu'askar, Algeria, No. 1&2 P. 285-297.

1. The Principle of the Subject/Object Divide

According to our 'modernist' mind, excluding subjective factors, such as our beliefs, feelings, and prejudices and so on, from scientific research or logical analysis guarantees objectivity of our results. This is a common sense statement that we learn and apply in any scientific field. If we don't apply such a constraint then we subscribe to relativism, and there is no convergence about truth.

The claim of relativism is defined by Maria Baghramian as follows,

The relativist claim, then, is that the presence or absence of properties such as truth, rationality, goodness, etc., and the correct ascription of predicates such as 'is true', 'is rational', 'is ethical', etc., depend not only on the objects to which the ascription is being made but also on factors such as social and cultural norms, cognitive frameworks, historical epochs, etc. Furthermore, it is assumed that it is impossible to rank judgments of truth or falsity, etc. or to privilege one over another, for all cultures, historical epochs or cognitive frameworks that give rise to such judgments have equal standing[5].

Relativists has advanced different sorts of arguments, as well as scientific findings that support their claims. In social sciences, anthropology showed that reason, norms and values are relative to culture. In philosophy of science, philosophers presented the claim that there is no uniquely rational way to order the epistemic values of simplicity, consistency, plausibility – and different orderings endorse different scientific theories upholding competing truth claims.[6]. Such findings have created a problematic in different fields of inquiry, centered on the question: is objective knowledge that is agreed upon by all humanity possible? If the answer is yes, then we separate the subjective aspects of knowledge away. If the answer is no, then knowledge is subjective. The positive answer to this question is termed generally, in this paper, the principle of "the subject/object divide". Baghramian concedes that such a principle has prepared the way for relativisms, as follows:

Arguments for relativism often assume the truth of various philosophical dichotomies— in particular the dichotomies of subjective vs. objective, the mind vs. the world, and the factual vs. the evaluative. Modern philosophy, from Descartes to Kant to the Logical Positivists, has bequeathed a number of dualisms which, despite their absolutist overtones, have contrib-

5 Maria Baghramian, 2004, " Relativism", Routledge, Pp. 4.

6 Gerald Gaus, in his "Contemporary Theories of Liberalism" (cited above), classifies the relativistic challenges to the Enlightenment thesis into three categories: challenges from Social Sciences, Challenges from Philosophy of Science, and the Challenge of Pluralism, see Pp. 5-14.

uted greatly to the development of relativistic tendencies in contemporary thought.[7]

This statement describes in a different formulation the transition shown above from classical modernism (the different sorts of dichotomies) to post-modernism (relativism).

The Different Manifestations of the Subject/Object Divide

However, in this work we take, as a convention, the term "the subject/ object divide" as the general form of the different manifestations of such a relation. Therefore, such a general form includes the fact/value, mind/world, observer/phenomena, etc., dichotomies. In this sense, the principle of the subject/ object divide, along with its specific forms mentioned above, is in effect an indirect structural feature of modernist thought as a whole.

Structure, in the philosophical sense, points out to systems in which what is important, constant, and enduring is not members or elements of the system but the relations between them[8]. Therefore, the elements change its nature according to the circumstances but the structure itself remains as it is. Hence, for example, people change in a specific governing regime, but its structure remains as it is; scientific theories change its basic entities but its structure remains as it is; and so on. In the same vein, in the classical Modern thought, the two basic elements of the subject/object dichotomy change according to the domain of inquiry, but the structure of the dichotomy remains the same.

Modernity has made great contributions to humanity. These contributions can be divided into two basic types, its concept of rationality and the way we acquire knowledge, and its theories of reality both on the natural and human levels. Accordingly, we may divide the different manifestations of the basic structural feature of modernity, which is the subject/object divide, into two basic types, its epistemic forms of inquiry and its ontological forms of reality.

On the epistemic level, such a feature is manifested in dichotomies such as: self/nature (utilizing nature for the benefit of man); observer/phenomenon (separation between observer or the scientist and phenomena under examination); value/ fact (values belong to ethics, facts belong to scientific knowledge); 'human sciences'/'natural sciences' (human sciences is not

7 Baghramian," Relativism", Pp. 9.

8 This is the definition on which Structuralism, as a philosophical movement, is based. However, structure in its scientific 'literal' sense points only to the apparent members and its relations.

based on concrete scientific facts, whereas natural sciences do); Religion/ Science (Religion is based on belief whereas science is based on real observations), and so on.

On the other hand, on the ontological level such a feature is manifested in different fields of knowledge. With respect to natural science: in physics, the atom/world dichotomy (the Newtonian mechanical system based on the isolated atom); in biology, mechanical system/life dichotomy (reducing life to a simple mechanical system); in cognitive science, brain/mind dichotomy (reducing mind to brain processes), and so on. With respect to social sciences: in sociology, the individual/society dichotomy (the concept of individualism, in which the person resembles the atom for the society); in philosophy of political science the state/world dichotomy (in which the state represents the atom for the world community of states); in philosophy of language the word/world dichotomy (in which words represent specific real objects), and so on.

Details of such a wide scope of the different manifestations are far beyond the space of this work. However, Shu-Yun Ma in his review of the historical stages of political science stresses on the picture given above, that the classical Modern reason has created a specific general worldview centered around the mechanical system, which is a basic manifestation of the subject/object divide. Ma states that,

Newtonian science is not just about natural science. It is a huge framework of ideas that shape our modern perception of the world, and its emergence is an important part of the Renaissance and the Enlightenment. Through synthesizing the ideas of Copernicus, Kepler, Bacon, Galileo, and Descartes, Newton replaced the medieval belief in a spiritual universe with a secular, mechanistic philosophy[9].

He then describes how such a view has been established as a culture in the different fields of knowledge,

The Newtonian worldview, as summarized above, formed the paradigm of physics in the 18th and 19th centuries (Chalmers, 1999: 108–12). It also produced a "culture of Newtonianism" that spread around different fields of knowledge (Dobbs and Jacob, 1995: 78–95). In the study of politics, mechanistic thinking had begun to influence political philosophy even before the birth of Newtonian physics. Hobbes's Leviathan (1651), which treated human action as matter in motion, was published about three decades earlier than Newton's Principia (1687). But it was after the establishment of

9 Shu-Yun Ma, 2007, "Political Science at the Edge of Chaos? The Paradigmatic Implications of Historical Institutionalism", *International Political Science Review* Vol. 28, No. 1, Pp. 60.

the mechanistic worldview in the 18th century that Newtonian-type scientific knowledge began to enjoy a privileged status. Different branches of academic endeavor, whether they were about the natural world or human society began to search for their own Newtons (Capra, 1982: 55–6; Cohen, 1985: 174–5; 1994: 101) (Ma: 61).

Therefore, it is easy to see that despite that God (i.e., the subjective belief) created the world (the objective reality), he is nevertheless separated from it creating the general structure of such a thought. The Newtonian system makes such a view real and concrete. So, we can easily spot the other manifestations of such a structure in both natural and human sciences, as we have don above.

2. Challenges to the Subject/Object Divide

The picture of classical modernity, presented above, which is centered around trying to achieve complete objectivity in perceiving as well as interacting with reality has faced, since the first third of the twentieth century, both in natural and human sciences, great challenges.

With the advent of Quantum Mechanics (by 1926 onward), the foundational underpinnings of the Newtonian Mechanistic model of nature has gradually fallen apart. The concept of the Quantum as well as discovering the peculiar behavior of the subatomic entities has led to the acknowledgement of the essential role subjective factors play in understanding and studying Quantum physics.

Around the same period (by 1926 onward), the field of sociology of knowledge as well as its subsequent ramifications, such as sociology of science and sociology of scientific knowledge has appeared. In this field and its related transformations, the social factors affecting the subject (i.e., worldview, beliefs, values, etc) play with different degrees (depending on the specific field) a basic role in the process of knowledge, in general, and in scientific knowledge in particular.

In philosophy of science, the new trends of research of history of science has appeared around mid the twentieth century. In these trends, the role of the subjective factors in advancement of science has been gradually uncovered. Therefore, works of Thomas Kuhn, Hanson, Lakatos, Feyerabend and others have shown evidence that science is not a completely objective enterprise, but it is subject to effects of the different forms of our subjective view to reality.

In Sociology, by mid the twentieth century also, new sociological theories that reject possibility of complete objectivity in studying sociological phenomena has appeared. By the end of the century works of Antony Giddens on reflexivity as well as Habermas on communicative rationality, and others, has appeared acknowledging the effects of the self on the objective sociological studies.

In political philosophy, around the last two decades of the century, the concepts of public reason and pluralism of worldviews (or comprehensive doctrines) has appeared as an alternative to the concept of objective rational choice that is detached form realities of the society and political participation.

Details of the scientific and philosophical transformations of human thought throughout the twentieth century fall, naturally, behind the limited space of this paper. However, in the following we will introduce in brief the central ideas of two basic works that have been published during the last decade that present directly such transformations and in different tones tackle the problem of the subject/object divide. One of the two deals with the problem in the fields of natural science as well as philosophy of science, the other deals with it in the fields of human science, ethics, as well as philosophy of science.

3. Challenges in Natural Science and Philosophy of Science

David Peat, in his 'From Certainty to Uncertainty - The Story of Science and Ideas in the Twentieth Century"[10], draws a general picture of the transformations of science and philosophy of science during the twenties century. He epitomizes it as a transition from the belief in 'Certainty', i.e., complete objectivity, to 'Uncertainty', i.e., the belief that subjectivity plays a role in our endeavor to achieve objective knowledge. In this important work, he studies such transformations in the fields of Quantum Mechanics, Language, Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence, Chaos Theory, Biology, Environmental Studies, Mental representation of the world and Art works.

In these different fields, Peat doesn't present a picture of complete agreed upon transformation of ideas, instead, he presents the new 'scien-

10 David Peat (2002), "From Certainty to Uncertainty - The Story of Science and Ideas in the Twentieth Century", Joseph Henry Press, Washington D.C. Peat is a holistic physicist and author who has carried out research in solid state physics and the foundation of quantum theory. He holds a Ph.D. in physics from the University of Liverpool. For many years he was associated with physicist and philosopher David Bohm.

tific' findings that forced scientists and philosophers to introduce new ideas. Consequently, in the following brief presentation, we will try to introduce the 'essence' of such findings and the new views associated with it. However, the existence of such new ideas doesn't mean that it represent the full position of contemporary science, for classical views which defend objectivity and certainty still exists.

In Quantum Mechanics, Peat introduces the different peculiar aspects of the subatomic world. Quantum theory, according to Peat brought with it a number of curious and bizarre new concepts. One is called wave-particle duality. In some situations, an electron can only be understood if it is behaving like a wave delocalized over all space. In other situations, an electron is detected as a particle confined within a tiny region of space. Then, he asks, how can something be everywhere and at the same time also located at a unique point in space? Niels Bohr, one of the founders of Quantum physics, introduced the concept of Complementarity to express such a peculiar situation, and elevated it to a universal principle. According to Peat, he believed that Complementarity was far more general than just a description of the nature of electrons. Complementarity he felt, was basic to human consciousness and to the way the mind works, "Until the twentieth century, science had dealt in the certainties of Aristotelian logic: "A thing is either A or not-A." Now it was entering a world in which something can be both A and not-A" (Peat: 8).

Accordingly, the concept of "Complementarity" establishes an irreducible relation between the objective and the subjective aspects of the phenomena. From another perspective the facts of the Quantum world proves the existence of unavoidable relation between the observer (the subject) and the Quantum phenomena (the object). Peat describes such a fact as follows,

Our acts of observing the universe, our attempts to gather knowledge, are no longer strictly objective because in seeking to know the universe we act to disturb it. Science prides itself on objectivity, but now Nature is telling us that we will never see a pure, pristine, and objective quantum world (Peat: 13-14).

These peculiar phenomena of Quantum Mechanics lead Wolfgang Pauli, one of the founders of Quantum physics, to speak about "the need for physics to confront the subjective levels of matter and come to terms with irrationality in nature". According to Peat, it is as if physics in the early decades of the twentieth century was anticipating what has become known as postmodernism and "the death of the author." Likewise, in Quantum mechanics the observer 'chooses' the question as well as the expected answer of the

system. (Peat: 17). Later on the physicist Yoichiro Nambu, who developed the first string theory coined the term “postmodern physics” to express the same idea. Nambu, similarly, suggests that the postmodern condition applies not only to literary criticism but also to physics (Peat: 60). Therefore, humans (the subjects) are not a mere observer separated from the universe (the object), but became “participators in the universe”.

Peat introduced the contemporary problematic that confronts science in different fields of knowledge, as mentioned above. In each of those fields, physics, language, mathematics, environment, etc, he ends up with the same conclusion, that complete objectivity is not possible, subjective elements in understanding reality can't be avoided. At the concluding chapter of his work, he comes to a few general conclusions concerning the nature of science.

First, he points out that modern Western science has introduced an overly simplified picture of reality, so that “ultimate explanations and totally objective observations may not really exist” (Peat: 199). Consequently modern Western science is in need of essential revision, “Notions of continued human progress and development must be carefully reexamined if society is to be founded on wise values and enriching approaches” (Peat: 201).

How such a revision can be achieved? Peat presents his views to achieve such a goal through acknowledging multiculturalism in science. He acknowledges the possibility of developing a different type of science by other societies or cultures,

Other societies, had they developed a strong science of matter and an associated technology may have had quite a different relationship to the natural world. In turn, they would have asked other sorts of questions. They may have been more concerned with relationship, wholeness, the position of the human observer, and the role of consciousness in the world. They may have abstracted quantities or qualities different from those of, say, mass and velocity… it would provide a different framework for knowing the world. It would ask different questions and seek other sorts of answers. In this way alternative theories and types of explanations would be offered (Peat: 208-209).

At the same time, Peat rejects the idea that this position leads to ‹relativism'. For, in his view, this is not to say that one can choose to create any reality one wishes, or that reality is no more than the expression of a particular belief system, “Certainly objective aspects to the world clearly do exist, although different cultures may see these in different ways” (Peat: 209). However, such a defense against the claim of relativism is restricted by the following condition,

> "Provided that such alternative approaches engage in disciplined argument and deduction, and that there is an element of careful attention to an observation, then the knowledge systems of other cultures have the right to stand as scientific viewpoints" (Peat: 209).

In other words, the final conclusion of David Peat's work, based on detailed study of contemporary developments of science, is that science possesses an objective as well as subjective side. The objective side is scientific methodology, and the subjective side is differences of cultures which produce differences in knowledge systems. Complete objective view of science is but a Western version of science that can be contrasted with other versions of other worldviews or cultures. Hence, the story peat presents epitomizes in a scientific analysis the current transformation from a classical 'complete objectivity' view of science to a contemporary view that acknowledges the existence of a subject/object relation in natural science.

4. Challenges in Ethics and Human Sciences

With respect to the relation between ethics and economy, the philosopher Hillary Putnam introduces a detailed study of one of the manifestations of the subject/object divide, which is value/fact divide. In his "the collapse of the fact/value dichotomy"[11], Putnam reviews the basis of such a dichotomy in classical modern philosophy. He points out that "A version of each of these dichotomies, the fact/value dichotomy ("is" versus "ought") and the analytic-synthetic dichotomy ("matters of fact" versus "relations of ideas"), was foundational for classical empiricism as well as for its twentieth-century daughter, logical positivism". Accordingly, he confirms our view in this work stating that "to come to think without these dogmas is to enter upon a genuine "post-modernism"- to enter a whole new field of intellectual possibilities in every important area of culture" (Putnam: 9). Putnam describes the problem as follows:

The idea that value judgments are subjective is a piece of philosophy that has gradually come to be accepted by many people as if it were common sense. In the hands of sophisticated thinkers this idea can be and has been developed in different ways. The ones I shall be concerned with hold that "statements of fact" are capable of being "objectively true" and capable, as well, of being "objectively warranted," while value judgments, according

11 Hilary Putnam, 2002, "The Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy and Other Essays", HUP.

to these thinkers, are incapable of object truth and objective warrant. Value judgments, according to the most extreme proponents of a sharp "fact/value" dichotomy, are completely outside the sphere of reason. This book tries to show that from the beginning these views rested on untenable arguments and on over-inflated dichotomies. And these untenable arguments had, as we shall see, important "real world consequences in the twentieth century (Putnam: 1).

Putnam reduces such a problem to the analytic synthesis dichotomy. In his work, he shows how the idea of an absolute dichotomy between "facts" and "values" "was from the beginning dependent upon a second dichotomy, one unfamiliar to most non-philosophers, the dichotomy of "analytic" and "synthetic" judgments" (Putnam: 2). He states clearly the negative effect of such a dichotomy as follows,

This book tries to show that these two dichotomies, "fact versus value judgment" and "fact versus analytic truth," have corrupted our thinking about both ethical reasoning and description of the world, not least of all by preventing us from seeing how evaluation and description are interwoven and interdependent (Putnam: 3).

However, the problem of the fact/value dichotomy, according to Putnam, is not only related to domains of ethics and social science only, but also to natural science. He stresses that "science itself presupposes values - that epistemic values (coherence, simplicity, and the like) are values, too, and in the same boat as ethical values with respect to objectivity" (Putnam: 4).

In his detailed analysis, Putnam takes Quine's attack on the analytic-synthesis dichotomy, which led to its collapse as, a basis to his attack on the fact/value dichotomy. Putnam introduces what he calls "the entanglement of fact and value" and shows that "such a phenomenon undermines the whole idea of an omnipresent and all-important gulf between value judgments and so-called statements of fact". He draws upon this phenomenon to argue that "this dichotomy collapses in a way that is entirely analogous with the collapse of the analytic-synthetic dichotomy" (Putnam: 8).

Through his analysis of the logical positivist's endeavor to exclude ethics and values from the domain of the 'rationally discussable' as well as Quine's critique of the logical positivists' picture of what they called the language of science as neatly divided into a "factual" part and an "analytic" part, he states that "the whole argument for the classical fact/value dichotomy was in ruins, and that, "as far as logical empiricism could tell, "science might presuppose values as well as experiences and convention. He adds, "Indeed, once we stop thinking of "value" as synonymous with "ethics," it is quite clear

that it does presuppose values - it presupposes epistemic values. The classical pragmatists, Peirce, James, Dewey and Mead, all held that value and normativity permeate all of experience. In the philosophy of science, what this point of view implied is that normative judgments are essential to the practice of science itself" (Putnam: 30).

In this context, Putnam criticizes contemporary positions that view science as purely objective "simply by shutting their eyes to the fact that judgments of coherence, simplicity (which is itself a whole bundle of different values, not just one "parameter"), beauty, naturalness, and so on, are presupposed by physical science" (Putnam: 31).

Despite such forcing arguments, Putnam cites contemporary resistance to acknowledging the fall of such a dichotomy, he states,

But the collapse of the various grounds on which the fact/value dichotomy was originally defended, including the Verifiability Theory of Meaning, has not led to a demise of the dichotomy, even among professional philosophers. What it has led to is a change in the nature of the arguments offered for the dichotomy. Today it is defended more and more on metaphysical grounds. At the same time, even the defenders of the dichotomy concede that the old arguments for the dichotomy were bad argument (Putnam: 40).

This brief review of these two comprehensive studies that cover the fields of natural sciences, human sciences, and philosophy shows clearly that the problem of the subject/ object divide as expressed in this work is central to contemporary transformations toward a new era of multicultural modernity. However, it shows also that there is no, yet, a general agreed upon position from such a problem. As a consequence, we find in contemporary literature an array of positions that range from relativism to different forms of subject/object relation in different fields, to complete objectivity (i.e., subject/ object divide). Hence, we may say that we are in need to introduce a general framework for the problem of the subject/ object relation that plays the normative role and, hence, makes it possible to achieve the final goal, which is formulation of the new reconstructive period of multicultural modernism.

The Separation/Connection Principle

As we have seen above, the 'subject/object divide', as a basic principle in the classical modern thought, reflects a formal logical view to reality along with an over simplifying tendency of every natural or human phenomenon. We have seen also that such a view, despite its numerous successes, severely

limits human capabilities to deal with reality. Therefore, gradually since the first third of the twentieth century, views that violate such a principle have been introduced in every domain of inquiry within the modernist thought it.

The result of such a situation was the appearance of postmodernism, as we mentioned above. Postmodernism rejected such a principle without an alternative, a situation that resulted in a totally relativistic view. Following rejection of such a principle as well as its associated relativistic tendency, sporadic and scattered new views has appeared that endeavor to present some form of reconstruction through violating such a principle. However, these new views, despite its partial rejection of the subject/object divide, do not introduce an alternative principle, leaving the door open for different contributions.

This situation draws attention to two basic points. First, the absence of a definite alternative (or alternatives) to this principle makes assessment and classification of the new views difficult and obscure. For, with the absence of a normative principle, any specific view could be classified by some as relativistic, while others may classify it as a positive reconstructive one (as it is the case with Hilary Putnam himself)[12]. The second, is that acknowledgement of multi-culturalism combined with absence of an alternative makes presenting several alternative principles by different cultures a natural and required consequence.

In this work, we introduce, on the basis of several previous books and research works, a proposal for an alternative principle that serves two basic purposes. The first, is to save the objective (or the inter-subjective) aspects of phenomena through acknowledging what is common between humanity, which is reason, logical inference, and experimental methodology. The second is to preserve, at the same time, a room for the effects of our subjective nature in comprehending natural and human phenomena.

Hence, in such a principle, there is always a degree of separation between the two fields of inquiry, as a result of acknowledging the objective aspect of the phenomenon. At the same time, there is always some form of a continuation, communication, or connection between the different domains or fields of inquiry, due to the effects of the subjective aspect on how we perceive and comprehend the phenomenon. On this basis, our proposed alternative principle is termed 'the separation/connection principle' (مبدأ الفصل والوصل).

Accordingly, such a principle is in contradiction with relativism (identity of subject and object), for it preserves, within certain limits, objectivity (subject/

12 See Maria Baghramian in her "Relativism" (cited above), Pp.2.

object partial separation). At the same time it is in contradiction with complete objectivism (subject/object divide) for it allows for certain effects of our subjective aspects (subject/object partial connection).

For example, instead of assuming that science is completely objective, as it is the case in classical modernism, or assuming that it is completely relative to subjective factors, as it is the case in relativism or postmodernism. Instead, we adopt the separation/connection principle. Applying such a principle as well as its associated methodology, as we will show in the following pages, results in saving objectivity of science within the limits of the subjective factors, which differ according to the specific case under study. In this way, we establish some form of connection between the natural and the mental domains, while keeping at the same time the difference or the separation between the two within the designated limit.

Presenting such a principle as a general view is not enough. Rather, it should be supported by successful application on a wide range of phenomena and domains in order for it to be established as an alternative. Therefore, we introduced a substantive methodology composed of specific steps with the same name, in order to make it possible to apply such a general principle. Hence, we introduced the 'separation/connection methodology' (منهج الفصل والوصل) as a means for application of the new principle introduced in this work.

The Arab/Islamic Origin of the Principle

The principle introduced here, the separation/connection principle, is inspired by the historical thought (Al-turath) of the Arab/Islamic civilization and effected by the Arab/Islamic worldview. In general, the worldview of such a civilization assumes that complete objective knowledge by humans is impossible. For, the world is too complex for the limited abilities of human beings; absolute knowledge is only possible for the absolute being, God (Allah)[13].

In addition, we have analyzed the system of knowledge of the Arab/Islamic civilization within a general historical view of philosophy of science in our previous works[14]. In this analysis, we have established the basic difference between four forms of general systems of knowledge (i.e. philosophies of science), the Greek, the Arab/Islamic, the classical modern, and the contemporary systems. According to this analysis, the Arab/Islamic general

13 See our detailed analysis of the Arab/Islamic worldview in our "Science and the Arabic Worldview" (cited above), Pp. 107-120.

14 Ibid. Pp. 151-176.

system of knowledge is based on a realistic, experimental, probabilistic, indeterministic view to the world. In such a view, certainty (i.e., complete objectivity) is not possible, however, the more we acquire realistic evidence the more we become close to certainty. Therefore, the Arab/Islamic view accepts objectivity within limits, leaving a room for subjectivity (the basic Islamic beliefs). A position that is consistent with contemporary views of the subject/object relation as introduced here.

Furthermore, in our previous works we have analyzed one of the major works in the Arab/Islamic civilization: the works of Al-sheikh Abdulqaher Aljurjani (عبد القاهر الجرجاني) in his three books about the linguistic miracle of 'Al-Quran Al-kareem' (الإعجاز اللغوي في القرآن الكريم)[15]. In these works, Al-sheikh Abdulqaher was able to create a completely new field of knowledge that belongs to social science: the science of 'Al-Nazm' (علم النظم). Science of 'Al-Nazm' (means literally arrangement of words) is a completely scientific field, in the modern sense of social science, which belongs to the science of language (or linguistics). At the same time, he was able to deal - within the Islamic religious fields of knowledge - with the issue of the 'linguistic miracle of Al-Quran', without conflating the field of 'religious knowledge' with the field of 'human sciences'.

Through our detailed and scientific analysis, using contemporary tools and constraints, we came to the conclusion that he managed to achieve such an amazing result through implementing a specific methodology. That methodology was in fact what we have called the separation/connection methodology. The separation/connection methodology implemented by Abdulqaher is, in turn, based on the fact that the whole Arab/Islamic thought rests on what we have called the separation/connection principle.

Al-sheikh Abdulqaher separated the two basic issues of the problem (the scientific issue of the rules of language and the religious issue of God's miracle), hence, he first preformed the separation step of that methodology. Afterwards, he created a connecting relation between the two separated issues. Such a connecting relation, in his case, was the unlimited possibility of complexity of language. Hence, humans use language in a limited degree of complexity, whereas God (Allah) uses language in an unlimited degree of complexity. Thus, miracles are essentially possible in such a completely scientific field as language.

By deducing the general form of the methodology implemented by Al-Sheikh Abdulqaher Aljurjani, we were able to formalize the definite and sub-

15 Samir Aubzaid, 2005,"The Methodology of Religious Renewal in the Thought of Al-sheikh Abdoulquaher Aljurjani"(In Arabic), in *The Magazine of the Faculty of Dar el'Oloum*, Cairo University, Issue no. 36, October, Pp. 161-212.

stantive steps of what we have labeled afterwards as the separation/connection methodology.

The Separation/Connection Methodology

Based on our analysis expressed above we formulated the 'separation/connection methodology' in a series of substantive methodological steps. Such a methodology has been formalized through generalizing the methodology implemented by Al-Sheikh Abdulqaher Aljurjani described above. Therefore, such a methodology in its general form can be summarized in the following steps: 1) analyzing the issue under inquiry into two basic sub-issues each falls within a different category or domain, 2) constructing the connecting relation between the two basic sub-issues, 3) dealing with each sub-issue within its domain while respecting the truth of the connecting relation.

This general methodology can be implemented in different problematic on any level of abstraction. If we agree to generalize all types of issues under study within the most essential categories, the subject and object, then we may interpret the separation/connection methodology as that which purports to achieve two basic targets: 1) Saving the value of objectivity by analyzing the issue into two basic separated issues, while at the same time; 2) saving the integrity of the whole topic by advancing a connecting relation. In this view, the connecting relation represents the creative part of the methodology. Without advancing such a relation, the methodology fails to achieve the goal for which it is implemented.

It is worth mentioning here that the results of such a methodology, like any other methodology, depend on correct application. For example, introducing a false or unrealistic connecting relation would result in incorrect results.

Take the issue of Religion/Science relation as a clear example of the problem of subject /object relation. In the classical modernist thought, the two are completely separated; Science is completely free from religious beliefs. However, if we implement the separation/connection methodology we may solve the problem in a more specific and creative manner. We may advance the concept of the mysterious areas of knowledge, defined as those scientific topics that are not agreed upon by scientists themselves. Therefore, we can divide the problem into two basic issues, the domain of the scientific practice which is not in dispute by scientists (call it factual or proved science), and religious issues that are not scientific. In each of those domains, we have no conflict between Science and Religion. In the third

newly created domain (the disputed science), religious belief may play the role of the deciding factor between the different 'Scientific' views[16].

If we wish to state the methodological steps in dealing with a specific scientific topic formally, then we state the following:

a- To define the field to which the 'scientific' problem belongs clearly.

b- If the problem falls within the 'proved science', then it is to be dealt with within the scientific domain only.

c- If the problem belongs to the 'mysterious area of science', then it is to be analyzed into two problems; one is to be solved through scientific domain only, the other through subjective 'religious' belief.

d- A connecting relation, depending on the nature of the problem, is to be established between the two problems in the two domains.

e- Depending on the case, we might have a religious as well as a scientific solution that are in no contradiction (due to respecting the connecting relation). Or, we might have one solution by taking the religious view as the deciding factor between the different scientific solutions.[17]

Consistency With Contemporary Human Thought

The principle/methodology of the 'separation/connection' is perfectly consistent with contemporary modernist thought. For as we have pointed out above contemporary modernist thought is essentially multicultural, i.e., it allows to advance different subjective views while dealing with the objective aspects of reality. In other words, contemporary modernist thought rejects the strict subject/object divide in favor of different forms of relations that respect scientific methodology, as we have made clear in the previous section of this paper.

Consequently, the principle/methodology of separation/connection pre-

16 It should be noted here that such a connecting relation 'the mysterious areas of knowledge' is a highly controversial concept. For it recalls the continuing realist-antirealist debates in philosophy of science, which can't be dealt with here. Despite that, the concept itself is correct and analysis proves its feasibility in minimizing disagreement in the problem of Religion/Science relation. For, parties would agree in principle about demarcation between the two domains, while controversy would be concentrated only on the process and definition of demarcation. See details in Samir Aubzaid, 2008, "Science and Conditions of Renaissance – The New Scientific Conceptions and the Scientific Founding of the Arabic Renaissance" (in Arabic), Madbouli Bookstore, Cairo, Pp. 346-364.

17 A complete statement of the methodology is given in our "Science and the Arabic Worldview"(cited above), Pp. 343-344. Notice that these same steps can be used for more specific or particular scientific issues, with a different connecting relations (the creative part of the methodology) which should be consistent with the problem under consideration.

sented here is in no contradiction with contemporary modernist thought. Hence, it does not only comprise a part of the 'specific' Arab/Islamic thought, but also a part of contemporary human multicultural modernism.

This multicultural view to the problem makes contemporary views that still support the program of objectivity and the strict subject/object divide, but one trend in contemporary thought. Such a trend, therefore, continue to exist as a part of contemporary modernism, which is multicultural in nature. Hence, such views (views that defend complete subject/object divide) are the contemporary representative of the classical Western modernist culture within the whole multicultural picture of contemporary modern thought.

Scope of Application of the Methodology

Within this general view, the separation/connection methodology can be implemented in a wide range of applications. It can be implemented as a general principle in dealing with general topics such as scientific knowledge (the self/scientific object relation), analytical philosophy (the self/the logical analysis relation), philosophy of political science (religion/the political system relation), sociology (worldview/sociological mechanisms relation) and so on. At the same time, it can be implemented as a specific methodology for specific problems.

For example, in Quantum Mechanics there is the problem of interpretation of the Quantum system. Different worldviews can be (and has been) used to present different interpretations of such a system with equal scientific status. Also, in philosophy of mind, there is the problem of consciousness in which different views can be (and has been) introduced on the basis of different worldviews, with equal scientific status. In political science, the problem of pluralism can be dealt with from different worldviews, also from equal scientific status. In all these specific 'scientific' problems, the separation/connection methodology can be implemented in order to introduce new creative views that are fully compatible with contemporary scientific view.

Application of the Separation/Connection Methodology

In order to show that the separation/connection methodology can be a useful tool for solving diverse critical problems in today's multicultural modernism; we applied such a methodology in our previous works on some specific topics.

In a previous work, we have applied such a methodology on the problem of achieving consistency between religion and science, in general, and between Islamic religion and contemporary science, in particular. As mentioned above, we have made use of the concept of the mysterious areas of science as a connecting relation. Constrains on any religion, in general, that claims consistency with contemporary science was deduced. Such constraints has been applied to the Islamic religion in order to show the limits of interpretations of Islam that claim consistency with contemporary science. In this way, through the separation/connection methodology, we were able to establish consistency between the Arab/Islamic worldview and contemporary science.

The important consequence of such an application is that it introduces, for the first time, a methodological means, which is part of contemporary human thought that can be applied to other cultures or religions as well, to achieve such a consistency. This helps to uplift the basic barrier that prevents proliferation of scientific thought within Islamic communities, which is the unconscious understanding that contemporary science is in contradiction with the Islamic worldview.

On the other hand, we implemented such a methodology on the problem of political participation and political consciousness in contemporary Arabic societies. In this case, the relation between the political domain and the scientific method has been established through the separation/connection methodology in order to introduce the concept of the 'scientific citizen'[18]. Here, the connecting proposition is the pre-established consistency between the Arab/Islamic worldview and contemporary science.

On this basis, establishing the concept of the 'scientific citizen' asserts consistency between the domains of 'natural sciences', 'human sciences' and the Islamic religion, in the consciousness of the layperson in the society. So, the function of the concept is to overcome the separation between our scientific behavior in our work and our unscientific behavior in our social and political live. In addition, such a concept is meant to counter the overly emphasis of the Arab/Islamic layperson on his religious identity (i.e., identification of himself with his Islamic belief) as well as the overly emphasis of the intellectual on his ideological identity (i.e., identification of himself with his ideological loyalty).

The scientific citizen, then, according to the separation/connection methodology is not the citizen who rejects or isolates his religious beliefs and/or

18 For more details, "Science and Conditions of Renaissance", (cited above), Pp. 401-531.

his ideological loyalties, in favor of his objective scientific behavior. Rather, the scientific citizen in this sense is the citizen who is able to adhere to objective behavior in the political domain with full consistency of, and without contradiction with, his ideological loyalty as well as his religious belief.

Hence, instead of separating the scientific (i.e., the objective), the ideological (i.e., the intellectual or the philosophical) and the religious (i.e., the basic beliefs) in the consciousness of the layperson, as it is the case when applying the principle of the subject/object divide. Instead, we establish a consistent relation between these three domains in the consciousness of the layperson, as it is the case in applying the principle/methodology of the 'separation/connection' presented in this work.

Consequently, if implemented as a strategy of the state, we construct a citizen who is capable of positively and objectively participating in his social and political activities, who can define his preferred intellectual and ideological loyalties, while at the same time keeping his religious beliefs in consistency with his thoughts and activities in the society. Such a concept, in this sense, if applied to the society, would comprise a strong driving force toward a true modern Arabic/Islamic (or Turkish/Islamic, Iranian/Islamic, and so on) society as much as any human society, in an age of multicultural modernism.

Conclusion

In this paper, we studied the problem of the subject/object relation in the modern era and the transformations through which it has been passing throughout the twentieth century. The 'subject' and the 'object' are used as the most general terms for the different manifestations of the subjective mental aspects and the objective inter-subjective phenomena. Within this general definition, we presented a picture of such a topic composed of three consecutive stages, the classical modern, the postmodern, and the current multicultural modern stage. In the first stage, the dominant position is objectivity, which is reflected in a basic divide between the subject and the object. The second stage is usually viewed as relativistic, and hence, reflected as no distinction or divide between the subject and the object. The third stage is characterized by the acknowledgement of the subjective factors without a specific form for the relation between the subject and object of inquiry.

Given this picture, we introduced, on the basis of several previous comprehensive studies, a proposal for an alternative, which is the 'separation/connection' principle. We have shown in this work that such a principle is in

complete consistency with contemporary multicultural modernism. In addition, we presented substantive methodological steps through which such a principle could be applied.

Finally, we introduced how such a proposal can help to advance new creative solutions to different problems that are characterized by the existence of subjective as well as objective components. This is done through discussing application of the principle/methodology on the problem of the relation between science and religion as well as the effects of solving such a relation on the behavior of the layperson in the society.

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Cultural Heritage in the Middle East: The Question of Legal Protection in Egypt, Syria and Turkey

Nevine Soliman

That the world had witnessed the rise and fall of numerous civilizations is undeniable. Remnants dating back to ancient eras have attested to humanity's cultural richness. Today's Latin America, Africa, Asia and parts of Europe stand among the main contributors to such a heritage. Many states within those regions further share a history of falling prey to greedy colonialist powers that, in addition to other aims, desired to claim 'some' of those relics for themselves and boastfully exhibit them at their palaces and museums.[1]

Archaeologically rich as they are, Middle Eastern states are a great illustration to that account. With a few exceptions, most of them had to endure colonial rule and wars, foreign intervention, and/or occupation.[2] It was mainly during the colonial era that those countries were stripped of a lot of their cultural artifacts, whether through colonially supported excavation missions, looting or smuggling.[3] Even after gaining independence and having control of their fate, they have continued to suffer from the theft and illicit trading of antiquities, while grappling with the difficult task of recovering what they already lost.

For those states as well as others, the situation appeared to improve with the efforts of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).[4] Under its auspices, the Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property was adopted in 1970. With an emphasis on international cooperation,[5] the Convention obliged states to take measures to prevent and criminalize the illicit import and export of cultural property, and allowed for restitution of property illegally acquired after the Convention's entry into force, in 1972.[6] It also referred to the possibility of concluding special agreements to recover the property stolen or illegally exported before 1972.[7]

However, forty years after its adoption, the Convention may not have fully reached its goals,[8] particularly concerning the Middle East. It is true that, to date, there are 120 state-parties to the Convention.[9] Nevertheless, the region has not seen a complete halt of illicit trade and smuggling of cultural properties. As will be discussed, numerous states have also not received any satisfactory response, if any, to some of their restitution claims concerning cultural property illegally acquired before 1972, in the midst of arguments for and against restitution as course of action.

This has been particularly true for Egypt, Syria and Turkey. While domestic litigation against looters, smugglers, and illegal traders caught before crossing their borders is fruitful, it becomes less effective when attempts fail to apprehend criminals and they escape with the artifact(s). Left with two options, these states can either resort to international cooperation or decide to initiate proceedings before foreign courts. In either case, restitution is not as difficult as when the stolen or illegally smuggled artifact had left the country before 1972. In the latter case, not only may cooperation prove to be futile, but also treading the judicial path can be fraught with difficulties that go beyond those related to the law.

Against this backdrop, my paper aims to shed light on those factors that affect the decision of archaeologically rich countries, such as Egypt, Syria, and Turkey, to adopt or reject the legal option for restitution their cultural property, while examining the impact of such choice on the system for antiquities protection. In attempting to answer these questions, this paper will comparatively analyze instances of judicial proceedings initiated by the selected states, and contrast them against examples of international cooperation, or even lack of any action on their part.

The paper is divided into four parts. Part I highlights the notion of culture and comparatively investigates how the three states perceive cultural property. Part II explains and comments on the arguments of the advocates and the opponents of the idea of restitution, in order to set the ground for the discussion. Part III then sets out to discuss the current situation in the three states regarding restitution, while analyzing various approaches to the issue and their underlying reasons. Part IV lastly provides the concluding remarks.

I. Culture, Identity and Property

Understanding the significance of restitution first warrants a discussion of its object, “cultural property”. Simply, the term means that parts of the culture

has been identified as an item for ownership or possession, over which disputes arise. On a deeper level, it connotes a certain value for this element of culture that belongs to a people or a nation.

Such notion of culture constitutes various elements. Without going into the details of its numerous and area-specific meanings, one basic definition can be "the *total range* of activities and ideas of a group of people with shared traditions, which are transmitted and reinforced by members of the group."10 As such, it incorporates all known material and non-material components of a specific way of life that has become obsolete or still existing in the present. Added to that is the possible presence of other sub-cultures that can be either complementary or threatening to a main, dominant one.

Deciding upon whose and which part of culture is to be venerated by people leads to the formation of their cultural identity and selection of cultural property. This process obviously entails adhering to certain historical accounts that form the "official narratives of national history."[11] This does not mean, however; that such identity is static or does not change. In fact, it is subject to transformation in accordance with "the demands of the present."[12] But once created, this cultural identity becomes reflective of what is to be considered as cultural property worthy of protection or even restitution. For such property becomes "an inseparable part" of the state's identity.[13]

For Egypt, Syria and Turkey, modern legislations on the protection of antiquities provide helpful insights into the definition of cultural property and its system of protection. It is worth noting that all three states have witnessed several legal developments and amendments in order to enhance their cultural property protection regime.[14] Despite some differences among these laws, there are still visible commonalities. The following section examines some of the important legal provisions currently existing on the definition of cultural property, ownership system, dealership, exportation, penalties, and restitution.

A. Definition of Cultural Property

All three states divide their cultural property or antiquities into two main categories, moveable and immovable or fixed property.[15] However, while Egyptian law does not elaborate further on those categories, Syrian and Turkish laws do provide extensive examples on their possible components.[16] Within those two categories, Syrian and Turkish laws further distinguish between "natural" property on the one hand, and "man-made" or "cultural" property on the other.[17] This is unlike Egyptian law which lacks such distinction. Even its implementing regulation says nothing about it.[18]

As for what falls within the ambit of 'cultural property,' the three laws share two elements. First, they all refer to products and creations that relate to and are significant in the fields of arts, religion, science and culture, resulting from civilizations existing in each state's land.[19] Secondly, those legislations accept prehistory as a starting period to which such property can date back.[20] In general, they include all the periods of all civilizations that ever existed on those states' lands, with a focus on their tangible products.

But several dissimilarities are still discernible. For instance, the Turkish legal definition of cultural property encompasses all such property regardless of their location. It can be "above, underground, or underwater."[21] The same is applicable to its natural property.[22] This is unmatched in both the Egyptian and Syrian laws, which only deal with property above and below the ground.[23] Turkish law also extends protection to buildings, objects, and documents that reflect the war of independence period in the Turkish Republic's history, as well as Mostafa Kemal Ataturk's personal possessions and property used by him.[24] Furthermore, while Turkish law determines natural immovable property worthy of conservation to have been built before the 19th century,[25] it still lacks any temporal limitation in its general definitions. This is unlike Egyptian and Syrian laws, which generally accepts property to date back to at least 100 and 200 years respectively, before the law's entry into force date.[26] Nevertheless, these legislations make it possible to override the designated dates of origin, subject to the approval of the authorities concerned, if "national interest" or particular "artistic or historical characteristics" qualify a certain object to be become legally protected property.[27]

B. System of Ownership

Having set the scope of cultural property or antiquities, these legislations go on to control their ownership and possession. In all three states, such property is legally regarded as belonging to the state.[28] Egyptian law goes a step further and extends state ownership to antiquities that illegally left the county.[29] Yet there are exceptions to this state ownership. For example, Egyptian law excludes religious endowments or *waqfs* as well as private property legally acquired before 1983 from this public property ambit.[30] Similarly, Syrian law rules out some types of property, including immovable property that is legally owned and officially documented, or "registered" with the authorities, or deemed "unnecessary to [be] register[ed]," and allows individual keeping of movable property so long the "important" pieces are registered.[31] Turkish law also makes an exception for "property belonging

to foundations," such as those "administered by the Directorate General of Pious Foundations."[32]

Such exceptions, however, necessitate that legal owners and possessors follow specific rules in the three legislations. For instance, Egyptian law requires the permission of the Antiquities council before holders of moveable cultural property can dispose of it, provided that it does not cross the borders.[33] Syrian legislation specifies some rules for owners of immovable property, while it stipulates that an authorization be obtained from the antiquities officials to transfer ownership of registered moveable property.[34] Turkish law similarly provides that owners are to "exercise all rights of ownership" in accordance with the legislation, and are obliged to maintain and preserve the property they hold.[35]

While private property is, to an extent, guaranteed, all three legislations reserve to the state its right to expropriation. For example, Turkey sets a condition for seizing immovable cultural and natural property that is not mirrored in the other two states. In that case, if owners fail to maintain and do repair works, then their property will be expropriated in return for compensation according to rules set out by law.[36] Moreover, Syria allows for the appropriation of "historical building[s] and archaeological site[s]," as well as private immovable property deemed as movable antiquities by the council, in return for compensation.[37] Likewise, Egyptian individual owners can be dispossessed of their lands or buildings and be compensated fairly, if the Antiquities council deems their property to be "of archaeological importance."[38]

C. Dealership

This is another area with some similarities. In the case of Egypt and Syria, their legislations have reversed the earlier permissibility of state-authorized dealership. To be exact, Egyptian current law obliges dealers with registered antiquities under the 1983 legislation to relinquish them to the Antiquities council in return of a "fair compensation, within a maximum period of 6 months from the new law's entry into force.[39] Syrian law has also prohibited trade in antiquities, and views it as a crime punishable by imprisonment and monetary fine.[40] Nonetheless, it allows presidentially-decreed sale of "properties of less importance" particularly those with many copies.[41]

As for Turkey, antiquity dealership has been dealt with in a slightly different manner. On one hand, the law allows for the domestic "purchase, [sale] and transfer" of particular "ethnographic cultural properties" as defined by

law, but taking them outside of the country is subject to the control of state-museums.[42] On the other hand, trade in movable cultural and natural property that has been "left outside the scope of listing and registration" with state museums is allowed, as long as these traders are licensed from and are subject to the inspection of the Ministry of Culture and Tourism.[43] Therefore, it seems that the law provides for a controlled, more restricted form of dealership, rather than imposing a complete prohibition on it.

D. Exportation

On the matter of antiquity exportation, the three states are in agreement that it is prohibited. Egypt, Syria and Turkey all have explicit provisions that do not allow movable cultural and/or natural property to leave the country unless for short-time for purposes of exhibition or museum loans, following the approval of the authorities.[44] In addition, Turkish law grants the state the power to reject the exportation of items or works legally permitted for purchase and sale.[45] Similarly, Syrian law does subject dispensing with "unimportant" movable property to the approval of the antiquities authorities.[46]

This issue of property exportation further relates to excavation finds. It is another area which demonstrates how differently states approach it. While Egyptian and Turkish legislations agree in their prohibition on giving as a gift some of the property excavated to foreign excavation missions,[47] Syrian law allows granting to the licensed foreign excavation mission "some of the movable antiquities of which there is a large number of similar pieces discovered."[48] Naturally, such gifts will not be regarded as state property.[49]

E. Penalties

Completion of such antiquity protection regimes necessitates penalty provisions. With the subsequent amendments of the three legislations, those provisions had their share of modification. Violation of all the stipulated prohibitions and rules is punishable by prison sentences and fines. For example, smugglers or their accomplices that take an artifact outside Egypt get a life sentence and a fine between L.E100,000 and L.E.500,000.[50] Under Syrian law, smuggling or attempts at smuggling antiquities is punishable by 15 to 25 years in prison, in addition to a fine of SP 500,000 to SP 1 million.[51] Less severe prison sentence is stipulated under Turkish law, which only imposes

5 to 10 years imprisonment for taking "movable natural and cultural property to be preserved" outside of the state, but sets the fine within TL 100,000 to TL 300,000.[52] In general, all three laws allow increasing or imposing heavier punishment, in case it is so stipulated in other laws, including the penal code.[53]

Upon examining the rest of the penalties stated in these laws, an interesting observation comes to the fore. Of all three legislations, Egyptian law imposes the most stringent of all imprisonment periods.[54] It is followed by the Syrian and Turkish law respectively.[55] Emphasis on pecuniary fines also varies among them. This is a clear manifestation of the different perceptions of the type and combination of penalties that effectively play a deterrent role in accordance with various crimes.

F. Restitution

A final area of comparison is restitution. In contrast to Turkish law, both Egyptian and Syrian legislations make an explicit reference to it.[56] Egyptian law specifies its implementing regulation as the document to regulate procedures and lawsuits for repatriation of illegally trafficked antiquities.[57] However, this regulatory document just states that in accordance with international agreements, the state's right to legal proceedings "does not lapse with prescription."[58] The fact that the document specifically mentions the legal option in specific may imply to be one of the state's restitution methods in the future.

To some extent, Syrian law includes a comparable provision. But while it assigns the antiquities authorities with the task of "seek[ing] … and help[ing] [to] restore" smuggled property according to international instruments,[59] it does not openly specify the legal means. Nevertheless, it sets restitution on the condition of "reciprocity."[60] This may imply adopting diplomatic and other informal options.

While these laws promisingly tackle many aspects, enforcement has evinced some of the problems and loopholes within them. For example, concerning reporting to the authorities on property discovered by chance, Turkish law lacks a mechanism to verify adherence to set deadlines, thus leaving a legal gap for "smugglers, looters and plunderers."[61] Added to that is the absence of "practical measures" in areas such as research and documentation, particularly "inventorying and registration," to cite a few.[62] Syrian law also suffers from ambiguous division of tasks among the different directorates dealing with antiquities, and limited coordination with public adminis-

trations.[63] A further impediment to its enforcement is the antiquities authorities' hesitation to apply its severe prison sentences.[64] This is not to mention that antiquities authorities do not possess a "complete inventory" of property that left the country.[65] For all these shortcomings, there are current efforts exercised to amend the law.[66] As for the recently passed Egyptian law, more time needs to elapse before problems in application start to unveil.

II. Reclaiming the Looted, Stolen and Smuggled: Arguments and Critiques

These reviewed laws illustrate a stance that is not unanimously shared. While many archaeologically rich states are supportive of repatriating their cultural property to their place of origin, other states, mainly hosting such property, stand strongly against it. These positions summarize the difference between what John Henry Merryman described as "cultural nationalism" and "cultural internationalism."[67] The following section dwells deeper into this premises.

A. Cultural Nationalism

As obviously adopted by Egypt, Syria and Turkey, this viewpoint considers cultural property as "part of a national cultural heritage."[68] Under its banner, antiquity-rich, yet often poor states are known as "source nations" where supply of cultural property is higher than the domestic demand, as opposed to the high international demand in usually well-off "market nations" that support importation of such property.[69] That it why proponents emphasize state ownership of cultural objects regardless of "location and ownership," favor prevention of their exportation and advocate for their restitution if stolen or illegally trafficked.[70] Epitomized in the UNESCO Convention guarding against "impoverishment of the cultural heritage," cultural nationalism is further concerned with the contextualization of cultural property, which necessitates that cultural objects be left in their original locations so as to avoid "any loss of information."[71] Supporters also adopt the opinion that market nations should impose similar controls and prevention measures against importation and purchase of undocumented antiquities, in order to dry up the market and end looting.[72]

B. Cultural Internationalism

On the opposite end of the spectrum comes cultural internationalism. Its main underlying principle is that cultural property belongs to all humankind; that it is part of a "common human culture" irrespective of its source, location, or ownership status.[73] Enshrined within the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, this notion deems it "of great important" to protect cultural heritage.[74]

Against cultural nationalism, many critiques have been leveled. First, cultural internationalists hold that cultural nationalism is a matter of "national retention of cultural property."[75] They argue that it is an emphasis of "national control" and attaining power through artifact possession.[76] It does "assert the right [of source states] to just keep cultural objects, without necessarily putting them into good use.[77] To them, the resultant "hoarding" of cultural antiquities deprives the world from knowing and studying such objects, and prevents source states from "spread[ing] their culture" abroad.[78] At the same time, the world's "great museums will be empt[ied]" to the immense detriment of the visitors.[79] Second, cultural internationalists maintain that many source states are short of sufficient funds and the capability to provide adequate protection for their cultural artifacts, a matter which may lead to situations of "destructive retention."[80] Third, they point out that legal restrictions on antiquity export have not resulted in a decrease in looting or illegal trafficking; rather it has pushed the trade of undocumented artifacts underground or into the realm of private collectors.[81] This is not to mention the threat these laws pose to the unity of humankind, as "they dangerously reinforce the tendency to divide the world into irreconcilable sectarian, or tribal, entities."[82] Interpreting world politics from a "clash of cultures" perspective, cultural internationalists ultimately view restitution as a "conflict over identity" that is widening the rift between East and West.[83]

In order to avert this undesirable situation and guarantee the preservation of cultural artifacts, cultural internationalists envision a different scenario. This entails embracing the idea of a "universal museum," where artifacts from all cultures are to be showcased for visitors from all around the world.[84] For museums "build vital bridges between cultures, creating avenues for mutual exchange and understanding."[85] Contrary to archaeologists' fears, this will still preserve the antiquities' aesthetic, technological, iconographic … [and] epigraphic" meanings despite being "outside of their specific, archaeological context."[86] It is also a scenario, where the market becomes one of the venues to guarantee that cultural property reaches "the locus of

the highest probable protection."[87] Sale of artifacts, in addition to exchange and loans to foreign museums can guarantee this goal, as those "who pay the most are the most likely to do whatever [ ] needed to protect their investment."[88]

In application to the three case study states, it is undeniable that advocates of cultural internationalists make two valid points. One is that illicit trade in cultural objects has remained on the rise. Turkey, for instance, has seen over the last several years more attempts at smuggling. Rising from 3,255 artifacts successfully seized in 2003, the figure reached "42,073 historical artifacts" in "1,576 operations" in 2008.[89] The same can be said of Egypt and Syria, where illegal trafficking in

Artifacts have not been brought to a halt.[90] While it cannot be said that legislations against illicit trafficking in antiquities are useless, they are still in need of more robust measures to be taken in certain fields, particularly police enforcement and security services that supplement their objective.[91] This becomes all the more significant as all three states are facing major problems ensuring security against thefts at museums and/or antiquities warehouses and archaeological sites.[92] This leads to the second point, which pertains to the shortage of resources for antiquities and preservation in general. Indeed, both Egypt and Syria rely on international assistance and loans in many of their antiquities restoration and museum modernization projects.[93] This is indicative of the fact that these states' budgets cannot meet the huge costs required. Turkey is also at a comparable position. With a state's account deficit of $32.4 billion,[94] Turkish antiquities authorities have to struggle with a budget insufficient for museum administration expenses, archaeological excavations, preservations projects, and staff, experts, and guards' salaries needed for thousands of archaeological locations and 93 museums.[95]

Nevertheless, cultural internationalists' ideas can be refuted on several grounds. First, the issue at hand is not a concern over 'national retention' of cultural artifacts, as much as it is an apprehension about going out of business and all of its financial implications. The fear of having 'empty museums' is the real reason behind cultural internationalists' objections to repatriation. Indeed, art keeping is a lucrative, multifaceted business, connected to the sectors of tourism and employment to say the least. Consider the Louvre museum of France. Of around 8.5 million people visiting it annually, 65% are foreigners.[96] Charging entrance tickets range between €9.5- €14,[97] the museum can thus acquire around €80 - €119 million per year. 20% of this amount feeds an "art acquisitions fund," which makes it possible for the mu-

seum to purchase new objects of art.[98] Owing to this amount, the museum was able to acquire €38.6 million worth of such creations.[99] The rest of the ticket revenues, in addition to other sources of income including "partnership with foreign museums, and space rentals for corporate events," make it possible for institution to increase its staff to 2,196 employees.100 One can accordingly argue that there exists a self-sustaining cycle. The Louvre's reputation is built on the masterpieces it has possessed from all around the globe. That defends its position as one of the most significant tourist attractions in the world. As a result, income generation becomes conveniently possible, which further opens up the door to other sources of money. All of that enables the museum to maintain its *raison d'être*, enlarging its collection of artifacts, and paying the staff working to realize that objective. Restitution, therefore, endangers the sustainability of such project, as important masterpieces may be returned to source states. Not only can it tarnish its reputation that it may be involved in purchasing stolen or illicitly obtained antiquities,[101] but also not as many tourists will visit in the absence of some of the unique collections they want to marvel at. This means cutting down art acquisitions, and reducing employees. Taken broadly, restitution may adversely impact tourism revenues and employment rates in market states, to the advantage of source states. In a world driven by economic competition in all fields, it becomes obvious why restitution creates a big risk that famous museums, and their states behind them, are not so willing to take.

Secondly, while cultural internationalists dismiss restitution as a vicious retentionist, nationalistic claim, they fail to realize that their rejectionist argument is employing that same logic. Indeed, they tend to forget that nationalism was the initial driving force behind museums in the West, especially in France, to get hold of its current artistic collections.[102] Egypt under colonialism, for example, witnessed the "race" between the French and British to "despoil the country."[103] Like the rest of Europeans collectors, they were motivated by "greed and national pride" to "gather as many pieces for their national collections as possible before their . . . rivals could do so."[104] Nowadays, it appears to be that the acquired cultural artifacts still constitute part of that national pride in the market states.[105] This is further supported by egoistic attempts to redefine the cultural identity and its components for the restitution-claiming source states. Regardless of the fact that source states and their people should be free to choose the manner by which they identify themselves, the aim is to show a disconnection between "modern cultural identity" of a state and "objects of its ancient history," since restitution requires the presence of such link.[106] Countering Egypt's restitution claims for pharaonic artifacts, arguments are presented to show that Muslim

Egyptians "are not related to these great [pharaonic] ancestors" who were "pagans."[107] The same applies to modern Turks, whose identity is argued to be mainly and only shaped by the Muslim Ottomans' legacy.[108] Therefore, at a time when cultural internationalists argue that antiquities should be shared by all and that they "should not be owned,"[109] all these attitudes imply the total opposite; that market states and their museums should 'retain' what is not rightfully their property.

Third, cultural internationalists' concern over the condition and fate of cultural artifacts once repatriated is weakly founded. There is no doubt that there are difficulties that source states face in areas of museology and preservation, as previously discussed. However, it should not be forgotten that these states adamantly seeking to reclaim parts of their lost national patrimony do understand its value and what it entails for its preservation. They do take great pride in their cultural artifacts just as much as the museums exhibiting them, if not even more, by virtue of being the place of origin of those artifacts. Dismissing any possibility for these states to develop and improve thus becomes unrealistic. Besides, there is nothing that international cooperation cannot address. For instance, Egypt's current gigantic project to build the Grand Egyptian Museum (GEM) as "the largest archaeological museum in the world" has garnered a lot of international support, especially from the Japanese Cooperation Bank which accepted to give a loan of $300 million over a period 30 years to cover the construction expenses.[110] Syria has its share of internationally supported projects, such as the "Italian program for the Rehabilitation of the National Museum and the Citadel of Damascus."[111]

Fourth, cultural internationalists falsely assume that unless cultural artifacts are displayed in a 'universal museum,' they will never be duly appreciated or accessible to the global public. On a closer look, an obvious bias against museums of source states appears. The ancient world is viewed as lacking in "investment in [its] museums."[112] While such an assumption may hold some truth in cases where museums are in drastic need for resources and adequate management, it is inaccurate to make a sweeping generalization about all museums. The possibility for such museums to be developed is completely ignored, thus undermining all efforts undertaken for improvement. Even when there are some museums in good condition, skepticism still remains. Turkish museums, to cite one example, have been described as "nearly empty of visitors," despite being in many instances "well curated, well lit, and cogently explained."[113] Once again, regardless of how museology is, cultural internationalists only have support for 'universal museums.' To them, this is a matter contingent upon the museum's location

which would determine the ultimate possessor or de facto 'owner' of cultural property. However, they fail to recognize that visitors or scholars from around the world are most welcome to visit museums in source states, and be exposed to the cultural experience in its original location. Source states will neither deliberately hoard their artifacts in warehouses nor desire to hide those magnificent objects from the public. Although 'sale' of such pieces will be out of the question as no state can ever put a price on their cultural heritage, exchange and loans for short periods are allowed by states, such as Egypt, Syria and Turkey. Such routes may be even carried out in return for some revenue.

Still, this does not negate the possibility of having a truly 'universal' museum under new conditions. States should willingly display their artifacts there on a rotational basis, provided that they can be returned after a short period. All archaeologically rich states are to be represented in an international board of trustees that manages it. It can also have two permanent, different locations, to facilitate accessibility from all corners of the globe. It may sound overly utopian, but it may not be as farfetched if the international community really wants to cooperate towards this end.

Fifth, contrary to cultural internationalists' prophecy, repatriation will not lead to a wider cultural drift among nations. There appears to be too much exaggeration on their part. It is true that cultural divisions already exist, and in some cases they may be irreconcilable. However, this does not mean that restitution will give rise to more political and cultural conflicts than is currently happening. If anything, it is resistance to repatriation claims that can perpetuate this condition of clash. Yet contrary to the predictions, repatriation of cultural property can act as a bridge between nations and increase the inter-cultural understanding, to the effect that more cultural confrontations can be averted.[114] While the mistakes of the past should be admitted and apologies should be made,[115] returning back the antiquities is surely a more genuine form of apology and a true demonstration of good faith on the part of market states and museums towards source states.

III. Restitution Demands: Resorting to Law or Other Means?

If repatriation is not voluntarily undertaken, other approaches can be resorted to. Egypt, Syria and Turkey demonstrate examples of formal (legal), informal, or combined approaches. Various factors affect their choice of method.

A. Egypt

Five, very distinctive Pharaonic objects comprise Egypt's main restitution demands. These are the Rosetta stone from the British museum, the bust of Nefertiti from the Egyptian Museum of Berlin, the Dendara Temple's Zodiac Ceiling from the Louvre, the Statue of Hemiunu, the Great Pyramid architect, at Roemer-Pelizaeus Museum from German Hildesheim, and the bust of Ankhaf, the architect of Kephren

Pyramid, from the Boston Museum of Fine Arts.116 Having constituted "an essential part in Egyptian heritage," all those artifacts, except for the statue of Ankhaf, were illegally taken out of the country during the 19th century.117 However, Egypt's requests were refused, and not even a "three-month loan" for the GEM inauguration.[118]

As a response, Egypt has not yet adopted the legal course of action. Although the new Antiquities law does not rule out possible litigation, it remains to be seen if it will be put into action in the future. For the time being though, Egypt appears to be disfavoring legal confrontation, while tilting heavily towards a combination of cooperation, negotiation, and pressure as need requires. This can be attributed to a number of reasons.

1. Legal Difficulties

Resorting to litigation entails overcoming lots of hurdles. Without getting into legal details, one example is whether Egypt has a valid legal claim before foreign courts or not. Most of the objects currently demanded were taken out during the 19th and early 20th centuries. There are competing legal arguments for and against the legality of the departure of those artifacts under Egyptian laws and international legal rules then applicable.[119] Hence, the matter is inconclusive. Another problem is whether there exists a comprehensive inventory of all cultural artifacts. Though working on that, Egypt still does not possess "reliable and comprehensive inventories of public and private cultural objects and of archaeological sites."[120] Not only can this limit its ability to identify its stolen/smuggled artifacts, but also to prove theft or smuggling.[121] Therefore, there is no solid guarantee that Egypt can prevail in restitution lawsuits.

2. Economic Considerations

Given this legal uncertainty, it becomes pointless to spend much needed resources on litigation. For challenging "well-financed museums [,] large collectors and galleries" is a costly and lengthy process.[122] At a time when Egypt is already venturing into new projects for museums and is receiving international funding as previously mentioned, it becomes imperative to dispense with available resources wisely.

3. Political Will

Although the previous two reasons may suffice to guide a state's decision away from litigation, the political factor is equally important. One can argue that the Egyptian leadership's emphasis on dialogue as a means for conflict resolution helps explain this non-legal approach. This perspective seems to extend to culture-related disputes, in light of the importance accorded to "the dialogue of civilizations as a way of combating conflict between different cultures."[123] Given that Egypt is seeking to highlight its "cultural existence on the international scene,"[124] choosing the legal option may not be useful.

4. Successes of Zahi Hawass

Another possible reason is the many successes achieved in artifact repatriation under the direction of Dr. Zahi Hawass, head of the Supreme Council of Antiquities (SCA). Throughout eight years since heading SCA in 2002, he managed to reclaim "31,000 relics" from different foreign states.[125] Having the president's support,[126] Hawass has pursued his own unique two-tiered approach to effectuating restitution. The first tier involves direct engagement with the museums concerned. On one hands, he can publicly 'name and shame' Western museums, a matter which eventually gets international publicity, given his fame and stature in the archaeological circles as well as his vast knowledge of the media.[127] On the other hand, he threatens to withhold licenses from foreign excavation crews and to sever ties with museums in order to enforce restitution.[128] Indeed, suspension of cooperation in 2009 with the Louvre over five ancient stolen frescoes bore fruit as the artifacts were subsequently returned.[129] The second tier pertains to international diplomacy. Indeed, within the 1970 UNESCO framework, Egypt has concluded a number of bilateral agreements on repatriation of stolen artifacts

with "Italy, Greece, Denmark, Cuba, Kazakhstan, Jordan, Peru, Switzerland, Romania, Ukraine, Somalia, and India," to the effect of facilitating litigation procedures on a bilateral level.[130] This is not to mention that

Egypt's organization and hosting of international conferences on restitution, such as that recently held in April 2010,[131] in order to rally as much support for the cause and exert pressure on market states.

Despite these efforts and successes, the five main objects on Egypt's list are still unreturned. No bilateral agreement has even been signed with France, Britain or Germany. It still remains to be seen whether Egypt's current approach will bear more fruit, or will it require resorting to legal steps, especially after the end of Hawass's term ends.

B. Syria

Syria also has not yet initiated legal proceedings abroad to regain its artifacts. Similar to Egypt, the legal path seems to be full of difficulties. The major cause of such difficulties is the lack of a register of Syrian artifacts residing in foreign states.[132] Even inventories of cultural objects within the country do not have "a legal capacity" as they do not have comprehensive details about the artifacts.[133] No statistics, at least not updated, even exist regarding incidents of theft of cultural objects.[134] All this renders proof impossible to establish. Furthermore, expensive legal costs may be dissuading Syria from adopting litigation. As in Egypt, Syria has been undertaking "major projects" for new museums, in addition to considering programs for museum upgrading,[135] which requires abundant funds.

But at the same time, it seems that Syria is not in such a hurry to demand back its stolen artifacts. Given the challenges it is facing with museums and its plans for addressing them, one can argue that it is not yet ready to intensify its efforts towards restitution until these problems get resolved. Thus, it is slowly tackling the issue. This is further supported by the fact that it only started to engage in protection and restoration endeavors in the 1990s, three decades after the issuance of its 1963 law.[136]

Nevertheless, Syria has thus far chosen cooperation to encourage restitution. On a state level, this has resulted in the return of smuggled objects from states such as Canada, Cyprus, and France.[137] Yet one cannot gauge how successful those efforts are in the absence of what actually resides abroad. Moreover, museums have been approached. In 2006, Syria signed with the Louvre a "cooperation agreement" for excavation projects.[138] Such

agreements can cement relations in preparation for later cooperation in the field of repatriation. However, there have been no bilateral treaties on restitution concluded, as the 1970 UNESCO Convention, allowing for such a mechanism, has not yet been incorporated into Syrian law.[139] No sign of Syrian pressure on states or museums to return back stolen artifacts exists. One wonders if a future legal amendment will give this friendly cooperative approach a more assertive tone.

C. Turkey

Similar to Egypt and Syria, Turkey has loads of cultural masterpieces demanded for return. With the increase in illicit trafficking, it is noteworthy that out of the $2 billion worth of smuggled and stolen artworks market, Turkey's share alone amounts to $400 million.[140] Examples of such objects include the Boguzkoy Sphinx that resided at the Berlin Museum, an entire "Lycian mortuary temple" at the British Museum, the German-smuggled "Priam's treasure" or "Treasures of Troy" now residing at Russia's Pushkin Museum, and the "Lydian Hoard" or "Karun's treasure" that used to be at the Metropolitan Museum of Art (the Met) in the United States.[141]

Attempting to recover its heritage, Turkey has taken up a highly diversified approach of legal and non-legal tools. Yet one can still argue that lawsuits are topping its most powerful restitution techniques. Undertaking a fervent repatriation effort since the 1980s, it filed several lawsuits abroad. Defendants included the Met, Sotheby's auction house, and the smuggling Telli Family.[142]

Marking Turkey's first attempt at legal pursuit of its restitution claims, the Met case offers some insights into some possible reasons of this decision. First, all other means were ineffective for years. Litigation thus became a last resort for Turkey. Following the 1966 theft of the Lydian Hoard and the Met's subsequent purchase of its "363" smuggled pieces in 1970, Turkey started to inquire about it at the museum for some time.[143] Upon knowledge of the Met's acquisition of the Hoard, Turkish "pressure" for restitution intensified but to no avail.[144] This continued till July 1986, when Turkey made an official request for the Hoard's restitution, and sent its Consul-General to meet the Met's administrators.[145] Only when such efforts proved unsuccessful did Turkey initiate proceedings before Manhattan's Federal court in May 1987.[146] Second, Turkey was capable of presenting a solid legal argument for restitution. Indeed, with the help of American lawyers, it was able to overcome the previously mentioned legal difficulties normally associated with

bringing restitution claims before foreign courts.[147] Without such confidence in its case, it might have been unlikely for Turkey to adopt the legal path. Third, the fact that the issue of theft of cultural artifacts had been regularly tackled in the local press might have also supported the decision to litigate. Indeed, investigative writings of the journalist Özgen Acar helped uncover hidden information about the theft and smuggling of many Turkish artifacts over the years.[148] They had been cited as what "largely" prompted the government in the 1980s to "[take] up the cause of stolen cultural patrimony."[149] Therefore, one can argue that this strengthened the will to go ahead with the case, despite for instance its high legal costs. Fourth, examples of restitution in other countries might have further supported Turkey in its decision. Indeed, in the 1970s and 1980s, repatriation of many artifacts occurred, mostly a result of negotiation and cooperation.[150] Desiring to benefit from such developments, it became possible that Turkey must have wanted to find another effective way of restitution as negotiation efforts with the Met faltered. Its choice did prove useful, as the Met decided to settle the dispute and finally agreed to give the Hoard back, which it did in 1993, after six years of Turkish persistence in the courts.[151]

In any case, this lawsuit impacted Turkey's assertive approach towards restitution. On one hand, it increased Turkey's confidence in the legal option.[152] More Turkish claims were successfully brought in foreign states in the 1990s including the United Kingdom and Switzerland.[153] On the other hand, litigation became an influential pressure card, due to the negative publicity it creates for the defendant-museums. For example, the Brooklyn museum returned a "garlanded sarcophagus" that it exhibited for a private collector to Turkey, after it was "threatened to sue."[154] Trying to avert lawsuits, other art-related entities also undertook voluntary restitution steps.[155]

Nevertheless, two problems still exist. One concerns the effect of litigation. For Turkey has been able to acquire "only a few" of the cultural objects it has abroad.[156] Another problem, which is more significant, is the high expenses of litigation. Indeed, until 2009, restitution efforts had cost Turkish Culture and Tourism Ministry "$17 million."[157] Meanwhile, illicit trafficking has not been curbed. At a time when funds are scarce,[158] preservation priorities are increasing, budget deficits linger, and lawsuits take a long time as already discussed, the situation calls for a parallel utilization of non-legal means.

Turkey has not totally given up on cooperation, negotiation, and pressure. Similar to Egypt, it seeks to establish bilateral agreement on restitution. For instance, it sought to conclude one with China.[159]

It also conducts negotiations, such as that leading to the Met's repatriation of "fifty-three cases of [stolen] antiquities from Sardis," in exchange for leaving an "iconic pillar from the Temple of Artemis."[160] Pressure can be also resorted to. An example is Robert Hecht, the American antiquities dealer with a bad reputation, was declared a *"persona non grata* on suspicion of smuggl[ing] antiquities."[161] Suspension of "cultural exchange" had also been tried with Germany "over the Boguzkoy Sphinx."[162]

Finally, whether Turkey resorts to litigation or cooperation depends on certain factors. But aside from the economic considerations and legal aspects, factors such as the importance of the disputed cultural objects, or the state interests at stake,[163] will normally play a role. It falls within the state's discretion to decide which factor(s) trumps the rest.

Therefore, it cannot be ultimately judged which approach is the best to adopt. Similarities can be drawn across the three states. But each state presents unique circumstances. It depends on the situation at hand. However, there is no harm in keeping options open, as they may vary in effectiveness at different times. Flexibility will eventually be imperative.

IV. Conclusion

Restitution of cultural artifacts is such a sensitive issue to all states concerned. Many source states feel that they have been illegally despoiled and unjustly stripped of their heritage and identity-defining relics, during a time period when they had no say in their fate. They demand the return of such artifacts as a way to rectify the wrongs of the past, and have been adopting laws against illicit trade or export of artifacts abroad. Market states argue to the contrary, and believe they had done a great service to humanity by hosting, preserving, and showing those objects to the whole world. A lot of them are reluctant to repatriate many of the distinctive artifacts that adorn their museums and private collections. They do not agree to restrictive laws, and hold that they have not been effective in stopping illicit trafficking of antiquities. Together, these two camps generally represent the arguments of cultural nationalism and cultural internationalism respectively. Upon examination, it becomes clear that cultural internationalist ideas are refutable, although some still hold validity. Cultural nationalism on the other hand seems to present a more convincing line of thinking. Although there is room for reconciliation, the conflict in ideas has not been resolved.

This paper has attempted to demonstrate the aspects of such conflict using three examples of Middle Eastern source states, namely Egypt, Syria,

and Turkey. It has highlighted the similarities and differences in their system of antiquities protection, particularly in aspects of cultural property definition, protective legal provisions, as well as their approaches to restitution. More specifically, it has sought to identify the factors that affect a state's decision to litigate restitution claims before foreign courts. With visible commonalities and some variations, one can finally conclude filing restitution lawsuits is not always resorted to, due to some obstacles and other considerations. The emphasis may be more towards non-legal means. However, litigation still adds strength to them. Together, both types are surely necessary in the battle of restitution.

Notes

1 *See* Sharon Waxman, Loot: The Battle over the Stolen Treasures of the Ancient World 67 (2008) (stating that looting first started with Napoleon Bonaparte's conquests at the end of the 18th century as his armies plundered "artworks from across Europe" as a matter of "national pride.").

2 Palestine, Syrian Golan Heights, and Iraq are still under occupation.

3 This will be later discussed in the examples of Egypt and Syria.

4 The focus will be on protection of cultural property during times of peace. Protection of cultural property during wartime is regulated by other instruments including the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict.

5 Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, arts. 2, 17, Nov. 19, 1970, 823 U.N.T.S 231 [hereinafter 1970 UNESCO Convention].

6 *Id.* arts. 7(b) (ii), 13; Entry into force of the Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of cultural Property, http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.phpURL_ID=13039& URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html#ENTRY, (last accessed on Nov. 19, 2010).

7 1970 UNESCO Convention, supra note 5, art. 15. See generally Dalia N. Osman, Occupiers' Title to Cultural Property: Nineteenth-Century Removal of Egyptian Artifacts, 37 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 968, 971(1998-1999) (referring to how the 1970 UNESCO Convention only addressed the "current illegal exportation and theft" without tackling the "historically expropriated" cultural property).

8 Countries Seek Return of Looted Antiquities, Hurriyet Daily News & Econ. Rev., Apr. 8, 2010, 4, available at http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=looted-antiquities-be-asked-back-2010-04-08 (last accessed on Nov.7, 2010) (reporting on the call for amending the 1970 UNESCO Convention made at the Egyptian hosted conference for archaeologically rich countries in 2010) [hereinafter Countries Seek Return].

9 States Parties to the Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of cultural Property (2010), http://portal.unesco.org/la/convention.asp?KO= 13039&language=E#1

10 Collins English Dictionary 385 (4th ed. 2000) (emphasis added).

11 A Geography of Heritage: Power, Culture and Economy (B. Graham et al. eds., 2000) cited in Çiğdem Atakuman, Value of Heritage in Turkey: History and Politics of Turkey's World Heritage Nominations. 23.1 J. Mediterranean Archaeology 107, 109 (2010), available at http://www.equinoxjournals.com/JMA/article/_viewPDFInterstitial/9220/pdf (last accessed on Nov. 16, 2010)

12 *Id.* (explaining how heritage reshapes identities through competing narratives of the 'other'(s) created by the "official narratives.").

13 Atakuman, *supra* note 11, at 108.

14 All three states had antiquity laws and regulations dating back to the 19th and early 20th centuries. However, the focus in this paper is on legislations passed since the mid 20th century.

15 Law No.3 for the Year 2010 for Antiquities Protection amending Law No. 118/1983, art.2, *cited in Al-Youm Al-Sabe' Yanshur al-Nass al-Kamel li-Qanun Himayet al-Athar Algadid* [Al-Youm Al-Sabe' Publishes the Full-Text of the New Antiquities Protection Law], Jan. 19, 2010, Al-Youm Al-Sabe', *available at* http://www.youm7 .com/News.asp?NewsID=179632 (last accessed on Sept. 20, 2010) [hereinafter Egypt's Amended Law]; Syrian Arab Republic Antiquities Law Passed in Legislative Decree # 222 of October 26, 1963 with All its Amendments, art.4, 2000, UNESCO Cultural Heritage Laws Database, *available at* http://tebtunis.berkeley.edu_/laws/Syria/sy_antiquitieslaw1963_engtof.pdf (last accessed on Sept. 20, 2010) [hereinafter Syria's Amended Law]; Legislation for the Conservation of Cultural and Natural Property No. 5226/2004, art.3 (trans. International Foundation for Art Research), *available at* http://www.ifar.org (last accessed on Sept. 20, 2010) [hereinafter Turkey's Law for 2004].

16 Syria's Amended Law, *supra* note 15, art.3; Turkey's Law for 2004, *supra* note 15, arts. 3, 23.

17 Syria's Amended Law, *supra* note 15, art.3; Turkey's Law for 2004, *supra* note 15, arts. 3, 23 (while Syrian law includes nature-made objects within moveable and immoveable property, Turkish law creates a sub-category called "natural properties.").

18 Decree No 712 for the Year 2010, Ministry of Culture, Jun. 27, 2010, 153 Al-Waqai'al-Rasmeyya 2-50 [Official Gazette], on file with author [hereinafter Decree 712].

19 Egypt's Amended Law, *supra* note 15, art. 2; Syria's Amended Law, *supra* note 15, art. 1; Turkey's Law for 2004, *supra* note 15, arts. 3(a)(1)-(3).

20 Egypt's Amended Law, *supra* note 15, art. 2; Syria's Amended Law, *supra* note 15, art. 1; Turkey's Law for 2004, *supra* note 15, arts. 3(a)(1)-(2).

21 Turkey's Law for 2004, *supra* note 15, art. 3(a)(1)

22 *Id.* art. 3(a)(2).

23 Egypt's Amended Law, *supra* note 15, art. 2; Syria's Amended Law, *supra* note 15, art. 1.

24 Turkey's Law for 2004, *supra* note 15, arts. 6(d), 23(b).

25 *Id.*, art. 6(a).

26 Egypt's Amended Law, *supra* note 15, art. 2; Syria's Amended Law, *supra* note 15, art. 1. *See* Decree No 712 for the Year 2010, *supra* note 18, at 5 (explaining that the limit for the date of origin of Egyptian antiquities is the beginning of Mohamed Ali's family rule).

27 Egypt's Amended Law, *supra* note 15, art. 3; Syria's Amended Law, *supra* note 15, art. 1; Turkey's Law for 2004, *supra* note 15, art. 6(b).

28 Egypt's Amended Law, *supra* note 15, art. 8; Syria's Amended Law, *supra* note 15, art. 4; Turkey's Law for 2004, *supra* note 15, art. 5.

29 Egypt's Amended Law, *supra* note 15, art. 8

30 *Id.* arts. 8-9. See generally Bonnie Burnham, Int'l Council of Museums, The Protection of Cultural Property: Handbook of National Legislations 70 (1974) (explaining that Egypt's 1951 Law prohibited exportation of antiquities without a permit). See Lyndel V. Prott & Patrick J. O'Keefe, UNESCO Handbook of National Regulations Concerning the export of Cultural Property 70-71 (1988) (referring to the 1983 Egyptian Law that banned antiquities export except for temporary exhibitions).

31 Syria's Amended Law, *supra* note 15, arts. 4, 32.

32 Turkey's Law for 2004, *supra* note 15, arts. 5, 11. It seems though that private ownership is allowed in the law, particularly when articles on expropriation are considered. *See id*., arts. 7, 10, 11.

33 Egypt's Amended Law, *supra* note 15, art. 9

34 Syria's Amended Law, *supra* note 15, arts. 23, 26, 34.

35 Turkey's Law for 2004, *supra* note 15, art. 11.

36 *Id.* arts. 11, 15.

37 Syria's Amended Law, *supra* note 15, arts. 20, 37.

38 Egypt's Amended Law, *supra* note 15, art. 18.

39 *Id.* art. 9.

40 Syria's Amended Law, *supra* note 15, art. 30, 57.

41 EuroMed Heritage Regional Workshop on Strengthening of Institutional and Legal Frameworks: Preventing and Fighting Illicit Traffic in Cultural Property, Nov., 2009, Beirut, Leb., at 136, *available at* http://www.euromedheritage.net/euroshared/doc/EN_PROCEEDINGS%20BEIRUT%20PART%202_Contributions.pdf [hereinafter Beirut Workshop].

42 Turkey's Law for 2004, *supra* note 15, art. 24.

43 *Id.* arts. 27, 29.

44 Egypt's Amended Law, *supra* note 15, art. 10; Syria's Amended Law, *supra* note 15, art. 31 (conditioning the loan or exchange on whether it is "beneficial"); Turkey's Law for 2004, *supra* note 15, art. 32 para. 1.

45 Turkey's Law for 2004, *supra* note 15, art. 24.

46 Syria's Amended Law, *supra* note 15, art. 32.

47 Egypt's Amended Law, *supra* note 15, art. 35 (stipulating that all artifacts excavated "belong to Egypt."); c*ontra* Law No. 117 at 193(1) Promulgating the Law on the Protection of Antiquities, art. 36, (trans. International Foundation on Art Research), *available at* http://www.ifar.org/upload/PDFLink4897669e0f11dWMK%20-%20Egypt%20-%20Law%20No.%20117.pdf , (last accessed on Nov. 22, 2010) (permitting rewarding licensed exaction missions with movable antiquities provided, *inter alia*, that their number "does not exceed 10% of all the mission's movable finds."); Turkey's Law for 2004, *supra* note 15, art. 41.

48 Syria's Amended Law, *supra* note 15, art. 52 (stating that this is for "promoting the civilizations which flourished on the territories of [Syria] outside of the country and encouraging foreign scholars to get involved in archaeological studies ….").

49 Beirut Workshop, *supra* note 41, at 130.

50 Egypt's Amended Law, *supra* note 15, art. 42 (added to that is the confiscation of the property attempted to be smuggled, and the devices or equipment used for that).

51 Syria's Amended Law, *supra* note 15, art. 56

52 Turkey's Law for 2004, *supra* note 15, art. 68.

53 Egypt's Amended Law, *supra* note 15, art. 41; Syria's Amended Law, *supra* note 15, art. 64; Turkey's Law for 2004, *supra* note 15, art. 75.

54 Egypt's Amended Law, *supra* note 15, arts. 41-50 (showing that prison sentences range from 3 months to life imprisonment).

55 *See* Syria's Amended Law, *supra* note 15, arts. 56-68 (showing that prison sentences range between 25 years to 1 month); *see* Turkey's Law for 2004, *supra* note 15, arts. 65-75 (showing that prison sentences start from 3 months to 10 years).

56 Egypt's Amended Law, *supra* note 15, art. 8; Turkey's Law for 2004, *supra* note 15, art. 12.

57 Egypt's Amended Law, *supra* note 15, art. 8.

58 Decree 712, *supra* note 18, art. 13.

59 Syria's Amended Law, *supra* note 15, art. 12.

60 *Id.*

61 Nelleke M. Basar, The Rape of Our Heritage (Part 1). Hurriyet Daily News & Econ. Rev., Aug. 17, 1997, 25-6, available at, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/h.php?news=the-rape-of-our-heritage-part-i--1997-08-17, (last accessed on Sept., 21, 2010).

62 Atakuman, supra note 11, at 124.

63 Beirut Workshop, supra note 41, at 131.

64 *Id.* at 137.

65 *Warshet Tasmeem Mashrou' Ta'deel Qanun al-Athar: Tatweer Istrateegeya li-hemayet wa-Ta'heel al-Irth al-Thaqafi al-Watani* [Worshop for Drafting an Amendment for the Antiquities Law: Developing a Strategy to Protect and Restore the National Cultural Heritage], SANA, Nov. 11, 2010, 8, *available at* http://www.sana.sy/ara/9/2010/11/11/318697.htm (last accessed on Nov., 12, 2010).

66 *Id.*

67 John Henry Merryman, Two Ways of Thinking about Cultural Property, 80 Am. J. Int'l L. 831, 846, (1986).

68 *Id.* at 832.

69 *Id.*

70 *Id.*

71 *Id.* at 843-44.

72 James B. Cuno, Who Owns Antiquity? Museums and the Battle over Our Ancient Heritage 6 (2008).

73 Merryman, *supra* note 67, at 831.

74 *Id.*at 836-37.

75 *Id.*at 844.

76 Cuno, *supra* note 72, at 15.

77 Merryman, *supra* note 67, at 847.

78 *Id.*

79 Waxman, *supra* note 1, at 5, 371; *see id.* at 297 (quoting Giacomo Medici, an artifact dealer, who stated that "if all the countries where the antiquities come from asked for their unprovenanced pieces back, the Getty would be empty. . . [m]ost of the American museums would be empty.").

80 Merryman, *supra* note 67, at 849, 846.

81 Cuno, *supra* note 72, at 5; *see* Merryman, *supra* note 67, at 848 (arguing that legal restrictions lead to more of the illegal trade, which in turn require more controls "and so it escalates.").

82 *Id.*at 19.

83 Waxman, *supra* note 1, at 3. *See* Cuno, *supra* note 72, at 11(arguing that "national claims on identity are political [ones], so are national claims on antiquities.").

84 Waxman, *supra* note 1, at 120 (quoting Henri Loyrette, the director of the Louvre Museum).

85 *Id.* at 266 (commenting on the idea of Neil McCregor, the director of the British Museum, that "culture is the shared inheritance of everyone.").

86 Cuno, *supra* note 72, at 9.

87 Merryman, *supra* note 67, at 849.

88 *Id.*

89 Ercan Yavuz, Turkey: A Magnet for Smugglers of Historical Artifacts, Today's Zaman, Sept. 27, 2009, 4, available at http://www.todayszaman.com/news-188131-101-turkey-a-magnet-for-smugglers-of-historical-artifacts.html (last accessed on Nov. 16, 2010) (referring to the Culture and Tourism Ministry's 'Cultural and Natural Assets Smuggling Report' based on statistics of the Anti-smuggling and Organized Crime Bureau (KOM) of the police department).

90 Beirut Workshop, *supra* note 41, at 60.

91 *Id.*

92 *Id.* at 93, 133; Yavuz, *supra* note 89, 8; Sebum Arsu, *Art Thefts Highlight Lax Security in Turkey*, N.Y. Times, June 12, 2006, 12, *available at* LEXIS Nexis.

93 EuroMed Heritage Workshop on Strengthening of Institutional and Legal Frameworks: Heritage Economics and Conservation Funding, June. 6-8, 2010. Damascus, Syria, at 44-45. *available at* http://www.euromedheritage. net/euroshared/doc/100913%20Proceedings%20LEG_05.pdf [hereinafter Damascus Workshop].

94 *Turkey's Current Account Deficit Reaches $32.4 Bln*, World Bull., Nov. 11, 2010, 2, *available at* http://www.worldbulletin.net/news_detail.php?id=66190 (last accessed on Nov. 17, 2010).

95 Arsu, *supra* note 92, 2, 8; *see id.* 7 (pointing out that shortage of resources has led to the problem of under-staffing at state museums). *See also* Engin Özgen, *Some remarks on the Destruction of Turkey's Archaeological Heritage*, *in* Trade in Illicit Antiquities: The Destruction of the World's Archaeological Heritage 119 (Neil Brodie et al. eds., 2001) (elaborating on how the Ministry of Culture "ranks number 40 in importance behind other government ministries and thus is lacking in necessary funds and personnel.").

96 Waxman, *supra* note 1, at 120; Souren Melikian, *Transforming the Louvre in Uncertain Times*, N.Y. Times, June 12, 2009, 2, *available at* http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/13/arts/13iht-melik13.html (last accessed on Nov. 7, 2010).

97 *Admission Fees*, Louvre Museum Website, *at* http://www.louvre.fr/llv/pratique/tarifs.jsp?bmLocale=en (last accessed on Nov. 2, 2010) (discarding discount rates).

98 Melikian, *supra* note 96, 2.

99 *Id.* (it bought 167 new works).

100 *Id.* 7, 9 (added to those sources is government funds).

101 Cuno, *supra* note 72, at 2.

102 Waxman, *supra* note 1, at 120; *see id.* at

103 *Id.* at 70.

104 *Id.*

105 John Henry Merryman, Thinking about the Elgin Marbles, 83 Mich. L. Rev. 1881, 1888 (1985) *in* Aisha Y. Salem, Finders Keepers? The Repatriation of Egyptian Art, 10 J. Tech. Law & Pol. 173, 178 (2005) (arguing that "works in the British Museum have entered British culture, help define the British to themselves, inspire British arts, give Britons identity and community, civilize and enrich British life, and stimulate British scholarship.").

106 Waxman, *supra* note 1, at 142.

107 *Id.* 61, 85.

108 *Id.* at 142.

109 Cuno, *supra* note 72, at 19.

110 Damascus Workshop, *supra* note 93, at 44, 98 (referring further to other new museum projects underway in different Egyptian cities).

111 *Id.* at 45; *see id.* at 131-132 (including other projects with GTZ and Aga Khan Trust Fund).

112 Waxman, *supra* note 1, at 120.

113 *Id.* at 142.

114 *Contra* Waxman, *supra* note 1, at 3.

115 *Id.* at 373.

116 Waxman, *supra* note 1, at 16; Nevine El-Aref, *Antiquities Wish List*, Al Ahram Weekly, July 14-20, 2005, 3, *available at* http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2005/751/eg7.htm (last accessed on Sept. 28, 2010).

117 El-Aref, *supra note* 116, 8, 17 (noting that despite Ankhaf's legal departure outside of Egypt, it is still demanded back as a "unique and valuable object.").

118 Waxman, *supra* note 1, at 18-19.

119 *Compare* Osman, *supra* note 7, at 973-92 (making a legal argument under international law that Egypt does have a legal claim to restitution of objects historically seized), *with* Josh Shuart, *The British Museum's Title to the Rosetta Stone and the Sphinx's Beard,* 52 U. Kan. L. Rev. 669 (2003-2004) (making a legal argument against Egypt's claim to the Sphinx's beard and how it belong to the United Kingdom).

120 Beirut Workshop, *supra* note 41, at 60; *see id.* at 95 (stating that a "computer-based documentation program" is underway for the GEM project).

121 Howard N. Spiegler & Lawrence M. Maye, American Litigation to Recover Cultural Property: Obstacles, Options, and A Proposal in Trade in Illicit Antiquities: The Destruction of the World's Archaeological Heritage 122 (Neil Brodie et al. eds., 2001); Beirut Workshop, supra note 41, at 52, 60.

122 Spiegler & Maye, *supra* note 121, at 121.

123 Nevine El-Aref, *Under Tut's Spell*, Al Ahram Weekly, Nov. 11-17, 2004, 6, *available at* http://weekly.ahram. org. eg/2004/716/he1.htm (last accessed on Nov. 18, 2010).

124 *Id.* at 7.

125 *Countries Seek Return*, *supra* note 8, 6.

126 Waxman, *supra* note 1, at 15.

127 *Id.* at 14, 18

128 *Id.* at 18.

129 France's Louvre Museum Returns Five Frescoes to Egypt. BBC News, Dec. 14, 2009, 1. at http://news.bbc.co. uk/2/hi/8412762.stm (last accessed on Nov. 7, 2010).

130 Beirut Workshop, *supra* note 41, at 95 (adding that negotiations are ongoing with the U.S too).

131 *Countries Seek Return*, *supra* note 8, 1, 3.

132 *See supra* text accompanying note 65.

133 Beirut Workshop, *supra* note 41, at 133

134 *Id.* at 137; *see id.* at 139.

135 Damascus Workshop, *supra* note 93, at 40.

136 *Id.* at 127.

137 Beirut Workshop, *supra* note 41, at 132.

138 Melikian, *supra* note 96, 12.

139 Beirut Workshop, *supra* note 41, at 129, 132.

140 Basar, *supra* note 61, 20-21.

141 Waxman, *supra* note 1, at 136, 138, 141, 148.

142 *Id.* at 150, 152.

143 *Id.* at 149.

144 *Id.*

145 *Id.*

146 -*Id.* at 150.

147 See Speilger and Maye, Supre Note 121-125 (Discussing how Turkey Succeeded in Establishing its Case Despite the Legal Difficulties)

148 waxman, *supra* note 1, at 135, 137.

149 *Id.* at 137.

150 Jeanette Greenfield, The Return Of Cultural Treasures 373-75 (2007).

151 Waxman, *supra* note 1, at 151.

152 Kelly Couturier, Talking Turkey; Aegean Nation Tries to Recover its Lost Antiquities. The Wash. Post, Nov. 26, 1995, 15, available at LEXIS Nexis.

153 Waxman, *supra* note 1, at 152.

154 *Id.*

155 *Id.*

156 Erdem Yucel, Museums of the Culture Ministry, Hurriyet Daily News & Econ. Rev., July 11, 1999, 22, available at http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/h.php?news=museums-of-the-culture-ministry-1999-07-11 (last accessed on Sept. 21, 2010).

157 Yavuz, *supra* note 89, p 13.

158 -Waxman, *supra* note 1, at 164.

159 *Id.* at 163.

160 -*Id.* at 200.

161 *Id.* at 188.

162 *Id.* at 137.

163 Couturier, *supra* note 152, p17-18.

A Perspective on Gender Equality in Egypt and Turkey

Sherine El Alaily

A Global Concern

With the increasing global concern for "female empowerment", gender issues have come to occupy a position of top priority on the international agenda. This concern has been especially picking up the pace since the International Conference on Women in Mexico of 1975, to be followed by further pursuits of gender issues as represented by the Nairobi Conference on Women 1985; the Earth Summit of Rio De Janeiro in 1992; the Vienna International Conference on Human Rights in 1993; the International Conference on Population and Development in Cairo in 1994; The Social Summit in Copenhagen in 1995; and finally climaxed in the Fourth International Conference on Women and Development in Beijing in 1995. To follow up, in the year 2000, the United Nations helped the "Beijing+5" meeting to follow up on the Beijing Conference, with the objective of evaluating what the representative countries have achieved from the Beijing Declaration. The earlier efforts on gender issues had taken a slow pace, but the last two decades pushed them forward as their importance came to be more strongly felt, coupled with the realization for the need to take more active steps in this respect. Not only are women's issues addressed in the broad context of the world arena, but they have come to constitute topics of utmost significance in the respective countries, each with its own particular situation. If women's issues reflect common characteristics that can be seen in all societies, the fact remains that variations exist, based on the variations in each society respectively that are, in turn the result of specific cultural, social, economic, and even political conditions (El Safty, 1996).

Gender issues have emerged as concerns of priority in an era where "development" constitutes a target of utmost significance in the world arena. The addition of "development" to global conferences/ seminars on women is

not only an indicator of their role in development as important active agents equal in participation to the role of men, but also a further implication of the fact that gender issues have to be understood in this broader context.

Employment Opportunities

A logical sequence of the expansion in female education is the opening up of employment opportunities for women. Whereas historically and traditionally they had been restricted to the female jobs of teacher and nurse, new venues emerged. The number of women in different fields of employment increased.

One significant variable leading to the wider access of females to the labor market is the support of a legislative system, which have come to realize the necessity of guaranteeing their rights in employment. However, the fact remains that female representation in economic participation and the labor force is lower than that of males. The UNDP Human Development Report (2000) estimates female economic activity as 34%. Cultural factors help explain this situation. On the one hand, a man's identity is, for the major part, defined in terms of his work, he is traditionally being seen as the breadwinner. A women's identity, on the other hand, reserves a small segment. One other causative factor in this respect appears in the lower educational status of women when compared to men, thus limiting their opportunities for work.

In addition, there are still some subcultures, in particular in traditional parts, which believe that employment for women is improper and violates cultural norms. It must be noted that data on female employment may be deficient, sometimes even inaccurate, because of the tendency to exclude from statistics certain segments – i.e., agricultural labor, the informal sector, and unpaid labor. The latter, in particular, creates a paradoxical situation. Women's important role as housewives and mothers does not fall under the estimates of economic participation, in spite of the time spent in these chores. It comes as a surprise then that a housewife is not paid for her labor, whereas another woman who performs the same task is paid – a situation of both inconsistency and contradiction. The housewife who is overburdened with multiple tasks and responsibilities of the home and children is considered both by herself and society as "unemployed". Disregard of this labor is not only a situation of inaccuracy when measuring female labor, but also one among many acts of discrimination against women employment, when their vital role goes unpaid, and more so, inhumanly underestimated. Such slogans as "Every mother is a working woman" have been recently

raised in response to this discriminatory situation, and in attempt to address this form of unpaid labor (during the Beijing Fourth International Conference on Women) (El Safty, 2001).

Background

Despite a great deal of attention to gender relations in Islam and Muslim societies (e.g. Ahmed, 1982; Haddad, 1984; Mir-Hosseini, 2000; Fargues, 2005), gender equality in employment in Muslim majority countries (MMCs) remains under-explored (Syed, 2008). International statistics on women's participation in economic activities, their income levels, and proportions in decision making positions in organization suggest that women in MMCs remain largely disempowered and disadvantaged within employment contexts. For example, the United Nations' Human Development Report revealed that MMCs have a long way to go to women's empowerment; MMCs being firmly placed at the bottom of the index with an average rank of 69.4 amongst the total 78 countries evaluated on Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM) (UNDP, 2005: 356) [1].

This paper sheds some light on the status of gender equality at work in two MMCs, Turkey and Egypt. Secularism is the state ideology in Turkey, while Islam is the state ideology in Egypt. It will be evident that, there is a need to salvage gender equality from the clutches of ideology and bring in genuine processes of equal opportunity and social justice in the work place. In other words, there is sufficient evidence that issues of gender equality (or lack of it) in these countries are in need of urgent attention.

Secularism and Gender Equality in Turkey

The Turkish Republic was founded on the principles of secularism by clearly evacuating Islam from public life.[2] These ideological differences were to have far reaching implications for the future of social policies including gender policies in both countries.

In Turkey, relaxation of the religious structures on gender separation of public and private spheres of life during the declining years of the Ottoman

1 GEM is a composite index used by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) to measure gender inequality in three basic dimensions of empowerment – economic participation and decision-making and power over economic resources (UNDP, 2005: 356).

2 Kemalism, The Turkish version of secularism, replaced religious law with a modern secular system of jurisprudence.

Empire (in the late nineteenth century) enabled women's political activism to gain acknowledgement. Following the national wars, the early years of the modern day Turkish Republic (in the 1920s) witnessed significant legal and social changes in women's rights. Turkish women gained their political right to vote and to be elected to the Grand National Assembly in 1934 (Tekeli, 1993). In 1937, Turkey became a secular state, culminating in future relaxation of laws and social norms which previously constrained women's full participation in public life (Bilge, 1995). Turkish women entered education employment, and other public domains of life in increasing numbers between the 1930s and the 1970s. However, this is only one aspect of the issue.

Some argue that the door to gender equality was open only to women guided by the Kemalist project of modernism. Accordingly, the women who did not belong to the proper ethnic and social economic background were excluded. The Turkish feminist movement in the 1970s adopted the Marxism ideology and the military coup in 1980 hit both the Marxism and the Marxist-feminists severely (Tekeli, 1993). However, Turkish democracy was restored in 1982. Public debates resumed about feminist concerns, e.g. women's employment and domestic violence (Ecevit, 1993).

Islamic Ideology and Gender Equality in Egypt

Egypt is a society which has undergone a set of successive invasions / conquests, each of which has left its mark on its social fabric. It is this cultural context which shapes the environment of the contemporary Egyptian women. The decade of the fifties and sixties in particular marked the climax, when they witnessed the rising of the liberal movement for women's rights, in line with the socialist transformation in society introduced by the new political regime. Equality for all citizens was now legally granted, and women started to enjoy their equal rights to those of men in all spheres. The gender gap during this period was undoubtedly reduced, though never disappearing totally.

It should be mentioned that the newly introduced socialist ideology was able to integrate its principles with Islam, going as far as claiming that Islam is the religion of socialism. Being highly learned in religion, Scholars of this movement's interpretation of religion showed consistency with modern life. Basic in this liberal trend was the emphasis on the rights of women as given by Islam.

By the mid-seventies, there was a reactionary tide that swept the whole society, and infiltrated its various aspects. The façade of this backward

movement appears to be religious, although in reality, its roots can be found in political, social and economic factors. During the 1980s, however, new feminist groups were formed to counter religious fundamentalism. Today, there are many different feminist groups within Egypt. Some of the movements are affiliated with the state in some way, while others are independent feminist associations. Although the organizations have different goals in general they all entail the improvement of women.

Secular vs. Islamic Ideologies

The struggle between Islamic and material perspectives of gender equality, especially in the workplace, seems to be a major issue both in Turkey and in Egypt. The tension is clearly evident in the legal framework in Egypt but remains subtle in Turkey because of the relation between stated and intended approaches to gender equality across the rift between Islamist and secularist.

Despite certain organizational and cultural differences, Turkey seems to share a relatively solid common denominator, i.e. the adaptability of the laws consistent with national progress. The tendency is to broaden and interpret regulations and laws to increase their efficiency and adaptability. Consistent with the practical approach, legitimacy has gained more importance parallel to the institutionalization and standardization in organizations. Gender equality issue in organizational settings – although difficult to generalize – seems to be handled with common sense, which is also deeply gendered. At this point, one of the major dilemmas in gender equality issue in Turkey appears to be the significance attributed to family life and women's roles as wives and mothers on the one hand (consistent with the Islamic / cultural discourse), and gender equality polices and practices as part of modernization processes, on the other hand (consistent with the secularism discourse) (Sayed, et al., 2009).

As for Egypt, the cumulative effect of the historical transformation has consequently created a milieu where, at present, women rights are caught in a cultural base in which contradictory currents clash. On the one hand, a long history of a strong active feminist movement based on a liberal Islamic tide has succeeded in granting women many rights for which they have struggled. On the other hand, the Egyptian woman is currently confronted with a reactionary tide. The liberal trend has been reversed on the basis of misinterpreted religious grounds. Therefore, women have fallen victims to this setback, as being the vulnerable group in society. Many opportunities

which have come to open for females are also being questioned. This reactionary tide, gaining momentum over time with the increasing problems in society at the political, economic and social levels, has aggravated the already existing inequality between males and females. In a traditionally male-dominant culture, the above mentioned reduced gender gap, has come to widen in the face of strong reactionary tide (El Safty, 2001).

The Intermixing of Culture and Religion

Dissatisfaction is expressed in Egypt with misinterpretation of Islam with respect to the status and role of women is society. In Turkey, there was not such a critical awareness of this issue.

In the case of Egypt, the most controversial issue that emerges with respect to female employment appears in the ongoing long debate over the position of the female judge. No woman has been appointed in this position. There is no legislative nor religious barrier to this issue. The Egyptian constitution grants all citizens equality in employment, as has already been mentioned. The history of Islam includes women judges. The religion has no constrain against women judges. The constrain is totally cultural, on grounds centering basically around the inability of women to cope with the strenuous, stressful task of the judge, as it is not suited to her delicate nature, as well as, her highly sentimental, emotional constitution, which will positively shadow her sound judgment (El Safty, 2001).

In reality, gender equality in employment will remain a goal too difficult to achieve in the absence of a radical transformation in cultural and religious perspectives on gender.

In the case of Turkey, there was not a critical awareness of the link between religion, culture and gender equality. Instead, Turkish participants focused on issues of representation by gender. A Banker in Turkey represents his views on the issue at work:

The main reason for women workers to leave work life early and not to progress their career is the problems they face to harmonize work and family responsibilities. Women are considered homemakers who should take care of domestic duties, and childcare and be responsible for the well being of other members of the family, including the elderly. Women have to share these responsibilities with their husbands and/or with the State (Governmental policy document, Turkey).

Despite a liberal stance on gender equality in employment, the low rate of female participation in managerial positions is detected. Reflecting a pro-

tective approach, where she is considered to be too weak to cope with newcomers from the rural areas- especially if they serve in high positions under her management. It is recognized how women might be deemed unsuitable for recovery and confiscation related jobs which may require physical as well as emotional strength. It is also acknowledged that there is little female participation in senior decision- making positions. Thus it is believed that, in accordance with present governmental, assumed (pro- Islamic) norms and expectations, the dominance of males in top management positions is deemed to be more effective.

Starting from this organization, the number of women employees has always exceeded the number of men. This is not a random situation. Female employees' keen interests and responsible attitudes were always valued. Gender equality concept is not mentioned in the organizational policy because it is among our assumptions. The only exception is their maternal leaves which lead to an interruption at work. And for this situation there is nothing that can be done (Bank official, Turkey).

This emphasis on harmonizing of work and family responsibilities seems to be a common challenge to gender equality in Turkey and Egypt. Indeed, Islamist in both countries place a high emphasis on family related roles of women, and offer little encouragement to laws which promote equal employment opportunities to women. This attitude may be described as an outcome of the combination of patriarchal traditions of religion (or religion interpretations) and local culture in both countries.

Efforts for Change: Oratory versus Execution

In both countries, there was evidence that state and private sector organizations are engaged in gender equality initiatives. Ironically, such evidence was more visible in public speaking rather than in practice. In some interviews of women in Egypt, about gender equality, one professor interested in gender equalityreported:

The fact is that elements of Middle Eastern male-dominated culture tend to prevail, hence affecting gender relations, and as such allow men at certain times to enjoy the privileges granted to them by religion, while ignoring those granted to women. Again it must be asserted that this situation is not the rule but it is likely to happen (Professor, Egypt).

An integrated approach instead of lip service approach is needed. Although, NGO sector seems to be active in both countries, particularly Egypt,

NGOs have indeed limited resources and outreach to raise awareness and implement gender equality on a national scale.

In Egypt the number of NGO's currently involved with women's issues as part of their programs is 2000, with 144 of them working exclusively on women (Kandil, 2009).

Religious extremists have started questioning many rights already gained by women after years of struggle. This situation creates a challenge for women activists, since they have to stand against strong reactionary tide, which is gaining impetus with the culmination of unresolved issues (Board Member of the Alliance for Arab Women).

In Turkey, despite the macro-level indicators signaling key challenges facing gender equality in employment, there is also evidence of an attention to gender equality in the workplace. It is suggested that the Turkish managers and policy makers do carry out a number of gender equality initiatives.

Having bound itself with international agreements and conventions, the Turkish State has demonstrated a deliberate intention and will towards the attainment of related standards. This institution, as an organ of Government, is a growing entity which has quite a few challenges on the way to serve the goal of achieving gender equality in all settings (Governmental official, Turkey).

Conclusion

This paper has attempted to shed light on the rights of women in two MMCs, Turkey and Egypt, as they are trapped between religious and legal guarantees on one hand and the actual practice on the other. The society has been shaped by a multitude of variables, each of which has had an impact on the culture. The dialectic between Islam and culture continues, and women are stuck in the midst of this dilemma. Moreover, the legal system acts as another variable in this drama, attempting to maintain and protect the practice of the given rights, as well as to guarantee against violation.

However, stronger forces are in action, as represented by the traditional backbone of society. The male-dominant structure still places priority over gender differentiation. Whereas Islam grants women explicit rights as equal partners, cultural factors may intervene to create a situation of inequality where women are denied many of these rights. It is important to mention that giant leaps have been taken over the years to reinforce the rights granted to women by Islam.

The dialectic between Islam and culture is still ongoing. The debates likewise continue as to where to draw the line. Women are therefore caught in the midst of this drama. Their call is for a more democratic society where gender is no barrier to any human right.

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The Honour Related Violence in Non-Muslim and Muslim Societies

Ayse Tekdal Fildis

Every year thousands of women and girls are murdered by male family members across the world. This practice is called 'honour killing' and it entails the execution of female family member(s) for the perceived misuse of their sexuality. The practice of 'Honour Killing' has been largely overlooked by national and/or international scrutiny mainly because the delicate balance between different traditional and cultural practices requiring respect, tolerance, and human rights and therefore a thorny social and political issue. The question is whom should we blame or spare for such violence? The individual (personal actors i.e. husband, father, brother), family structure, patriarchal, religious, legal, economic, social and political system.

The main focus of this paper is to look at the formative phase of religio-legal ethical codes for disciplining of female sexual conduct, which marks the boundaries of the institution of family in Muslim and Non-Muslim societies. Furthermore, since most of the incidents reported in the local and global media come from Muslim communities living in the Middle East, Africa, and Asia, the question raised in light of historical record is: Why is coercion of female sexuality mainly present in Muslim societies today? And how have other religions and civilizations managed to shed attitudes, perceptions and practices which breed sexual suppression of women? Additionally, when within the same religious communities (for example, Muslim communities), in certain geographical locations, honour related violence does not occur? Therefore what are the factors that lead to the absence or persistence of such violence within the same type of religious/cultural communities?

Honour Killing

Honour killing is one form of extreme violence perpetrated on women by men. It is most commonly a premeditated killing of girls or women committed by their brother, father, or a combination of male agnates.

Honour killings are surprisingly widespread. Reports submitted to the United Nation Commission on Human Rights confirm continuing occurrences in Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Brazil, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, Palestine, Great Britain, Iraq, Iran, India, Italy, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Pakistan, Morocco, Netherland, Qatar, Syria, Sweden, Turkey, Yemen and Uganda (UN Report 2003).These reports suggest that it would be an error to view it as being peculiar to a certain geographical area or belief system. It is focused specifically on a gender based form of violence which is part of cultural practices within the family, including honour killings and marriage related practices. Until recently these practices have escaped national and international scrutiny largely because they are presented as "traditional" or "cultural" practices and therefore require tolerance and respect. Thus cultural relativism or respect for multiculturalism is often employed to excuse the violation of women's rights by inhuman and discriminatory practices within the community at large and the family in particular despite these practices being clearly contrary to the international human rights legislation.

What is Honour

Honour means respect, esteem, and prestige. Honour is a relative term and can be defined and redefined in various socio-economic and cultural contexts with different attributes and its source and meanings vary from one culture to another. In honour killings the perpetrators of the killing are men with whom sexual interaction is prohibited socially and religiously (fathers, brothers, sons, and uncles). It is remarkable to note here that nowhere in the world would a defence lawyer use "heat of passion, rivalry, or jealousy" as a mitigating circumstance to get an acquittal or reduction of sentence for a client who has murdered his daughter, sister, or mother. As a consequence of that Khan makes a useful distinction between 'honour killing' and 'crime of passion'. She suggests that the main distinction between these two forms of killings is the presence or absence of a sexual relationship between victim and perpetrator (Khan 2006: 43).

Crimes of passion tend to be individual acts of violence rather than collective punishments. The conflating of crimes of passion and crimes of honour is therefore a substantive error. Abu-Odeh defines passion as "a private relationship between a man and women, as opposed to a collective one that involves several men related to the women, who are deeply engaged in defending the public image of their masculinity" (Abu-Odeh 1996: 72).

What is required for men and women to be considered 'honourable' is dramatically different from one another. In the case of a man, honour is a

condition of integrity that, if violated accidentally or otherwise, the response has to be without delay and violent if his reputation is to survive, whereas women are assessed within the framework of 'shame', and in particular 'sexual shame'. Campbell suggests that honour is always something assigned by others; it is not based on hard evidence. As a consequence a women's honour depends upon the reputation that the community is willing to concede her (Campell 1994).

Baker points out that, the concept of honour used to rationalize killing is founded on the notion that a person's honour depends on the behaviour of others and therefore it must be controlled. In Baker's view, when a female member violates a norm of honour, the whole family experiences shame. He argues that honour concepts are only another way of understanding the operation of patriarchy. Patriarchy is anchored in the assumption of male authority over women and the male definition and expectations of 'appropriate' female behaviour (Baker, Gregware & Cassidy 1999: 164-84). Males are considered the sole possessors and defenders of honour. Honour is a dialectical term and its opposite is shame. Men are the main sufferers of shame, "manliness and shame are complementary qualities in relation to honour. The women, thus, must have shame if the manliness of man is not to be dishonoured…" (Jafri 2008: 21). Kandioti adds, "Women are vested with immense negative power because any misbehaviour on their part can bring shame and dishonour to the male members of a whole community, lineage or family..." (Kandioyoti 1987: 322).

Through her historical investigation of patriarchal institutions of human society, Gerda Lerner explains how men became the sole protectors of family honour, "The very concept of honour for men embodies autonomy, the power to dispose of oneself and decide for oneself, and the right to have that autonomy recognized by others. But women under patriarchal rule do not dispose of themselves and decide for themselves. Their bodies and their sexual services are at the disposal of their kin group, their husbands, and their fathers. Women do not have honour..." (Lerner 1986: 80).

Women do not possess honour or suffer shame; they can only bring dishonour/shame. The question of honour and shame is directly related to a women's body, her sexuality, and statements of her sexual desires, behaviours and acts, and her marital choices. Khan states that "since the question of family honour is deeply connected with female sexuality, to discipline and control female sexuality, the patriarchal institution of family constructs the borders and defines the limitation of a women's space. Consequently, a crime of honour can be called an act that can occur when any of the borders are crossed..." (Khan: 47).

Historical Roots

Subjugation, exploitation, and commoditisation of women are ancient and widespread. The history of human civilization bears witness that women have been humiliated and treated brutally certainly since the rise of city-states. Lang is explicit about the pervasion of violence against women in general and honour killing in particular: “Family killings and other violence committed in the name of ‘honour’ or reputation occur beyond the Arab world and the Middle East; it is by no means endemic to the religion of Islam or tied to any particular group...” (Jafri: 27). Lerner informs us that the period of the ‘establishment of patriarchy’ was not an ‘event’ but a process that was developed over a period of nearly 2500 years from approximately 3200 to 692 BC. Lerner suggests that the increase in population and the need of labour power in the evolving city-states led to the commoditisation of women, whose sexuality and reproductive capacity became the first ‘property’ for which tribes competed. As a result, a warrior culture, ‘naturally’ favouring male dominance emerged (Lerner: 8). Gradually, Ahmed surmises, the patriarchal family, designed to guarantee male control of female sexuality, became institutionalized, codified, and upheld by the state. As women’s sexuality became designated as the property of men, first of father and then of husband, female sexual purity became negotiable and an economically valuable property; laws became harsher and more restrictive towards women (Ahmed 1992: 26).

Religious dogmas, evidenced by religious verse, reveal an underlying respect for the sanctity of marriage in the Code of Hammurabi, the code of Nesilim (was developed by the Hittites), the Code of Assure, Aztec, ancient civilization of Egypt, Ancient Rome, and other cultures throughout time (Goldestine 2002: 29). The construction of the honour/shame schema relating to female sexuality was already in the offing about four millenniums ago.

It is important to be mindful of the Roman law because Abu-Odeh reminds us that most of the later European penal codes are inspired and derived from these Roman edicts (Abu-Odeh: 28-29). The first instance of legislating female sexual conduct was in the reign of Augustus (22BC to 17 AD). Augustus introduced stricter laws regarding sexual morality and provisions establishing adultery as a crime. Cantarella interprets that the husband and the father of the adulteress had the right to kill, not only were fathers and husbands given legal permission to kill their daughters and wives in case they committed adultery; brothers (who had paternal powers) were also allowed to take action against their sisters (Cantarella 1991:230).

As Cantarella sums up, the ideology and the concept of family honour in Italy remained almost unchanged for about two thousand years. During this time, it was used by medieval and modern law to justify a large number of murders. To put things in perspective, it would be interesting to note that the lenient view of killing for the sake of honour was removed from the Italian code only in 1981(Cantarella: 232).

In the Old Testament, prohibitions against adultery and premarital sex as well as death sentences for violations of them are present in the books of Leviticus and Deuteronomy. The New Testament contains similar prohibitions and punishments (Goldestin: 29).

A brief look at an aspect of canon law enlightens us about a Christian argument to grant immunity to homicide for the sake of honour. Thomas Aquinas gave the arguments for and against immunity in his *Summa Theologica***.** One of the arguments in favour of immunity was that because divine law ordained the stoning of the adulteress, the husband who killed his wife was not committing a sin because 'he was carrying out divine law' (Cantarella: 230).

To comprehend the nature of honour related violence against women in certain societies, it is crucially important to understand the religious basis and cultural determinants of the formation of the institution of family in the historical perspective. The family is a mega platform where all the major civilizations and religions have constructed, deconstructed and reconstructed the ethical, social, and religious boundaries to control, discipline, regularize, and penalize female sexuality. Human history shows the fact that all major religions and civilizations before the advent of Islam had been misogynistic, patriarchal, and oppressive of women in every walk of life, i.e. ethics, economy, law or politics. Islam, being the latest in the series of three major monotheistic religions, continued most of the socio-legal disciplinary tools, sometimes in its original forms and sometimes with modification and changes according to the needs of the existing Meccan-Medinite societies.

Reports and statistics prove that, in recent times most honour related violence incidents have occurred among the dominantly Muslim community. In light of this we need to ask the following, if all the pre-Islamic civilizations and religions had codes for female sexual ethics similar to those of the Islamic ethical code, then why and how have former religions (Judaism, Christianity) and cultures transformed their attitudes toward female sexuality and developed a more open and liberal attitude toward male/female dynamics in their societies with the passage of time? The second question we need to ask is why Muslim cultures and communities remained more rigid and mi-

sogynistic toward female sexuality despite significant socio-economic and political changes in their system.

Economic systems and material forces have determined socio-religious, legal and moral boundaries in ancient, pre-modern and modern communities. There are two aspects of economic systems and material conditions: covert and overt, which play a crucial role in the violence committed by family men against their women. Sometimes it is very difficult to find evidence of the hidden role of the economic system or material motives that turn women into commodities in some communities. Commodification of women founded the institution of women's exchange and trade, in the beginning mainly for the purpose of marriage and sexual services. In the context of 'exchange of women' was the first form of trade, in which women turned into a commodity and were 'reified' as they were thought of more as things than as human beings. The exchange of women marked the beginning of women's subordination (Lerner: 24).

Even today in order to understand various forms of women's historical oppression around the world, it is vital to understand the gradual development of the notion of women as an exchangeable and tradable commodity in analysing the institution of marriage or prostitution. Brides and prostitutes can be categorised as human commodities, which are also sold under the overarching umbrella of the non-human commodity market. The trends and patterns of the non-human commodity market have always determined the prices of brides and prostitutes (along with factors such as age, colour, class, ethnicity and sexual appeal). As Khan explains, changes in practices and patterns of the prostitution, concubinage, and marriage markets have occurred due to changes in the nature of the economic system, high/low demand for labour and services, and modified means of subsistence due to the development of science and technology.

Changing roles of men and women in the job market today construct and de-construct social perceptions, and challenge familial authority and relations. The West has gone through the re-making of their social institutions due to local economic developments. Consequently, we see quite different social systems where women's roles and perceptions have changed significantly in the public and private spheres. For example, we see in many societies that parental authority over their daughters' marriage has diminished due to the economic independence of women and the development of an individualistic, democratic political system (Khan: 169-172).

Today, societies where barbaric practices such as honour related murders exist have not gone through such changes. Due to a specific land-based

economic system, a feudalistic, tribal, and collectivist culture has survived and has not weakened despite scientific developments in the urban centres of the same countries. Commodification of women has turned them into the private property of their kin men who could exchange, purchase and sell them for material benefit in the tribal, feudal semi/rural areas of south-eastern parts of Turkey, Middle East, South Asia, India, Pakistan, Afghanistan and many more communities. In some countries notion of honour/dishonour is used to cover up the covert economics motives and material greed. One latest form of such terrible crimes being committed against women in some parts of Pakistan, Afghanistan, and India is by labelling a woman as immoral and then selling her through the broker who traffics her to the urban areas and abroad for the purpose of prostitution.

The social life of men in such communities has changed in the public sphere due to changes in the system of economy, politics, education, and electronic media but their approach towards the fate of female relatives has not changed.

Young men, especially those who migrated to the city from rural areas, emphasize more strongly the control of how women dress, whether or not they should go to school, whether they should work, with whom they should be friends and how they should behave. Young men ages 18-25 were rather hard and intolerant on the topics of virginity and divorce. It was observed that with age came some degree of increase in tolerance.

Changing socio-economic conditions in society, young women's access to schooling, and infiltration of internet and electronic media inside the home, have all made a deep impact on female family members. However the boys of the family are ignored if they "play around" with girls of another family, but girls of the family are chastised and coerced. The double standard of family men's ethics has created tension in the social system of the family and community.

In Landowning, agricultural, feudal mainly Muslim communities in Turkey, South Asia, Middle East, India, Pakistan, Afghanistan competition for limited economic resources and protection of existing resources serves to facilitate women's coercion in the name of honour. The family men guard their women to maintain the family's resources, which are already shrinking due to changing global economic conditions. Women's bodies are used as a means of protecting economic boundaries. Men know that women may disrupt these boundaries by sexual defiance and they attempt to control and protect their women to prevent this. The men of the community want to maintain the status quo. A woman whose sexual defiance or personal ac-

tions challenge the existing socio-economic set up stands a greater chance of being killed by someone in her own family (Ibid: 174).

Love transgresses boundaries across class, caste, faith, colour and geography. Love based transgression is a universal phenomenon occurring in human history since the day economically determined boundaries were marked. Private property, monotheism, monogamy, and the emergence of class, caste, and faith constructed invisible walls between various sections of populations. Societies made rules to discipline and control the romantic love. As I mentioned before, all kinds of social stratifications have been determined by material forces and economic systems throughout history.

In the West during the nineteenth century, enlightenment, liberalism, and democratic ideas gave birth to ideas of equality, liberty, and individualism. The changed economic system (industrialization and capitalism) brought more women from the private to the public sphere and increased male-female interaction outside the family. The growth of capitalism and democratic political systems resulted in the emergence of an individualistic culture that gradually and sometimes rapidly demolished the walls between human beings. Further, these processes weakened parental authority over the children. Soon romantic love replaced class, caste, or religious preferences and as a result of changes in the economic system, romantic love became a legally and socially acceptable factor for a couple to marry.

These changes didn't occur in non-West Muslim cultures, due to the different course of economic change. Rural, tribal, feudal, and semi-closed communities didn't go through the kind of changes that urbanised, industrialized, and democratized Western societies went through. Parental authority, class superiority, racial purity, tribal ties, and religious affiliation remained the strongest factors in determining sexual interactions between males and females.

Yet in spite of this, high exposure to Western culture through the electronic media is infecting young people in non-Western Muslim cultures with ideas of glamorized romantic love and forcing them to challenge the love-oppressing norms and practices in their own societies. The challenge of romantic love is not new in Muslim societies but the level of occurrence, the nature of manifestation, and the force of defiance has changed through the interactions between various cultures in modern times.

The major concerns of Islam with respect to marriage and love were to stop sexual interaction between unmarried youth (fornication) and to bar Muslim women from marrying non-Muslim men without converting them to Islam. However, Muslim men were exempted from such religious sanc-

tions and could marry Jewish and Christian women without forcing them to change their religion, not only that but also Islam intended to demolish the boundaries of class, caste, colour, language, and race and gave rise to the idea of a universal Muslim brotherhood called the *Muslim Ummah*. Unfortunately, diverse and ever changing material forces caused a return of social stratification of class, colour, and language.

Tribalism, which was the main target of Islam's social philosophy as it attempted to break the backbone of the tribal system, could not be eliminated from the early and late Muslim societies. Tribalism persists today in many Muslim societies where the ratio of honour related violence is very high. Honour related violence has direct links with modern tribalism, as each tribe wants to protect its physical and social boundaries. Tribal socio-economic affiliation is stronger than religious affiliation. That is why all tribes, ethnic groups, and social classes in Muslim societies are very hostile to the idea of romantic love as the basis of marriage.

Throughout his life and teaching, the Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) made efforts to eliminate social, economic, linguistic, and racial differences among Muslims. He stressed the elimination of social stratification and emphasized that the only boundary that should be recognized was the boundary of religious faith. In a stratified society, such as Arab society during the Prophet's time, this was the most distinct and humanitarian message of the religion.

As Mernissi argues, today romantic love poses a great threat to the existing set up (Mernissi 2003: 104-110). Romantic love has always existed in every Muslim country, what is new is the attachment of the idea of romantic love to the institution of marriage. Previously 'falling in love' was not the primary reason for getting married; in history whenever such reasons were given by a young couple, the family and community showed resistance, and in many cases, provided the basis for honour killings. Economic motives, responsibilities of kinship, family structure, and the desire for children have been the primary motives and that is why for a long time throughout history and across the world, marriages were normally arranged by the parents and family.

As I explained earlier, in the West, attitudes towards romantic love as a basis for marriage changed more than a century ago, but in communities where honour crimes are reported, falling in love is still considered a rebellious and subversive act. The natural, biological, and universal feeling called romantic love has been one of the strongest factors in the occurrence and persistence of the murder of women in the name of honour. Since the biological urge has been socially constructed and its dimensions have

been determined economically and religiously, it stands to reason that the universal feeling of romantic love has diverse local expressions and cultural manifestations. The role of romantic love in people's lives changes according to socio-economic realities. Honour related violence cannot be checked or curbed until societal attitudes towards romantic love and gender perceptions of family and community are radically challenged and changed, and family gender relations and perceptions cannot be changed until material conditions and economic roles are changed and reformulated.

At the beginning of the 21st. century, the tribal, feudal class and caste system have been identified as the biggest factors for honour related violence in Muslim world. In the existing economic system of landholding feudalist/ tribal rural culture and semi-capitalist urbanized mode of production, state law will remain unable to check honour related violence in countries like Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Egypt, Iraq, Iran, India, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Pakistan, Palestine, Morocco, Qatar, Syria, Turkey, Yemen and South Asia. Modern forms of capitalism, globalized corporate culture, electronic media-incited material greed and valorisation of sexual romantic love through the entertainment industries from Hollywood to Bollywood have added the material factors responsible for the recent increase in the number of rebellious/ assertive women and raised the level of manifestation of masculine wrath in the form of honour related murder.

I agree with Khan's suggestion, in general his remedy for the social evils including the honour/shame code was 'de-tribalizing, de-casteifying and de-feudalizing' (Khan, Mazhar ul Haq, Purdah and Polygamy 1972: 177). Challenging and changing the tribal, feudal and economic system which, in turn, would change the perception of family and community at the micro and macro level. It is a change in the public and family's perception of female sexuality, geared by a change in material conditions that would check honour related violence, not just strict penal codes, or iron handed law enforcement measures taken by the state.

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Virtual Society and Media:

Social Networking Platforms as a Virtual Public Sphere in the Arab World

Saddek Rabah

Introduction

Over the last two decades, it has been argued on several sites, ranging from academic papers and conferences to offline and online news media, that social networking platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, MySpace, hi5, Friendster, LinkedIn, etc. are witnessing an exponential growth rate. Some researchers even go so far as to predict that these networks will bring about a revolutionary transformation of the social, cultural and political relationships (Boyd, 2008; Godin, 2008). Since their inception, these networks have appealed to millions of enthusiastic users who have integrated them into their daily life practices. The variety of the content of these platforms, with many social affordances[1], reflects a wide range of interests and practices. If their main technological characteristics are fairly uniform, the practices that emerge from them are varied. These networks serve diverse audiences; they attract them based on common language, race and religion or shared identities based on nationality. They also differ in the extent to which they incorporate new information and communication tools, such as mobile connectivity, blogging, and photo/video-sharing (Boyd, 2007). These networks are also very active arenas whereby participants with their cultural, religious and ethnic diversity exchange, debate and express their points of view related to all sorts of issues. In many countries, political issues are predominantly present in theses debates because they are banned from being discussed in the traditional public sphere.

1 Barry Wellman has imported the concept of affordances, barrowed from engineering, into sociology. See: Benkler, 2006.

It would not be exaggerated to say that technology allows people to overcome barriers of time and space. People use the telephone, television, computers, Internet and the social media networks to share information, knowledge and interact across temporal and geographical boundaries. In some cases, new communication technologies even facilitate the shift and acceleration of information flows. With the rise of electronic and networked technology, scholars suggest that social interaction become increasingly disembedded and transcend the constraints of time and space (Giddens, 1991; Meyrowitz, 1985). People can use the Internet, mobile technology and social networks platforms to connect with family and friends from all over the world.

The growing interest of the academic research and public debates about the democratizing features of these networks dates back to 1990s. The most promising utopias of deliberative online communication and formation of active counter-publics have been envisaged with fears ranging from trivialization, fragmentation, even the disappearance of widely and commonly shared issues, to viral distribution of non-democratic, "harmful" content (Fraser, 1990). Nowadays the same questions are re-emerging once again in an era that is witnessing the explosion of social content on a multitude of networked platforms (Williams & Gulati 2007; Keim & Clark 2009). Recent examples of dramatic events in some Arab countries have provided just cases where the information produced by non-professional individuals and distributed via informal networks, including social networking platforms, has supposedly played a major role in the tedious democratic process in this region of the world.

This study examines how social networking platforms may form a virtual public sphere in the Arab world, and thus contribute substantially to the ongoing democratic debate. Can these networks form an attractive virtual public sphere to empower citizens, and encourage the concretization of democratic principles in the Arab World? Can they revolutionize the political practices or whether they would accommodate the current *status quo* at a time of increased cynicism towards politics? Can they extend the political capabilities of the Arab world citizens and promote rational discourses? Will the "revolutionary" potential of these networks be constrained by the authoritarian regimes of the region and the apathy and cynicism of the citizens?

The central idea of this study is to explore the potential of social networking platforms in the Arab world to form a virtual public sphere, thus fostering democracy and empowering citizens to transcend the different kind of paternalism they have been experiencing since many decades. It draws on

examples from some Arab countries where social networking platforms are intelligently used to revitalize the political and social life in significant ways. The premise of the study is that in a virtual public sphere context, social networking platforms could offer an alternative space to the traditional hegemonic Arab elitist sphere. In a social networking platforms context, virtual public sphere could help individuals achieve their social and political aims, or help maintain a movement by supporting virtual forms of self-expression, friendship networks and communities.

The approach in this study is exploratory. Although many authors have recently emphasized the importance of analyzing the perceptions and uses of the notion of public sphere in relation to social networking platforms, and several journal theme issues have been dedicated to investigate these questions (Feenberg 2009; Gripsrud 2009), there are no systematic overviews of the relationship between the public sphere and social networking platforms and its users/publics.

The study begins by defining the concepts of social networking platform and virtual public sphere coupled with a contextual perspective, drawn from available literature on the subject. Then, it addresses the question of social networking platforms in the Arab World and how they might herald the advent of a virtual public sphere. Next, it discusses the potential of these networks as virtual public sphere from an optimistic and skeptical perspective. It concludes with the assessment of the question from the researcher's point of view.

Social Networking Platforms

Social networking platforms and what may be termed web 2.0 have become an overwhelming topic all over the world and are increasingly shaping the economy, politics, and culture of the contemporary society. A social network broadly embodies the notion of all the individuals with whom we share a social relationship. They are defined as web-based services that allow individuals to (1) construct a public or semi-public profile within a bounded system, (2) articulate a list of other users with whom they share a connection, and (3) view and traverse their list of connections and those made by others within the system (Boyd & Ellison, 2007, p. 211).

Most social networking sites share the same basic structure. Each network's user has a profile that contains information about him/her. This information, for example, may be the user's full name, photographs, date of birth, marital status, former and current employers, and education. One of the basic technical elements of a social network is its website, and the un-

derlying web application. The web application provides the main features of the social network. This functionality often includes features that allow a web visitor to become a member, edit personal profiles, to view profiles of other users, or join groups. To join a social network, users can register on the site. This process usually requires only a valid e-mail address for verification.

These sites foster the process of connecting people based on their social ties and bonds. They are virtual spaces for friends, classmates, and people with similar interests, connections or affiliations. People use these networks to satisfy their need for belongingness, esteem needs through self-presentation, and due to peer pressure (Krasnova, Hildebrand, Günther, Kovrigin & Nowobilska, n.d.). Although, the biggest ones present the users with a variety of interactive tools for anyone wishing to maintain a personal online communication portal, some of them focus on specific themes, interests or regions.

Social networking platforms have gradually moved from a limited phenomenon to mass adoption.[2] Although the term dates back to at least 1960s (with University of Illinois Plato computer-based education tool) (Leonard, 2004), exponential growth and commercial interest only arose well after the advent of the Internet.

The rapid and continuous increase of participants in these networks in recent years has been accompanied by a gradual diversification and sophistication of purposes and usage patterns across a multitude of different sites. Although the boundaries between social networking platforms are blurred, most of them share some common features: through the platform individuals provides a representation of their selves and in many cases their own social networking platforms to others, with the intention to be contacted or to contact them, to meet new friends, find new jobs, receive or provide suggestions, and much more.

The ability of Social networking platforms to connect rapidly people to the world, make it easy for people who are interested to initiate change without a bureaucracy to back them up. Shawn Ahmed, for instance, has helped expose the problem of Bangladeshi school that was destroyed in a cyclone, by posting the school story on YouTube. After more than 140,000 YouTube viewers saw the plight, many of them sent money to help rebuild

2 Social networking platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn, are increasingly gaining popularity. In fact, Facebook has been reporting growth as high as 25 million per month (2009, December 1), with more than 500 million active users as of July, 21, 2010. Alexa, Top Sites. The top 500 sites on the web, 2010. http://www.alexa.com/topsites/global;0 Facebook. Press Room. Statistics. http://www.facebook.com/press/info .php?statistics

the school. Thanks to donations, Ahmed was able to help rebuild the school, buy supplies for fishing, provide assistance to single mothers, and build a well (Kessler, 2010).

"Free the Children", an organization founded by Craig Kielburger, adopts a similar way based on organizing the online volunteering throughout the world. The Organization, with some 174,000 members "liked" its Facebook page has a group of students in 3,500 Canadian schools that have helped build 650 schools worldwide (Kessler, 2010).

Social networking platforms take many forms, and are launched for many reasons. Despite the predominance of English in most of these networks, others sites are dedicated to diverse countries and regions serving different national and cultural groups (e.g. AraSpace and Naqatube in the Arab World, Mixi in Japan, Wer-kennt-wen in Germany, Vkontakte in Russia, Cloob.com in Iran).

As an efficient mechanism for mediating social interactions, these networks become very trendy in the era of the Web, though some authors argue that they do not exist as such, but are pertinent analytic structures of understating social dynamics (Wellman, 1996). With the features that allow individuals to follow their friends, acquaintances and families, the number of individuals on social networking platforms has grown gradually and rapidly since the turn of the millennium. Facebook, Twitter and Friendster, to cite a few examples, attract millions of user who tap into these networks to keep track of each other, engage in social transactions and find experts when needed. Moreover, commercial conglomerates try to take advantage of them for marketing purposes, as they form a reliable medium for propagating recommendations through people with similar interests (Korgan, Odell, Schumacher, 2001).

The success encountered by these networks has drawn the attention of the media and researchers. The latter have often built upon the previous research on social network theory to discuss its virtual embodiments (Granovetter, 1983; Travers & Milgram, 1969). A large number of studies[3] have been carried out on the formation and dynamics of these networks have discussed issues of trust and intimacy in online networking. Some of

3 Danah Boyd has gathered a collection of research on social networking platforms that lists roughly 340 including research papers, books, theses, conferences, and research reports published in the years 2003-2010. None of these papers covers the Arab-speaking world or has Arab-speaking authors. This shows a lack of research concerning the phenomena in different Arab countries. See Danah Boyd. Bibliography of Research on Social Network Sites. http://www.danah.org/researchBibs/sns.php (*Accessed on* October 16, 2010).

them have analyzed different self-presentation strategies, while others have investigated harvesting social network profiles. (Coutant & Stenger, 2010; Fauad, 2009.; Donath & Boyd, 2004; Golbeck, 2007; Golder, Wilkinson & Huberman., 2007; Huberman, Romero & Wu, 2009; Kleinberg, 2008; Lugano, 2008; Montagut-Lobjoit & Mbiock, 2009; Torloting, 2006).

Social networking platforms are usually debated in relation with the concepts of Web 2.0 and social software which tend to be more general than the category of social networking platforms. The latter just like blogs or wikis, are generally meditate upon as types of web 2.0 and as social software. However, all of these terms have remained rather vague, which is due to a lack of theoretical foundations (Fuchs, 2009).

Some authors maintain that the Internet and related software have always a social dimension because they represent a certain visions and understandings of society (Dourish, 2001). Their approach to the social echoes Durkheim's notion of social facts (Fuchs 2009), by which he means "every way of acting, fixed or not, capable of exerting on the individual an external constraint; or: which is general over the whole of a given society whilst having an existence of its own, independent of its individual manifestation" (Durkheim, 1895/1982, p. 59).

A third group of authors considers social software and web 2.0 as tools that support community formation and online collaboration (Gillmor, 2006; O'Reilly, 2005; Saveri, Rheingold & Vian, 2005). These approaches can be connected on the one hand to Tönnies' concept of community by which he understands the "consciousness of belonging together and the affirmation of the condition of mutual dependence" (as cited in Fuchs, 2009, Social Networking Sites, Web 2.0, Social Software Section, para. 4), and on the other hand to Marx's concept of co-operation:

> "By social we understand the co-operation of several individuals, no matter under what conditions, in what manner and to what end. It follows from this that a certain mode of production, or industrial stage, is always combined with a certain mode of co operation, or social stage, and this mode of co-operation is itself a 'productive force'" (as cited in Fuchs, 2009, Social Networking Sites, Web 2.0, Social Software Section, para. 5).

Virtual Public Sphere

The concept of public sphere, usually associated with the German philosopher Jurgen Habermas (1962/1989), is both historically descriptive and

normative. It identifies a historical formation that arose in late 18th century western Europe and it posits a model of what a good society should be. The concept is one of the most relevant concepts within academic fields that deal with society and democracy. Habermas conceived of the public sphere as an essentially co-present space where deliberate democratic opinion could be expressed and debated among citizens. On a descriptive level, the public sphere can be described as a number of arenas, which can be accessed directly and are not restricted to any membership conditions, and in which individual and collective protagonists comment on diverse topics in front of a wide audience (Garnham, 2007).

Visibility has always been a key aspect political philosophers, like Hannah Arendt, Jürgen Habermas and Norberto Bobbio, Craig Calhoun, Nancy Fraser and Michael Warner, have traditionally associated with the concept the public sphere. Haberma's (1962/1989) original term of the public sphere refers directly to the characteristics of openness and visibility of this type of social space (Brighenti, 2010).

According to Calhoun (as cited in Rong, 2009), a genuine public sphere should have the following common features:

- The focus of the debates in the public sphere is on issues of common interest to the public.
- It not exclusive in principle and should be accessible to all who might be interested in these issues or may be affected by them.
- It is based on deliberative proceedings and rational critical exchanges.
- The deliberation itself is determined by the standards of normative evaluation, and should be evaluated on the validity and rationality criteria of communication, rather than on the identity of the participant.

Nowadays, we are living a blurred moment of history where many scientists, sociologists, media and communication scholars, and information and technology researchers are converging on a common question: Is the Internet in general and social networking platforms in particular a virtual public sphere, a new form of publics ("networked publics), a networked public sphere?

While Habermas wrote about a public sphere rooted in time and place, it became clear that we must revisit the concept to update it in order to better adapt it to our changing reality. Much of the public space that we are constructing should not be conceived of in traditional terms, for it is neither oc-

cupying a physical space, nor limited by geography; it persists over time differently. In this new public sphere (virtual), we can observe that a new class of individuals has emerged in recent years, encouraged by the same opportunities and pressures that enabled their earlier counterparts, i.e. advances in communication technologies coupled with a deep anxiety stemming from a renegotiation of societal arrangements. The central difference being that now, with the many-to-many nature of the new medium of communication– sharply contrasting all preceding models – we are presented with the added opportunity of having a low-cost platforms for being able to aggregate and distill the opinions generated by a number of observers of varying expertise, despite being separated by great physical distances. In short, we are no longer confined by the opinions of certain experts in particular geographical locations, associated with the right institutes, but rather, we now have the ability to tap the aggregated opinion of a crowd of individuals who carry on a critical discussion regarding, among other topics, what is best for society.

Millions of people are showing keen interest in expressing their opinions online. Will that add up to a great revival in the public sphere? Answers to this question are divergent. In the days of pre-web Internet, Fernback & Thompson (1995) argued against such a notion, warning of the danger that people sitting at their computers and typing error to another for political action: "Indeed, it seems most likely that the virtual public sphere brought about by CMC will serve a cathartic role, allowing the public to feel involved rather than to advance actual participation." (Conclusion section, para. 4). A decade later, Yochai Benkler, in his book (2006), *The Wealth of Networks*, commented:

> "We are witnessing a fundamental change in how individuals can interact with their democracy and experience their role as citizens. Ideal citizens need not be seen purely as trying to inform themselves about what others have found, so that they can vote intelligently. They need not be limited to reading the opinions of opinion makers and judging them in private conversations. They are no longer constrained to occupy the role of mere readers, viewers, and listeners. They can be, instead, participants in a conversation" (Toward a Networked Public Sphere section, para. 3).

The fact that people from different cultural and ethnic backgrounds, and countries engage in social, political and cultural discussions in an interactional way, often expanding each other's cultural backgrounds with diverse views, captures the essence of the social networking platforms. The value of

the virtual sphere lies in fact that it encompasses the hope, speculation, and dreams of what the world could be. Castells noted that "we need utopias - on the condition of not trying to make practical recipes" (Ogilvy, 1998). The virtual sphere reflects the new dynamics of social movements that compete on cultural, rather than on traditionally political arena. It is a vision, but not yet a reality. As a vision, it inspires, but does not yet succeed in transforming the political and social structures.

This virtual public space facilitates, but does not ensure, the rejuvenation and revitalization of a traditional public sphere culturally drained. Easy, cheap, fast, and convenient access to more information does not necessarily render all citizens more informed, or more willing to participate in social, cultural, and political discussions. Greater participation in all sorts of discussion helps, but does not ensure a healthier democracy. New technologies in general and social networking platforms in particular encourage more, but not necessarily more diverse, participation in social discussion since they are still only available to a small fraction of the population.

The most reasonable manner to conveniently conceive of a virtual public sphere consists of several culturally fragmented cybersphere occupying a virtual common public. Groups of netizens sharing the same interests will debate and may strive to achieve the common social and cultural objectives. Much of the social and political debates occurring online does not, and will not, seem different from those, which are taking place in casual or formal face-to-face exchange. The widening gap between different categories of people, politicians, and journalists will not be bridged unless all parties put partisanship aside and assess rationally their respective attitudes. However, people who would never be able to meet to discuss social and political issues offline are now able to do online, and this is no small matter.

Likewise, fully active participants, like cultivated and conscious citizens, are not automatically generated by computer ownership: access to the Internet and the ability to get involved on social networking platforms by a population is not sufficient to ensure that these platforms will have a significant positive impact on the virtual public sphere. How this population uses the medium does matter. The literacy as a skill set could be a crucially influential battle in the struggle over the social and political impact of social networking platforms. Being able how to take advantage of a tool into one's hand does not guarantee that anyone will use it constructively, but without such knowledge, constructive use is less likely and hegemonic control becomes more likely by those who do know exactly how to exercise the power of social networking platforms.

Social Networks and the Advent of a Virtual Public Sphere in the Arab World

As part of the process of building the nation-state, before the advent of the Internet and other transnational media, the state-run media in the Arab world were mobilized towards shaping the collective national identity within each of the postcolonial Arab states (Boyd, 1993; Rugh, 2004). The conception of the media during this era tended to be tribal and operating within a defined geopolitical unit with closed borders.

In these circumstances, the public sphere is virtually nonexistent as the media operate as a mobilization apparatus for the regime, whereby the communication pattern is top-down without any form of feedback. Only one potent factor determines which topics will be included and how the media can address them. The public is seen as a passive rather than active consumer. The public discourse on social or political issues is alien to this kind of media.

Consequently, citizens are increasingly turning to alternative ways, which allow them to express their discomfort, ideas and opinions. They increasingly invent a variety of creative ways to display their discontent not through traditional political organizations but through all forms of social networking platforms. Thus, platforms have become significantly relevant in many Arab countries, as we shall see later. This has occurred as platforms have become more visible, popular and numerous, but also as their members have expanded to include social categories rather than a minority of activists. Before platforms became popular, they were reserved for the computer savvy. As the platforms phenomenon grew, many of their members became activists, and began engaging in all kinds of discussions. Soon thereafter, more activists became “networkers” and the chorus of voices on these platforms continued to grow.

To figure out how social networking platforms enable citizens to engage in virtual public spheres, we must look beyond the Internet’s increased interconnectivity and speed. The benefits of convergence, bringing together print, video and broadcast, best explain how citizens in the Arab world could bypass their marginalization in traditional public spheres such as mainstream media outlets. This phenomenon has shifted the power from mainstream media to ordinary people, allowing groups and individuals to share their thoughts, ideas and opinion with a wide audience.

With regard to Facebook as the most influential platform, statistics indicate that there are more than 17 million users (October 12th, 2010) in the

Arab world (15 millions in 2009) whereas the total circulation number of the Arab newspaper in Arabic, English and French is just under 14 million. Likewise, the introduction of an Arabic interface for Facebook in March 2009 prompted 3.5 million users to join the service in the Arab world, with Egypt and Saudi Arabia showing the strongest growth. More than 3.4 million Egyptians have Facebook accounts, along with 2.3 million Saudis and 1.8 million Moroccans. Along with Tunisia and the UAE, these five countries account for 70% of Facebook users in the Arabic-speaking Middle East (Malin, 2009; SpotONPR, 2010).

As for the language, English language dominates Facebook throughout the Arab world as the Facebook main language, with the exception of Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia which are 80-95% French users. Although Facebook has added some 3.5 million Arabic language users in the past 12 months, Yemen is the only country with a clear majority of Arabic Facebook users (Malin, 2009).

Malin (2009) also found that out of 22 Arab countries, eight (Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestine, Tunisia and Yemen) have Facebook communities whose more than half of their users are below the age of 25 years old. Qatar and the UAE, The two countries with the oldest Facebook communities, also have the highest percentage of users who selected “married.”

A study carried out by O’Reilly Research (Lorica, 2009), dealing with the numbers of active Facebook users around the world showed that 8.3% of active Facebook users come from the Arab world, representing a 7.9% penetration. With regard to the number of users under 25 years, they represent 60% of active Facebook users in the region. Moreover, male users outnumber female users, with 59% of the user base being male, and 35% Female. (This difference is due to users who refused to report their sex.) More importantly, this region witnessed the fastest growth in user adoption in the 55+ age group.

The other platform that is growing exponentially is Twitter. According to comScore figures, Twitter’s annual growth rate makes up a phenomenal 1,105%. It attracted 73.5 million unique individuals in January, up 8 percent from December, 2009 (when it had 65.2 million visitors) (Schonfeld, 2010). Although such statistics are not available for the Arab World, activity on Twitter has visibly increased over the past year and overall user numbers have grown in the United Arab Emirates, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Egypt. It is estimated that Twitter attracts 35,000-40,000 registered Twitter users in the region compared to only 3,000 users in March 2009 (Malin, 2009, 2010).

Gulf Cooperation Council (Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Qatar Kuwait, Sultanate of Oman) countries have 8212 registered Twitter users with the UAE accounting for approximately 60% of all users of the GCC. In common use with Facebook across the region, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the UAE's have the three largest Twitter communities, 1741 users, 1405 users and 4952 users respectively. More than 90% of Twitter users are Facebook users, while 76% are also users of business networking website LinkedIn. Friendfeed (21%), MySpace (15%) and Xing (14%) are the next most popular social media (Malin, 2009).

Studies showed that demographics of Twitter community in the Arab world are significantly different from global statistics. This is probably due to the late adoption of twitter in the region, and therefore Twitter communities is being largely composed of early adopters attracted to Twitter by influences such as the news media rather than starting with youth audiences as has occurred elsewhere. Consequently, 15-19 year old users account for less than 10% of Twitter users across this region. However, the 15-19 year old age group was much less evident in the UAE accounting for just 1.44% (Malin, 2009).

Unlike the global Twitter trend, more than half of the platform's users in the Arab world are male. According to a global Twitter survey conducted in June 2009, women make up a slightly larger Twitter demographic than men, 53% over 47%. It is clear that male currently dominates the Arab world Twitter community; a trend consistent with the recent findings from O'Reilly Research on the Arab world Facebook demographics mentioned earlier (Malin, 2009).

A survey conducted by Spot on PR showed that 80% of Twitter's users in the Arab world are Arabic speakers. Nevertheless, all interviewees said that they spoke English, which is consistent with the hypothesis that Twitter is at the stage of early adopters in this region and that the investigation itself was conducted in English only (Malin, 2009).

In addition to serving as an additional means of personal communication with large universes of individuals, Twitter is used in the Arab world by a variety of groups and individuals, covering the full range of society. Although limited, Tweets are disseminated by political and social movements, religious sites, fashion, commerce, and films industry.

The explosive growth of Facebook and Twitter-like platforms as significant constituents of the virtual public sphere in the Arab world can be partly explained, as stated above, by a collective construction of reality that is common in regions, like the Arab world, where the governments control me-

dia environments, and the spaces of free expression are limited if not inexistent. Social networking platforms thus extend the informal networks and provide a previously unavailable space for knowledge production and sharing, which results in a collective construction of reality and most likely a conflicting account of events than reported by mass media. They provide varied alternative spaces for communication and sharing, so that they restrain the power of the traditional media model, where ownership of the means of communication enables the owner to select what others receive, and therefore affect their perceptions of what they can and cannot do (Benkler, 2006). Moreover, they give voices to the most marginalized people and groups in the society. The prominence of outlets such as Facebook and blogs have extended the capacity of these platforms and pushed the discussions so far, and in essence, allowed ordinary citizens to be a part of a thriving community that can actively participate in the nascence of a virtual public sphere.

As Granovetter (1983) has rightly pointed out that the platforms of social media are built around weak links. The relationships, not the friendship, are the main source of new ideas and information, and play an important role in connecting different subcultures. The Internet allows people to harness the power of these types of remote connections with reliable efficiency. It is reliable at the diffusion of innovation and interdisciplinary collaboration. But weak ties rarely lead to high-risk activism.

In the Arab world, citizens and social movements in particular are increasingly using social networking platforms as a virtual public sphere to debate on social, political and economic issues that are overlooked, for decades, in the mainstream media, such as corruption, torture, discrimination against women, human rights, fake elections, etc. They are used as efficient tools to generate public interest, spread culture of diversity, promote dissident ideas, and foster citizen's capabilities and democracy.

By tapping into the power of social networking platforms, Arab users are undermining the traditional schema of media power. Castells (2007) estimates that the empowerment of citizens lies in their capacity "to challenge and eventually change the power relations institutionalized in society" (p. 248). He further considers what he calls "mass self-communication" as an "extraordinary medium for social movements and rebellious individuals to build their autonomy and confront the institutions of society in their own terms and around their own projects" (p. 249). Arab members of social networking platforms, who are not acting collectively, would probably have very little impact on social and political reality. It is only through the connectedness power these platforms offer that these members can see their impact.

In Egypt, society suffers multiple exclusions. Coupled with the insistence of the regime to block all avenues of social participation, this situation in fact leads to increased radicalization of social and political activism (Shehata, 2008). The inability of ruling political and corporate elites to integrate large segments of society, in particular youth, became clear over the last decades. Most instances of political and social activism occurred largely outside pre-existing structures and both the ruling party and opposition parties and movements failed to appeal to wide layers of society, which preferred other more efficient forms of expression, like social networking platforms.

Indeed, these platforms have become a venue for social and political activists to articulate their thoughts and opinions, organize around political and social causes, and disseminate information that would be deemed taboo in other media. The general strike that took place in Egypt on April 6th 2008 was announced on a Facebook group, which managed to attract more than 70,000 members (Shapiro, 2009) and played a significant role in the mobilization of supporters and increasing turnout for the demonstrations. The group was created in solidarity with the textile workers of Mahalla al-Kobra who had been in the forefront in calling for a national minimum wage.

Two weeks after the formation of the Facebook group, the group claimed thousands of members, rather surprising given that only about 790,140 Egyptians at the time were members of Facebook (Faris, 2008). The idea was that the group members stay home the day of the strike on April 6th and that idea soon took on a life of its own. In the authoritarian state of Egypt, the organization of demonstrations is illegal as well calling for a general strike.

A follow-up general strike was launched on May 4th 2008 on the social networking platform Facebook. It coincided with the 80th birthday of President Hosni Mubarak, who has been ruling the country since 1981. Although a majority of Egyptians lack access to the Internet, but the initiators of Facebook group succeeded to spread word using mobile phone text messages and by plastering leaflets across Cairo.

Although the general strikes on April 6th and May 4th drew limited public participation and failed to generate a lasting political movement pointing to the limits of technology-driven activism, they have revealed an important new political and social phenomenon in Egypt. The latter embodies a political and social mobilization triggered by second generation Internet users via blogs, YouTube, and Facebook. It highlighted the possible role of social interactive platforms in bringing about political and social change in Egypt, as the government's repressive response to the strikes proved its inability to find new forms of political and social control outside the usual repression by the security apparatus.

Mohammed Elbaradei's Facebook group is another stunning example of how social networking platforms are perceived and used as a virtual arena to reflect on various social and political issues and aspire to change. The group has attracted more than 200,000 supporters in a few months (Al Jazeera, 2010). Its membership has largely surpassed that of the Facebook group created by April 6th Youth movement, which has called for a general strike in 2008. Aware of the limits of this platform, some members have volunteered to go into the streets to collect signatures for a petition calling for constitutional changes and more freedom.

Moreover, the death of Khaled Mohammed Said, who have been arrested and allegedly beaten to death by police in Alexandria, as well as physical assault against Somia Ashraf by a police officer of Al Azhar Zagazig University, have prompted thousands of demonstrators to demand an end to impunity for police brutality. Protesters have turned to the social networking platforms like Facebook and Youtube to express their solidarity with the victims. Photos and videos of the two victims have widely circulated on these platforms.

Like Facebook, Twitter was hailed as an incredibly useful social and political tool. Its potential was tested after the University of California-Berkeley graduate journalism student James Karl Buck was arrested while filming a demonstration (Arrington, 2008). He immediately alerted his 48 followers on Twitter via his mobile phone. As a result of the ensuing attention, he was quickly released. Similarly, the Egyptian blogger, Wael Abbas, was quick to publicize his arrest causing embarrassment to Egyptian government.

Indeed, the increasing role of social networking platforms and the rise of social and political activism among Egyptians alerted the government to this networking force that eluded to control. Since the general strike on April 6, Egyptian authorities closely scrutinized the social networking platforms. They continued to crack down on these platforms users, particularly through increasing censorship on the web and enacting new rules requiring WiFi users in Cairo's cafes to provide their personal information (Sandels, 2008). They fear the revolution of rising expectations that may come from exposing to the "subversive" content of these platforms.

Egypt is not the only example of this new and innovative use of social networking platforms. Increasingly, political, social and economic discontent in many Arab countries finds expression on these platforms. They are powerful tools, not only for social interaction, but also for dissent. Local activists organized many strikes and demonstrations by harnessing the capacities of these platforms.

In Bahrain, networking platforms have opened up, in a variety of ways, fields of discussion and debate that could never have occurred in Bahrain's traditional media. Bloggers and many users of these platforms have been subjected to interrogation and intimidation, with several of bloogers spending weeks in jail for having criticized the government. A lot of users have been energetically focusing on local politics in both English and Arabic, many under pseudonyms. Nevertheless, these platforms may grow in size, and influence, but as long as they remain vulnerable to political control, they will be unable to force extensive social and political reform alone.

Similarly, in Morocco, a court sentenced a political activist and an Internet café owner for facilitating the circulation of information about brutal repression on student protests on December 1st 2009. They were sentenced to four and 12 months respectively for reporting on the police's violent attacks on a demonstration by university students (Menassat, 2009).

Another young Moroccan Facebooker was sentenced to three years for creating a parody Facebook profile for Prince Moulay Rachid. He received a royal pardon after 43 days in jail (Elaji, 2008). The support for the Facebooker, both in Morocco and abroad, was immense. On Facebook, sympathetic members created a new profile for the young man which was joined by 4,000 people, and dozens of Facebook users replaced their profile picture with the Facebooker as a sign of support.

Indeed, several social and political activists were arrested in Morocco for expressing their opinions online. They include a blogger and journalist known for his engagement against corruption, who was arrested and sentenced to six months for filing a complaint accusing a local attorney of corruption. But he was released (Menassat, 2009).

Tunisians also turned to social networking platforms[4] for coverage of events like protests in the Gafsa mining region in 2008 (Al-Mizlini, 2008). Activists in the district posted reports on sites like Facebook and blogs like "A blog for Gafsa" featuring videos, pictures, and eyewitness accounts of the demonstrations that made their way in particular to western mainstream media.

Additionally, on Facebook only several "Gafsa networks" posted France 3 TV's reportage on the trial of some of the Gafsa's demonstrators arrested in January 2008 (Al-Mizlini, 2008). Many expect that Tunisia will curb on

4 Statistics show that there are 1,554,760 Facebook users in Tunisia (May 2010), most of them are young. See. http://www.spotonpr.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/05/FacebookMENA_24May10.pdf

Facebook activists groups as it did with the group "Friends of the National Council for Liberties in Tunisia."

Finally yet importantly, the war on Gaza in 2008 was an excellent example of the prominence of new media, and, in particular, social networking platforms. Many Palestinian, Arab and Moslem groups used these platforms to advertise the tragedy of Gaza Strip and Palestine as a whole. These platforms enabled the Palestinians, deprived of tools and resources, to tell their version of the story, to mobilize large number of people around their cause (Najjar, 2010). Shortly after Israel launched its military operation, a Palestinian named Hamzeh Abu-Abed created a Facebook group titled "Let's collect signatures to support the Palestinians in Gaza."[5] Intrigued by the high levels of mobilization of social networks platforms on both sides of the crisis, Time magazine published an article entitled "Facebook users go to war over Gaza".[6] Although most of these platforms initiatives were the work of individuals, belligerents also joined the social web propaganda campaign to get out their message.

Discussion

Reflecting on the networked technologies, Boyd (2009) believes that they have renewed the structure of power. She has persuasively demonstrated that "power is no longer in the hands of those who control the channels of distribution, but those who control the limited resource of attention" (From Broadcast to Networked section, para. 6).

The proponents of the networked technologies, including the social networking platforms**,** argue that the potential of computer-mediated communication will encourage the construction of a virtual public sphere, and thus local democracy and bring people across the Arab world closer together. Geographic and social boundaries can be overcome and "diasporic utopias" can flourish (Pavlik, 1994). This virtual public sphere can help the public overcome the physical and social constraints and communicate more freely and openly, thus promoting a more enlightened exchange of ideas.

They believe that despite all forms of restrictions, social networking platforms have undoubtedly contributed to the advent of a much-anticipated virtual public sphere. They have provided an avenue for social and political activism in the Arab world, although limited and with more or less efficiency.

5 http://www.facebook.com/group.php?gid=61050101920
6 http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1871302,00.html

Controversial issues and voices that are never heard in any other Arab media are expressed without big constraints.

Moreover, enthusiastic discourses celebrating these platforms promise that they will increase social and political participation and pave the way for democracy. They assure that the decline as well as the non-existence of the public sphere in some Arab countries lamented by academics and several members of the public will be either halted or brought about by the democratizing effects of the social networking platforms and the surrounding technologies.

These platforms are structured to generate a communication environment, which replicates more or less on a much larger scale that existed during what Habermas has described as the Bourgeois public sphere, with decentralized print media that were part of civil society's communication infrastructure before the commercialization of mass media (Brandenburg, 2003). So, discussions and ideas sharing taking place within civil society, were distributed and publicized through the print media, which therefore fed with information and opinions and hence reinforced democracy. Such an environment is actually being generated in the Arab world thanks to social networking platforms.

Arguably, even if social networking platforms can not be a genuine public sphere without appealing to a mass audience, they still might form a virtual public sphere, an environment favorable to new ideas and new identities which evolves alongside and slowly reshapes the mainstream public from below.

This network-based virtual public sphere challenges the punditocracy in Lynch's (2007) term directly as privileged elites gradually lose some of their power to impose the terms of debate and frames of reference. The expertocracy still has the real advantages of access to privileged positions in the mass media, but can no longer control or close the public discourse. Social networking platforms have posed a similar challenge to the rigid structures of the Arab punditocracy. Today's virtual public sphere most committed users (or Webactors to use Pisani's & Piotet's (2008) term represent the tip of an iceberg of socially and politically informed and engaged citizens persuaded to argue in public about things they care about. Intimidating social networking platforms users and closure of their profiles is perhaps part of increasingly obsolete Arab government's attempts to keep control of virtual public sphere

Whether these platforms can live up to Habermasian ideals of rational critical discourse is another matter. The main contribution of many Arab so-

cial networking platforms users is that they are the pioneers of a new engagement with politics by Arab citizens. Those who claim that these public debates are still limited to a minority of people, or that many users make a "trivial" presence on these platforms, is hardly a crucial problem: how many people actually participated in the literary salons in Habermas's idealized eighteenth century? How many important political tracts were published under pseudonyms? What matters are the arguments themselves, the political and social identities, commitments, and the ideas they generate. Social networking platforms offer people in the Arab world, particularly young generation, disillusioned with the status quo, an outlet to "voice their concerns and ideas in spaces where they will be taken seriously and where results are possible" (Guidry & Sawyer, 2003, p. 273).

Conversely, skeptics object that Internet is not widely accessible in the Arab world and even when it is accessible, it often gives rise to a fragmented, absurd, and enraged discussion, otherwise known as 'flaming' (Papacharissi, 2002), far from guaranteeing a healthy virtual public sphere.

In fact, statistics about Internet penetration in the Arab world (to be considered cautiously) show that the rates (with the exception of North Africa)[7] are significantly low at 29.8%[8]. This situation makes many Arabs feel unfortunate when compared to North America's 77.4%, Europe's 58.4%, or even Latin America's 34.5%. Bahrain takes the lead among Arab countries at 88%, followed by the United Arab Emirates with 75.9%, whereas Yemen lags behind at only 1.8%. It is estimated that the number of Arab Facebook users exceeds 17 millions with 3.4 million in Egypt followed by Saudi Arabia and Morocco with 2.3 in and 1.8, respectively.

These low Internet penetration rates in the Arab world are coupled with high rates of illiteracy in some Arab countries. Others factors further limit the impact of the social networking platforms, like the linguistic barriers, high levels of technological illiteracy, and the repressive measures against Internet freedom. All of this combined factors challenge the euphoric discourse about the potential change that the Internet in the Arab world is supposed to make.

7 The statistics regarding this region are as follows: Algeria: 4,700,000 (13.6%); Libya: 353,900 (5.5%); Mauritania: 75,000 (2.3%); Morocco: 10,442,500 (22%); Tunisia: 3,600,000 (34%). See: http://www.internetworldstats. com/stats1.htm

8 Internet Usage Statistics. The Internet Big Picture. World Internet Users and Population Stats. (*Accessed on* October 28, 2010). http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm By the end of 2010, Internet user penetration in the Arab world will reach 24.9%, a little bit behind the world average (30%). See. http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/ict/material/FactsFigures2010.pdf

Furthermore, the debates about the advent of a virtual pubic sphere in the Arab world facilitated by social networking platforms suffer many deficiencies, inconsistencies and false assumptions.

First, a more substantial question arises once we look beyond the issue of access to technologies, and, by extension, to social networking platforms. The issue of access is about allowing the technology to fulfill its democratization, and public sphere building potential. Skeptics note that opinion diverge with regard to the question of whether the social networking platforms are already or will inevitably be a viable virtual public sphere if only any form of government intervention, censorship, and legislation is prevented, or instead we need constitutional engineering beyond providing access to people, namely the proactive creation of constitutive elements of a virtual public sphere, funded and partially initiated by civil society (Brandenburg, 2003).

Second, although the standard definition of a social network embodies the notion of all those with whom we share a social relationship, in reality people interact with very few of those "listed" as part of their network. One important reason behind this is that attention is a scarce resource in the Web era. Users face many daily tasks and large number of social links that make them only interact with those few that matter and that get their attention. For instance, a recent study of Facebook showed that users only message a small number of people while they have a large number of declared friends (Haberman, Romero, & Wu, 2009).

Third, the virtual public sphere that the social networking platforms are generating tend to be asymmetrical, with regard to access, use, group polarization, individual filtering, and observable patterns of online engagement which appear to be insufficient to maintain ideal speech condition. The technology can be considered as a useful tool for organizational and social purposes, but do not change, by itself, the nature of the established non-participatory model in the Arab world. What these platforms lack are the social homogeneity, inclusiveness and symmetry of the public; a characteristic that has prevailed in the bourgeois public sphere 200 years ago (Brandenburg, 2003). The Arab users of the social networking platforms, even if they are linked through Internet, remain segmented rather than pluralistic. Online exchange is a cacophony of detached dialogues, if not monologues, that are not intertwined, and not leading to the establishment a societal consensus on values and ends as much as means which, according to Habermas, is the ultimate goal of a functioning public sphere.

Fourth, social and political expression, which the individuals enjoy on these platforms, may lead them to falsely feel empowered (Papacharissi,

2002), which in turn denatures the real impact of their opinions. People may leave political groups on Facebook, for example, with the positive feeling that they are part of a well-established democracy. Does this feeling represent reality or substitute for genuine civic engagement? At the same time, it is through authentic face-to-face discussions and exchanges with others that individuals come to realize the handicaps of democracy in the Arab world, not necessarily through the social networking platforms.

Finally, a dynamic and efficient virtual public sphere in the Arab world that constructively debates social, cultural and political issues needs to be fed with information and genuine ideas, but also requires to proactively educating people to meaningfully use communication, and moderating their discursive exchanges. In Brandenburg's (2003) words "the core requirement for a functioning virtual public sphere, however, is citizenship" (p. 18). That means that in order to effectively devise a virtual public sphere we also have to effectively devise an online public.

Conclusion

The core question this study has addressed is to what extent and how social networking platforms can contribute significantly to the emergence of a virtual public sphere in the Arab world. The answer to this question depends on the one's normative orientations. In any case, the impacts of the integration of social networking platforms on social and political practices will not be uniform and must be considered along with the social and political contexts in which individuals use these platforms to achieve their social and political purposes. The good news is that in some Arab states a very dynamic and active virtual public sphere has emerged with the assistance of social networking platforms, particularly Facebook, and to a lesser extent, Twitter. The size of this virtual public sphere does not appear, indeed, analytically vital. It is important to note that even the Habermassian public sphere was also limited to small elites when it first appeared in the 18th century, yet its impacts were substantial.

However, what remains true is that social networking platforms are not primary political and social actors and that they do not replace dynamic social and political movement that should be seen as the main catalyst of any transformation from below. Because their adoption to reinvigorate crucial social and political debates is still confined to certain categories and in some cases completely devoted to "superficial" issues, social networking platforms in the Arab world seem to be far from being a virtual public sphere

dedicated to promote social and political change. It is only in special cases and brief moments of transition (e. g., the 6 April general strike in Egypt) that the social networking platforms have actually served as a catalyst for social and political actions, and for systemic change in general, however, without any clear lasting impacts.

In the long term, however, it can be argued that the social networking platforms have been paving the way for subtle but fundamental changes within Arab cultures. The enthusiasm that Facebook, for instance, have generated throughout the some Arab countries (e.g. Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, and Bahrain) demonstrates that many people in the Arab world value open discourse and fundamental freedoms. A political culture based on participation has began to evolve in many Arab countries even before the achievement of systemic change, and these developments pose a challenge to traditional transformation theory (Hafez, n.d.).

One can conclude on a cautiously optimistic note, arguably, social networking platforms have a valuable contribution to make to the emergence of a virtual public sphere in the Arab world where traditional public sphere have traditionally been controlled by governments. This virtual public sphere has a significant potential for creating a more democratic and egalitarian society, although many different forms of constraints and obstacles may hinder the potential of these platforms to transform the social, political and cultural structures.

Researchers now need to carry out more systematic investigation into the differentiating contexts within the Arab world where these platforms are used, and move forward and determine the impacts of such uses on the traditional political and social structures as well as the individual relationships. Understanding and documenting the consequences of political and social uses of the social networking platforms can help determine whether these new virtual arenas will manage to transcend the long-standing constraints on Arab societies, and thus establish a very dynamic and long-lasting virtual public sphere.

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The Impact of Turkish TV Series Aired on the Arab Satellite Channels on Turkish-Arab Relations

Aida M. Yehia Salah El Din

This paper shall talk about the impact of Turkish TV series aired on the Arab satellite channels on Turkish-Arab relations. Since 2008, many Turkish TV series have aired on Arab TV channels. One could argue that these series are a means of 'Soft Power' used by Turkey to influence the Arab world, to regain their trust and restore strong relations after going through a down curve due to Turkey's close relations with Israel. Despite the fact that Turkey has announced several times that its close relations with the Arabs will not damage its relations with Israel, yet with recent events following the attack on the 'Freedom flotilla' sent to aid people in Gaza which has harmed their relations and drove Turkey closer to the Arabs.

Choosing to study these Turkish TV series comes from the fact that these series have gained a lot of popularity among Arab families, competing with other Arab series such as the Egyptian ones. The Turkish TV series are dubbed in Arabic in the Syrian dialect. This has helped these series to gain a lot of popularity and made them easier to be watched. The first to air these series was the 'Middle East Broadcasting Company' known as the MBC owned by Saudi businessmen Sheikh Waleed Al Ibrahim. This has been followed by other satellite channels of different Arab countries such as Libya, Dubai & Lebanon. Even in Egypt, channel Two which is locally aired, has run the most famous Turkish TV series known as "Güműs" or better known around the Arab world as "Noor", as an example out of numerous. Many critics have discussed this soap opera specifically because it was believed to have had a strong impact on family life in the Arab world. The love story between the heroes of this series has been viewed as jeopardizing Arab marriages due to a lack of this type of love in Arab families.

Other critics look through another lens when analyzing these series. Some have called it the 'Neo-Ottomans' invasion of the Arab world to restore their grandfathers' glorious days.

On the other hand, the Turks see it as building solid bridges with the Arabs. Moreover, from a liberalist perspective, which Turkey adopts in its Foreign Policy, these series could be used as a tool to meet an end which is creating a 'cooperative' atmosphere in order to solve many problems within the region. Therefore these dramas can be considered one of the tools utilized of by Turkish Foreign Policy –especially adopted by the AK party- towards the Arab world.

From my own point of view these Turkish TV series could be considered as a form of 'Soft Power' between Turkey and the Arabs. Turkey wants to expand its economy by opening new markets. It seeks to have more allies and believes in cooperation. Nevertheless, it wants to achieve more stability on its borders with its neighbors. Thus, Turkey views the Arab world as its resort to fulfill these interests.

This paper will discuss Turkish foreign policies tools utilized towards the Arab world. In addition, it will assess the success/ failure of these TV series in strengthening Arab-Turkish relations and whether this form of "Soft Power" has influenced the culture and views of the Arabs towards Turkey.

Definition of Soft Power

Joseph Nye believes that Soft Power "rests on the ability to shape the preference of others". He defines it as "getting others to want the outcomes that you want co-opts people rather than coerce them". Nye sees that Soft Power means acquiring the power of attraction to let people do whatever others want to. This in some cases can be more efficient than by using hard power represented in coercion or pressures imposed by sanctions or tensions arising from a sense of upcoming wars; "The ability to establish preferences tends to be associated with intangible assets such as attractive personality, culture, political values and institutions and policies are seen as legitimate or moral authority" (Nye, Soft Power: 6, 2004).

Soft Power could be exercised through different forms such as exchange of gifts, cultural events, giving aid and even sports events or what Joseph Nye refers to as 'sources of Soft Power' which are represented in a country's Foreign Policy, culture and political values. However, it is seen that the ideology of a country has an impact on its Foreign Policy which determines

whether it shall resort to Soft Power or not, and in making the choice of how and when to use it; whether through its culture or its Foreign Policy or both together.

Many scholars and observers of Turkish Foreign Policy in the past decade have seen that Turkey is inclining towards using Soft Power in its foreign relations. This tendency has increased and became more vivid when the Justice and Development party (the AK party) came to power. The AK party has shifted its regional relations with its neighbors which made it adopt a different Foreign Policy approach. Turkey became more concerned in using 'Soft Power' when dealing with neighbors' relations in the region. Turkey started to use its Foreign Policy to become a 'mediator' in facilitating the peace process talks in the Middle East. As Meliha Altunisik mentioned in her article "The Possibilities and limits of Turkey's Soft Power in the Middle East", Turkey is using new strategy and tools in its Foreign Policy by becoming a "Third party". The author mentioned the big role Turkey has been playing in opening up the channels between negotiations and talks between Syria and Israel in May 2008. However, this initiative was aborted as a result of the Israeli attacks on Gaza by the end of December 2008 and beginning of 2009. Furthermore, the role that Turkey has been playing between Hamas and Israel by bringing both parties for talks in Turkey, but again this was halted due to the Israeli attacks on Gaza. Turkey has been giving humanitarian relief to the Palestinian people under siege. This humanitarian relief has resulted in tense relations between Turkey and Israel in light of the Freedom Flotilla attack in May 2010. Moreover, the Turkish stand on Iran's nuclear program. Although Turkey is a close alley to the US, it is also a good alley with Iran; its neighbor. Turkey has supported the Iranian right for a peaceful nuclear program and refused to vote against Iran in any resolution imposing sanctions on it. This has driven some analysts to describe the Turkish attitude as adopting a "freelance nuclear diplomacy" which was seen as neutral and soft on Iran. ("The Davutoglu effect": The Economist special report on Turkey: 2010). Turkey has also worked with other parties that help Iran- like Brazil, China and Russia- to continue their support to Iran and to stand up against any US led sanctions imposed through the UN. In addition, the role played by Turkey in the Lebanese crisis. Turkey has been involved in Lebanon on two levels, the first by sending more Turkish troops to the UNIFIL II and this has proven a success and has been appreciated, second was the efforts made by Turkey to try to bring the disputing parties in Lebanon closer together. However, the second level has proven a failure because Turkey found obstacles in its way for achieving progress in this matter (Altunsik, Insight Turkey: 2008).

Last but not least is the great effort Turkey has been making towards helping the Iraqis to reconstruct Iraq after the US invasion in 2003. From the beginning Turkey was against this invasion therefore creating tension in its relations with its major alley, the US. After the invasion there were shuttle trips between Ankara and Baghdad in order to help Iraqis establish an Iraqi government that includes all factions. Also, the year 2009 has witnessed strengthening of ties in Turkish-Iraqi relations and cooperation on ministerial levels. Ufuk Ulutas mentioned in his commentary article, "Turkish Foreign Policy in 2009" that a High Level Strategic Cooperation Council between Turkey and Iraq was formed and it is mainly concerned with increasing co-operation between Turkey and Iraq in areas of trade, agriculture, water resources and energy (Insight Turkey:2010). Currently, Turkey has opened its borders to Iraqis' and is adopting a diplomacy of 'free-borders' as the level of trust between it and its neighbors is increasing.

Turkish Culture as a Tool of Soft Power

The other type of Soft Power used by the current Turkish government in dealing with its relations with the Arab world is culture. Turkey, under its current Foreign Minister Mr. Ahmet Davutoglu, believes in the concept of cooperation driven from the liberalist school of thought. Turkey is also using its culture as a Soft Power to achieve many goals such as gaining political influence and reaching a high degree of economic expansion and improvement.

It is commonly believed that Media is a powerful weapon in the hands of its producers. Thus, media is counted as a Soft Power tool in the hands of its governments. It could either bring states closer or make them apart. If the media has on top of its top stories coverage on Turkish news, this makes Arabs more concerned about Turkey. An example to illustrate this is given by Hakan Altinay when he stated in his article "Turkey's Soft Power: An Unpolished Gem or an Elusive Mirage", that "Experts in Arab media indicate, Turkey does arouse interest in the Middle East. Ankara Bureau of Al Jazeera is second after Al Jazeera Washington in terms of the number of news stories filled." (Insight Turkey: 2008). This proves the idea that many Arabs are keen to know news about Turkey as a result of news about Turkey being in the headlines of a big news channel such as Al Jazeera which has a wide range of audience. It also indicates that there are contacts and relations between the Qatari and Turkish government. Also the impact of media has been very determined in altering the relations between Turkey and Israel. The Turkish Medias condemnation of the Israeli war on Gaza

has been very vocal and heard in Israel, leading to tension in the relations between Israel and Turkey.

Sports are another form of presenting states abroad with their culture. In 2002 World Cup, Turkey won surprisingly third place after it defeated the host country South Korea. When this match is recalled in the Middle East, many Arab fans remember their huge support for Turkey as the only Muslim state represented that has reached the semi-finals and won third place. This made many Muslims and Arabs proud and very supportive of Turkey. This has later on encouraged many sports channels to air matches that are played by the Turkish national team against other national teams. "Arab television stations frequently broadcast derby football matches from Turkey. What is even striking is the anecdotal evidence that popular Turkish TV shows as Televole a show depicting the lives of football players and fashion models enjoy substantial following in places like Egypt, Iran and Syria in-spite of the obvious language barrier" (Altinay: Insight Turkey 2008).

Also, one could add to the Soft Power exercised by Turkey over Arabs the wide spread of think-tanks such as the Arab-Turkish Forums, NGOs, international cuisines and exchange programs for scholars.

Many critics would see that Soft Power- especially when tackling the cultural dimension- would seem as a limited tool due to cultural differences. But in the case of Turkey and the Arabs, culture is not a limit but instead an asset. Despite the fact that there are differences between Arab and Turkish ancient history which influences their traditions until today, yet Arabs and Turks share their adoption of the same religion; Islam and they share the same geographical location which makes them close neighbors, as well as the fact that the Arab world was under the Ottomans rule for a long period of Arab history which has effected both sides. Thus, the similarities are more than differences which makes Soft Power represented in culture more applicable.

Turkey is also utilizing Soft Power through culture when it encourages more commercial activities between the Arabs and Turkey, exchange in educational programs and sports events. This increases the chances for such a policy to be successful. Thus, an observer would see that the Soft Power adopted by Turkey is like a network that is interrelated. This is represented in popular culture- as discussed in this paper- in the example of soap operas or dramas, joined with commercial activities between both nations thus resulting in intensifying the relations between Arabs and Turkey on different levels; politically, economically and culturally.

Turkish Dramas and Soap Operas as a New Tool of Soft Power

The focus of this paper is on the impact of Soft Power represented in culture on the relationship between Turkey and the Arabs with special focus on Egypt. The culture that is meant in this paper is the 'popular culture' which is represented in the soap operas; drama as a mass entertainment for Arab audiences.

In the year 2008 a wave of Turkish soap operas were aired on Arab satellite channels. It started with the famous Gumus or Noor which lasted for months yet was able to attract a wide range of Arab audiences around it. Since then many more dramas have been aired, although many did not gain the same popularity as Noor did but they were still watched.

There are multiple reasons which drove Arab families to watch these dramas. Sadi Altinok, First Counselor to Egypt when asked in an interview conducted in his office about this matter said, "There is a culture difference between Turkey and the Arabs', it is this difference which attracts Arabs to watch these dramas. Also, the Turkish soap operas previously were based on fiction books but now it is based more on reality. They are subjects of real lives, so this makes them attractive to the Arabs. It is the people acting in these soap operas look 'real and close' and very much appealing to the Arabs imagination. The Arabs think while watching these dramas that Turks are Muslims, near to the Arabs region which makes them neighbors and the type of life the Turkish actors lead in these dramas make Arabs think that it is possible for them to have one like it as well. Further more, the role that women play in these soap operas, whether as independent women or businesswomen who run their own work, this inspires Arab women who are in some closed Arab societies do not enjoy this type of freedom and this type of life. This point in specific has caused a disturbance to many religious men and conservative families. But still these are the elements of success for these dramas."

There are other opinions on why these Turkish dramas are very popular among the Arabs. Through these Turkish dramas, Arabs see a new country and its beautiful cities with nice sceneries. "Most Arabs watch Turkish shows to ogle beautiful people in exotic locales, Arab women have also made clear their particular admiration for the rags-to-riches story of the title Noor, as well as the love story between its heroes" (Michael Kimmelman, "Turkey's soap opera diplomacy": International Herald Tribune, 2010). So this shows that Arabs resort to watching these dramas because they fill the vacuums which Arab families suffers from such as: lack of love, high poverty rates .

In addition, many Arabs like these dramas because they see them as coming from a 'Muslim' country that, although not as conservative as theirs, it is more conservative than other dramas they are used to watch whether American, Mexican or Brazilian. Something which Kimmelman has described as, "the Muslim context remains the crucial bridge.... and Turkish screenwriters have learned to adapt these shows to local themes with Muslim story lines" (Kimmelman: International Herald Tribune, 2010). Furthermore, for the Arab buyers of these dramas who show them on their screens, they see these dramas as produced with a very high quality and at low costs. This drove not only Arabs to demand these soap operas but also Asians, " Turkish production values have improved and Asians, Eastern Europeans are buying Turkish TV series, not American, or Brazilian or Mexican" (Kimmelman: International Herald Tribune, 2010). This explains the reason for owners of the Arab channels to highly demand them. Finally, Paul Salem further explained in his article, "Turkey is the only Middle Eastern Country Pointing toward the Future", that "the public culture is completely dominated either by globalized pop culture or Arabized pop culture, which are both shallow, and dominated by traditionalist religious culture. None are creative or intellectually progressive and Turkey has done much better" (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace: 2010). Therefore, the Arab popular culture suffers from a crisis; this leads the Arab audiences to resort to Turkish dramas. These are reasons behind the landslide popularity of Turkish drama in the Arab world.

The Consequences of Turkish Dramas on Arab –Turkish Relations:

There are repercussions as a result of this high popularity for the Turkish drama on Arab-Turkish relations. First, the feedback of this popularity has shown the power of media in promoting one of the main Turkish Foreign Policy goals which is to bring Turkey and the Arabs closer. It has encouraged Turkish government to continue in its dialogue with the Arabs, which have benefited it a lot on several levels. Therefore, as a result the Turkish Radio and Television-also known as the TRT channel- was launched in 2010. This channel is mainly broadcasted in Arabic in addition to other languages as well such as Kurdish, Persian and English. The goal of this channel is, "to broaden its reach across the region and to get greater access to the regional market" ("Turkey builds Media Empire in the Arab World", The Layalina Review: 2010). Added to that, "this (channel) is a way for Turkey to put forward its political agenda through media while ensuring financial gain... and bridge the societies despite geographical distance" (Turkey builds Media Empire in

the Arab World", The Layalina Review: 2010). Hence, it could be concluded from the goals of this channel and how it is perceived by many Turkish media analysts that it is another tool used along with the soap operas to promote Turkish Foreign Policy in the region and to serve Turkish interests in the region.

Second, there has been an increase in the number of Arab Tourists to Turkey especially starting in 2008 until today. This is something that was described by the Guardian newspaper as a 'phenomenon'. The number of Arab visitors to Turkey in 2009 increased remarkably despite the financial crisis. 21 percent of the tourists came from Emirates and 51 percent came form Morocco. ("Soap Opera Sparks Arab Tourism", Layalina Review: 2009). Nicole Sobecki, wrote that this 'phenomenon of Noor has been sparking a tourist boom to Turkey that drew 105,000 visitors from the Arab countries in May 2010 alone an increase of about 33 percent on last year" (The Guardian, 2010). The main reason- as mentioned in Layalina Review- is that Arab tourists wish to visit the houses which the famous Noor drama was being shot at. This led to, "about a dozen travel agencies are now offering sightseeing tours that specifically include filing locations" (Layalina Review:2009). Furthermore, Turkey has become more attractive to Middle Eastern tourists and made them dream and imagine visiting Turkey. This is because Turkey is now being viewed as 'Hollywood' where Arabs and other Middle Eastern would be able to meet there dream stars. Altinay has put it in this context when she said, "What Hollywood is to America's ability to capture the imagination of ordinary people around the world, and tourism could be to Turkey in its region.... Turkey offers features of the good life and captures the imagination of its neighbors is through tourism" (Altinay, Insight Turkey: 2008).

Yet, it should be highlighted that there are other reasons for this remarkable rise in the number of Arab tourists such as the willingness and insistence of the Turkish government to exert efforts to deepen its relationship with the Arabs. Turkey has signed a number of agreements to a 'visa-free travel' (The Davutoglu effect; The Economist: 2010). The countries which are granted a free visa entry to Turkey are Syria and Jordan and talks are still on-going with Egypt to recieve the same status. Moreover, just like there are Arab tourists in Turkey there are more Turks visiting Arab countries. Sadi Altinok, the First Counselor to Egypt mentioned that, "during the last big feast vacation of Muslim celebration, thousands and thousands of Turks came to visit Egypt alone and more to other Arab countries."

Third, the popularity of these dramas has encouraged Turkey to increase its cultural events in many of the Arab states as well as the rest of its neigh-

bors. This has driven Turkey to become more active in its 'cultural diplomacy' and encouraged it to open Turkish cultural centers in Balkans, Central Asia and North Africa (Sinan Ulgen, 'Turkey's Shifting Foreign Policy: what next?' Carnegie Endowment for International Peace: 2010). The Turkish Cultural Center in Cairo, Egypt was established long ago but it was never officially opened until spring 2010 when the Turkish Foreign Minister Davutoglu officially opened it. This shows that both countries are getting closer in their relations in one area out of several others.

Finally, it is because of the insistence of Turkish soap opera producers to produce a soap opera that has heavily criticized the Israeli inhuman and hostile acts against the Palestinians known as "A cry of a stone". This drama in specific has added more damage to the relations between Turkey and Israel. On the other-hand, it has given more credit to Turkey within Arab audiences and has affected Arab public opinion in favor of Turkey thus bringing governments closer.

The Reasons for the Shift of Turkish Foreign Policy towards the Arabs

It is worth investigating the reasons for the shift in Turkish Foreign Policy towards the Arabs in order to understand the reasons for Turkey's choice to use Soft Power as a tool to achieve its goals. Since 2002 Turkey has witnessed fundamental changes domestically that had its reflections on its Foreign Policy. The major reason for this shift is the rise of the Justice and Development party -the AK party- to power. The AK party when analyzing domestic problems found that part of the solution to these problems would come from adjusting its Foreign Policy. This made them build their own vision about the region. This vision was realized with the arrival of Mr. Ahmet Davutoglu in 2005, as Turkey's Foreign Minister. Mr. Davutoglu's approach in Foreign Policy has been influenced by his academic background and his study of the liberalist school. Mr. Davutoglu adopts a comprehensive and inclusive Foreign Policy in dealing with the Middle East, he believes in including all states and not marginalizing anyone. He also believes in the power of dialogue and sound of reason over sound of the gun. This made the Turkish Foreign Policy to become known as a policy of 'zero-problems with Turkey's neighbors', as Mr. Davutoglu has always described it, therefore resulting in taming and adding more friends in the region instead of neglecting ones. This liberally inspired policy also includes states and non state actors such as NGOs and civil society. At the beginning, this policy was observed skeptically then was welcomed later by its neighbors. Thus, many analysts of

Foreign Policy would consider the Turkish model as a success and was able to achieve many of its goals and is on its way to accomplish more.

When Sadi Altinok was asked about the reason for the success of the current Turkish governments' Foreign Policy in comparison to previous governments he justified by saying, "It is the conjuncture which determines it. Turkish Foreign Policy is attractive because the government pays good attention to the Middle East than the previous governments did. It gave more emphasis to the region because Turkey is part of it. Furthermore, the circumstances in the Middle East permit Turkey to do this. The Arabs want to be close to Turkey because this is in their own interest. Arabs feel threatened in the region by several forces; the US especially when it was under the Bush's administration, on the other side there is Iran which the Arabs view as pushing itself into the region and individual countries affairs. This is beside the endless sense of threat Arab feel coming from Israel. Thus, the Arabs looked for another partner in the region to balance Israel, US and Iran. Turkey was this balancer. Turkey on the other hand is in between the Arabs, Israel, Iran and the US since it is a good alley for all of them."

Turkey -when the AK party came to office- suffered from both domestic and foreign problems. This has led them to seek a shift in both camps. First, the domestic problems were grouped in two main areas, Political and Economic:

- **The Political problems**: Turkey suffered from political problems such as the role of the military which led the AK party to alter the role of the military from being a competitor of power to a benign institution. Secondly, the AK party under Prime Minister Erdogan, called for constitutional amendments that might allow regulating or even controlling both the judiciary and the military. These amendments were approved in a public referendum by the Turkish people, which signified the consent of the Turkish people with their government. Thirdly, is the problem of Kurds who are calling for separation from Turkey and want to create their own state. The previous Turkish governments and their hostile stand towards these Kurds have led to the rise of terrorist attacks in Turkey. Thus, the AK party decided to deal with situation differently by including the Kurds into Turkey and recognizing their right to use the Kurdish language.
- **The Economic problems**: The Turkish economy prior to AK party's leadership has experienced lots of difficulties and has not fully recovered till now. Turkey had to face one of the worst financial crises at the end of the 1990s and early years of 2000. Till today Turkey suffers from "high inflation

rates which is not wholly defeated, the current account deficit is large and Turkey's competitiveness in manufacturing is a matter for concern" ("Anchors aweigh": The Economist; Special report on Turkey: 2010). Turkey suffers from high unemployment rates especially among people in the rural areas, youth and minorities. Furthermore, the inability of Turkey to gain membership in the EU which if granted could have helped in solving some of the Turkish economic problems. All of these problems have acted as motives for Turkey to seek new partners in its foreign affairs.

Second are the foreign problems which Turkey faced and had an impact on its foreign and domestic policy. Turkey, as a result of its geographical location has been surrounded by many threats to its own security coming from its borders. Syria at one time was seen as very supportive to the PKK, a terrorist organizations which created instability inside Turkey. This has harmed the Turkish-Syrian relations for a period of time but now it has been restored because of the new Foreign Policy approach Turkey is adopting.

Turkey has been accused of neglecting its Arab neighbors and having hostile relations with them due to its good relations with Israel. The Iraqi chaos- post 2003 invasion- has been seen as a threat to the stability of Turkey. Also, Turkey has been and remains on bad terms with Greece over the Cyprus crisis. However, this is improving because of the opening of communication channels between Turkey, Greece and Cyprus.

All these problems and conflicts made Turkey think that any tendencies to isolate it would be more damaging. Thus, the only solution became to adopt a policy of "a pro-active diplomacy in Middle East and Balkans and to adopt this 'zero-problems' with Turkeys neighbors as well as to encourage high level political dialogue" (Ahmet Davutoglu's speech at the American University in Cairo (AUC);2010). This would result in better foreign relations between Turkey and its neighbors; in addition it would facilitate cooperation between these neighbors which would in turn improve the economic situation in Turkey therefore leading the established government to win more supportive voices at home. Thus, this shows that it serves the political, economical and security interests of Turkey.

To any observer, this shift towards better relations with the rest of the Middle East neighbors would be seen as something newly adopted, however Sadi Altinok sees it differently. He explained his argument by saying that, "Turkish Foreign Policy has been the same since the days of Ataturk, governments come and go but Foreign Policy does not change. It is the emphasis on one region over another that is decided by each government to deal with in its Foreign Policy. Foreign Policy reacts to changes around

it and become proactive but they do not change. As for the Turkish Foreign Policy; Ataturk has decided to establish a group of circles that would protect Turkey in the form of pacts. The same is happening today. Current Turkish Foreign Policy adopted by Davutoglu is based upon drawing these circles in different regions like Asia, Africa, Middle East, Caucasia and the Balkans. The present government is just following the old traditional Foreign Policy but these days with more emphasis on Middle East. This is important because two of the biggest countries in the Middle East share borders with Turkey, Syria and Iraq as well as Iran which is not an Arab country. So any change in these countries would have their set-backs on Turkey." Again, this proves that Turkey works on gaining its own interest.

The Outcomes of This Shift on Arab-Turkish Relations

The Turkish inclination towards adopting a Foreign Policy mainly relaying on its Soft Power has benefited Turkey and its neighbors a lot. The Arabs and the Turks are indeed getting closer politically, economically and culturally. On the political level Arabs feel secure with the presence of Turkey in the region as a balancer of power. Arabs also view Turkey as a partner in helping them solve their problems-for example Iraq- and a good mediator in the Arab-Israeli conflict who was able to open channels of communication between Israel and Syria. Many well known politicians call for a continuous Turkish presence in the region, as a proof of the Turkish active political role in the region. This was evident by the calls made by Amr Moussa, the Arab League Secretary General, for giving Turkey a seat as an observer in the Arab League.

As for Turkey, this is counted as an evaluation for the success of its policies in the region on one hand and it has established itself as a 'stable' regional power that is seeking to fulfill its dream to advance and become a 'regional hegemonic power' on the other hand. In addition, Turkey feels more secure now than it used to be because of its cooperation with Syria over the Kurds issue. "Understanding security comes to the front, now we feel good and not threatened by Syria", said Sadi Bey. Turkey has managed to strengthen its relations with each Arab country individually. "Turkey does not deal with Arabs as a package, Turkey deals with each state on its own to have more in-depth relations. Also Turkey pays more attention to big states in the Arab region such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Syria", added Sadi Bey. He gave the example of Turkish-Egyptian relations and described it as one of the best. The reason behind that is because Turkey understands the weight of Egypt in the region.

On the economical level, both Arabs and Turkey have gained a lot. The size of cooperation between Turkey and the Arab world is continuously rising. This has preceded the airing of the soap operas in 2004, as this has been pushed forward by both Arab and Turkish governments. Later in 2004 around 200 companies began working in Turkey with a total of 42 million dollars in fields like infrastructure, tourism and finance. It should be mentioned that one of the biggest living proof for the Turkish-Egyptian cooperation in the field of infrastructure is seen in the establishment of Terminal 3 at Cairo International Airport which was executed by a Turkish company. Moreover, Prime Minister Erdogan was quoted in the Egyptian "Al Masry El Youm" newspaper encouraging Arab investment in Turkey. "Turkey enjoys brotherly relations with the Arab states and we will provide all facilities for Arab investments" ('Turkish PM Calls for Arab investment in Turkey', Al Masry Al Youm: 2010). The way Arabs view Turkey has changed and this has encouraged opening trade and commercial channels between them. "For an example Egypt and Turkey have high economic and investment relations, in 2009, 2.6 million dollars has been the size of Turkish exports to Egypt and 4,500 million dollars was the size of Egyptian exports to Turkey..... Egypt and Turkey deal together in areas such as Transportation and energy since there is an Egyptian gas pipeline passing to Europe through Turkey", said Sadi Altinok.

As for the Turkish - Syrian economic relations, they have also witnessed a boom. Syria and Turkey cooperate together in agriculture, irrigation and tourism ("Syria, Turkey boost investment cooperation in Tourism and agriculture"; Global Arab Network: 2010).

Concerning the Turkish-Saudi economic relations, in 2006 the Saudi king visited Turkey with many Saudi investors who were keen on opening businesses in Turkey. The Saudis were encouraged to seek Turkey as a partner due to the stability of the Turkish political system as well as the reform policies carried out in Turkey by the AK party. The areas for investment and cooperation between Saudis and Turks are in energy, petrochemicals, telecommunications and finance ("Arab Investors eye country for massive investments"; New Europe: 2006).

One of the reasons that should be highlighted when explaining the Turkish economic incline towards the Middle East is because the EU market is becoming smaller in the face of Turkish goods especially when the expectations of Turkey to join the EU are reduced. This drove the current Turkish government to seek new markets for its goods in the region. Thus, the Arab market was seen as a haven for the Turkish goods and the Arabs saw in

Turkey a good commercial and business place for their investments to nourish. Therefore, both Arabs and Turks have found mutual interest in opening up business and economical channels and expanding them, as well as it signifies the level of trust both nations have for each other.

The role of Turkish soap operas in leading to high levels of cooperation between Arabs and Turkey: There is nothing official that says that Turkish dramas are the main reason behind economic cooperation between Turkey and the Arab world. On the contrary as mentioned earlier, the cooperation between Turkey and the Arab world started with the AK party coming to power in 2002 and after AK party became well established in its new office it started to expand its relations with its neighbors. The Turkish drama began to air in 2008. However, an argument could be made that these Turkish drama came to serve the interest of the Turkish government to get closer to the Arabs because now Turkey has become more attractive and appealing to the Arabs. "There is nothing official that indicates that the Turkish government has instructed anybody neither to produce these soap operas nor to sell them to Arabs... it is the Arab businessmen who dogged deep into Turkey and searched inside it and came out with the idea of showing these soap operas", elaborated Sadi Bey. Hence, it could be concluded that Turkish soap operas have served economic cooperation and contributed indirectly to its expansion. They acted as a facilitator to enhance better relations at the right time.

Conclusion

To conclude, Turkey has well established itself in the Arab region. This has been done through its Foreign Policy under the smart leadership of the AK party and their good choice for their representatives abroad. Turkey has been eager to use only Soft Power in its relations within the region. This has been successful so far. The tools of this Soft Power are numerous, such as media, foreign aid, sports events and cultural events. Media and culture are the most vivid tools used in the past five years and they have been well advertised through the Turkish soap operas or dramas. It is this drama which acted as'propaganda' for the Turkish Foreign Policy and intensified the cooperation between Arabs and Turkey on different levels. Although, Turkey and the Arab world might seem different on cultural and linguistic level but it is this difference which attracts them to each other. Thanks to soap operas this cultural difference is almost fading and is considered an asset not a limit to the Soft Power of Turkey. Turkish drama should be seen as the 'hidden

solider' or a mechanism behind the success of Turkish- Arab relations. Turkish dramas have acted in an 'indirect way' in favor of the Turkish Foreign Policy in the region. Moreover, Turkish Soft Power has proven a success in achieving Turkish goals in the region and has also served the Arabs by gaining a new strategic and an important alley such as Turkey. Therefore, the impact of Turkish drama as Soft Power on Arab-Turkish relations has been vivid and had positive outcomes.

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Turkish Cultural Envoys on Arabic Televisions

Bahadir Ileri

Soaps speak to emotions and situations known to all of us- love, pain, family relationships-whether or not their external worlds are familiar, and soaps prefer to exploit the rich resources of human expressiveness (Anger 1999:23-31). The soap opera could be seen a useful television form as it achieves and retains audiences, gains press coverage, creates advertising revenue and generates discussion. No other form of television fiction has attracted more viewers in more countries more regularly over a longer period of time than has the soap operas. For decades it has been axiomatic that the international circulation of television programming occurs from North to South and from west to east: that is to say, US and, to a lesser degree, European program producers maintain their hegemony over the global television market by selling their programs at a low cost to foreign broadcasters, particularly to broadcasters in the "developing" nations of Latin America, Africa and Asia(Allen 1995:13). For a long period of time Turkey, which is an import country has turnt into an exporter. Something happened and since the first decade of the 21st century, from Balkans to Middle East and Middle Asia, many Turkish Television Series began to obtain high ratings. Now the Turkish Series where there are handsome guys, beautiful ladies and picturesque shots are amazing popular especially in Arabic countries and can may be regarded as the new form of Turkish envoys. Series like Gümüş, Ihlamurlar Altında, Kurtlar Vadisi, and several others gained significant success with audiences all over the Arabic countries, Arab expatriates living in Europe and the USA, and showed as a reason for an unexpected social impact. Probably it is because everywhere in the world is beginning to look and feel the same and on the other side, many people are more likely to choose media contents concerning issues familiar to them.

Role of Media in Turkish Policy

As Turkey had started to follow a more active foreign policy towards Middle East than before, the need for a high profile among neighboring countries got increased. It is clear that cooperation is a result of mutual trust and in this case, images are leading factors where media play a central role. The media determine what is real and what is not and mainly have two functions to make up a total image of Turkey. First there are several news channels which can broadcast through borders thanks to recent technological (internet and satellite) developments. And secondly as being the main theme of this article, there are television series which bring the Turkey, Turkish People, and briefly Turkish Culture to the Arab lands.

Cultures can never really be described in their entirety, partly because of being too complex and dynamic. In practice, seeing through the cultural maze requires the identification of cultural totems: the images, meanings, norms, values, stories, and practices that seem particularly significant in determining what political or social life looks like (Baylis & Smith 2006: 540). Turkish Soaps are well fit cases to represent Turkish culture and this help Arabian people to understand why Turkish people act in the way they do, and what similarities and differences exist among them. Television has always been a medium encoded with the meanings prevalent in the society to which it appeals and "the shared historical and religious circumstances between Turks and Arabs may have played a large role in endearing Turkish culture to Arabs more than to others, and made the impact of its media much stronger" (Al-Jaber 2010).

In the last few years, television has responded to challenges relatively quickly. Globalisation has increased the revenues of many national broadcasting institutions, and created new export markets. Television, which literally means "seeing from afar" has no dominant global form, and is always local, however television programmes and formats are distributed globally (Butler 2001: 4). The meaning, the importance, the televisual and cultural significance of reality's events are determined by the makers of non narrative television-as well as historians, newspaper columnists, textbook writers, and other cultural workers (Butler:60). Unlike cinema, television has always placed emphasis on the witnessing of events in the real world. On one hand, television gives viewers access to the world with immediacy and credibility as television technology appears to transcribe or reproduce faithfully what is seen and heard (Bignell, 2004: 19).

Films, television programmes and series are often dubbed into the local language of a foreign market. Countries may have different policies in the

way of broadcasting foreign language productions in their own countries. While in Poland and in some ex-Soviet countries imported foreign-language programmes have the dialogue of all the speakers read in local language by a single actor and the original soundtrack kept, in some other countries like the Netherlands and Nordic countries, foreign programmes are shown with local subtitles. And as a third way, countries including Spain, Italy, France, Turkey and in some other cases Arabic countries foreign programmes are usually shown with dubbed dialogue in the local languages. Furthermore the choice of the translating strategy largely depends on the attitude of the target culture vis-à-vis the source culture, and it is not uncommon that it is political factors that determine the chosen mode (Szarkowska 2005). From a point of view, Arab audiences are such conservative that no hesitation occurs while changing the original names of the series and characters into local ones. While Mehmet turns to Mohannad, Gümüş becomes Noor and as an example Ihlamurlar Altında was Arabizated as "Senevatüz Ziya" (Lost Years). Dubbing and changing the names to Arabic ones is a way to eliminate the "alienation effect" of that series and increase the motivation of identification with the characters. The dubbed programmes are perceived as entirely new products. Furthermore these new characters are uttering a translated, which always also means interpreted, appropriated, and recreated new text, thus undergoing fundamental shifts in the construction of their national and cultural identity and context. The new hybrid characters, which have Arabic names, speaking Arabic without the harmony of the mouth movements are not totally perceived as "others" (Aschied, 1997) It is also necessary to underline the fact that, colloquial Syrian Arabic has been used instead of the tradition of dubbing foreign television into stilted formal Arabic, which was very new for Arab televisions (Mullaney, 2010: 26).

Different interests and needs cause diversity in the representation. Image is also related by what it is covering and in this sense Turkey means a country where; there is good healthcare for an Arab patient, there are wonderful resorts for an Arab tourist and there are successful universities for an Arab student (Yildiz, 2010). It is expected to come out of an evolution in various fields such as tourism, language, music, cinema, fashion and etc. Thanks to series, while many Arabs are trying to learn Turkish, some others are visiting Turkey and some prefer to consume Turkish goods. Places, costumes, music, cuisine, decoration are all on the focus of Arabian audience.

On the other side of the coin, Turkish soaps are accused for the promotion of gender equality, alcohol, premarital sex, abortion, infidelity, and even children born out of wedlock, which penetrate the Arab conservatism from several aspects. It was almost the first time that the Arabic society faces with

the phenomenon which was always used to be considered as the features of Western civilization, however this time they were all taking place between the Muslim people. Despite the reorganization and the censorship of the series, several remaining aspects were seen as contrary to Islamic principles (Buccianti, 2010) and many religious figures give fatwas one after another to the governors to make a ban and to the masses to boycott Turkish soaps.

The leading global actors are not silent about the impact of Turkish Series in the region too. An article published in Iran suggested that; these series are meant to raise Turkey's profile in the region in order to reduce Iran's political and cultural influence, and it is the first act of a political and cultural plot devised by Turkey and certain Arab countries. The aim is to create Turkey as an alternative to the model of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Hanizadeh, 2008). Also an article published in United States of America (USA) is also stressing the role of Turkish Series on Arabic countries as "Through the small screen, Turkey has begun to exercise a big influence at Arab dinner tables, in boardrooms and bedrooms from Morocco to Iraq of a sort that the United States can only dream about" (Kimmelman, 2010). Here, describing the situation is not complex anymore. This is a lesson showing that a simple television production can be utilized as a potent social tool to effect change and influence thinking and in the process win a few million hearts and minds (Bilbassy, 2010).

Arabs are now get introduced with Turkish customs and culture more. It is stated by the Chief of Bureau of news channel Al Jazeera, Yusuf El Şerif that the success of Turkish Series in the Arabic World can explained by the demand of more liberation. Secularization guarantees liberation even between man and woman and it is not surprising why only religious fundamentalists protest those series (El-Sherif, 2008). While focusing on the effects of Turkish Series on Arab society, it is also being discussed what should be the Arabic or Islamic culture like and can Turkey be a model? The characters are mostly Muslims and there are many cultural and physical peculiarities between the characters and the Arabic audience. Indeed Arab nationalism was essentially a reaction to Turkish cultural hegemony after the Young Turks' (Jön Türkler) revolution, a feeling of proximity between both societies, Arab and Turkish that was found neither in Mexican telenovelas nor in American hit series, flourished (Buccianti, 2010). In an Arabic perception a Turkish soap is obviously closer than a Latin American one. The soap opera Gümüş (Noor) centers round a Muslim family living in a Muslim country. It reflects a way of life, and a collection of values and customs that resonate from Istanbul to Sana'a. The importance of family in households where three generations live under one roof, respect for the elderly, arranged mar-

riages, all connect with its public. A shared culture means viewers identify with characters, but conservative critics are infuriated by the secular Turkish culture (Clech, 2008). According to an assessment, contrary to the unique and static image of "Turkish" in the past, now it is so complex and can be described as multiple (Yildiz, 2010) The series put emphasize both on the emancipation of individuals and traditional societal structures. The starring woman can make her career and at the same time can be a good mother and wife. It presents an alternative for the dominant ideology which considers liberalism and modernity equal with moral corruption. Turkish Culture which is a synthesis of Western and Eastern originated thoughts, is making the Arab society question itself and accelerate the social transformation.

Dorothy Hobson, a senior lecturer in Media & Cultural Studies discusses the audience as active and the program's "message" as not solely in the text but can be "worked on" and "augmented" by the audience as they add their own experience and opinions to formulate their interpretations of the program (Spence 2005:44). In an influential 1973 paper, Stuart Hall, a leading figure in Cultural Studies has also argued three theoretical positions from which a television text can be decoded: a dominant-hegemonic reading, a decoding that complies with dominant ideological definitions, a negotiated reading, a contradictory reading that partly shares dominant definitions, and an oppositional reading, a decoding where the viewer recognizes the dominant televisual codes and opposes them. (Procter & Hall 2004:70) So from this perspective it can be advocated that, the dominant reading in Arabic case is negotiated reading, where the audience partly shares the text's code and broadly accepts the preferred reading, and on the other hand sometimes resists and modifies it in a way which reflects their own position, experiences and interests. Turkish life style which is partly represented in series is almost something new for Arab viewers as it composes both traditional and modern values at the same basket.

Conclusion

Turkish series reflect mirror to Arab audience to let them see who they are and where position themselves and what would like to be? There is asymmetry. Arabs now know Turkey much better than ever but there is still lack of acquaintance for Turkish people towards Arabic neighbors. There are still exotic and Orientalism originated perceptions among Turkish stereotypes on behalf of standard Arab image. Discourse and rhetoric used in television programmes and soap operas should serve to de-construct ill informed

images and prejudices. Probably the best solution for the interchange of cultural representations would run both import and export television productions between the sides to make up a total improvement of political and economic cooperation through cultural exchange.

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The Turkish Soap Operas in the Middle East, as Framed in the Arab Media

Ahmet Uysal

Introduction

Saeed was an ordinary Arab that worked in a factory. He became upset with his colleagues' continuous talks over the soap opera *Noor* and went to the manager to complain about the situation at work. However, he could not find him there because he was out to apply for a Turkish visa in order to visit to the villa where the soap opera was shot. On his way home, Saeed found the road closed and thought the Turkish president was in town but soon found out that they were the heroes of the Turkish soap opera (soap hereon). When he came home, his wife asked Saeed to buy his daughter a skirt similar to the one worn by Lamees, a Turkish heroine of the soap *Sanawat Dhiya'*. He realized that all the newspapers and TV programs talked about the soap and its heroes' recent visit to Jordan. Saeed called his mother and found out that his sister broke up with her fiancé because his name was not Muhannad, the name of the soap's hero. His little son's homework was on the reasons for the pride of being Syrian. As an answer, the boy wrote, "I am proud of being a Syrian Arab because the soap *Noor* is dubbed in Syrian dialect". Being furious, Saeed hit an electrician knocking the door when he said his name was Muhannad. The police arrested Saeed but he was later released on bail. On his way to his lawyer, he found that all the streets were filled with the t-shirts and dresses carrying the names of the soap heroes, he saw coffeehouses named after Muhannad and barber-shops named Noor's. During the court hearing, the judge sentenced him to six months in prison and did not allow him to make his case as the judge was rushing to watch the soap *Noor*. Losing his temper, he attacked the judge and beat him. As a result, he was put in the mental hospital and was prognosed for isolation from society due to his dangerous madness. This was a fictional story told in *Noor Ala Noor Ma'a Musalsal Noor* (Double Enlightenment with the Turkish

soap *Noor*) by Bahraini writer Muhsin al-Saffar around the fever caused by the Turkish soaps in the Arab world and its effects on the lives of an ordinary Arab man named Saeed. [1]

Background: Turkey and the Arab world maintained close relations since the Turks' conversion to Islam and these relations intensified during the Ottoman rule over the Arab lands from the Persian Gulf to Algeria in the North Africa. The Ottoman administrative system's broad Islamic framework allowed some local variations in the Arab territories for about four centuries[2]. During the era of decline the Ottoman elites tried to westernize the country by adopting western military, political, and social principles. These reform attempts were not equally enacted across the Ottoman as they were gradually spreading from the center to the periphery. The Ottoman state held most of the Arab territories until the early 19th century. After First World War, the founding fathers of the new Turkish Republic saw it a barrier before progress tried to reduce the role of Islam to conscience [3]. Mustafa Kemal Ataturk aimed at making Turkey a western-style republic based on the principle of secular nationalism and implemented several reforms for this purpose. Among them were the abolition of the Caliphate and the Sharia courts and replacing the Arabic alphabet with Latin. The Arab lands that were mostly under western occupation did not experience such radical secularizing reforms as religion mostly maintained its central role in Arab social life[4]. In fact, the role of Islam was critical to the rise of nationalist struggle against the western Christian powers in the Arab world[5], if not increased during this period. Most Arab societies gained their independence after the World War Two and some Arab countries experienced so-called socialist regimes such as Nasserism in Egypt and Baath in Syria and Iraq. However, none was as radical as Turkey's Kemalist experience in its western and secularist orientation and in its efforts to distance religion from the public sphere.

While the secular policies seemed to hold mostly in Turkish cities and especially among the intellectual and state elites, the Islamic cultural codes continued to be a major factor among the masses in the periphery.[6] Related to the elite perspective, the secular outlook is currently dominates Turkish media products such as movies and soaps. Uysal showed that the Turkish media maintained strong negative attitudes toward any public role of religion.[7] This paper also suggests that such an anti-clericalism seems to be prevalent in the Turkish TV products, including soap operas. The Turkish soaps with triple-digit episodes are a phenomenon of the last decade in Turkey and they mostly maintain a secular western outlook in their content

and presentation. Their recent popularity and their perceived effects in Arab societies constitute an interesting case for investigation as it concerns an interaction of culture, politics and economics in the Arab world. Its popularity is well reflected in the story of the Saeed cited above and seems to affect all Arab territories. It is estimated that 150 million viewers watched the last two episodes of the soap *Sanawaat Diyaa* in the Arab world.[8] It was also reported that the hours of broadcast for Turkish soaps became almost like the time of breaking fast in Ramadan[9] with a ritual and symbolic meaning in people's life. However, the feverish following of Turkish soaps in the Arab world even surprised the soaps' Turkish producers[10] as well as Arab intellectuals.[11] This paper analyzes the phenomenon of Turkish soaps as framed in the Arab media outlets rather than their empirical causes and effects among the population. Mass media's framing of an issue is very significant because almost all social issues are publicly debated through the mass media. The mass media do not provide a mirror image of an event as many different factors play into their coverage such as power relations and ideological orientation of journalists in a particular society.

The Arab media extensively covered Arab communities' attraction to these soaps and debated the issue during the years 2008 and 2009 with reactions ranging from whole-hearted admiration to total rejection. This study analyzed the Arab media's coverage of the phenomenon of Turkish soaps in the Arab world by analyzing the news accounts and opinion columns covering this phenomenon by focusing on the expressed causes of this phenomenon and their effects on Arab societies. To provide a sense of their popularity among Arabs, many explanations were put forward in the media. For example, Jawaad al-Bateeshy argued that the Turkish soaps for Arabs were like a mirror where they see what they wish to see and for the Arab intellectuals it became something they condemn publicly and watch it secretly.[12] Some even compared them with the Napoleon's campaign on Egypt[13] or labeled them as another type of western assault on Arabs[14] or "a nightmare".[15] Moreover, the Arab media mentioned many different causes and effects of these soaps. In this paper, I attempt to decipher the Arab media's attitude toward this phenomenon by analyzing on the reasons stated for their popular reception as well as their perceived effects as reflected by the Arab media.

1. Why Turkish Soaps Swept the Arab World?

Wendy Griswold's model of 'cultural diamond' explains various aspects of a cultural product such as a book or a film[16]. This model can be a useful

theoretical tool to better understand the feverish following of Turkish soaps in the Arab world. In her model she develops a balanced view of cultural product by incorporating various dimensions such as production, reception and social world (institutional context and cultural setting).[17] By rejecting mass culture perspective that viewed people as passive receivers of cultural products, she argues that a cultural product is created by certain individuals and it is actively received and interpreted by other individuals within a social context.[18] However, the Turkish soaps as cultural products are created in Turkish society and are translated, dubbed and received in Arab societies. In another word, social settings of creation and those of reception are significantly different from each other. So, why and how did Turkish soaps that were produced in a Turkish context become very popular in the Middle Eastern (Arab) context? The rise of Turkish soaps among Arabs becomes an interesting case for investigation. This paper adopts a multi-dimensional approach to explain this phenomenon. Therefore, we reviewed and analyzed the reasons expressed in the Arab media as to the popularity of these soaps in the Arab world by following Griswold's multiple aspects of cultural objects (e.g. production, reception and social context)[19].

Creation, Reception and Social Context

The Arab media attributed the success of Turkish soaps to many factors concerning their creation such as acting, scenario, shooting and production. The Turkish actors and actresses were especially a focus of attention. Arab newspapers frequently reminded its readers that beautiful actresses and handsome actors attracted Arab viewers.[20] The historical image of beautiful Turkish women seemed to be re-affirmed by the advent of Turkish soaps to the Arab world. One even called this image a 'legendary Turkish beauty'.[21] Moreover, the personalities of the Turkish characters were contrasted with the negativity and pessimism of their Arab counterparts. For example, an Arab producer reportedly argued that it was the good personality of these characters that attracted Arab viewers rather than their physical beauties as they seemed to show concern for neighbors and relatives, altruism and sacrifice, and sensitivity to one's environs.[22]

The artistic quality of the Turkish soaps was also seen as a major reason for their popularity among Arabs. The ability of these soaps to present romanticism in soaps was a reason frequently seen responsible for their success among the Arab population that is missing romanticism.[23] It was frequently argued that they addressed the need of Arab women for romanti-

cism they are missing in their lives. Many news accounts and opinion columns mentioned the role of shooting and production in attracting Arab viewers.[24] It was also argued that the Turkish soaps were committed to the plain and simple acting while its Egyptian and Syrian counterparts very often resorted to exaggerated performance.[25] Some others pointed to realistic and interesting scenarios that attracted viewers.[26]

Griswold argued that social context mediates between the producers and consumers of a cultural object in the form of institutional arrangements and cultural context.[27] As a mediator between the Turkish producers and Arab viewers, the Syrian Arabic was used in dubbing seems to play a critical role. [28] That was because the Syrian dialect succeeded in transferring the meanings from Turkish to Arabic with its proximity to the literary Arabic as well as due to the affinity of Arabs due to the prior popularity of Syrian cinema and soaps in the whole Arab world. Some even argued that the dubbing in Syrian Arabic magnified the effects of Turkish soaps by an exaggerated tone of romanticism more than its original product.[29] In addition to the dialect, the quality of dubbing and the eloquence of Arabic were considered critical.[30] For that reason, Turkish soaps were even labeled as Turko-Syrian cultural products as they are dubbed with Syrian Arabic.[31] In that sense, the translation and dubbing of these soaps can also be regarded as a secondary claims-maker (production)[32] along with its mediating between the original producers and consumers.

As part of the social context, cultural factors were seen as contributing factors to the popularity of Turkish soaps. The proximity between Turkish and Arab cultures was often as the main factor to attract viewers.[33] On the other hand, it was also argued that Turkey constituted an interesting synthesis between the East and the West[34] in providing interesting topics and issues, playing a bridging role between Europe and the Arab world.[35] Moreover, some pointed to the recent success of Turkish cultural activities such as in literature, cinema and music as a factor. For example, Saeed Abu Mala of Jordan's *Al-Ghad* attributed the rise of Turkish soaps in the Arab world to the late success of the Turkish arts such as a factor.[36] Some even associated Turkish soaps with globalization that spread with satellites.[37]

Of course, the phenomenon of the Turkish soaps in the Arab world must also be explained with the nature of the reception. Griswold distinguished between passive and active reception.[38] In that regard, it is necessary to understand why the Arab viewers paid an unprecedented attention to Turkish soaps, especially the soaps *Noor* and *Sanawat al-Dhiyaa.* Among others, Arab women and youth were especially mentioned as the main followers

of these soaps.[39] The lack of romanticism in Arab societies and especially women's search for romantic love were the most frequently mentioned reason for the popularity of Turkish soaps on the receiver side.[40] The Arab media depicted women and teenagers as the passive recipients of these cultural products, mostly in a negative tone. Zaynab Tamimi of the Iraqi *al-Motamar* newspaper found the use of romanticism in the Turkish soaps excessive.[41] Quite often teenagers were blamed for being addicted to these soaps.[42]

Blaming women and teenagers for their admiration with Turkish soaps can also be associated with the Arab patriarchal view of women as less rational and naïve human beings. On the other hand, some even explained their popularity among Arab women with their reaction to the prevalence of patriarchy in Arab societies.[43] Yousef ben Ahmed al-Qasem associated this phenomenon with the desert culture and dry natural environment that made Arab men hard-tempered and women began to demand more attention and understanding from their husbands as these Turkish soaps rendered these demands more visible.[44] Al-Qasem, then, explained that the original Islamic teaching contained romanticism, concern and understanding for women but Arab men could not maintain it.[45]

Also, as a factor of reception side, Muhannad, a very handsome actor of the soap *Noor*, seemed to play an additional role as a considerate husband to the liking of Arab girls and women.[46] Moreover, Al-Ashraf argued that Arab women are attracted to the issues of love, betrayal, richness and gossip that abounded in the soaps.[47] Similarly, Arab men are also reported to be attracted by legendary beauty of Turkish women.[48] Moreover, Arabs' interest in knowing more about their long-forgotten neighbor seemed to play a role in spreading the popularity of Turkish soaps.[49] That is probably because Arabs want to know more about Turkey as the heir of the mighty Ottoman Empire that ruled the Arab lands for centuries, creating a close resemblance between the Turks and Arabs.[50]

In connection with creation, another report referred to the issue of freedom the Turkish producers enjoyed in production, reminding its readers the high level of freedom in Turkey and its absence or shortage in Arab societies.[51] Moreover, the natural beauty of Turkish landscape is often noted in presenting various beautiful scenes to the liking of viewers.[52] In addition, it was argued that Turkish soaps' ability to continue for more than one hundred episodes played a role in garnering a long-hauled interest and following.[53] However, this was not the case for the Arab soaps that could hardly produce over thirty episodes. The phenomenon of Turkish soaps in the Arab world must be related to social context of the reception of these cultural products.

With regard to the reasons for the popularity of Turkish soaps, it is very often noted in the Arab media that the Turkish soaps depict an imaginary world rather than reflecting a real world. Many commentators and scholars attributed their success and popularity to grim social conditions in the Arab world and people's desires to escape from these realities to an imaginary paradise.[54] As for the youth admiration with the soaps, one argued that most of Arab countries did not have opportunities of entertainment and programs that targeted the youth and social development.[55] Oppression, injustice, insecurity, famine, disease and ignorance are mentioned among these negative social conditions.[56] For example, the newspapers *Al-Madaa* pointed to the lack of entertainment and cultural activities and security in Iraq.[57] The same situation is probably valid for other Arab societies, as well.

Some of the factors are also related to the nature of the Arab drama during this period, leaving a room for the Turkish soaps to take hold in Arab societies. Egyptian and Syrian drama were its two most powerful representatives. In that respect, many criticized Arab drama with its repetitiveness, lack of creativity, irrelevance to actual reality as opposed to the realistic scenarios in the Turkish soaps.[58] The latter's novelty to the Arab viewers with its style and content seemed to have played a role, as well.[59] Moreover, Arab drama seemed to be far from daily realities and mostly historical in this period.[60] In relation to social context, it was also noted the lack of freedom the producers of Arab drama could enjoy stripped them of their creativity and initiative.[61]

2. The Perceived Effects of Turkish Soaps in Arab Societies

The effects of cultural objects still are still a contested issue in cultural studies. The theory of mass culture envisages a passive consumer while the theory of popular culture accepts the receiver's active role in creating and sharing meanings (Griswold 2004:102). Arab journalists' attitudes toward the Turkish soaps contain some aspects both theories. They generally attribute a greater role to the Turkish soaps in their influence on Arab societies but they also accept personal significance made by the viewers of these shows. Arab media were filled with numerous positive and negative effects of these Turkish soaps on Arab people. I grouped these effects into social, economic and cultural but they are not necessarily considered as mutually exclusive.

The social effects of Turkish soaps on Arab society tended to circle around the domestic problems caused by the jealousy of a spouse for the

character of the soaps. The disputes are said to reach to the extent that the rates of divorce increased in Arab societies. These effects seemed to be highlighted in Saudi newspapers and Islamic circles more often than others. For example, a Jordanian man is reported to divorce his wife out of jealousy caused by her downloading Muhannad's picture into her cell phone.[62] Many news accounts mentioned various cases of divorce caused by the Turkish soaps as some Arab men became jealous of their wife obsessed with the Muhannad character in such countries as Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria, Qatar.[63] Among other things, Arab women are said to have complained about the lack of respect and appreciation from their husbands[64] and even about domestic violence[65]. Their demand for romanticism from their husband also caused problems for some Arab women On the one hand, Turkish soaps seemed to provide an escape from daily hassles. On the other hand, these Turkish soaps supposedly increased grievances and discontent among Egyptians.[67] It was reported that the close following of the Turkish soaps even caused absenteeism and lack of focus in business.[68] One such event was reported about the nurses neglecting women in the delivery room.[69] Similarly, a husband complained about his wife failing to prepare dinner due to the Turkish soaps. [70] As a result of these soaps, Saudi Arabian people, like others, are said to be increasingly interested in learning Turkish language and want to be closer to the Turkish culture and people under the influence of Turkish soap characters.[71] Similarly, it was reported that the Turks began to learn Arabic as a result of the increasing Arab tourists.[72]

Arab media mentioned various economic effects of Turkish soaps. Due to their admiration with the natural beauty, the increasing number of Arab viewers to visit Turkey was reported very often. For example, the newspaper *Ittihad* reported a rise in the number of Arab tourists that wanted to see the natural and historical beauties of the Turkey and the places the Turkish soaps were shot.[73] For example, this kind of rise was most visible for the Moroccan tourists with a 51 percent.[74] Moreover, due to the admiration[75], the posters of the Turkish heroes were reportedly sold in almost every Arab street along their T-shirts and Turkish dresses.[76] In addition, the soaps' melodies and songs were used as ringtones in mobile phones and the heroes' pictures were downloaded to personal computers and mobile phones[77]. It was even reported that Arabs were showing greater interest in the Turkish real estates.[78] Interestingly, due to the popularity of the Turkish soaps and their heroes, it is reported that the sales of newspapers rose in Iraq when they published news covering the soaps.[79]

It was also reported that the popularity of Turkish jackets and coats raised the prices in Iraqi markets.[80] As a negative economic effect, the

newspaper *Sabaah* claimed that Turkish soaps damaged the market position of Syrian drama in the Middle East.[81] Awaatif al-Zayn, too, argued that Arab artists were suffering financial and non-material losses due to Turkish soaps.[82] Moreover, some even mentioned the absenteeism and neglect at work among the viewers of these soaps.[83] Unlike the negative coverage of social effects, the economic influences of Turkish soaps were mostly covered neutrally in the Arab media. Due to Turkish soaps, the popularity of Turkish jackets and coats reportedly raised the prices in the Iraqi markets.[84]

The Arab media seemed to mention the cultural effects of Turkish soaps on Arab societies more frequently than other aspects. The effects on Arab material culture mostly seemed to concern a change of dress-style as a result of imitating the soaps' heroes. Similar trends were reported for Palestinian youth[85] and other places. Moreover, it was reported that, like their Syrian[86] and Saudi[87] counterparts, many Jordanian youth began to have their hair styled like Noor's, Muhannad's or Tuba's.[88] It seemed that Turkish soaps also changed the sense of beauty among Arabs. It was reported that the handsome male characters of Turkish soaps undermined the Saudi women's perception of their husbands and vise versa.[89]

The Arab media focused on the effects of Turkish soaps on Arab symbolic culture including names, social values, language, moral conduct. The issue of naming became a major issue as the two Turkish soaps affected the perception of certain names while highlighting the ones associated with the soaps' characters. In that regard, it was reported that many Arab couples began to give the names of *Noor* or *Muhannad* to their new-born babies due their loves for the Turkish characters.[90] The names are not necessarily Turkish but rather Arabic but their selection seemed to signify the influence of the Turkish soaps. Changing one's name to that of the soaps' heroes was another trend reported in the Arab media. For example, an engaged couple in the gulf broke up because the bride, under the influence of the soap *Noor* insisted that the groom change his name to Muhannad and he failed to do so.[91] In Aleppo, the Arabized Turks reportedly began to change their names to Turkish ones by using Turkish titles such as Bey, Agha and Hanim.[92]

As to preferring Arabic names associated with the soaps, some journalists warned against the danger of loosing Arab identity and culture. Muhammad Sadiq Diyab warned against the Turkification of Arab audience[93] and of Arab culture.[94] Some saw this phenomenon as filling the vacuum rather than replacing what is present among Arabs. For example, one associated the popularity of Turkish soaps with the loss of Arab identity and Islamic tradition.[95] Like others, this fear was expressed in Palestine[96]. Interestingly, in his Aljazeera.Net article, Abdullah al-Abid Abu Jafar of Libya seemed to be puz-

zled by the popularity of the secular Turkish soaps among the Muslim Arab population.[97] In brief, Arab intellectuals seemed to worry about the cultural influence of Turkish soaps over Arab culture and identity.

The Turkish soaps' influence on morality were mostly viewed negatively in the Arab media. Frequently referring to Turkey's secular and western style culture, many commentators and scholars expressed dislike toward the moral influence of these soaps. What they see as odd customs (e.g. fasting during the day in Ramadan and drinking alcohol in the evening) in Turkish soaps are attributed to the country's secular regime.[98] It was argued that these soaps reflected the secular principles of the Turkish state that fought the Islamic headscarf.[99] Moreover, It was argued that these soaps encourage the mixing of men and women and other activities prohibited by Islam.[100] This view frequently repeated within the Islamic papers as one expressed this opposition in very strong words, "this soap [*Noor*] destroys what is left from morality and Islamic values"[101]. Some even called the popularity of Turkish soaps as a disaster for Arab women that were inflicted with romanticism and for Arab men that were seduced by the Turks' natural beauty.[102]

Many journalists and intellectuals criticized Turkish soaps for inciting natural sexual desires among Arabs.[103] The Yemeni Newspaper *26 September* covered the attitude of the Yemeni ministry of information toward the Turkish soaps, "these soaps do not possess the values maintained by Arabs… the Yemeni viewers are not aware of the poison presented with honey as they watch dramas and influential scenes without paying attention to the destruction of societal values"[104]. However, not all coverage was negative in the Turkish soaps nor the cultural values expressed in them. For example, Badr Muhammad praised the Turkish soaps for their focus on family values and for spreading a positive tune among the viewers.[105] As for the language in the Arab world, the Turkish soaps seemed to have an indirect effect, as well. It is argued that Turkish soaps strengthened the position of the Syrian dialect in the Arab world.[106] In a somewhat nationalistic tone, Muhammad Sadiq Diyab was defending the Syrian soap *Bab al-Haara* against the Turkish soaps[107]. This theme was repeated by Awaatif al-Zayn that warned against the threat of Turkification to Arab culture.[108] On the other hand, even the Syrian Baath party joined the race by surprisingly considering these dubbing activities executed by the Syrian actors as a useful learning experience for their artistic skills.[109] Similarly, the Syrian dialect somewhat became more popular due to the Turkish soaps and even the Egyptians reportedly overcame the dialect barrier in order to watch them.[110]

Moral Panic: Media outlets play a critical role in spread of moral panics, unrealistic fear of moral decadence. Some commentators raised the

negative effects of Turkish soaps to the level of moral panic as if they were responsible for all evils in Arab society. They were blamed for spreading the culture of abortion, killing, illegitimate children.[111] Some even went further to define the popularity of Turkish soaps among Arabs as another kind of influenza following the threats of bird flue and swine flue.[112] Moreover, some argued that these soaps were purporting dangerous notions such as illegitimate sexual relations, obscenity, kissing in public and encouraging women to rebel against men.[113] One condemned these soaps by labeling their producers as evils seeking disorder, disunity and derision in our society that is committed to Islam.[114] The Saudi sheik Abdulazeez ben Abdullah labeled these soaps as criminal, dirty, destructive, misguiding, harmful and evil against God and his prophet by issuing a fatwa to prohibit watching them.[115] Similarly, a Syrian sheik ruled that the picture of the Turkish character Muhannad on one's T-shirt invalidates his/her prayers.[116] Interestingly, many Saudi newspapers and commentators claimed that he was a homosexual and did not like women in order to undermine the popularity of Muhannad among Arab women[117], disregarded the difference between acting and actual life. In the end, media campaign against Turkish soaps did not reach to the level of moral panic in Saudi Arabia and other places as these campaigns failed to yield any tangible official or legal consequences and the public continues to watch other Turkish soaps.

Others criticized the Arab media for exaggerating the negative effects of Turkish soaps in the Arab world. One criticized the critiques of Turkish soaps, "as if these two [Turkish soaps] were responsible for the backwardness of this [Arab] nation"[118]. For example, some criticized the exaggeration of the negative effects of these Turkish soaps such as the rising rate of divorce and domestic problems as imaginary.[119] In his long article, Saeed Abu Mala welcomed Turkish soaps against American movies and saw them as medium of opening the door to Arabs' neighbors.[120] The controversy over Turkish soaps concerned the religious authority of the Iraqi Ayatallah Ali Sistani. When his fatwa against watching these soaps was criticized by a Saudi columnist of Shia origin, it led to a huge online campaign for and against the columnist.[121]

Turkish Soaps and Turkey's Image in the Arab World

Turkish soaps seemed to have played a big role in making Arabs viewers familiar with Turkey's culture, landscape and people. Therefore, this kind of interest and information seemingly to have turned into a higher of number of

Arab tourists visiting Turkey. These soaps shot in the present environment also displayed the modern and developed face of the country, as well. It would be necessary to distinguish the popular admiration with the Turkish soaps and intellectuals' attitude toward them . By analyzing the media coverage of Turkish soaps, we cannot infer about the precise extent of Turkey's image among ordinary Arab people. For example, it is reported that these soaps created a fever about Turkey among Arabs such as the people of Aleppo[122] with traditional ties with Turkey. Due to a great interest in Turkish culture and Turkish people, even the Turkish restaurant workers in Saudi Arabia are reportedly received a special treatment as they were responding to their Arab customers outside the menu.[123] To illustrate the changing image of Turkey seen as a developed country, the Egyptian newspaper Gomhuriya said that Turkish soaps showed the quality of Turkish products along with a variety of Turkish kebabs and deserts.[124] Moreover, Arab viewers reportedly noticed the splendor of Istanbul as they were not very familiar with Turkey and used to think that Turkey was a unclean and underdeveloped country out of their unfamiliarity but the Turkish soaps changed this perception for better.[125]

In some commentaries, Turkey's position in the world is recognized as a somewhat different from the Arab world while others reminded its readers the changing cultural and political role Turkey began to play in the Middle East. In these soaps Turkey is defined as a bridge between Europe and the Arab world.[126] It was also said that Turkish soaps brought the Turkish and Gulf societies closer to each other socially and culturally.[127] There were also incorrect views about Turkey. For example, the newspaper *Al-Sharq* told its readers that eastern Turkey was populated with the Muslims with Islamic customs and traditions like Arabs while the western part located in Europe consisted of mixed population.[128] This, of course, is not the case for Turkey's population being 99 percent Muslim. In any case, it is clear that Turkey's image seemed to change in the Arab world with the rise of Turkish soaps.

In Arabs' perception of modern Turkey as depicted in soaps, its Ottoman legacy still constituted a major point of reference. Many commentators referred to the Ottoman legacy in order to explain its effect in the Middle East. A Saudi writer attributed the rise of Turkish soaps in the Arab world to Turkey's increasing role of Turkey in the Middle East as the heir of the Ottoman Empire by assuming a role alternative to that of Iran and Egypt in the region[129]. For some, Turkish soaps meant an indicator of Ottoman return to the region, even in the form of art.[130] The Ottoman image was mostly positive among Arabs with the exception of some Saudi writers. Presenting a favorable image of the Ottoman legacy in the Arab world, one journalist

said, "these soaps reminded Arabs their memories pertaining to the Ottoman state and today's Turkey and that their former rule over Arabs affected them in every aspect to the extent that Egyptian people, for example, still use many Turkish words in their daily conversations"[131].

Several journalists pointed to a cultural gap between Turkey and the Arab world. For example, Abdullah al-Mutairy of Saudi newspaper *Al-Watan* pointed to a the cultural gap between the Turks and the Arabs, "Arabs do not hold very good memories from the Ottoman period while the Turks think that Arabs betrayed them during the First World War by supporting their enemies.[132] Another one claimed the Ottoman Empire levied heavy taxes on Arab people and caused backwardness and oppression.[133] Another journalist attributed to the negativity to the emergence of modern secular Turkey. For Al-Mutairy, after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, Turkey severed its ties with the Middle East and turned to Europe, probably creating the gap between the two cultures.[134] Aware of the secular nature of the Turkish soaps and to improve its image Turkey's ambassador to Saudi Arabia said that, despite the secular regime, Islamic culture was deeply rooted in the country.[135] That was because some Islamic circles were uneasy with the rise of western-style Turkish soaps in the Arab world. For example, a Palestinian scholar of the Gazza Islamic University said that Turkey's Islam is different from that of Arabs because secularism influenced every aspects of Turkish society.[136] As appeared several times previously, this clearly marked secularism as a major wall of separation between Turkish and Arab countries.

3. Conclusion

It is clear that the popularity of Turkish soaps among Arab people reached to the level of quasi-obsession and Arab intellectuals that expressed their views in the Arab media generally maintained a negative attitude toward them, implying a cultural gap between the Arab elites and popular masses. As a witness to this relatively new phenomenon, Arab media's coverage of the phenomenon of Turkish soaps provides significant data to find out why they became so popular in the Arab world from the Gulf to the Atlantic. In this study I analyzed the news articles and opinion columns about the Turkish soap operas that appeared in the Arab media in order to establish the perceived causes and effects of this phenomenon. Many different reasons were mentioned as to why the Turkish soaps received such a surprising welcome among Arabs. Some were related to the personal features of the Turkish actors and actresses such as their physical beauty and positive personality.

The use of romanticism in soaps and the lack of thereof in Arab societies were also seen as a major reason for their popularity as well as the plain acting far from exaggeration and the quality of scenarios absent in their Arabic counterparts. Moreover, several contextual factors were considered as contributing to the success of Turkish soaps such as their dubbing in Syrian Arabic with which most Arabs are familiar as well the quality of dubbing itself. Some others mentioned the proximity between Turkish and Arab cultures, the natural beauty of Turkish landscape, as well as a demand for novelty and a made-up world for people suffering from hard social conditions in Arab societies.

The Arab media emphasized several significant effects of the Turkish soaps in Arab societies and mostly in a negative tone as these effects were perceived ones rather than empirical ones. One of the major effects of these soaps was the rise of divorce rates and domestic disputes in Arab societies due to the couples' admiration with the Turkish characters and Arab women's demand for romanticism and concern from their husbands. Absenteeism and lower productivity was attributed to people's engagement with these soaps. As socio-economic effects they mentioned a increasing interest in Turkish culture and language, higher number of Arab tourists visiting Turkey, the widespread sale of Turkish heroes' posters, of Turkish clothes and even of real estates. Moreover, various other cultural effects were also noted: youth changing their names, hair-styles, a rise in obscenity and immoral conduct. These findings probably reflect a difference between elite and popular attitudes to Turkish soap operas in Arab societies. It is very clear that Arab populations loved these soaps in an overwhelming scale. However, the mostly negative tone that appeared in the media probably reflects the Arab elite's nationalistic and somewhat self-confident attitude toward the Turkish soaps. Despite their criticism as well as appreciation, many Arab intellectuals recognize a recent rise in the quality of Turkish cultural productions in cinema, literature and music.

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Development and Public Policies:

Wickedness, Governance and Collective Sanctions: Can Corruption Be Tamed?

Amr G. E. Sabet

Tackling a problem requires the ability to read it, conceptualize it, represent it, define it, and then apply the necessary tools and mechanisms to (re)solve it. This may sound self-evident except when the problem to be engaged, in this case corruption, happens to be complex (Fernandes & Simon 1999), ill-structured (Simon: 1973) and/or wicked (Rittel & Webber: 1973). The former requirements may become less straightforward or feasible, imposing modest expectations regarding the possibility of any definitive solution to such an insidious phenomenon. They also entail initially approaching and defining the problem abstractly, moving thereon, and if possible, toward what Herbert A. Simon indentified as the plane of a "well structured problem" (Simon 1973: 181).

This involves identification (Simon 1997: 11) as well as problem representation (Fernandes & Simon 1999; Simon 1997). *Identification* allows for limiting the range of values to be considered to a set of specific aims or purposes rather than that of the entire domain of human values. This allows for a measure of *parsimony*, task feasibility, as well eventual representation upon which alternative problem-solving strategies may be formulated (Simon 1999: 226; Simon 1997: 11). *Representation*, by the same token, is an ambiguity and complexity reducing exercise, based on establishing a common frame of reference and goals, and is the pre-requisite for any possible problem solving or strategy choice (Simon 1997: 52). It starts with advancing an abstract vision of an alternative followed by "decomposition" of the various components of sub-problems, addressing each one on its own then integrating all the sub- solutions into one (Fernandes & Simon 1999: 227).

This constitutes a form of "diagnosis," followed by "prescription" and then "action" (Mintzberg, Ahlstrand & Lampel 1998: 32) or, in other words, analysis and then synthesis. Unfortunately, things may not be that simple when dealing with the problem of corruption, when it is difficult to identify it with

any single or group of factors and almost impossible to problematize it in all its dimensions. Thus, Simon (1973) invites a measure of skepticism when he states – especially when it comes to non-exact social and organizational problems – that the boundary between solving a well structured and ill structured problem is vague and fluid and merely quantitative depending on the "size of knowledge base." Therefore, no new concepts or techniques are needed (Simon 1973: 181, 197, 200). Skepticism does not imply that Simon's methodology offers no help, but rather is simply a reminder of some of its limitations. For the problem at hand may be more complex, related less to the boundary between the well structured and the ill structured, and more so to that between the ill structured and the *wicked*.

Corruption identified and represented in the context of this chapter as bribery and/or extortion is one of these kinds of problems. Both in its global but particularly national manifestations it is ill-structured. Where it is structural, endemic and pervasive, it is perhaps even *wicked*. If so, it may not suffice to address the problem using the existing categories of law and/or good governance, which overlook the "long-term memory" of the collective and cultural specific dimensions of the subject (Simon 1973: 181) – i.e. its path dependency. Such socio-historical conditions require focusing on the interactive and self-reproducing networks of corruption and attempting to "*subvert"* (Klitgaard 2000) the phenomenon's entire matrix. For this to work, it may be more effective to focus on a certain aspect of this negative value (e.g. bribery) rather than on its entire spectrum. Invoking the *sufficing* principle and narrowly specifying bribery as a foundational factor or element that influences the phenomenon's pervasiveness, and then targeting it may be a more practical option.

This study suggests collective punishment and sanctions (French 1985), and "modified vendetta" (Corlett 1989; Shipp 1987) as conceptual tools or mechanisms that may help in reducing or possibly undermining the untenable problem of bribery among corrupt and colluding individuals. These tools are linked to Kurt Lewin's theory of change, incorporating the three steps of unfreezing a situation, inducing change, and then freezing the achieved changes as a norm (Cummings 2004: 34–35). By exploring these as potentially relevant categories in the structural, as well as behavioral, unfreezing of some of the most prevalent and institutionalized aspects of citizen corruption, perhaps a new perspective on corruption fighting strategies may consequently evolve.

Corruption as Collective Guilt

What is corruption, what are its causes, and why have numerous anti-corruption policies failed to deal with it have been questions, which have dogged many theoreticians and practitioners alike. Svensson (2005: 21) for instance admitted that there is no clear definition of what constitutes corruption. Much, perhaps, has to do with the fact that "different causal chains" pertaining to this phenomenon have led to "different discourses on corruption prevention and corruption control" (Graaf 2007: 39). The anti-corruption organization Transparency International for instance, defines the phenomenon as 'the misuse of entrusted power for private benefit.' A broader definition provided by the Tax Justice Network (2005) proposes that, "an activity which undermines public confidence in the integrity of the rules, systems and institutions that govern society is corrupt".

The significant point in the latter understanding is no longer whether corruption can be observed and judged in relative or absolute terms, but rather if it fits the duck test. That is: "if it looks like a duck, swims like a duck, and quacks like a duck, then it probably is a duck." This suggests it suffices to identify the different, even if sometimes vague, fluid, or contested manifestations of a phenomenon or subject matter by observing its "habitual characteristics" and implications even in the absence of a clear definition or label[1]. This necessitates that not only actual corruption be observed and prevented, but as importantly, the "appearance of corruption" (Warren 2006: 161). The "integrity of appearances" provides clues to the ethical performance of the citizen as an individual, a public official, or as part of an institution or organization. Failure in this respect, presumably "disempowers" people by denying them participation, or the "means for inclusion in public judgments" (ibid. 160).

Competing representations contribute to dissipating strategies and efforts of fighting corruption as they serve to undercut consensus on the issue, and challenge any common frame of reference that would guide policy action. This may not be merely a cause for failing to grasp the issue but perhaps also an effect of the immense complexity or wickedness of the problem

1 The logic of this test is frequently utilized to counter confounding arguments that something is not what it appears to be; for instance that what constitutes 'corruption' is a *relative* matter. The elephant test on the other hand refers to situations in which an idea or thing "is hard to describe, but instantly recognizable when spotted"— a sort of 'I know it when I see it' type of argument. Both are utilized in this chapter as sufficing conditions in order to circumvent contentions about the diverse meanings of corruption in different cultures and societies or about cultural relativity.

and how to confront it. Corruption involves a most intricate and elaborate labyrinth of human moral, cognitive and social processes. These range from the psychological and ideological to externally imposed agendas, the economic, the political, the socio-cultural and the technological. It is contagious and nebulous, and in fact "can be attributed to almost anything" (Caiden, Dwivedi & Jabbra 2001: 21–26).

In poorer and transitional countries where corruption is structural, pervasive and endemic, and despite its harmful impact on "good governance," "sustainable development," and "human justice," it is considered to be something of a natural order. It is the way things are done in the conduct of business and governance, "habitualized" and "institutionalized" into the social fabric, rationalized and justified. Reasons to fight it or oppose it are weakly internalized so as to sustain any significant counter collective action. The system continues to self-reproduce until "conducting personal and public affairs eventually collapses" and as "rottenness" strikes at the core, society and the State are rendered "incapable of facing major outside challenges. Then, the price is very high in terms of uncertainty, loss of trust, and risky supersession at best – and civil unrest, revolt, and bloody revolution at worst" (Caiden et al 2001: 2.).

This does not mean that the blame is to be rested entirely on the shoulders of the 'system,' guilty as it may be, while exonerating individual and group agents, explaining corrupt behavior by causes beyond their control. This would allow the citizen as a "corrupt agent" to disappear together with the phenomenon under observation, despite that agent being a source of corruption. Agency consequently would be reduced to "background characteristics, translated into variables" (Graaf 2007: 41); essentially, as Aaron Wildavsky has pointed out, "swallowing" the whole "subject matter". On the contrary, this is to highlight agency and emphasize corruption as a collective responsibility susceptible to forms of collective punishment and sanctions. Such recourse is justified by the nature and wickedness of the problem and applies to the system, state, government as well as groups and citizens.

The Wickedness of Corruption

While it is apt to refer to corruption as evil, wrong, and immoral, the term 'wicked,' at least as conceived back in the early 1970s by Rittel and Webber (1973), did not necessarily envisage negative ethical attachments to any particular issue. Rather, it was to contrast it with a tame, well-structured social problem. Wicked, as has been applied in this context was used to refer to the "malignant," "vicious," "tricky," and "aggressive" nature of a social

problem rather than to "malicious intent" (Rittel & Webber 1973: 160–161). This analytical distinction does not hold when dealing with the problem of corruption. In addition to being difficult to formulate, with no "stopping rule" or final and clearly identifiable solution, and in many cases symptomatic of other problems (ibid. 161–165), corruption is also wicked in an ethico-moral sense. It is wicked as a problem and as a value.

Yet, this does not simplify matters much. For while it may be possible to develop a consensus of condemnation in the abstract, this is likely to break down once action and policy are undertaken, and 'interests' threatened. As anti-corruption investigations of political and administrative executives, for example, "hit close to home," attempts are made to derail these investigations by those very same executives (Maor 2004: 1). Accountability and transparency are early victims. In other cases and quite significantly, measures to fight corruption may end up producing adverse outcomes instead. One is then faced with the ambiguous task of having to "weigh" (Simon 1997: 47) trade-offs: what one hopes to achieve versus potential losses in terms of unintended consequences. One study found that policy measures providing incentives or positive sanctions to fight bribery have created, in some cases, inducements for extortion – a greater evil (Khalil, Lawrrée & Yun 2010: 179). Citing an example of a corrupt police officer who when officially rewarded would presumably be less inclined to accept a bribe from a driver who ran a red light; he may in fact, and in lieu of the same reward, extort innocent drivers by claiming they have run a red light when they had not (ibid).

Ironically, even the ethical decision to provide incentives to reduce bribery incidences cannot be defined as correct or incorrect, right or wrong, or good or bad (Simon 1997: 59; Rittel & Webber: 1973: 162). While the chain of means-ends in such a case may be traced to the abstract realm of fighting corruption, the connection eventually becomes so "conjectural" and the "content" of the value so "ill defined" that analysis would hold little significance for administrative or policy purposes (Simon 1997). The "ramifications" of the problem solving decision turn out to be confusing, and the suggested solutions end up being, in many cases, worse than the symptoms; hence wickedness (Churchman 1967: B-141). A more insidious component of such wickedness is that the margin of error is limited and in many ways quite risky.

Once a decision has been made to confront the phenomenon, which must be first and foremost a political decision, failure is not an option. There is "no right to be wrong" so to speak (Rittel & Webber 1973: 166). With all its intricacies, corruption is like a hornet's nest. Either one burns it down in its entirety or suffers the consequences of being painfully, if not fatally, stung

by its agitated inhabitants. Half hearted, skeptical or insincere measures may very well incite a vicious response that would enshrine a self assured corruption structure against a seemingly weak or failed state. Good and well intentioned laws may end up causing social unrest and unraveling activities (Dobel 1978: 972), exacerbating the "softness of the state" (Caiden et al 2001: 31). Thus, in addition to being a matter of collective moral and social responsibility, fighting corruption is also a matter of national security and high politics.

Corruption, particularly where it is structural, pervasive and endemic, is one of those problems which beg some form of "resolution," where at best the "system of problems" or "mess"[2] can only be iteratively "re-solved–over and over again" (Ackoff 1974: 21, 33; Rittel & Webber: 1973: 160). It is a condition where, in most cases, one can only hope for a re-solution rather than a solution, i.e. the type of response that may address a particular problem or aspect of it but at the same time creates a new set of problems. What this means is that no definite solution to the social "mess" (Ackoff 1974: 21) of corruption is or can be proposed. At the same time, corruption is perceived as wicked not as a matter of definite representation, but as a worst case scenario among better hopefuls, in order not to underestimate its complexity.

If the problem happens to turn out to be tamer than it actually appears to be, then well and good. After all, there are societies that have gone a long way toward minimizing levels of societal corruption. Whether their examples can be replicated is a contingent matter which depends on context, situation and environment as well as leadership and a host of other factors. For there is always the alternative possibility that once the system of corruption gets on top of things "it stays there" (Rothstein & Uslander 2005: 72). Hence, readymade representations of 'good governance' mechanisms as the 'one best way' may not be totally relevant to the problem at hand.

On Good Governance

The concept of governance and for that matter 'good' governance is a term that has become increasingly in vogue since the 1990s. Yet it remains contested and ambiguous, lacking in precision or contextual meaning (Kjær

2 According to Ackoff (1974: 21), "…no problem ever exists in complete isolation. Every problem interacts with other problems and is therefore part of a set of interrelated problems, a *system of problems*.... I choose to call such a system *a mess*".

2004: 2). The United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP), for example, defines the term as referring to processes of decision making and implementation in broad terms so as to include both formal and informal actors (UNESCAP 2010: 1), constituting much of what came to be termed civil society. From an administrative point of view, however, Rhodes (Kjær 2004: 3) perceives governance as "self-organizing, inter-organizational networks characterized by interdependence, resource-exchange, rules of the game, and significant autonomy from the state". Ironically, this same definition can apply to the very concept of corruption in societies where it is structural, pervasive and endemic. It becomes so pervasive that it incorporates most, if not all, the characteristics of the above designations. Corruption constitutes self organizing, interdependent, formal or informal networks, with their own rules of engagement and resource exchange, autonomous of the state or even in control of it. Old boy networks and nepotism are examples of such subtle unethical structures of pay-offs (Salminen & Ikola-Norrbacka 2009: 28). Other manifestations and forms of corruption are of course not so subtle and much more sinister and destructive of the entire integrity structure of society.

Thus, most of the criteria of good governance mentioned above become quite irrelevant as under such conditions of pervasiveness groups of individuals may accept and participate in corruption, even when conscious of the error of their ways (You & Khagram 2005: 139). This constitutes a "social dilemma", where despite the fact that people do understand the situation and the disastrous consequences of their own attitudes, they are unable or continue to be unwilling to do anything about it (Kollock 1998 185). Through a continuous process of 'denial' they may condemn corruption verbally but resist attempts at breaking its networks as many adapt to its order of things. Anderson and Tverdova (2003) observed that political allegiances in modern democracies filter perceptions or negative attitudes toward corruption depending on whether a group of citizens supports the government or not. This raises the question as to whether this group is guilty by association and therefore collectively responsible for corruption as well as deserving of concomitant collective punishment. In states, particularly those with weak controls, democracy can in fact be a source of corruption and crime, especially in societies with high socio-economic inequality levels, as the two separate studies of Rose-Ackerman (2001: 417), and you and Khagram (2005: 155) have observed.

In civil society, informal NGOs are not above suspicion either. In most cases, they are funded and controlled by external actors with their own agendas, including, as Segal (1998: 2) has put it, encouraging capitalism's

secret weapon – an apolitical middle class, and empowering business leaders through trade, in order to create presumably alternative centers of power. Yet in many cases, both business leaders and the terms of trade are a major source of corruption. As alternative centers of power, they either become autonomous of the state, with external commitment and support, or in fact become the state; establishing a form of a kleptocracy or what has come to be termed "state capture" (Hellman et al 2000). This 'wicked' problem by its very nature is "enmeshed in established ways of life and patterns of thinking" (Clarke & Stewart 2003: 274) as the boundaries between kleptocracy on one hand, and freedom and free market on the other, wither away. Adding to the wickedness is a situation where 'civil society,' in many countries, fails to materialize as what may be designated the 'corrupt society' replaces any resemblance of the former. In this sense, corruption reflects a form of governance or in fact, is governance, for to capture the state as well as the society is to run both[3].

State Capture and Globalization

In order to avoid arriving at such an 'undesirable' conclusion, Hellman and Kaufman (2001) introduced the concept of state capture as an alternative term to salvage that of 'governance'; perhaps also as a means to circumvent the wicked problem. State capture is defined as "the efforts of firms (or such groups as the military, ethnic groups or kleptocracies, formal or informal) to shape the laws, policies, and regulations of the state to their own advantage by providing illicit private gains to public officials". It involves "parliament [legislative] capture," "executive decree capture," controlling and influencing the "formulation" and "content" of laws and regulations (e.g. courts capture), and shaping the "basic rules of the game" (Ibid.).

As such, state capture is "closely embedded in political processes" as well as in legal and economic activities (e.g. banks capture) (Anderson &

3 In fact, 'state capture' fuses two unvirtuous concepts: *Kleptocracy* and *Kakistocracy*. The first one refers to a rule or government by thieves; from Greek *kleptes* (thieves) and *kratos* (government, rule) (Wordsmith Words 2010a; Oxford English Dictionary 2010) and the latter to the government by the worst, least qualified or most unprincipled and unscrupulous citizens; from Greek kakistos (worst) + -*kratos* (government, rule). (Wordsmith Words 2010b; Oxford English Dictionary 2010). Together they combine the economic and political capture of the state and this is what makes the problem of corruption 'wicked' both ethically and in terms of having no possible solution. This fusion is common among many regimes in less developed as well as transitional countries. The Mubarak regime of Egypt is an archetypal case in point.

Gray 2006: 3, 7, 29, 85–86; Hellman et al 2000: 3). With such extensive control, state capture reflects "not merely a symptom but also a fundamental cause of poor governance" as "collusion between powerful firms and state officials … reap substantial private gains from the continuation of weak governance" (Hellman & Kaufman 2001). Reading through the above definitions and understandings of state capture, its characteristics and what the term is all about, one cannot but infer it to be government as well as governance.

In such similar socio-economic and political systems, identifying state capture simply as a form of bad governance when the boundaries between the good and bad had collapsed does not make much of a difference. In a morally, politically, socially and economically corrupt and decaying state or society, governance, state capture and corruption merge and fuse; they become largely interchangeable, leading to a state of "banality of wrongdoing" (Moody-Adams 1994: 299). If such is the case, then what we are observing in countries or societies with rampant corruption is not merely a relationship of influence or control, but of immanence. This is the nature of the 'wicked' problem.

The proposed governance re-solution becomes the problem as the very concept of 'good governance' fluctuates from being an "insight" to being nothing more than a "cliché" (Schmitt 2010: A10). In a rather candid admission of such a reality former Russian President Vladimir Putin, in a meeting with Russia's business leaders in July 2000, stated:

I only want to draw your attention straightaway to the fact that you have yourselves formed this very state, to a large extent through political and quasi-political structures under your control. So perhaps what one should do least of all is blame the mirror (quoted in Hellman, Geraint, & Kaufmann 2000: 1–2; Hoffman 2000).

This condition does not, of course, apply to Russia alone. Bhargava and Bolongaita (2004) observed that, South Korea, a country considered to be an economic and developmental success story and a member of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), had achieved its status in the context of state capture. They identified this country as particularly interesting because it reflects the fact that corruption "cuts across all kinds of governance and operating environments" (ibid. 136).

It is important in this context to draw attention to the changing role of the very conception of the role of the state and how this serves to affect incidences of corruption. Traditionally, the modern state has been expected to play the role of a sovereign power structure that aims at projecting national economic demands onto the international system. As opposed to this

image, neoliberal notions of global interdependence came to perceive the state as the instrument through which external demands of capital flows are imposed on domestic focal groups. This in fact, constitutes a reversal of its earlier role (Clark 1999: 94). Whereas bureaucracy reflects the organizational structure which serves the interests of the national state, state capture, bearing the seemingly benign term of 'management reform,' constitutes the changing domestic equivalent, mirroring demands of global capital flow. State capture has in reality become a demand of transnational capital and foreign direct investment, for economic but also political and strategic interests. A global attitude toward commensurate corruption thus came to depend on the extent to which this behavior facilitates or stalls such demands. Where it enables interests of the kind, it is tolerated if not encouraged. When it constitutes a hindrance or a loss, it is condemned. This helps explain ambivalent attitudes toward such behavior and sheds light on the ecology of the reciprocally supporting connections between globalization, governance and pervasive corruption.

Globalization, according to Schwartz (2005), is a process characterized by mutually constituting states and markets as well as by continuously decreasing mediation between states and citizens and incessantly increasing pecuniary mediation of social relations. In its framework, corruption has come to reflect the politics of global capital flow taken to a much higher dimension of unethical behavior. Particularly as it impacts on societies, where the modern state structure, and its concomitant social capital, had never been totally consolidated, and therefore legitimized, and as such constituted a partial and fragile historical existence. Consequently, as the formal and functional role of the state as the sole monopolizer of coercive power recedes in favor of global and external influences, marketing agents resort to hire or finance informal "specialists" in the use of violence such as, militias or mafias, but where tribes, sub-national as well as supranational groupings, may also play an important role. This becomes the means to self-protect but also "to enforce contract and assure property rights" (Ibid.).

Actors with a comparative advantage in the use of force are equally willing to extort a share of production from direct producers as they increasingly come to replace the state as alternative centers of power (Schwartz 2005). Security, let alone other needs, becomes a marketing enterprise. Modern globalized marketing as Ramonet (Asad 2003: 152; my emphasis) insightfully observed, "has become so sophisticated that it aims to sell not just a brand name or social sign, but an identity. It's all based on the principle that having is being". In a world of scarcity, inequality and anxiety, having in order to be is conducive to, and helps explain why, corruption, the ripping apart

of the fabric of ethical intersubjectivities, the destruction of vital forms of organizational structures and the degradation of human relations, and moral values in the global market, are being normalized as a way of life (Sabet 2008: 242). Having as being insidiously imposes corrupt behavior, and as it links such behavior to security, the foundational aspect of any subsequent welfare, it creates the corrupt identity and from thereon, the corrupt society which at its extreme, becomes the insane society–the "unadjustment" of the entire culture itself rather than just individuals (Fromm 1955: 6).

The wicked problem, in other words, is at its worst when this state structure is required to transform to serve the interests and demands of global capital. This does not mean there is nothing that can be done, that there can be no re-solution, or that this is a despairing situation. Rather, it is to propose a collective responsibility or perhaps 'collective sin' approach which demands a form of collective response and sanctions. Such a collective sanctions proposition may not necessarily be consistent or consonant with the philosophical underpinnings and tools or mechanisms of good governance put forward by different international and global institutions. However, it may be closer to being a more holistic, non-linear, non-partial reconceptualization of the problem, cutting across societal boundaries while involving the public, even if in a different way (Clarke & Stewart 2003), and hence more realistic. For as Garret and Weingast (Goldstein and Keohane 1993:18) put it, "to assert that institutions help assure adherence to the rules of the game is to overlook a prior and critical issue. If the members of a community cannot agree to one set of rules, the fact that institutions might facilitate adherence to them would be irrelevant".

On Corruption

Despite the corruption problem's presumed 'wickedness' one may still attempt, to the extent possible, to structure and contextualize it. If the above analysis and inferences are correct, then this, in fact, is a phenomenon-corruption which is institutionalized. Conceptualization helps link both notions in a common framework where fighting corruption becomes intertwined with institutional perspectives. The question of how to fight corruption becomes one of how to perform acts of institutional subversion through both endogenous and/or exogenous imperatives i.e. to transform, demolish, deconstruct, infuse and rebuild institutions and their concomitant structures–by nature a *collective* and systemic enterprise, but also contingent.

"Institutions are concentrations of power in the service of some value. A correlation between power and commitment to a certain value is thus the

defining characteristic of an institution and determines its causal impact on social life" (Stinchcombe 1968: 9–10). If corruption is institutionalized, and commitment to bribery is a defining (negative) value, then shifting the power relations between the corrupt civil servant and the individual seeking service may be an important factor in changing behavior, while still maintaining an organization's basic structure. Identifying broad characteristics and forms of corruption and then seeking to subvert them is perhaps a useful exercise in this direction.

Caiden (2001) attempted to offer generalizations about both. Corruption is observed to be in all political systems and at all levels. It is related to many causes, different social contexts, varied origins, assorted cultures, facilitated by political and economic instabilities including unequal wealth distribution. It is persistent, cancerous and contagious, benefitting the privileged and powerful few and is essentially ineradicable. As to the forms it may take, they range from treason, kleptocracy, abuse of power, deceit and perversion of justice, dereliction of duty, vote rigging, unauthorized licenses and sale of public offices, tax evasions, favoritism, influence peddling, perjury, accepting improper gifts, organized crime, illegal surveillance, and so on (Caiden 2001: 17–18). The catch here is that almost everything can be included. Caiden does not economize on explanation and consequently lacks in *parsimony* and succinctness.

Path Dependency and Bribery: The Contagion of Illegitimacy

The "law of parsimony" proposes to make issues, to the extent possible, "clear, simple and specific" (Mintzberg et al 1998: 28). In attempting to move closer in this direction it may help to seek a common or 'foundational' principle that permeates the dynamics of corruption in all its forms and characteristics. Admittedly this incorporates an element of subjectivity, but the attempt nevertheless remains worthwhile. For the purposes of parsimony, path dependency is chosen as the defining characteristic, bribery as the defining form. The connected dynamics of both elements contribute to perpetuating the environment in which people or groups function, largely shaping both their values and behavior. The focus on the latter form of corruption in fact is in line with Salminen and Ikola-Norrbacka's observation that bribary falls in "a league of its won" as a "most unethical action" (2009: 27).

Both elements of path dependency and bribery constitute the "contagion of [il]legitimacy" (Zucker 1987: 446) or the structure which "infects," institutionalizes and socializes agents into this mess. To fight corruption therefore

is to strike at those two conceptual elements by providing relevant counter-tools and mechanisms. Such tools and mechanisms do not have to do everything well, they only have to do something well (Rigby 1994: 23). One should not harbor ambitions for "doing it all" or "one all purpose" tools or mechanisms, as this rarely is feasible (Rigby 2001: 158; Rigby 1994: 24). They need not be there to eradicate all corruption, but perhaps only one aspect of it – bribery.

Choice may be informed by the same logic that Noonan (Lennerfors 2008:13–14) has insightfully and parsimoniously applied when he observed that,

> "[a]s a world evil," "corruption," defined as bribery, is not as bad as the exploitation of children by child slavery, child prostitution, child pornography, and child labor. Corruption is not as destructive of life as AIDS or as tobacco or some drugs. Corruption control may not be as vital to the planet's health as arms control. All of these subjects may be more important globally than bribery. But the reduction, if not the elimination, of bribery may be the key to reducing each of the other evils."

In other words, bribery is identified and represented as a "weakest strategic component" or least common denominator, which to a great measure determines corruption combating performance at all other levels (Rigby 1993: 9); a center of gravity so to speak. The mechanisms and tools to be chosen and used for that purpose must be representative and relevant to the problem at hand, specifically made to serve its focus. To improve the level of performance and probability of success in implementation, two main conditions are necessary, ideally speaking: Firstly a strong top-down support and commitment from the political hierarchy and secondly the chosen tools and mechanisms should be used in a "major effort" and as "linchpins" not as a "limited initiative" i.e. "go deep, not broad" (Rigby 2001: 152, 154).

Focusing on bribery may still be a broad effort, given its pervasiveness. At an early stage of policy implementation it may be better still to narrow the focus further on a particular organization or (sub)sector (e.g. corrupt police force which presumably is responsible for law enforcement) where the full force and brunt of the tools and mechanisms could be applied. Maximizing 'major' effort while minimizing target space may not only increase desirable outcome levels, but may also create a shock wave or 'ripple effect' that spreads into other domains or sectors, bringing about an additional desired outcome elsewhere, even if one cannot fully anticipate its characteristics, while helping economize on energy. By going deeper, one at the same time

can go broader, as change in the performance of one institution or sub-institutional structure can affect the functioning of others (Jenkins 2007: 136).

The second component or the path dependency of corruption relates to the mechanisms of reproduction which sustain this perverse institution. According to Mahoney (2000: 507–508), "path dependence characterizes specifically those historical sequences in which contingent events set into motion institutional patterns or event chains that have deterministic (self-reinforcing) properties". An approach of this kind offers "insights" into the nature of both endogenous and exogenous influences or even shocks, which may help bring about a "breakdown" or "decay" in the highly resilient and institutionalized (path dependent) pattern of corruption (Thelen 2003: 209).

While it is beyond the scope here to examine all the specific causes or mechanisms of reproduction which serve to perpetuate this behavior, nevertheless, a relevant and interesting study has been conducted by Tirole (1996), which attempted to examine the persistence of corruption and some means to break its patterns. The study started with a hypothetical steady state low corruption economy that was subjected to a perturbation, at an initial date zero, resulting in a "one-shot increase in the gain to being corrupt (or a relaxation in the enforcement of anticorruption laws)" (Tirole 1996: 3). While the economy does not change much in subsequent times (1, 2, …) most agents (individuals/people) at the initial date i.e. time 0, have in fact engaged in corrupt activities. Tirole found that in "the unique continuation equilibrium" the temporary increase in corruption due to an initial temporary perturbation, transformed into a long term condition. The economy is unable to return to the earlier low corruption steady state, and must therefore remain corrupt. The agents at time zero have already "smeared" their reputation with more incentives to engage in corruption than if they had always remained honest. They have already been "locked into corruption", as the honesty barrier, so to speak, has been broken (Tirole 1996: 3..)

The ongoing question, however, is why do subsequent incoming agents with unsmeared individual reputations also engage in corruption despite the fact that the first agents have been progressively replaced? Tirole (1996: 3) posed the question: Why do the young inherit the corrupt practices of their elders? In response, he stressed the idea of the "imperfect observability" of individual past behavior as an explanation (ibid). While an agent's reputation as part of a group is individually built depending on that person's observed traits based on past behavior, as part of group belonging, individual past behavior is "imperfectly observed."[4] Concomitantly, the group mem-

4 According to Tirole (1996: 2), "[i]f past individual behavior was fully unobserved, mem-

bers' past behavior conditions both this group's as well as its individuals' current behavior. In a "self-regenerating" imperfectly observed group, the behavior of new members, whose welfare and incentives are shaped by the group's existing reputation, will largely depend on the past behavior of their elders (Tirole 1996: 2).

Things get worse over time as a pattern of path dependency is established and as "poor collective behavior in the past… make current good behavior a low-yield individual investment," generating "poor collective behavior in the future" (Tirole 1996: 18). What we have here is a situation where, as Sewell (Thelen 2003: 218) has described it, "what has happened at an earlier point in time" affects "the possible outcomes of a sequence of events occurring at a later point in time". The result is a "vicious circle of corruption," leading to such behavior becoming structural, pervasive and persistent (Tirole 1996: 3–4). This means that to be "stigmatized as 'baddies' in the eyes of society" (Salminen & Ikola-Norrbacka 2009: 28) no longer becomes a constraining factor. In fact going further beyond mere bribery, the members of the group may deliberately seek to sustain a reputation of being corrupt in order to extract or extort bribes from their "trading" partners (ibid). Consequently, even a "one-shot" enforcement of anti-corruption laws leading to some measure of short term reduction in corrupt activities would have no permanent impact as corruption "ratchets up" rather than "down" (Tirole 1996: 3, 10).

Path Dependency and Change: Kurt Lewin Revisited

Path dependency implies stability, persistence, and continuity. Decisions are influenced by earlier decisions, forcing corrupt behavior and fomenting a corrupt culture, reproduced in a self-generative form. It becomes institutionalized as its structures, actions and roles proliferate. The question of dealing with institutionalized corruption becomes one of how to break its path dependency and the 'rigidities' it creates. What tools, if any, may serve this purpose? How may it be possible to bring about or allow for an endogenous process of "creative destruction" capable of undermining corruption "from within" (Schumpeter 1970: 83) with or without necessarily having to demolish an entire administrative structure, such as the bureaucracy for

bers of the group would have no incentive to sustain their own reputation and therefore the group would always be expected to behave badly. Conversely, the collective reputation would play no role if individual behaviors were perfectly observed". In other words, a "group's reputation is only as good as that of its members" (ibid. 1).

instance, with it? In a society where corruption is pervasive, connecting the concept of the collective to Lewin's theory of change may help contribute to developing such contextual tools.

In his model, Lewin underscores the broad conditions that could bring about change in human behavior in terms of a balance of opposing, driving and restraining, forces. He observes that it was more important to remove the "restraining" forces which resisted change than merely to consolidate the opposing "driving" forces, even though change from an earlier equilibrium was possible only when the latter were more powerful than the former (Schein 1999). The model comprises of three steps: 1) unfreeze (create a felt need for change), 2) change (attitudinal or behavioral modification or conversion) and, 3) re-freeze (institutionalizing and reinforcing the change in behavior) (Schein 1999; Mathews 2009: 7). The first step disconfirms, the second drives, and the third locks-in.

Unfreezing a corrupt situation, or the path dependent status quo equilibrium, takes place under "complex psychological" (agent) as well as structural conditions. This is due to the fact that a driving force in one direction almost inevitably produces counter restraining forces in the opposite direction in order to preserve the equilibrium (Schein 1999). Those involved in corrupt behavior will resist any type of change that would disrupt the benefits that accrue to them from such an attitude. Unless, of course, some increased benefit or cost is sufficiently involved and a fundamental change in their perceptions of the situation has been brought about.[5] The purpose here is to increase the driving forces, reduce their restraining counterparts, and to introduce "implicit" as well as "explicit" consciousness altering modifications (Mathews 2009: 7; Anderson et al 2000). The latter involves creating an awareness that corruption "demoralizes the human spirit" even if the waste it causes in terms of energy and resources is not individually clearly observable (Johnson 2004: x). This constitutes the motivational, disconfirming stage.

Change involves moving to a new equilibrium through some form of "institutional conversion" (Thelen 2003: 228), "reeducation" (Coghlan & Jacob 2005) or, environmental shift. An ecological shift shocks institutions into conversion away from earlier objectives toward other ends by confronting actors with different sets of issues and problems, causing them to re-conceptualize the entire institutional culture in favor of a behavioral change (Thelen 2003:

5 Lewin observed behavior and change to be a function of the individual (agent) and the environment (structure). He set the formula as follows: B= f(P,E) where behavior (B) is a function of the person (P) and the environment (E) (Coghlan & Jacob 2005: 446).

228). It creates a situation of so called "survival anxiety" (Schein 1999). This means that the path dependent status quo, corruption in this case, must be perceived or deemed not only inappropriate and unethical, but also very costly, both individually and collectively, rendering identification with it , of any kind or form, self-defeating. Behavioral change, as a most effective way of transforming culture, or the mental programming of the mind, as Hofstede (2001: 12) has designated it, is to be followed by or commensurately associated with a process of reeducation: the "unlearning" of "patterns of thinking and acting that are well established in individuals and groups and operates at the level of norms and values expressed in action" (Coghlan & Jacob 2005: 446). In other words, change, whether environmental or institutional requires, as the content of such a change, both behavioral and values conversions, with the whole idea being to increase the cost of the path dependent status quo to intolerable levels.

Refreezing is the final stage which attempts to stall the possibility of reverting to an earlier or initial stage. It formally or informally co-opts (Selznick 2007: 143) the agents subjected to behavioral and values changes into the new institutional structure, through different policies and procedures, as well as through commitment to and following up on replacing old attitudes with new alternatives. Together these elements constitute the new legitimating and stabilizing tools and mechanisms. It is worth noting that this three-step model has been frequently and quite effectively used for political objectives of control, with various tools and mechanisms applied to politicize or depoliticize i.e. sway a populous in one way or another. It would be a relevant exercise to apply it to administrative ethics in an attempt to de-corrupt or sanitize a corrupt environment, as well. Some tools will be suggested in what follows which may serve the purposes of innovation in this respect; innovation being "the effort to create purposeful, focused change in an enterprise's economic or social potential" (Drucker 2002: 96).

Collective Responsibility, Collective Punishment, and Modified Vendetta

Lewin constructed his model with the purpose of analytically identifying the steps that ought to be followed in order to bring about a desired change. However, he did not provide clear terms about what the agents of change should do in detail in order to accomplish such an objective (Levasseur 2001: 73; Mathews 2009: 8). In order to help launch the unfreezing stage where the "natural defense mechanisms" and "mental set" (Mintzberg et al

1998: 142) of corrupt group identifications may be surmounted, the notion of the 'collective' needs to be reinstated as a tool of change.

Collective sanctions refer to a situation in which "when an individual violates or complies with a rule, not merely the individual but other members of that person's group as well are collectively punished or rewarded by an external agent" (Heckathorn 1988: 535–536). Its punitive aspect aims at pervasive corruption as an intentional and willful act of wrongdoing. In a collective sense it involves the perpetrator, the accomplice as well as possibly the witness or 'fellow traveler.' The latter may have not been a direct accomplice or culprit, yet becomes indirectly so, given that he could have done something to stop or report the wrongdoing but chose not to. In addition, the environment in which all three parties practice their agency also exerts a crucial influence.

Pervasive societal and organizational corruption therefore, is to be perceived from the different perspective of collective responsibility and collective punishment, as a means of changing the environment structure by altering agents' behavior and increasing the cost of maintaining the status quo. This requires a major effort, and if fighting corruption is to constitute such an effort, punishment may well have to be disproportionate. Collective sanctions as a representation of disproportionality based on the principle that corruption is a collective responsibility helps "unfreeze" a situation and break path dependencies and patterns, as a prelude to changing behavior toward a new equilibrium. This is the case, because a one time or sporadic anti-corruption campaigns by an autonomous or semi-autonomous supervisory agency may reduce the level of corruption during the operation, but frequently have no effect thereafter (Tirole 1996: 11).

Disproportionate sanctions can work both ways; not only in the direction of punishment but also in that of "amnesty". According to Tirole's study, amnesty, if feasible and depending on types of corruption involved, may be "welfare enhancing out of [the] steady state" of corruption (Tirole 1996: 12). Offered to those who had committed acts of corruption at some initial point say, time zero, "yields a Pareto improvement," and enables a group to return immediately to the low corruption steady state (ibid).[6] Certainly, an amnesty is not possible in all cases, and should not be offered to highly influential individuals/ as this would be a sign that they get away with their misdeeds. Any subsequent anti-corruption discourse would consequently lose its cred-

6 Pareto improvement refers to a situation where a change in the allocation of goods or outcomes makes as a minimum one individual better off with no negative consequences to any other individuals.

ibility, when the essence of any such endeavor is what has just been lost. As a result, no trust is likely to be restored.

Amnesty therefore, should not be perceived as a means of escaping consequences of misdeeds. In fact, it serves the additional purpose of its opposite–disproportionate punishment. It helps to justify and set the psychological ground for applying a strict and collective form of retribution beyond any reasonable excuses that could be made. Those who commit any form of administrative corruption or bribery, after time zero, would be administratively penalized individually, as well as being subjected to severe legal repercussions, but also as part of a collective form of punishment, all for having wasted their 'second' chance. The purpose is to help demoralize and weaken responsive defenses of a potentially corrupt (bribe sharing) cohort, as well as identifying an individual and collective focus of "responsible agency" (Moody-Adams 1994: 292).

Such a regime provides individuals belonging to a particular group with "incentives to regulate one another's behavior," thus enforcing norm compliance and creating a social context in which a wrongdoing individual turns his entire group into a group of wrongdoers as well. For it is to be clear that when dealing with others, a corrupt individual "never stands alone" (Heckathorn 1988: 535–536). This constitutes a form of "modified vendetta" which recalls ancient tribal and group notions of informal and 'unofficial' control and retaliation against aberrant behavior by an individual(s) belonging to a collective, as well as injury by 'outsiders' (Shipp 1987: 606).

Advocates of individual responsibility, to whom group punishment is perceived as a "primitive" and "disreputable atavism of pre-modern, communalist cultures," as "anachronistic" as "punishing the innocent is immoral," may strongly oppose the idea (Levinson 2003). This would tend to confine possible approaches to linear perspectives despite the need of applying non-linear tools to ill-structured or wicked problems such as pervasive corruption. Tools should be evaluated in relation to their "utility" not their "novelty," as they exist for the benefit of the citizens not the other way round (Rigby 1993: 15). Yet, despite Levinson's (2003) interesting study justifying the principle of collective sanctions, he seemed constrained by the limitations of linearity. Levinson (ibid. 6) felt obliged to speak in the language of a "forward-looking, functional perspective" perhaps in order to avoid perceptions of being backward looking and therefore adopting some form of a non-linear approach.

This however, need not be necessary in general, but particularly when dealing with pervasive corruption in societies where the idea of the collective is not strange to their culture and ethical values. In many of these so-

cieties, members can readily accept the notion of collective responsibility to an act committed by an individual within the group. Levinson (2003: 5) suggests a strategy of "delegated deterrence" as an alternative conception by which the "responsibility for deterring individual wrongdoers is effectively delegated by an external sanctioner to a group that is well-situated to implement an efficient regulatory regimen". This is a form of an "informal monitoring" mechanism or tool, delegating the monitoring of individual members to the group. Internal informal monitoring is believed to be much more effective than formal monitoring by an external agent (Heckathorn 1988: 538), as it becomes a form of self-policing.

Sanctions, Deterrence and Interdependency

However, collective sanctions and delegated deterrence are not the same, even if overlapping and their differences remain quite subtle. Collective sanctions create a condition designated by Lewin as "interdependence of fate," where a heterogeneous group comes to form a psychological construct, not because of any particular similarities among its members, but due to a feeling of a common fate, or due to a strong sense that the fate of each member as well as that of the group is interdependent. The stronger the interdependence of fate, the more an individual would be expected to contribute to the group's welfare. Delegated deterrence, in turn, strengthens this relation by creating "task interdependence" or common goals and objectives among a group of possibly diverse members (Smith 2001: 2–3)

Both tools link the group members' task and fate in such a way that if the group as a whole fails to perform the task of monitoring and policing corruption among itself, all members are punishable.

> "[N]ot because they are deemed collectively responsible for wrongdoing but simply because they are in an advantageous position to identify, monitor, and control responsible individuals – and can be motivated by the threat of sanctions to do so" (Levinson 2003: 4). If and when such a mechanism does in fact produce a new equilibrium of norm compliance, the external agent can eventually establish significant influence over group behavior as both formal and informal regimes of control buttress each other" (Heckathorn 1988: 538–539).

It is possible however, that members of the entire group may choose to 'rebel' and decide that all of them would take bribes. Since they are all culprits, the assumption is that no one will have an incentive to bear the risk or responsibility of exposing the activity. This situation can, however, be turned into an opportunity. For one thing, if all engage in taking bribes, such a group

activity would become more visible and discernable to 'integrity' agencies as well as their network of informants, thus reducing the costs and demands of monitoring. In addition, it should be made clear that collective culpability and/or connivance would lead to ratcheting punishment up not down, given that as individuals they have failed to perform their collective task. There is no room here for pointing the finger of blame toward somebody else. Reporting a person who takes bribes becomes simply an act of self-preservation as well as self-defense given that such a person who chooses to commit this act has at the same time chosen to jeopardize the welfare of those working with him. In this case, he has already committed a threatening and detrimental act to all others, the entire group, or the colleagues in the bureau. He has broken the code of interdependency. Thus, when one or more members of the group reports the corrupt activities of a coworker to a supervisory agency, this individual is not to be perceived necessarily as a 'whistleblower' in the strict sense of the word.[7] Knowing this is important in minimizing psychological hindrances that may be associated with possible feelings of having betrayed a coworker.

The application of the tool of amnesty may also be practical in this framework. Any individual or member of this group who exposes corruption would become automatically immune from any kind of responsibility or liability even if at one point of time, he had engaged in this very same wrongdoing. 'Honor among thieves,' or the minimal level of trust that must exist among them in order to continue to function effectively as a group or as a network, is to be undermined by creating a context or a permanent environment of distrust, anxiety and uncertainty– a sort of a pervasive prisoner's dilemma. This would set path dependency under constant stress, as past collaborative behavior need not ensure the same in the future. Each member of the group will constantly recognize that at any time in the future, one or more individuals may very well decide to defect or jump ship in order to save oneself, wipe the slate clean, or for any number of reasons, personal or otherwise. In other words, at this preliminary stage of fighting corruption what is needed is not mere "integrity" but some form of a "negative notion of ethics" which determines the type of behavior to be changed An integrity system or the contrasting positive notion of ethics can only develop after this "negative" foundation had already been laid (Hyyryläinen 2010: 50). Integrity then becomes the norm to be 'frozen.'

Distrust of this kind also serves to unfreeze the problem as it destabilizes the 'rules of the game,' jolts individuals out of "moral lethargy" by bringing them around to the idea that one can still be guilty for shirking responsibility

7 On the risks of whistleblowing see Dye (2007: 318).

or doing nothing when one should have (Houston 2002: 1, 5; Räikkä 1997), and subverts corruption by turning it against itself. In fact, the study on collective reputations conducted by Tirole (1996) made the insightful point that in order for an organization or firm to undergo the very difficult process of trying to restore a compromised reputation, due, for instance, to lax management and/or poor workers' performance, its only choice is to mass fire its workers if it could afford the cost, even without evidence. This presumably implied firing honest workers as well. For if the organization or firm were to rely on evidence to conduct firings and to renew its labor force, this structure, as the study concluded, would never be able to restore its reputation even long after negligent management had been replaced (Tirole 1996: 17). This outcome may be in stark contrast to the Kantian maxim that "only the guilty should be punished" (Corlett 1992: 209; Altman 2007). However, rehiring the honest workers, in case they are identifiable, remains an option, and is not to be precluded.

Collective responsibility and sanctions by the same token, may contribute to producing the opposite effect of increasing broader social cohesion and responsibility and consequently, social trust. Social trust encourages the building of "reputations" as important sources of "social information," "identifiability," and "control" (Kollock 1998: 199), possibly instigating a snowball as well as a ripple effect that would help restore a measure of societal integrity and equilibrium. Collective sanctioning, to the extent that it can help strengthen the notion of collective responsibility as well as social structures, and encourages reputation building, becomes an important tool and mechanism in an environment where the costs of monitoring individual moral agency may be prohibitive. By restraining the 'having to be' mind-set, it may contribute to unfreezing the corrupt identity and its cumulative manifestations.

Some Practical Implications

Bureaucratic organization remains necessary even if it suffers from a reputational crisis or loss of public trust, due to a discrepancy between "norms" and "practices" (Peters 2001: 165). The question then becomes how to reform it by subverting its corrupt institutional elements – i.e. how to subvert the institution of corruption that has overtaken bureaucracy. State capture where public officials create a 'non-state' private market for the provision of normally public goods (e.g. the security of property and contract rights) as well as rent-seeking opportunities (Hellman et al 2000: 4) may be one

way to subvert the bureaucracy, but hardly its corrupt practices. Attempts at going around inefficient state institutions, especially in countries which suffer from poor state capacity, can lead to further "atrophy" of official organs (Jenkins 2007: 176).

It is important to note that reforming that which had functioned relatively well in its proper environment, but fell short when the context changed, is different from reforming that which had not functioned well in the first place (an element of path dependency). It is important also to emphasize the pervasive corrupting influences associated with rolling back the state, particularly in less developed countries. For while earlier sources of bureaucratic corruption may have been largely endogenous, state capture reflects the interplay of endogenous as well as exogenous sources of the same. This is perhaps a main reason way the global scene has come to exhibit a perhaps unprecedented explosion in manifestations of this phenomenon at all levels. Ongoing attacks on and criticisms of bureaucracy in fact have less to do with its proclaimed inefficiencies and more with ideology – the ideas and interests of dominating forces (e.g. neo-liberalism), as much of the so called reforms adopted by these countries are undertaken in response to exogenous rather than endogenous pressures (Peters 2001: 3).

Following from the above reasoning some broad heuristic observations may provide hints for further consideration even without delving into the details of bureaucratic reforms. A bureaucracy, presumably, is a setting where a public servant would have a permanent job, for life so to speak, among other privileges. Changing a parameter into a variable and then measuring the effect of such a change may be of relevance. A new bureaucratic rule may be something like this: as a civil servant you have a permanent job except if you take a bribe. Then you will be fired and subjected to other forms of punitive actions, while your immediate coworkers as well as superior(s) will be collectively fired for failing their collective responsibility, together with say, no severance pay. Of course it must also be handy knowledge to all civil servants who to contact (e.g. autonomous or semi-autonomous investigative organization), and which phone number(s) to dial in order to report an incident should immediate collective controls fail to rectify a situation. In addition to fighting bribery, this may also be a means to cheaply cut down the size of a bloated bureaucracy.

In his article Moran (2007: 19) suggests that "organizations and institutions can only be as ethical as their employees and members" and that time was opportune for innovating in the "realm of ethics training". This means that"[m]oral blame and punishment must ultimately go to the people who

have deliberately set the viruses loose or failed to control them or willingly submitted to them" (ibid). In other words, the target of punitive action should be the concrete "flesh and blood", not the abstract structure as such, even if the latter may need some measure of 'reengineering'. Otherwise, it remains an ethical mistake as well as misdirected energy to consider an organization, in this case, bureaucracy, as a moral agent per se, and the sheer focus of blame, for one "cannot reason with the organization nor … shame it" (Kerlin 1997: 1437). Thus, if there, in fact, is corruption in bureaucracy, this is no reason to demolish or undermine the entire institution as it does serve the important purpose of allowing better possibilities for applying mechanisms of collective sanctions and modified vendetta.

One can cite an empirical case observed by the author, related to a European international superstore chain that established its branches in a Middle Eastern country where giving tips for any service rendered is a matter of course. The store management wanted to eliminate this type of behavior, coming from both sides, the customer and, the service provider who typically makes the customer aware that he expects a tip even for just doing his job (a subtle form of extortion). The store hung posters all over the store which stated something like: "Please do not give me a tip, I do not want to lose my job." It was possible to observe an actual and even immediate change in behavior where tip giving actually ceased. This was a much more successful case as opposed to others where posters stated for example, that tips are not allowed, or that "we are here to serve you," among other stylistic variations. In the latter cases, the client was never sure whether he should really not pay anything, and had to continue to speculate as to how this might impact on the quality of the service provided. Tips or bribes consequently continued to be paid as usual.

In the superstore case and through a better choice of words, power relations were significantly altered. The customer acted as if he was doing the service-provider a favor by not giving any tips since that would cause him to lose his job. The service provider was aware that the customer thinks this way and acted accordingly. Of course, both must know that in case a tip is asked for or paid, the employee will, in fact, lose his job. This is a constraint on management credibility, to which the tool collective punishment may be added (this tool was not applied by the chain). According to the principle of collective responsibility, if someone does take a tip, his sectional or departmental coworkers must make sure to report the incident, in case they fail initially to restrain the wrongdoer, otherwise they too would lose their jobs. In any case, the contextual change created a situational "dilemma" by which the previous order of individual 'rationality' associated with maximizing gain

through taking tips is transformed into being an act of both individual and collective 'irrationality.' Everyone becomes worse off if they choose to persist in their behavior (Kollock 1998: 183). All become guilty by virtue of not applying the corrective tool of modified vendetta. Admittedly, the superstore chain was not a bureaucratic structure, and whether this outcome can be universalized remains an empirical question. Yet its experience may still offer helpful insights – through a simple device, power relations were relatively altered, a situation was un-frozen, and a path dependent behavior broken.

Conclusions

Bribery, as a representation of structural, pervasive and endemic corruption, is wicked both ethically and as a problem seeking a re-solution. The global explosion in this phenomenon, which underlies much of all other forms of wrongdoing, has rendered it a form of "routine" cultural practice generating a state of "banality of wrongdoing". A constructed environment, where cultural 'blinders' as well as "blindness" to ethical alternatives is set, in order to prohibit or constrain any possible questioning of the morality of 'cultural practices' of the kind (Moody-Adams 1994: 298, 294). The fact that corruption is contagious and capable of producing an intricate network of interests, spanning all class distinctions and economic variations, 'freezing' them into a self-consolidating complex environmental and cultural setting, makes any attempt to reverse this pattern risky and extremely complicated. Particularly so, when corrupt political, administrative and governmental systems are major causes as well as effects of such a wicked outcome.

Both formal and informal forces and structures are at play as the entire society becomes enmeshed in the vicious circle of corruption. State capture not only reflects high level corruption up the hierarchical echelons, but also the state as a producer of corruption, or the corruptor state, in response to demands of transnational capital flows, with serious economic and political implications. Administrative corruption in turn constitutes the lower level mirror image with additional negative social implications. The connective hierarchy of corruption which represents the wickedness of the problem goes something like the following: global capital flow demands—> administrative and organizational corruption—> domestic state capture—> corrupt identity—> corrupt society—> insane society. Governance institutionalizes all those aspects of ethical decay into a 'frozen' framework — a norm.

To attempt to break the vicious circle of corruption, the very concept of governance need be recognized, if not as part of the problem, then at least

not the one best representation of it. The focus in this chapter on the administrative manifestations of the dilemma is made for the purposes of analytical parsimony, despite the acknowledged shortcomings of such a method in dealing with a mess of this nature. I have tried, therefore, to develop a measure of form or structure to the problem by suggesting a possible comparison of policies adopted by many regimes to depoliticize their societies and to control political action, and refocus such policies instead on de-corrupting or 'unfreezing' strategies that help break path-dependencies. In many ways, corruption is similar to politics or to a political situation. A comparison with politics, with its different degrees of failures and successes, may allow for learning from actual experience. The characteristic resilience and complexity of political gaming between protagonist and antagonist groups is relevant to the equivalent characteristics of corruption. Like politics, it is an expression of power and interests, taken to the extreme, unconstrained by moral, ethical, or legal considerations. It is also a form of base violence, deprived of any of the virtues of war as the continuation of politics by other means – to paraphrase Carl von Clausewitz. An institutionally corrupt society, in other words, is a society at war with itself or against itself – a subverted and therefore insane society.

Like a political process, corruption is a resilient phenomenon that at best may be resolved, not solved. Thus, I have attempted not to lose sight of a main constraint of dealing with a wicked or ill-structured problem, and that is not to be overly ambitious about what can be accomplished. Attempts at a 'rational' approach to problem solving may not be of much help, as it is very difficult to delineate all strategic options or novel tools and then choose the most appropriate. This is so as not much confidence in the representation of the problem is possible from the outset, nor can the outcomes and consequences of any proposed re-solutions or strategies be initially anticipated. For in a wicked setting any response is very likely to change the nature of the problem (Camillus 2008: 104); the type of resilience capable of making a comeback even if in a different form. The alternative is to simply "experiment" with any number of feasible strategies or re-solutions despite uncertainty about what may in fact transpire (ibid.); a form of action learning, consistent with Kurt Lewin's aphorism "if you want truly to understand something, try to change it".

In choosing tools one need not be constrained by their novelty – i.e. linearity. Experimenting with older or ancient wisdom is not necessarily a vice. As a form of 'experimentation,' I have suggested collective responsibility and collective sanctions/punishment as potentially relevant and effective tools and mechanisms of citizen corruption control. This is particularly

so when efficient formal monitoring is inadequate, for whatever reasons, and needs to be complemented with some form of "mandatory self-policing" (Feinberg 1968: 681). They are relevant because in societies with endemic corruption, a collective phenomenon of the kind necessitates a collective rather than a mere individual case by case approach.

Collective sanction norms provide and highlight the link "between the macro- and micro-social levels and between formal and informal social control." They also contribute to "norm emergence" particularly suited to the diverse contexts of "the agent and the group subject to the agent's sanctions," and can integrate the experiences of these contexts, e.g. politics, war, subversion, and corruption, into some common framework in order to gain additional insight (Heckathorn 1988: 540–541). Such insight can inform action learning. By exacting social responsibility on diverse groups of people, norms of social as well as moral control may support counter-corruption values and behavior by re-constructing affective solidarities as well as inter-subjective communication in pursuit of an ethical "collective purpose" (Levasseur 2004: 147). Otherwise, endemic corruption can lead to very serious implications and consequences – as far as the deserved collective dismantling of the state structure itself.

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Evolution of Corruption and Institutional Development: the Optimal Level of Corruption Reduction

Hamid E. Ali

1. Introduction

States create order out of violence at the early stages in which as evidenced from pro-nation states of Europe dated back to few centuries which quietly resemble African nation states today. History can repeat itself, pre-modern Europe resemble by Sub-Saharan Africa in many facets such as violence, corruption and level of development. Beneath the surface of pre-modern state we postulate violence, wars and corruption[1], while in Post-modern states we witness stability, rule of law and accountability and lesser degree of corruption. Juxtaposing pre-modern and post-modern states, the corruption and human history are intertwined and evolve around human instinct of pursuing the pleasure and self interest that can only be constrained by institutional development and rule of law. Moreover, corruption has been cited as reasons for failure of economic development in some of the countries by impacting investment and economic growth (Mauro, 1995). Corruption arises in both political and bureaucratic offices and can be petty or grand, organized or unorganized (Inegbedion, 2004).

States with developed institutions includes legal, financial and governing institutions usually sets guidelines to define the conduct of public officials at all level to allow the market operate and economic development to take-off. Consolidation of legal institutions precludes economic development. The legal system with few amend, it can curtailed corruption and allows the market to function. Recent financial crisis has revealed the rules can be bended and

1 Corruption is covert and redefined by ethical and moral premises that govern the state, it is a misuse of public office for private gain. It encompasses abuses by government officials such as embezzlement and nepotism, and abuses and bribery linking public and private actors includes extortion, influence peddling, and fraud (Inegbedion, 2004).

loopholes can be exploited to pursue questionable in economic activities and bonze schemes in incomplete markets with devastating economic and social consequences. However, in less developed countries with weaker institutions, the officials use discretionary rules to avert intend of the laws to build economics and political empires without accountability and transparency. Therefore, the level of economic development is a reasonable proxy for institutional development. Higher GDP growth implies well developed institutions and better internal controls and lesser corruption practices of bribery and stealing states assets. In case of less developed countries, lower GDP and weaker institutions internal controls and corruption practices were masqueraded as compensations for low wages in the government sectors. However, we recognize that corruption levels are uniformed across the countries and more prevalent in some countries than others.

In the modern world corruption associated more with legal formality, especially constitutional principles where it is viewed as an act done with intent to give some advantage inconsistent with official duty and the rights of others and it subvert the governing process and undermine the economic development[2]. Nearly 40 percent of Africa's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is lost annually in corruption related practices (Lumumba, 2010).

In this paper we discuss first, to what extent the corruption as evolutionary phenomena is driven by institutional development in the context of the modern state[3]. Second, what is optimal level of corruption reduction? We will reconstruct the history of institutional development using GDP as a proxy measure of institutional and economic development in the context of market economy. The evolution of corruption is focusing on cross-sectional account of GDP as determinant of corruption level. Using perceived corruption index and group countries as pre-modern, and modern and post-modern corruption countries and reconstruct dense series of countries for period 1998-2009. As the GDP expand, the society leaps from one rudimentary stage of corruption to the next stage where the corruption tends to be covert with higher rewards and then leveled-off as GDP growth accelerated. In other word, the evolution of the corruption has inverted U-shape using world historical experience and much of the predictive or explanatory power rests with countries level of GDP. If our reasoning is correct, we should expect expanding GDP growth, the lesser the perceived corruption index. For the second part of the question reduction of corruption is very costly at the pre-modern and modern corruption stages than post-modern corruption.

2 See Black's Law Dictionary, 6th Edition, (1990).
3 The state is considered as entity greater than government.

There is no time in history that corruption reduced to a zero level. Society must accept some level of corruption with minimum societal marginal costs.

The paper is organized as follow: Section 2 presents background on power of state and corruption; section 3, discuss the evolution of corruption. Section 4 presents movement from pre-modern to Post-modern corruption. Section 5 presents theoretical specifications of optimal level of corruption reduction. Section 6 discusses the public policy implications. Section 7 is conclusion.

2. Power of State and Corruption

Weber (1964) argued that states are compulsory associations claiming control over territories and the people within them. Alfred Stepan (1978) describes Weberian perspectives the state must be considered as more than government. It is the continuous administrative, legal, bureaucratic and coercive systems that attempt not only structure the relationships between civil societies but also to structure relationship between civil societies as well. Hintz (1975) thought of state as organizations controlling territories, stand at the intersection between domestic sociopolitical orders and the transnational relation within which they must maneuver for survival and advantage in relation to other states. Hintz gave broader latitude to the state power than Weber, but both share the notion that state as sphere of highest government authority and how that authority will be exercise will determine the level and stage of corruption.

The modern notion of the state can be traced back to Machiavelli's treatment: a sovereign political entity, supreme in its territory and over its people, organized to enhance its power and to protect against threats posed by other states. To keep state as a whole he emphasis the rulers force, craft and immorality. In Machiavelli's type of state, corruption is embodied with the coercive power of the state and those who have the access to corridors of power can create the conditions favorable to corruption.

Corruption is more prevalent in less developed economies than developed ones. The state apparatus need resources to expand and so does the citizens need for the services, to accommodate the competing needs, corruption is one of venue to avert possible violent confrontation between the state and its objects. The absence of functioning government systems is due to nepotism and tribalism and the absence of rule of law. In some instances public employees go unpaid for months (Eker, 1981). Government has monopoly of the economy and contract wards; together with the

accelerated pace of economic development, provides a fertile ground for corruption (Eker, 1981).

Also the government was viewed as arena where competing groups or allied with one another to make public policy decision or benefit allocation. The states matter not only because of goal-oriented activities but because their organizational configurations, a long with overall patterns of activity, affect political culture and encourage some forms of group formation and make possible raising certain political issues but not others Tocqueville (2000). Since corruption is one of the tools that are used by groups to exploit the fragmentations of the governing institutions to lured material or psychological gains at expense of the society in general. A strong state has greater coercive powers and collective of officials may be able to formulate and implement policies Shefter (1994). Corruption is deemed to occur when state institutions are weaker and when the state officials collude with other parties to promote their own benefit. Understanding the strength of the state -weak or strong- can determine the level of corruption, the weaker the state the more powerful the kleptocrate or *rule by thieves* like Democratic Republic of Congo under during ousted president Maputo and Central Africa under Bocaso.

3. Evolution of Corruption

Though evolution of corruption can pursue a number of different evolutionary tracks or trajectories that go in quite different directions and that movement down one track may block movement down another. There is uncertainty about which track would prove the best, however the institutional processes and social forces could validate and strengthen one trajectory over other. Therefore the corruption is determined by culture, level of social and economic development. As shown in figure 1 as per capita income increases the corruption level is decreasing for cross-sectional country from 1998-2008.

Corruption determines by the different set of stages: pre-modern corruption, Modern corruption, and post-modern corruption that will be discussed in details. The movements from one stage to another stage are intriguing but the coercive power of the state in conjuncture with the economic development and evolution of the institutions.

Figure 1: Inverse Corruption index and GDP per capita (in dollars)






Figure 2: Corruption index and level of Income



3.1 Pre-modern Corruption

First stage of corruption is 'pre-modern corruption' where the lack of the institutions and cycle of violence can germane the corruption activities, from hoarding the vital commodities to engagement in smuggling and extortion. The society in the process of state-making, violence, wars and political instability is the reality. The state authority is decimated and corruption practices and favors were germane in every quarter of the society, preoccupied with conspiracy, secrecy, and favors. The object of the states was citizens without entitlements for accountable government. The pre-modern corruption is undermining the legitimacy of existing social institutions and more prevalent in fail states than in weaker states. The longer the conflict persists, the more difficult controlling corruption.

Figure 3: Average Corruption Index (1998-2007)






Figure 4: Corruption Index and GDP (in billion of dollar)

As figure 4 shows as GDP rises also does the corruption grow, Sudan, Kenya and Chad resemble similar patterns. Moreover, pre-modern corruption will deepen when society engaged in warfare, because wars create a subjective environment, where every act is justifiable. The absence of security and oversights breed the incentive for corruption and undermine economic development.

In addition, the informal sector steps up to fill the gap of lack of trust on current governing institutions, where most of transactions are in cash. The informal sector continue to evade the regulation, and free riding the

formal private enterprise which burden by taxations and regulations. For example, what is defined as “money laundering” in developed economies, is that luxury definition not applicable to pre-modern corruption practices since the banking institutions developing economies were weak, so underdevelopment and corruption go hand-in-hand.

3.2 Modern Corruption

The Modern Corruption associates with weak and semi-strong state (upper middle income countries). The actors of modern corruption are inspired and control by foreign or local entities; it focus on strategic assets such as oil field and diamond mines, they have tendency to bribe and corrupt the public officials. For example, in Angola until 1990s the foreign oil companies kept secret their tax and other payments, resulting in disappearance of Angolan state oil revenues. Complicity with state corrupt officials the oil revenues channeled into a hidden funds. Similar stories had happened in Nigeria and Algeria as well. For example during 1990s, billions dollars of diamonds were imported to into Belgium through Liberia by big companies colluding in the laundering of stolen diamonds.




Figure 5: Upper middle Income Countries Corruption Index and GDP (in billion dollars)

Jordan and South Korea are showing patterns of declining of corruption as GDP rises. Mexico and Malaysia are showing cyclical patterns but declining level of corruption.

In modern corruption; there is intimate links between the family networks that hold critical margins of power and business interest where boundaries are not well defined. However, during the Cold War this type of corruption is rewarded by donors and international institutions for strategic and pure economic reason. Foreign asset inflow into country end up in Swiss bank accounts as happen in Congo, under Moboto where he build hundred of palaces in across Europe and the U.S. and shore up his bank account with billions of dollars.

Recent selling's of the state-own enterprise create political and economic oligarch that aiming at liquidating state assets for the benefit of few under the umbrella of privatization. The long term implication at this stage of corruption if it ignored is not only weakening the state but it will plant the seeds for violence and social disorder as level of inequality and polarizations intensify.

3.3 Post-modern Corruption

The third stage of corruption is post-modern corruption which is dominant paradigm in current policy debate. This stage of corruption is resulting from conflict of interest, fraud, lack of transparency and the revolving doors between business and government. Countries that experience the post-modern corruption have high level of economic wellbeing and fragmented forms of government. Free and open media help expose levels of corruption and abuses.

Figure 6 shows OECD countries are relatively less corrupt, however, after 2007 with scandals in the financial industries and the corruption index falls.




Figure 6: Corruption Index and OECD Countries (GDP in billion of dollars)

Examples of post-modern corruption are recent financial meltdown, corporate scandals like Enron, WorldCom and corruption of arms trade which emits wave of concerns to global corporate sector and severely mutate the public trust in the business integrity. The post-modern corruption is weakening by the technology that promote accurate flow of information- the media and the public accountability for corporate and individuals is visible.

The actors in post-modern corruption are the political elites and governing clique who control the wealth and critical margin of power. Party's bribes through political contribution and corporate world control the political process and the outcomes. Therefore, the post-modern corruption subverts the rule of law and distorting policy outcomes and weakening the institutions.

4. Movement from Pre-modern to Post-modern Corruption

In this article I treated the post-modern corruption as ideal level of corruption, that society might tolerate as long as not subverting the rule of law and the system of government. The evolutionary movement from pre-modern corruption to modern corruption is materialized by breaking the level of violence and promotes the values that nurtures in the society prior to the war.

In warring societies, measures to build trust or social capital are essential for the private sector to leap to modern corruption stage. Restoring trust can simultaneously break the level of violence and corruption. There is immense difficulty in restoring the social trust but if the international community succeeds in that endeavor, it will legitimize the state and promote from within types of regime system that can have dividend in the future.

As dividend of peace realized the institutions will grow and strengthen the social fabrics. The root causes of per-modern corruption can be tackled by efforts to nurture economic development that empower the social and political capital through time without imposing structures from outside. Outside imposed structures create new opportunities empowering the political oligarch and further eroded the social and economic wellbeing of ordinary citizens.

The far-reaching political reform failed to produce tangible results in pre-modern corruption societies. For example, the recent elections in Sub-Saharan African countries-including Sudan, Cameron, Chad, Gabon, and republic of Cong have not produce accountable, transparent government, it produce only political oligarchy. In pre-modern corruption societies the issue of clinetalism, vote buying, weak institutions, and corrupt officials make it a cumbersome for democratic values and private enterprise to strive and nurtured. The effort of the economic reform should be vested in basic education and health. The norms of the informal sector should be basis to allow the system to develop not to suppress and impose super structures or introduce changes in societies that might resisted.

5. Theoretical Specification Optimum Corruption Reduction Levels

The reduction of corruption is depending on the stages of corruption. For example, the marginal reduction of pre-modern corruption is social costly compared with modern or post-modern corruption levels. The pre-modern corruption is inefficient, however it generate economic activities with given level of economic development. Any aggressive attempts to fight corruption will slow-down economic activities and production levels. As economic developed proceed, the country has enough resources to adopt better control measures such as accountability and rule of law to reduce the corruption levels. The country can leap from Pre-modern to Post-modern corruption levels. As shown in figure 8. Level of corruption reduction $C_{R;.}$ And CC_R is cost of corruption reduction (society benefit and of corruption reduction.




Figure 7: Optimal Corruption Reduction levels

6. Policy Implications

Understanding the evolutionary process of the corruption is important for any future regulatory measures adopt by the international communities. Uniform standard to root out post-modern corruption is different from the pre-modern corruption. In the post modern society for example the regulatory requirements of transparency in business transaction or political parties' contributions could reduce the corruption level. However those measures are impractical and add very marginal value to root out pre-modern corruption.

Anti-corruption laws are enacted in West Africa and more anti-corruption bodies were created, they were ineffective in curbing corruption. For example Nigeria's Anti-Corruption Commission failed to bring a single case against senior government official since it found 2000. In Sierra Leone, a crack down on police extorting bribes from drivers at check-points let to arrest just 41 police officers in 2001, that number should be arrest per minutes if there is a serious effort to curb corruption.

These ineffective institutions do not fit to address modern corruption. The modern corruption can be fought by measures that encourage pluralism and

empower the civic society. The political participation should flourish at expense of political control exerted by political oligarch. Economic aid should not be tied to government commitment to fight corruption; it should be tied to governments' improvement on basic education, health and civic society. The current reforms initiated by the international community are more relevant to post-modern society and doom to failure in modern corruption societies.

Countries that enter or leap to post-modern corruption stage should be concerns about collusion between corporate, auditors, and bankers to manipulate the accounting process for personal gains. However in modern corruption stage it is less concerns the idea of collusion between corporate and their regulator to gain any advantages over the share holders. Because the informal sector renders those measures ineffective. Transparency and disclosure are important to deter post-modern corruption but not modern corruption because the rules are made to be violated. The family network that embodied in the political and business interest can hardly distinguish any rule that effectively constrain the state institutions and limit the abuse of power.

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Islam and Politics

The Decline and Rise of Islamism in Turkey: Notes on the Course of Islamist Political Theology from Post-Caliphate Era to Citizenship Politics

Yasin Aktay

What is the current position of Islamism which has a prominent place in Turkish political and intellectual history? It is obvious that Islamism[1] in Turkey is in a noteworthy transformation, but does this show that Islamism has transformed as a result of this or that process or these and those actors or that it has transformed into something else? Granted that the law of conservation of energy to some extent works for social and political fields as well we should accept that the disappearance of a political energy influenced an era to a great extent in its accustomed form doesn't mean that it has perished but at best it has transformed. Islamism with its discourses in seventies, eighties and nineties seems to be an anachronic policy which chased impossible contingencies. On the other hand, it is frequently worded that those who acts or assumed to act on behalf of Islamism are far from the capability of presenting a project in the cause of Islamism in their political practice; that they are in a more liberal tendency; and politically they are surrendered to the contexture of parliamentary democracy. In that sense, Islamism is followed through the practices and discourses of shrinking groups which stiffen in line with the shrinking course rather than the political practices of bigger masses. Of course, the presence of these practices and discourses are both seen as the only representative of the real Islamism and at the same time undertakes an anachronic tag on behalf of Islamism. However, these samples are the movements which are vested with very small portion of the conditions that the political requires. In fact, since an anachronic Islamist understanding is deprived of condition of contextuality, it promptly

1 The term Islamism in itself contains the level or meaning of the political, so that I see it needless to use the terms as "political Islamism" or "political Islam" in this article. Islam by its very definition and by its appropriation by the Muslims already contains a political level.

loses its political quality. On the other hand, it can be focused on that at the very moment when the Islamic thought attained this contextuality it became unrecognizable with its old identification instruments (stereotypical clichés).

In this article I will focus on the idea claiming that Islamism is transformed rather than it has died down and in a more appropriate sense of word it corresponds to a higher politicization. The idea that radicalism which embroiled with Islamism in the post Caliphate conditions one side of which corresponds to a diasporic spirit while the other side corresponds to a cynic anti-politics is an element fending it off from the political will be discussed. Therefore, both a more comprehensive definition should be made political and within this frame, the nature of state and politics relation which has recently tended to transform should be evaluated. At the end of this evaluation it is observed that the transformation of Islamism is only possible relatively to opening of the channels for participative politics and thanks to its mastery of making a good use of these channels it follows a progress with main lines as such: The first term Islamist discourse founded on a trauma as a result of abolishment of Caliphate which was seen as the pre-requisite of Islamist politics, acknowledged the permanence of this situation and headed to a kind of citizenship policy, thereby, to discover the opportunity that the new term hold. The citizenship policy presumes a contract which is not particularly for Muslims in its ideal form but shaped during the negotiations with others. In order to observe the development of Islamic political theology in line with the course of this process which is dialogical in it nature we should start from illustrating the post-Caliphate conditions.

Genealogy of Islamism: Post Caliphate Conditions

The great defeat of Islamic world complemented not only with general westernization wave but also with the colonial experience in many of its regions and particularly the abolishment of the Caliphate at home constitutes the founder factor of self-consciousness of Turkish Islamism. This factor has become so determinative that any chronicle and discourse analysis cannot set off without taking its influence into consideration.

The Ottoman Empire perhaps was never a political corps that all Muslims identified with. Ottoman Caliphate never became a political corpse uniting all Muslims indisputably due to the indistinct discontent of a part of Arab community which never put up with the transference of the Caliphate to the Ottomans or the impact of some regional policies of Ottoman Empire on the regional power balances, and particularly the impact of Europe beginning

with the 19th century. Undoubtedly, a zone of influence extending to India sub-continent was resurrected under modern circumstances with Sultan Abdulhamit's utilization of Caliphate as a ground of a Pan-Islamist international power. This influence zone constitutes the first renewed genesis of Islam in modern conditions. Islamism is the ideology of an imperial order spreading to three continents but it is not exclusively the ideology of the respective empire, it is also a horizon primarily supported by Islam's discourse of ummah.

We can say that in the age of nationalism when religion was defined as the constitutive element of a nation another great discourse of Islamic ummah experienced another great break. However it should be noted that simultaneously with this break, the international pan-Islamism was sparkled. In short, either due to the developments in favor of the nationalisms or the conscious of ummah or the weakness in representation, Ottoman Empire might have not portrayed an indisputably united political body. However, the more important thing in unfolding the genealogy of Turkish Islamism was the perceptions of Muslims in Turkey regarding this supranational community. In the Islamic discourse of Turkey Ottoman Empire was seen as the representative of all Muslims in the world, because although Caliphate conjecturally subjected to certain political fluctuations since the era of early Caliphates it represented the political unity of Islamic ummah as a principle. This unity was not a simple theory to be easily abolished and replaced by something else. It was a constitutive principle making a sense of life and encoding it in a unique way due to the relations between Islam and politics. Simply, many rituals seeming to be Islamic, the command of the Qur'an and even an ethical advice were dependant on the condition of the presence of Caliphate. Caliphate was the expression of the situation enabling the practice of a significant part of the Islamic law and thus, decaliphatization brought about a situation making the respective practice impossible. Thus abolishment of Caliphate, that is, the process of "decaliphatization" meant the fading of all constitutive elements, actors and subjects of this meaning order and Islamic law environment from the scene and also disorganization of the Islamic political body. This situation enables the Turkish Islamism to be labeled with a "post-Caliphate" state of Republic era.[2]

This post-Caliphate era is, of course, not a waveless period in which no transformations came about. However, principally what we said here should be noted since they give hints regarding the factors explaining why

2 For an analysis on the conceptualization of Caliphate as a political body of Islam and the post Caliphate state coming about in the minds and lives of Muslims particularly in Turkey after its abolishment, see bkz. Aktay, 1997; 2004.

the Turkish Islamism was an ideology of potency till the great break that it experienced with decaliphatization. Islamism, at the same time, was the official ideology at that time and it has been also an ideology determining not only specifically the Islamist ideologies but also other political movements to a great extent. Islamism has been a hegemonic element over the Turkish nationalists such as Ziya Gökalp and Yusuf Akçura or the movements are considered to be conservative or Ottomanist. Furthermore, Islamism was a belief that most of the bureaucratic elites took for granted, because neither even extremely nationalist -including Ziya Gökalp- nor pro-Western intellectuals would think of a Turkish state without Caliphate. What is more, it should not be forgotten that the process known as decaliphatization was realized by transferring it to the legal personality of the Assembly instead of a total abolishment. All of the emphasis put on the political dimension of the Caliphate in the Turkey Grand National Assembly (TGNA) was not regarding the unnecessity or invalidity of the Caliphate but it was an endeavor to assure that continuance of Caliphate was needed as updated it in accordance with the conditions of the time. Although these discussions and the abolishment resolution in its actual form resulted in actual abolishment or invalidation and deactivation of Caliphate, it was not totally meaningless[3].

Actually this process, particularly for Turkish Islamism, undoubtedly had a determinative impact on political presence of Muslims in the whole Islamic World. As mentioned above the “decaliphatization” corresponds to a state of political disembodiment. In India, the endeavors trying to restore the Caliphate continued till the establishment of Pakistan and even aftermath, because a decaliphated Muslim could not adopt presence so easily. Even the establishment of Pakistan state with the encouragements of British was actually legitimized with the attraction of political vacuum came out as a result of the decaliphatization. Otherwise, the emergence of the idea of Pakistan state just after the independence of India under the wise leadership policies of Gandhi and separation of Muslims from such a big entity didn’t have any benefit for Islamists in long run. The viewpoint that could produce strategies in accordance with such a benefit could only be the politics of a global Caliphate. Thus, some of the ulema (religious scholars) of India, with the same consideration insisted that although the idea of Pakistan state was tempting it would not be so much beneficial. Although this idea pioneered by Mevlana Ebu’l Kelam Ahmad Azad remained weak it maintained the Muslim mass in

3 A rich and colorful literature came out on the Caliphate imaginations resurrected with the pan-Islamist policies of Abdülhamit II beginning from that period to the republican era. This literature as collected in the 5 volume collection edited by İsmail Kara between the years 2003-2006. See Kara, 2003-2006.

India whose number reaches approximately to two hundred millions today to favor the respective cause and considerations.

The main aim here is not to give a detailed or even a superficial summarize of the impact of decaliphatization on the Islamic World, but in terms of presenting the genealogy of the point that the Islamist politics reached I want to attract attentions to the abolishment of Caliphate as a turning point for Muslims in 14 centuries of Islamic history. However, although decaliphatization initiated a new era which had never been experienced in the history of Islam, the influence of that era has not remained the same. Decaliphatization has particularly become a real break point for Turkish Islamism and the westernization and/or de-Islamization of the political structure in Turkey accompanied this process. The inevitable consequence of this process was not only the de-Islamization of the ruling elite but also those of the social and economic elites. The harsh laicization policies of the single party were based on a program of creating elites which would never take Islam as reference and making them dominate the society. In this context, while Islamism was an ideology of potency in the era of decaliphatizaiton it became the ideology of the oppressed segments of the society. The de-Islamization which was succeeded in urban places, became an unsustainable policy due to the population waves hit the cities with the increasing urbanization simultaneously with the transition to the multiparty system in 1950s. In the single party era, the rural masses which never unified with the state due to the single party's policies embarking the economic burden of the state on their back nourished the greatest opposition against the state administration led by Republican People Party (CHP) whose ideology was de-Islamization. In a sense, the way for Islamism, a social dynamism of the new migration waves counter balancing the urban populations surrendered as the targets of the ideological apparatuses of the state in the single party era, to reemerge as the discourse of the public opposition was paved.

However, although it was fed by the migration waves, reducing Islamism in the Republican era to an ideology originated from the country will also be wrong. Contrarily, there is an articulation whose references go back to the potency discourses before the republican era or the founding trauma that came about with the process of decaliphatization and whose social grassroots is constituted by the sociology of migration.

The articulation hasn't finished yet. Decaliphatization created the conditions of a real disengagement, decomposition and diaspora to a significant extent in the history of Islamic World. This situation almost stopped the operation of Islamic law and made the expression of any Islamic presence

in the world through the traditional codes of Islam imposible, because an Islamic codification suitable for this situation that had not been even imagined beforehand was not foreseen. What is more, the lack of ulema accompanied the decaliphatization process. The preference of Muslim masses deprived of both intellectual and political leaders to survive under the new circumstances of the world with a victimized and abeyant feeling was not a strategic choice but naturally developed under these conditions. For the Islamist of that era feeling himself "destitute in his motherland and pariah at his homeland" this situation was a total interregnum. One dimension of the interregnum is idleness. This is a term when there is not any activity and there is a total disengagement in traditional social and political practices. Once this disengagement occurred it is quite sophisticated to engage the previous era to the following era. In an environment where all kinds of socialization grounds have decomposed the burden falls on the shoulders of individual memory or that based on the communication of small groups but the aforementioned memory can never restore that disengagement properly. The ontological difference between the two terms that interregnum divide is greater than thought. Neither the mentality and sorrow nor the horizon of two communities between which there is a gap are the same or similar.

The Influence of Translations and the Renewal of the Memory

On the other hand, as nobody is plenipotentiary to politics at the state of interregnum which validated the state of idleness, nobody has an authentic reference to judge politics either. Everybody considers the situation as a temporary process, because a permanent definition and codification of this situation is not possible. Although the definitions such as dar-al-harp (world of chaos) and dar-al-islam (world of Islam) have been occasionally utilized in accordance with the conditions these definitions do not suffice neither to explain nor to codify nor to encompass the realities experienced.

By the end of 60s the Islamic political thought studies accomplished in Islamic countries such as Egypt, Syria and Pakistan are seminal in terms of describing the situation and developing struggle programs suitable for this situation. In this context, Ebu'l ala al-Mawdudi, through his India-Pakistan experience, formulated the idea of Islamic state that fit into the nation state model to a great extent in such a way that would make sense in classical Islamic law. In Egypt Muhammed Qutb, a member of Muslim Brotherhood, reestablished a tag that was used for the pre-Islamic conditions in depicting the modern world under the title *Jahiliyya (Ignorance) of the Twentieth*

Century. This tag would identify the modernity including that in the Islamic community with pre-Islamic era. This may be a unique innovation in consideration of the post-Caliphate state of chaos in Islamic World. This would express an Islamist imagination that put off the feeling of defeat and positioned in accordance with the conditions of an Islamic Renaissance.

The elder brother of Muhammed Qutb, Sayyid Qutb began to imprint his famous theses which seemed radical but in depth stipulated Islam as a participation to voluntary life and emphasized that the Islamic law has a historical quality but at the same time stipulated to the presence of a group of believers. Qutb reformulating the Islamic theory of belief in modern conditions expressed that stipulating Islamic politics to the condition of establishment of an Islamic state was wrong; contrarily the need for an Islamic practice that will come out of the voluntary participation of a small Islamic group would define the boundaries of Islamic politics and Islamic life. Nevertheless, the actual purpose was to constitute the conditions of reestablishing Islam as a political body, that is, a political actor. However, this political actor under the ascribed conditions would come into existence in the presence of a community regardless of its size believing in it, instead of by taking over a nation state and transforming the community thoroughly. The problem of this community and the ways of solution for these problems would constitute the historical content of the Islamic law which expresses the Islamic politics. Therefore, according to Qutb the Islamic political model is not a closed model whose content could only be predetermined; instead it was an open-ended model which is shaped or varied in accordance with the historical needs, experience and conditions of the community constituting it. The only indispensible element in this political model was the common fate and the sense of devotion that had Islam as its basic reference.

In this Islamist discourse which was expressed and conducted out of Turkey there had been a few significant thematic slides at a time considered to be earlier than that of Turkey. First, the trauma of decaliphatization and feeling of defeat for Islamism was put off in a way and the post-Caliphate conditions were inured as a reality of ummah. Second, the relatively autonomy of Islamism under the colonial conditions was maintained. Of course, the contemporary Islamist discourse has a significant connection with the independence discourses under the colonial rule. Some of these discourses were anti-imperialist or anti-Western but to remind its universal references, the search of this Islamism to formulize itself above the colonial conditions attracts attention. Thus, Islam has avoided from East-West oriented struggle ground and it was expressed as the religion of both the West and the East. The obvious indication of this discourse is the criticisms directed to the de-

generation of Islam, behaviors of Muslims inappropriate to Islam, adoption of a secular administrative understanding by the Islamic World. Apart from the plots of the Western or Eastern enemies of Islam the non-Islamic life-style of those who claim to be Muslims also showed that Islam would be not accepted to be a racial tag as well. In a more obvious phrase, being a Muslim is a merit to be deserved every day and the Muslim community has more mistakes in terms of deserving this merit before accusing the external enemy.

However, the translation of these thinkers into Turkish was not in this way. The post colonial condition that they experienced were casted out to a significant extent. Thus, by a misinterpretation that reduces the political struggle to a kind of "taking over the state" hindered the stimulating contribution of these thinkers to the political theory. However, the translation of the works of these people by 1960s brought about a new articulation to the Turkish Islamism. The Turkish Islamism which was consisted of the references to semi nationalist, semi religious names such as Mehmet Akif (Ersoy), Necip Fazıl and then M. Şevket Eygi and confined to national borders opened to the world and began to put emphasis on the idea of ummah, adopted a more utopic, more challenging and more constructivist than damnification discourse[4].

The translation movements didn't only create a mass of audience among Turkish Islamists and influenced them; but they also created a hegemonic pressure on Islamist movement leaders' understanding of Islamism. Islamist discourse of pre-translation era and that of post-translation era differentiate to a significant extent in terms of the concepts such as nationality, ummah, *tawhid* (unity of god), history, tradition, Quar'an-centrism, nationalism and conservatism. However, the change in Turkish Islamism in these issues with the translation movement doesn't mean that all these ideas are from outside. Contrarily, a significant part of these ideas were the most prominent points which dissent the early Islamism from other views. Therefore, it can be said that Islamic thought experienced a kind of "remembering séances" via translation movements. This "remembrance" thesis has concrete proofs such as discussions between Babanzade Ahmed Naim and Yahya Kemal on cultural Islamic themes, glorification of tomb and folk religiosity, the dialogues on the idea of nationalism and ummah which Mehmet Akif and Eşref Edip participated including Naim as well and the approaches of Elmalılı Hamdi Yazır in his Qur'an interpretation being full of emphasizes as those of Maududi and Sayyid Qutb who will be introduced to Turkey later on.

4 For a study focusing on the relation between the development in Islamist political thought and the developments in the translation literature see Bulut, 2004.

Therefore, Islamism, particularly following the first interregnum term of the decaliphatization condition, searched for itself in the conservative and nationalist discourse arena though it returned as a public movement after 50s. Only after the remembrance that it experienced via the provocation of the translation movements, Islamism returned to its indispensible area throughout the history. This area covers the discursive elements containing reciting and understanding and living up to the Qur'an, the tradition pushing individual decision forth concerning belief, a critique that doesn't fetishize the history or certain individuals, a unique rationality and discredit the folk religiosity. Since the Mutezile movement the distinguishing themes of Islamism have required emphasis on public against power, demanding the right of the poor in the property of the rich, working for a better social life, pursuing equality among people regardless of race, language, color, class, active political participation, commanding goodness and forbidding badness as well. Of course it is not possible to say that all these emphasizes were process at the same level and in standard consistency in all fractions of Turkish Islamism in the post-Caliphate conditions. Contrarily, it should not be ignored that as in all other political movements in Islamism as well there have been many discussions on defining what fits to Islam what doesn't and that it is not possible to establish an objective authenticity measurement in this aspect via an external evaluation. The post-Caliphate condition propounded that this diversity has increased and it has become quite difficult to follow this authenticity politics. As a result, even you, individually, have an authenticity criterion, it should not be forgotten that it is not an objective evaluation criterion and a criterion that is only valid in community.

Articulations

To sum up, the Islamist discourse till 80s was shaped by the articulation of a series of elements till that time. Articulation as a technical term in Sociology means that the sociological facts create a new formation through attachment of these facts and phases which relatively influenced but not totally subjected to any dialectic transformation when encountered to different cases. No social case, concept or institution can remain as it is to the end. However, it does not transform totally into something else in each encounter as the dialectical thought assumes. Sometimes the old and new elements are attached to one another and coexist slightly transforming. What is more, this coexistence is usually functional. In other words, they pave the way for one another. The Modern Islamism is in conflict with traditional Islamism due to

its strong emphasizes on reason, text, equality and justice. However, at the same time it maintains the emotionality, superstitions and oral culture of traditional Islamism and the Islamist sentiment and discourse to get a ground in the large space of grassroots. A businessman or bourgeois Islamist practice coming out at one of the phases of the Islamism which emerged after fifties as a public movement of the lower classes or immigrants as a response to the equalitarian and socialist Islamist discourse but did not exterminate and not even attempted to exterminate this form of Islamism is one of the examples of articulation. Another example can be seen in the Islamist international relations practice which is able to get into contact and interaction with global actors in political practice in lieu of anti-imperialist or re-independence warrior Islamism of the post colonial conditions.

Undoubtedly, this is a conceptualization which can relatively and temporarily explain shaping of a movement like Islamism under the influence of many different discourses or forms and different social cases and experiences and existence of all these through some kind of incorporation into one another. A larger conceptualization with references to the image of differentiation and diversification that the foresaid articulation created and to particular emphasis on the political nature of Islamism will be tried in near future.

To count up the visible or noteworthy elements of articulation, first, the traumatic impact of the post-caliphate, the diasporic psyche alienated from the state and country and exterminating the contact ground of Islamic codes; second, in terms of Islamist politics and discourse, the damnification conditions of the interregnum era in the post-Caliphate period and the accompanying discourses; third, reappearance of Islamism as a public movement with new conveyors maintained by the urbanization beginning after fifties; fourth, occasional strolling of Islamism on a nationalist-conservative line in dense remembrance and awareness process but at the same time with cultural support of the translation movements, reference to its roots remembering the Ottoman heritage. At the points where it could not distinguish from the nationalist-conservative discourses an anti-communist emphasize and articulation has been recorded as well. In this articulation the state interventions which instrumentalize both the right and the left wings in junta politics played a prominent role. Fifth, the development of the newly emerged Islamism in a direction that in fact hinders the political under the influence of nation state and the Cold War era; sixth, the ant-Zionist hatred gradually converting into an anti-Jewish anger against the international Zionism which began in Arab world and penetrated into Turkish Islamism and reached its peak with the Israeli invasion of Jerusalem following the Arab defeats, sev-

enth, the Islamist resurrections which featured Islam in the identity of Turkey due to certain events as invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union in the late 1970s, Iran Islamic Revolution in 1979, and many other cases in the Islamic world principally in Algeria, Bosnia, Chechnya and Palestine in 1990s; eighth, Turgut Ozal and his political standing meeting the September 12 Coup D'état and the new relation phase that the National Vision Movement developed with the democracy in the early 1990s when it recorded its first great success on its way to democratic political participation.

The thoughts concerning democracy were quite vague in seventies and eighties when the Islamic references were relatively taken more seriously, and even there is even a confirmation of the Orientalist premise that Islam is incompatible with democracy at that time. Although the advancement in democracy served mostly the gains of Muslims, somehow the idea that Islam is incompatible with democracy has been accepted among the Islamist of that time like a faith. In this case the pre-political cynic colors of Islamist attitude have been dominant and imposed on Islamism a distant standing towards democracy. However, the nineties taught that such a standing, the assumption of incompatibility between Islam and democracy, was not an assumption working for the good of Muslims. The discourses critical to democracy work to the closest alternative among the available choices, that is, totalitarian and authoritarian Kemalist discourse. As a matter of fact, the progresses of Islamists in democratic struggle played a role to decipher those who seem to favor democracy in fact are not so well with democracy.

Islamism at the End of Islamism

The assumption about the end of Islamism surviving with the articulation of all these discursive and sociological sources was readily due to its incongruity problems with new political conditions the world entered recently. Oliver Roy, in his *Failure of Political Islam,* thought the political Islamism to have failed since it could not realize the promises it declared with its performance between seventies and the beginning of nineties. The place that political Islamism was most decisive was undoubtedly Iran and the gradual decline of the political model and revolution expulsion at the beginning, the emergence of the domestic discontent towards the Revolution created a the typical story of failure for political Islamism. Moreover, the obvious failure of the Islamist movements in taking over the power in Egypt, Syria, and Algeria created an image of failure for Islamism analysts such as Roy. However, particularly among the examples given, the failures that Islamism experienced in Alge-

ria, Turkey with the case of Welfare Party, Syria and Egypt are not failures in terms of discursive legitimacy and superiority but instead it was a state to be explained through asymmetrical power relations against the substantial regimes. In fact, the coup applied to the Front of Islamic Salvation (FIS) which was likely to come to power consenting a democratic way and defeat of the Islamist movement as a result of that is not only a failure of Islamism but it is also western supported regime failure that deemed proper for the Islamic world. This regime is not able to obviate the political movements with Islamic references and it can also repeal itself when an Islamic element participated to it. The same case is true for Turkey which had to close down the Welfare Party violating her constitutional limits. Although the Welfare Party is not an obvious Islamist project as soon as it showed that it has a Islamic source of inspiration with the recommendations of a just order and multi-judiciary the system was incapable of taking it and thus ostracized it. There is no explanation for the consideration of the closure of the Welfare Party which Roy exemplifies as a representative of political Islamism as a case of failure, because neither in the Welfare Party Case nor in the Algeria-FIS case the indication of success or failure of the projects are due to losing of plausibility or lack of popular support. The failure of the Islamic movements in both cases in developing a way or a policy to defeat their opponents undoubtedly is a topic to be evaluated separately. By the way, in return for the image of failure, contrary to the political discourses of seventies the subjects of the Islamist movements' articulating different ideologies of the nineties and two thousands like compromising with the given political systems instead of revolution was also perceived as a sign of failure.

The Islamist claims of the political structures which do not have claim of a state, and do not present a model for a society and do not struggle for it within a frame of a program were also considered to have failed. While Islamism suffered the absence of a central political decree in the post-Caliphate conditions, it was perhaps shaped by passing through spontaneously articulating process. By the way this didn't come about just as a result of the articulation of sociological or discursive conditions; at the same time, Islamism itself articulating with the political movements in effect, virtually crowded out any claims regarding its purity. This situation showed the weakness of Islamism in creating a unique and attainable context as a political project.

In return for the withdrawal of Islamism from the political arena with its common image, a significant rise in mass movements establishing either their identities, or lifestyles, or else political preferences by references to sense of belonging to an Islamic community or general benefits. Particularly, AK Party's coming to power in Turkey in 2002 and coming to power increas-

ing its votes again in 2007 for their office term which was one of the most successful term in history of modern Turkey with many indications became a lesson that preached to rethink the relation between Islam and the political. In this context, should we understand the meaning of the insistent emphasis of the AK Party that it is not a party that has an Islamist or nationalist claim with its literal meaning? I seems that the Chief Prosecutor of Supreme Court which opened a lawsuit for closure of AK Party or the focuses that he represents didn't hesitated to relate all the actions of the cadres of party and leader cadres with an Islamist politics although the party doesn't have a Islamist and Islamic emphasis neither in its political discourse not in the program of the party.

No matter how the AK Party defines itself, there is a problem of superficiality in the definition of secularism of the system that sees the AK Party as a threat to the secularism. What is more, these focuses, in fact, may possibly exploit the secularist discourse as a means of cheap power. In this case, perhaps there is no need for so much analysis. However, despite of all counter discourses, the inability of AK Party to avoid Islamist perception should be well analyzed within the frame of political relations mechanism. The boundaries of the identity of a movement are not always determined by it but instead it is determined by the perceptions concerning the movement. Particularly, if these perceptions move to appoint the relationality constituting its own identity against the aforementioned identity, it will not be possible for the movement's identity to avoid from its background. In this context, even if as a program or an identity it has been casted off, the elements of "identity in it-self" keep on playing a determinative role on the ontology of the respective movement. When we apply this fact to the Islamism in Turkey, even though it doesn't have a declared, true to its name project and program, claim and discourse, just the mutual relative interactions continues to determine the presence of political Islamism. Furthermore, when looked from this level, we can say that the impact of political content of Islam, that is Islamism, gradually increases. Moreover interestingly Islamism makes this progress through an articulation with a simple demand of democratic-secular citizenship without any Islamist claim, any search of total change of a regime, such as suggesting a regime model inferred from the Qur'an, or in search of an Islamic revolution. Islamism converts into a will withdrawing from the discursive areas, surviving through some kind of disappearance but a will that activates while doing this. While this disappearance or "withdrawal" was feeding the perceptions that the political Islam had failed or there is no project to present the other side of the view was of course extremely confusing and poses this crucial question: Is the articulation of Islamism with modernity,

conservatism, sometimes democracy or even with a radical secularism a result of the application of a strategy or a result of the lack of an foreseeable or applicable project to be presented for the actual world?

Undoubtedly, the effectiveness of Islamism is a fact measurable with the success level of a movement qualified as conservative and the charismatic synergy that it created. When the facts that AK Party conservatism significantly distinguishes from the classical conservative discourse and that conservatism which have never created such a synergy beforehand caught a different dimension with the AK Party experience are taken into consideration the areas that Islamists will have withdrawn will clearly be seen.

To word it with a more summarizing and alternative question, particularly as seen in the AK Party experience how does Islamism create such a political activism and sustain it? What is more, does the ability to create this synergy that can be considered as a record breaking level for a political movement proves the majority of this political movement?

Discovery and Effectively Employing Political Space

Undoubtedly this question has been posed to question the authenticity of the movement, thus answering it is quite difficult. However, we can say that in analyses concerning the political Islam up to now, one of the most prominent circles of the description chain seems to have missed. This circle is the political itself. Both transformations that the political achieved in the world so far are not appreciated as a matter of fact and also the reality that the movement that recompenses the political that define and clarify the boundaries best is Islamism should be recorded. In fact, I will try to express that the processes defined as the end of Islamism or “withdraw” discursively are in fact a simple politicization.

However, it should be reminded that while talking about the political we should elude ourselves from the meanings that have been attributed to the concept of the politicization. Although the politicization is not a negative concept in many cases, although it is an affirmative concept evoking human will of self determination and participation to the processes which are related to them, somehow correlating it with many issues is not so easy. In order to clarify it, the connotations that phrases such as “the politicization of religion” or “Islam”, “politicization of Kurdish issue” or “politicization of Alewi issue” create can be taken into consideration. In each of these three cases, in fact politicization expresses the expression of the social demands of these movements on a peaceful ground.

The alternative of politicization, contrary to popular belief, is radicalization, breaking with the community or perhaps militarization. Breaking with the community or taking guns is a short way of expressing that one doesn't have any designs on politics. The place where the political begins is the point where the other(s) are also taken into consideration. Therefore, it also should be that the communal is not an area of opportunities that a group or a human being limitlessly consigned to himself or itself. Hence, the political is something that can be done on the possible ground instead of being something able to do the impossible in any case. Thus, the political is not something to be feared for a community concerning about a healthy unity of itself. However, it is something to be feared for those those who imagine it as the absolute superiority and either rejection or suppression of the other groups.

Although different standard practices are put into action within this meaning of the political, that is operating on the working of social area, particularly in Islamic experience, it is a reality that there is a tendency of enlargement at the global level. We have already said that it is Islamism which benefit from the globally developing political and the political culture which has gradually begun to play a determinative role on more areas in Turkey as well. However, it is still difficult to define a starting point for the transformation of the political even in the Islamist experience. It is possible to ascertain the concurrence of this case with the post Cold War conjecture in which the nation states are no longer the only actors determining the international politics, development of the civil society areas, the increase in the rate of urbanization. However, the absolute date of the political behavior cannot be connected only to these developments. The political is actually a behavior. The essence of the political is to endeavor in taking the foreseeable and nominal results on the way to realization of the "good" within the horizon of a certain society and to enter into alliance and challenges in line with this endeavor.

We begin to establish such a conceptualization of the political by distinguishing it from the understanding that considers the state as the absolute actor of politics and the actual target of the political struggle to take over the state apparatus. At the horizon of the nation-states era the state apparatus is the only target of the politics and it is also the only determinative actor in politics. Since any activity that is not represented or conducted at state level doesn't have any political meaning, all facilities or activities out of this purpose are considered to be out of the frame of politics. Therefore, the aims of all political movements of this era were to take over the state either in a democratic way or in a revolutionary way. The success of these movements is measured in accordance with the distance from this target.

However, this definition legs behind the oldest definition, that is, as put forward in Ancient Greece polis for instance. Moreover, there is a boom in social and political participation in politics where the state cannot encompass. The new communication and interaction means coming forward as a result or reason of globalization casted off the state being the only actor of the international relations. Besides the economic structure reaching beyond the national borders the university and information circulation downgraded the state's role as the only target and operation space of the politics. This situation changed the quality of the political existence or behavior to a significant extent. The state is still a prominent actor but it is not the only actor and it is not a super-determinative that is able to consume the alternative political anymore. Not only Islamism but also a series of movements namely called "new social movements" have the potential to provide numberless examples of the new manifestations of the political at the sub-level. This era, by the phrase of Ulrich Beck, is not an era of a restriction which is stuck between the two choices of "either this or the other" and which does not give the chance of existence in case of preferring none of them. It is the era of an "and" when everything can be articulated to any other thing, in a more generalizing term it is an era of the invention of the political (Beck, 1999). In terms of socialist movement, this transition from the dialectical antagonism of a world constituted of two classes to an era when the classes are gradually trivialized and antagonisms increased drastically caused them to revise all off the socialist political-economic assumptions (Laclau and Mouffe, 1994).

In order to draw a framework that will explain the increasing impact of Islamism despite of its current discursive absence the nature of these forms of the political and the participation of Islamism to these political forms should be taken into consideration.

The Political between Identity and Ethic

In addition to the definition we gave above concerning the political, in order to understand the process of politicization that Islam has gone through it is crucial to express that there are prominent dimension of the political. One of these is the dimension of "identity claims" which creates a sufficient ground for the people's sense of belonging and political existence at this level. What is more, as we mentioned above the claims about identity in many cases may not be something objectively put forward by the people personally affiliated to that group. As in the case of AK Party Islamism is consolidated

with the "othering" process by the opponents of this identity. Practical belonging (identity in itself) to an identity component becomes some kind of "identity for itself" under the influence of this othering. Identities are already determined by this mutual perceptions and definitions and the antagonisms that these perceptions correspond. Philosophically Islamism begins with the sense of belonging which heeds the ties among people with the mere ties of being Muslim and which heeds these ties as a brotherhood at any level. As this feeling has a dimension appearing as some kind of "Islamic nationalism" (al-Azmeh, 1993) it also has a dimension which doesn't consider Islam as an acquired right but requires "appropriate and good actions" in order to deserve and condign it. This situation is considered at least theoretically to protect Islam against its conversion into a nationalism working against others. One of the most prominent stages constituting the political positions are the alliances and friendships that people established due to the given characteristics and in line with a demand that people defend and devoted to. This is what Carl Schmit defined the political as a "friend and foe relation" and signified as the basic stage for all humanitarian existence. Although this approach gives an incisive illustration of the state in nature of human socialization it is still not an approach giving the whole scope of the political. Even if the political requires discrimination as "we" and "they" at the very base, the emphasis on this stage may convert into an exaggeration which make the political impossible, because there is not any place for the political in a situation where opposition turns into war, rejection and denial with this emphasis.

The second dimension of the political is the ethical claims. The definition of the "goodness" tha the members of a certain identity made for themselves and for the community and the struggle to attain such a world has a determinative role in that sense. To what extent the definition of "goodness" that any social movement put forward is true for the respective movement or for humanity or only for a community is determined by the limits of "the identity" of that movement and the larger social structure that this movement is a part of. A social movement's claims over "goodness" also have an impact on the construction of the identity. Of course, this is truer when Islamism is considered in that sense.

Islamism always has a claim over what is "better" for a given situation or for a community. This claim, that is perception of "goodness" for Islamism, is not a fundamentalist recommendation made for each given situation once and predetermined for all times. Conversely, with an emphasis on a dynamic judicial opinion it moves with the assumption that there can be a "good" option among the possibilities for a situation. This is, in my opinion, the best way to explain the reason for the fact that Islamism is a movement that can

easily be articulated. Ulus Baker, in one of his letters to Tanıl Bora, in a bewilderment mixed with a disappointed feeling, pointed out that instead of a "unique and sophisticated" approach that he expected from them, Islamists thinkers preferred the easy way of struggling against many problems coming out which he defined as "simplicity" (Baker, 2007: 14). Baker sees this situation which I don't think as something wrong as a simple pragmatism or perhaps a simplicity of pragmatism, but it would be difficult for Islamism to explain this expectation why it should find theoretically unique and sophisticated ways while there are easy and possible ways in many situations. Although the ways, particularly in theory, seem to be smart generally come out to the impossible in practice and it is not a method of Islam as a religion which promise the happiness of this world and hereafter. A good solution is always preferred to an original solution. In an Islamic sense the ways to be qualified as "good" are always among those possible ones. Islamism, with its dimension producing *fiqh*, is a daily life politics which gives more priority to presenting applicable and quite easy ways for people of all levels within their daily life. The subjection of "goodness" in Islamic *fiqh* with a strong emphasis on the concept of "utility" (purpose) to the rules such as "the rules may change over time", "expelling badness is better than attracting goodness" "the essence of existence is neutral" and etc. makes it to be "practical and solution oriented" and to be more critical and free even towards its own taboos as well. As a result, one of the dimensions of the political is to be the art of the possible then it shows that the Islamic *fiqh* can find its solutions in a middle way among the possibilities and through negotiations with others.

As a result, although Islamism does not name itself as such there is an Islamism which has discovered the political with the aforementioned horizons of the opportunities maintained by its epistemological sources. In the horizon of the political there is the episteme that there is no absolute power. The existence of human being always reaches and leans on others' boundaries. He redefines himself on these boundaries and thus is influenced by others. Existence is a state of interaction and Muslims are no exception of this; they have never been either. If you are not alone in this world and also don't have chance to create a world of people like yourself then you have to live minding others as well. The legal order that the members of a religious community applied among its members is different from that it applies to the relations with people outside. The Islamist politics runs with the claim to grant the freedom that it demands for itself to others as well instead of imposing its lifestyle and communal legal order onto the others. It demands the freedom of telling its ethical claims to others but this is something that remains within the frame of freedom of speech and that never accepts any

impositions. In return for this, the failure in affirmatively responding its ethical claims is not a problem as long as it doesn't activate any hostility against it. Even if Muslims absolutely have certain suggestions for the reordering of the common world but they do not claim on being the only determinant. Of course it is an exception that in determining the frame of the common space Muslims have a political superiority or has the authority under certain circumstances. Even in that condition the historical and social conditions will not be less determinative in defining the social and political model that will be drawn for the respective society.

Undoubtedly, all these signify such a deep Islamist habitus that cannot be referred to all Islamist movements. Habitus means a political logos that contains all of the behaviors reflected onto the daily life of most of the Islamists.

In fact the discussions of "Testimonial of Madina" brought onto the stage by Ali Bulaç (Bulaç, 2004) in the early 90s presented significant clues concerning the wideness of the political horizon of Islamism, that is, to establish a common world negotiating with others. It is not important whether project inspired by such a historical testimonial is applicable or not. The important thing is to propound that Islamists are open to the idea of creating an order based on negotiation with the other sects of the society in any given historical condition. Isn't this the point where politics begin? Moreover, this is a reality that Islam or Muslims are quite proficient in exhibiting this characteristic through history. It is well known that Muslims never tried to homogenize the communities they built in the Middle East and Balkans. Even, this characteristic of Muslims has been expressed in Orientalist literature as a "weakness" of Islam in creating a common culture (Turner, 1978). However, "the common culture" that the West was quite successful in creating required an intense social violence, religious and ethnic cleansing. Since the Islamic community paid a prominence to the sensitivity against imposition in a sense it chose to leave every cultural community to their own devices and this maintained Islamic civilization to remain as a "mosaic community" which is a consequence that can only be noted as affirmative. This is the virtue of permitting the survival of a party which can really negotiate or make itself felt. It is the virtue of selecting not to use its superiority in power to "destruct" or to suppress. Here, if noticed, there is an Islamist politics which doesn't show any will of transforming others despite of being at an ultra determinative position in a sense. So, it doesn't fit into the rationality of the same will to try to transform the publicity defined by others at a weak/minor position instead of being at a determinative position. However, this doesn't mean that Islamism doesn't have any ethical claims under any given condition and

it obeys the existing conditions unconditionally. The conclusion that I want to reach from this point is that the political of Islam contrary to the popular assumption has decreased particularly in the post-Caliphate era, that is, as a party of negotiation it has alienated from the political reason which follows one's interests (affairs). The political reason has gone down and instead a desperately struggle of a disorganized body for survival and a structure that justified the diction of war rather than politics against the colonial conditions.

The mobility within this frame was generally called "political Islam" which is an immensely wrong definition. Even if sometimes under a cynic impression, the radical rejection, rejection of any political negotiation, may be a political response but functionally it doesn't have anything to do with the political. This mobility came out perhaps at a moment when the chance of Islamic politics is exhausted. This mobility is, in fact, quite far away from the political with the unattainable and anachronical project proposals called Islamism. The demands and discourses that are mixed with revanchist emotions in patches and also contain some kind of revenge take Islamism away from the political sphere. Undoubtedly in an Islamic community these kinds of discourses may come out as a humanitarian response in certain historical and social conditions. However, since these responses, apart from being humanitarian, didn't come out on a ground where the conditions for politics were available they cannot be considered as part of Islamist politics. Because at least theoretically, Islamic politics has also a reality which takes the passed as the past, induces the consciousness that the experience of one belongs to himself and everyone is responsible for his experience. A culture of resentment and revenge based on spending a lifetime on the restoration of a condition of defeat or victory can only have a relation with Islamic politics as a pathological state, that is, a pathological state as normal as a response of a body exposed to an ailment to protect itself instead of a pathology as a disdained state. It is natural that a body exposed to an attack gives abnormal responses. However, these responses are normal consequences that are produced by the body's instinct of protecting itself. These responses are temporary. The body, in the end, finds its natural balance under any circumstances and adapts itself even to the most difficult conditions that it would not bear up under other conditions.

We have already stated that the response that Islamism gave to the post-Caliphate trauma dates back to the literature of a long victimization or temporary conditions (Aktay, 1997; 2004). The literature of "being destitute in one's homeland, pariah in his motherland" which has been frequently appealed by the Islamist aesthete and has been perpetrated as a prominent theme for the Islamist masses led Muslims to create an eminently unique Di-

aspora imagination. The diasporic conditions on one's motherland directed Muslims either to the nostalgia in a longing for the era of bliss (time of the Prophet) or a utopic future that will be realized in the end. The main reason making the Muslims create a nostalgic or utopic Islam out of a religion of emigration (Hegira) was that they hadn't reached a sufficient socialization for survival or political activity; that they have passed through a new embodiment in its own way. While nostalgia and utopia worked like Muslim Diaspora it would approach to some kind of Islamic Zionism with its radical versions, but in any case a cynical rejection or denial of politics would be presented as the only possible way of expression for Islamists. Of course every kind of political which is seen as the way to participate to the established system would be theologically rejected. As a matter of fact, the apathy of Islamist going further to a cynical denial toward the political was disto from being their preferences. When all the ways to be a subject in a political sphere with its own identity were totally blocked finding a more functional way than a radical rejection for an Islamist emotion and discourse became a problem of mental and political talent. It is undeniable that Islamists lagged behind in exhibiting this talent for a long term.

Global Channels of the Political

However, it is a reality that today the conditions are quite different at least in this context. I defend that the political of Islamism has reached to a quite high level if not the peak as a cumulative result of the developments in the world and Islamist's remembering the political. The most prominent topics to be emphasized regarding the globalization and the new course of the world as a part of these conditions are these: globalization has made the nation-states not to be considered as the only actors of politics. The direct consequence of this is that the state is neither the only target of the political nor the only actor of the political at the level of international relations. The state structures evolve into different functions under the increasing pressure for the development of democratization and freedom. This democratization process, undoubtedly, corresponds to a political required by the global circulation and sharing based on division of labor of the new production and consumption patterns of capitalism. The intensive circulation of goods and people inevitably requires development of new politicals appropriate for the newly emerging condition.

On the other hand, the development of communication, transportation and media means has brought about an intensive trans-national transfer-

ence of cultures and identities and opened political spheres for various socialization and grouping and activities from local and national levels reaching global levels. Increasing use of internet and international (trans-public) relations prepared a ground for strong cooperation networks. The Gulen movement in Turkey and the opportunity of acting in international arena via hundred of schools opened abroad are also the cases that the global dynamism enabled. It can be estimated that today this movement has immunity against the decision of any state. However, this situation is not simply that Gulen movement has such an extensive spectrum of opportunity or being an international political and social actor. The fact that this movement also experienced dynamism besides the globalization step taken by the understanding that this movement represents is another reality to be underlined. As Peter Mandaville tried to express under the title "Global Political Islam" (Mandaville, 2001) the world that we are living in has passed through a process which deemphasized or at least made it share its power with other national and international actors. Within this process people carry their cultures with themselves when they migrate or travel to another country. However, the issue does not come to an end with this. The cultures that move or travel or migrate also experience an immigration or journey within themselves. When an individual from Turkey migrates or travels to Germany takes the Islamic culture with him as well. However, an Islamic culture carried to Germany (or any other European state) also experiences a transformation and devolution. From this point of view, the religious or national culture as well as the culture that the members of Gulen movement carry creates a ground for an internal transformation as well. This situation is an approach that explains the adoption and expression of a more universal Islamic understanding by Gulen who had a local and national Islamic understanding in 60s within a process extending over the US[5]. What is more, although Gulen Movement is one of the strongest examples of such a network, it is not alone. These channels give the chance for the evolution of these kinds of structures.

This spread mostly at cultural level has also an economic dimension. The new entrepreneurship horizon that the conservative Anatolian entrepreneurs whom are known as the Anatolian capital discovered signifies a new and a very prominent channel of Islamism. In this development signifying the articulation of Islamism with capitalism the important point is the rising role of Islamism which gained a trans-national quality and gradually became

5 For a study illustrating the evolution of Gulen and his movement's travel from Erzurum, Edirne, Izmir and Istanbul to the US reflecting on the thought and attitude of Gulen and his fellow see Bulaç,2007 and Aktay,2006

a remarkable actor at global level. These actors combining all geographies of the world under their commerce and investment portfolio pay the rents for political subjectivity of Islamism in this field with its own influence even if not intended[6].

On the other hand, particularly newly emerged Muslim districts coming about with the labor migration or brain drain particularly from Islamic countries to the west has created the reality of a European or Western Islam. The Western Islam not only brought a new dimension to the classical orientalism critique of Islamism but as a category it also led Muslim to think on how to live under a non-Muslim authority as citizens. At this point, even secularism as a concept thought to be anti-Islamic in essence has been redefined and adopted as a category that gives the chance for Muslim to create common public sphere with non-Muslims. Today in many European universities the studies on orientalism are conducted by Muslims students or instructors. The orientalist knowledge that these cadres produce overcomes many common problems of classical orientalism and maintains the production of more accurate knowledge in western conditions. Besides, while focusing on the meaning of being Muslim in western conditions the reel conditions concerning Muslims as minorities in a non-Muslim community have been quite didactic for modern Islamic law. For example, these conditions have gone beyond the axis dividing the earth as world of chaos (dar'ul harp) and world of Islam (dar'ul Islam) and instead directed to shape the principles of an Islamic law focusing on the meaning of citizenship at a level perceiving the state as a contract in its modern sense.

The concept of citizenship as a contract has been one of the most prominent grips of Islamic the political. The Islamic subjectivity has put its emotions excitement and will around the concept of citizenship at this level. The descendant of Hasan al-Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood movement in Egypt lives in Switzerland but for example as some Muslim intellectuals led by Tarık Ramazan who is influential in Europe principally in England, they present the sample that Islamism is not always dependant on a certain forma and when the appropriate conditions come about it can be converted into an ideology of adaptation. While this adaptation seemingly shows the ability of Islamist to adapt to the system, the question about

6 For an analysis on the practice of the religious and mental dynamics in the rising of the Anatolian Bourgeoisie in the MUSIAD case see Ödemir, 2006. Furthermore, the Works of Mustafa Özel giving intellectual support for the ideological, cultural and theoretical foundation of the structure named as Anatolian tigers. Özel's Works contains an analysis on the construction and development of this structure as a global actor. see. Özel, 1994; 1995; 1997. Also see Demir, Acar, Toprak, 2004

where an Islamist political that makes itself felt in different forms day by day spring from is a question at point though. While many political analysts consider this situation as the end of Islamism, I tried to tell that through a more pointed definition of the political this situation in fact is the strongest expression of Islamist politics.

It can clearly be seen that either for the Muslims in Europe or those in Turkey, there is a will of Islamism to base the defense and representation of the interest of its community on negotiation through finding its allies and rivals in the political arena at a political level. It is also interesting that the emergence of this will through the loose structure of socialization coming out at this level of post-Caliphate era instead of a harsh political hesitation. This loose socialization parallel with globalization aroused a stronger universalist (ummah) emotion on one hand; it brought a stronger individualism together with it on the other hand. While the international networks have sometimes developed via the initiatives of local religious communities (Gulen Movement, Muslim Brotherhood, Tablig Community, Hizb-u Tahrir, Jamaati Islami) on the other hand these net works also have created quite individualistic-autonomous spaces as alternatives to control of those local communities. In line with the observation of Mandeville mentioned above, increasing travels and global mobility both increase the contacts of Muslims with the members of other religions and cultures and also increase the interactions among Muslim communities. This interaction brings about the transformation in each religious group in itself by approximating them to one another. With the development of satellite communication-broadcasting technology, apart from the usage of Internet, as an example we can also focus on radio and TV programs that each Islamic understanding broadcasts on the same screen simultaneously vying with one another simultaneously still paying regard to the understandings of one another. The extreme abundance of these kinds of broadcastings while on one hand signifies the difference and diversity of levels of Islamic knowledge and understandings, on the other hand, the actual manufacture practice of these channel brings about a rapprochement to one another in terms of the audience. As a result it is possible to say that the general-global-homogenizing culture, you may say culture industry, in communication and media consumption works like this but it bears many affirmative functions in terms of general values of Islam. Regardless of the critique against the popular culture it can obviously said that it feeds the Islamic ummah perception and emotion. Undoubtedly this is not something that culture does on its own. As in the Hajj season each year a process connecting all Muslims all over the world within the same time circle, same calendar and same world of rituals works; at least five

millions of these Muslims participate to this great meeting at Kaabah and Arafat face to face or personally, together with their families forty or fifty millions of people are enrolled to this relation course mentally and emotionally. With the gradual development in broadcasting technologies, colorful, emotional and attractive images from this great meeting penetrates more into the world of meaning of Islamic world. It is pertinent to study on the function of the pilgrimage for the constitution of the perception and consciousness of ummah and of course other functions. The boundaries that those who were personally here during the hajj season inevitably reach are spread to the whole year via Umrah visits; at the same time it is possible to spread the excitement and relations for hajj to the whole year.

As clearly seen the high political inherent in the very basic religiousity of Islam created an identity consciousness and will at a high level with the increasing globalization. When we accept that approximately one and a half billion Muslims all over the world have brought our innumerable political experiences in different parts of the world we cannot expect all these experiences to resemble one another. What is more, with the increasing integration of the world it is possible to see that the Muslims have been caught to a thelos approaching them to one another day by day. Even if communal will, emphasis on brotherhood in Islam and its structure creating its own identity against racism, classicism or any other sectarianism have not some concrete and typical political projects and models but it can be expected to tend to the channels that will call it into being as a policy of identity and goodness. The most prominent of these channels are reproduced as such and more strongly day by day through the practical processes of the very basic worships of Islam (habitus), prayers, fasting or alms. Therefore, we can say that the stories about the failure of Islamic the political always arise from the imprisonment of the expectations about Islamism or Islamic the political into the theoretical imaginations. There are always many rabbits to be taken out of the hats of Islamism.

In Islamist political practice while the political which is not visible to all has increased, it is still acceptable that relatively there is a scarcity of unique projects expected from Islamism. However, the only reason that made this scarcity to be understood as the failure of Islamism stems from the fact that a very narrow even shallow meaning of the political has been adopted. Being able to easily articulate to liberal democracy, parliamentarian regime or other political choices under given condition is not due to its exhaustion but instead it is due to the high political it bear. Under the definition adopted here high political means the search for the best in any given condition and under the conditions when the best impossible is required the political ends.

Social Contract and Politics of Citizenship

It is not something new that Muslims are minorities in a non-Muslim community. There are examples in history that Muslims communities were minority in certain period. What is more, although these places were considered as world of chaos (dar-ül harp) or world of infidelity (dar-ul kufr) in classical Islamic body politics it had been possible for Muslims to live in these places as citizens for long times. In African societies, and regions such as Far Asia, India, Caucuses and Russia Muslims had lived as communities without having their own states and even if they had certain problems and tensions with the political authorities from time to time they had lived as citizens among these communities for centuries. Principally, as long as Muslims are recognized as a community and there is no intervention or interference with their beliefs and religious activities there is no theological-political requirement that prevents them from living as a subject of a non-Muslim state. In cases that the authorities are authoritarian, vulgar, oppressive Islamic theology-politics can easily be articulated with a conflicting, resistant and rebellious discourse. Even in this situation it doesn't matter whether the oppressive authority is Muslim or non-Muslim. Thus, it can be said that the early Islamist discourses are the Mutazili movements that come out for their opposition to the oppressive Muslim leaders.

One of the reasons behind the Islamism giving the impression of withdrawal by less unique project proposals but by being articulated to the governing political institution and movements is related to the diversification of the channels for political participation in the world in general and the emergence of a new and different citizenship standard through the state-citizen relation. The new citizenship definition, profile or laws gives the opportunity of establishing an open area shaped by the negation of the political with others.

There is a long history of the concept of citizenship and the order of relations[7]. We don't cast out this history of course but to refer to it with rough guidelines the concept of citizenship has been under the oppression of a development from a stage that state grant rights and duties to its subject to a stage that the state establishes itself with a constitutional process of citizens' contract. Of course it cannot be said that this oppression has created

7 For a few studies claiming that the development of the concept of citizenship parallel with the state-society relations, particularly the stages experiences through capitalism, the state of welfare and globalization determines the nature of politics see Marshall, 195; 1981; Rche, 1992; Turner, 1986.

a similar smooth state-citizen relation everywhere. However, in the era of nation states, the state model that imposes ideological political and cultural positions for its public on its own unilaterally or with colonial-post-colonial understanding began to lose its legitimacy gradually. In fact, the political horizon of Islamism as a project shaped under the conditions of that time aimed to produce the same state structure symmetrically and in that sense its citizenship model also included assigning the granted identities, cultural and economic sources granted to its imaginary subjects (Muslim or non-Muslim). Perhaps, the political order that it was living under didn't give the chance for a different political participation and thus such a political was quite far away from the functional meaning of the political that we know today. Even as we indicated above, this was not the political; conversely it expressed an obvious rejection of the political. The political cynism, one of the conditions of post-Caliphate era, as we have illustrated above, was fed by the literature of "being destitute in one's homeland". However this literature seems to be quite banal for Muslims and it also has very little vitamin to feed the Islamist politics. To express it frankly, the psyche of "being diasporic in one's homeland" that this literature feeds has already been overcome to a great extent. Even if they experience problems concerning headscarf and religious education, the objective conditions that would make Muslims feel themselves categorically mistreated in Turkey have weakened as a result of their active political participation and relative success. The reason of this development was the evolution of political understanding of the state considering the nation state ideological and considering its citizens as subjects. The second reason for this development was the rapture of feelings of weakness and misery thanks to the opportunities brought about by globalization and the third reason is inuring of Muslims concerning the persistence of post-Caliphate conditions and affirmatization of conditionality of Caliphate for a survival as Muslim. Finally, as a accumulation of all these processes, with the new opportunities came out with new state-community relations, the possibility of establishing the conformity codes between the new political channels and the Islamic political-theology.

The most prominent element of this conformity code is the social contract. Islamism is familiar with the culture of contract historically as well. Citizenship particularly, at a level of the political where constitutional citizenship is discussed and the state means to be a contract of the citizens, no matter to what extent unreal it is, it is appropriate to the Islamism as a legitimizing discourse. Muslims have done many contracts with many parties including even their enemies. Recently the historical contract known as the "Testimonial of Madina" and came on to stage in Turkey with the thesis arguing the

conformity of Muslims to a constitutional citizenship is a contract of coexistence between the Muslims and non-Muslims in Madina. The one that is known as the Hudaybiya Treaty is a contract undoubtedly containing significant and interesting political implications. The conditions that the Prophet accepted in this treaty were seemingly against Muslims and it hardly satisfied his companions. Even in the signature of the treaty, upon the imposition of Meccean infidels, Prophet Mohammed accepted the condition of removal of the phrase “Messenger of God” before his name and this was seen as a concessive attitude by Muslims. However, Muslims remained loyal to this contract to the end, the contract was terminated by the Meccean infidels for the results coming out of the contract bothered them. However, Muslims, remaining loyal to this contract seemingly against them to the end, came out strengthened at the end of the process. These conditions can be evaluated undoubtedly, but it is not possible to infer that considering the results of the treaty Muslims would have terminate it if the infidels had not terminated it. Conversely, there is not even a little implication in this contract culture that will legitimize the contract as a strategic cheating or evasion stage.

The contract culture requires two or more parties and the conditions in this contact text cannot be unilaterally in favor of or against a party. As the text protecting the rights of each party and address to the partial expectations of the parties are the results of certain negotiation (dialogue) processes. Since there is not a community submitted to Muslims (or to anybody) to restructure from scratch, establishment of a community in which Muslims are also a part basing on the contract with other participants is the most appropriate way for peace purpose of Islam. By the way since there no way of closing an order initiated via dialogue with a certain form it is not possible to envisage a static Islamic political model either. Islamic political model, with the most obvious phrase, is a dialogical model and is always open ended and established basing the negotiation among the political actors. The understanding of jurisprudence (ijtihad) that the tradition of interpreting the Islamic texts, the search for purpose (benefit for the society) emerging as a pragmatism in the political arena have the potential to pull the Islamist actors to a line on which they can easily negotiate in a political discussion and can accept the demands of the others as well.

When politics is seen as a way of solution the best possible choices for each party have to be found and this is not a choice and this is not a faultless choice. It is something to be selected among the possible ones and approved. The possible choice may be simple, or a known way but the important thing is that it can resolve the problem.

Undoubtedly, the condition that makes this model Islamic is that Muslims participate as the actors representing their sensitiveness, their sensitiveness concerning the ideal "good" in the given conditions and the interests of community. However, the Islamic side of the model doesn't mean that it will bring out a revelation like experience that will be referred to in any terms. At the very end this is a humanitarian political experience with its faults and corrects. It is produced through the faults of human being.

For all these, rather than the approach of Marshall who sees the concept of citizenship as a way to equal access to economic sources; thus something that declines the inequality among the social classes in the capitalist society to a certain extent, Rousseau's approach considering citizenship as a political participation code that enable the social contract seems to be more functional. Particularly, under the shadow of discussions concerning constitution spread of a discourse stipulating the existence and legitimacy of the state to the participation of the citizens seems to be appropriate for Islamist politics, even if the actual validity and the belief in this validity is quite naïve.

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Political Islamism between the Principles of Islam and Secularism Requirements in Turkey

Yasin Aktay

This paper is studies political Islamism in Turkey and how the Turkish state dealt with that kind of politics. Temporal roots of this study must be extended to include the pre-republic era as the republic era too. In the ottoman era, Political Islamism is named to be a main policy of the state directly. All policies, actions, decisions and activities held by the state at that time were a mirror that only reflects Islamic ideas, values. These activities are accountable to Islamic Shariaa inspection. At that time, developing the state must take place in the framework drawn by Islamic Shariaa. The goal from that is to develop Islam and lives of Muslims simultaneously with developing the state in order to guarantee permanence of the Islamic state or state of Islam.

On the other hand, the republic era was mainly based on keeping the state away from any religious obligations through ending the Islamic caliphate and adopting secularism as a main principle of the state. Islam became just a value inclusive on the individual after being religion of the state as it was perceived to be a source of forming new structure more adherent and alternative to the modern state. Thus All references, actions, programs were revised in order to check if they are fitting the new secular state or not. And those not fitting the state are accused of being retroactive and not modern.

It was forbidden to find any feature of Islamism in the daily life during the first republic, but Islamism appeared later on in the form of popular movements not official policies of the state (Like the ottoman state). These movements are different from other movements in the Islamic world. They are distinctive in their type. They did not call for a complete change in policies as much they called for more liberties, freedom and recognition.

In order to study the rise of these popular movements, the rise of Islamists to power we must study the political sphere in turkey that led to that.

In Turkey, there is no legitimate base (according to the constitution) for any political actor to stand upon or refer to religion in any case. It is highly

banned on the state, any political party, or even the social structure of the society to rely on the religion. If any political party adopted any program that includes such things so it is highly probable to be freezed. All of that took place because the first nine articles in the Turkish constitution protecting secularism and prohibiting any modification to the secular principles of the state.

The process of the secularization of the state started by modernizing the society through inserting secularism in the Turkish constitution in 1928, ending the Islamic caliphate, closing institutions of the religious education, enforcing men to wear hats “clothes revolution” and exchanging the Arabic letter by Latin letter under the name of “letters revolution”. All of these actions are taken in order to form a secular society.

Process of secularizing the state was not a tool for managing the state but it was a way for more rapprochements with the west. There is no doubt that the west was trying to attract Turkey to its modernized network. But although Turkey was trying to be freed from its Orientals it became more oriental than before. That’s what will be discussed now.

The program of the westernization of Turkey which includes shutting down the religious schools, getting rid of Islamists, ending the Islamic caliphates, printing the holy Quran in Latin letters not Arabic letters and converting calls for prayers (Azan) from Arabic to Turkish has led to great negative repercussions on the Turkish society. As a result of banning a source of religious education, the culture of the daily life became incomplete. The low level of the culture entailed the necessity of having scientist and more aware people in the religious sides. By the year of 1950, people started to forget the main religious information related to burying their dead according to Islamic regulations. A case of shortage has infected the culture of the society. And thus all calls by political were focused on freedom of practicing religion and freedom of expression.

After the Democratic Party came to power in 1950, it became allowed to say (Azan) in Arabic again. Political Islamism started to rise and flourish by more calls for the religious education and schools for that purpose. Islam at that time was perceived as a simple popular identity after being perceived as an enemy to the modern state.

The political system in Turkey did not allow political Islamism to go further than that (advocating religious freedom), despite that the groups formed to struggle for more religious freedom lived a more active life and an encouraging environment for their activities. The international context at that time led to the emergence of the Islamic identity. Political Islamism exceeded the

lines of domestic politics to take some responsibilities on the Islamic nation like facing communism, facing soviet colonization of Afghanistan, coup d'état happened in Iran.

Political Islamism in the Early Stages

Political Islamism in turkey till that time did not call for making religious values basics of political regime there. But it started to develop itself in a form of Ideology or a "utopia" for this popular movement. This "dream" or "Utopia" has its own political reflections on any party formed by these movements. The program of the National Order Party founded by Necmettin Erbakan was carrying these ideas (Utopia). This party was shut down for secular reasons but Erbakan did not give up. He formed a new party called the National Salvation Party with few modulations added to the program of the old party. The new tactics presented by this party is that it tried to find new supporters from the secular army. The new party of Erbakan started to work from an Islamic background by opening new schools for Imams and callers for Islam. The party also has a special perception on Turkey's position. Turkey must be more independent from the west so that it can gain its own identity. The more independent is Turkey from the west, the more closely to its Islamic identity. Thus it is a must on Turkey to secure a stable strong status in the recent power balance system. That was the Utopia in Erbakan mind. And he started to have a strong base in the heavy industry mainly.

The new party of Erbakan started to work from an Islamic background. The party encouraged opening new schools for Imams and callers for Islam. The number of these schools rose up from the fiftieth till end of sixtieth to reach 350 schools. This increase in numbers came due to the demands of the rightist and middle religious fractions in the Turkish society. These fractions formed lots of movements and rallies. Like the rally of the Al-Quds in Konya 1980 which was a reason for the 1980 coup d'état.

The 1980 coup d'état represented a turning point on the political Islamism in Turkey. At that time, the thought of Islamism has been started to find a popular support by big segments of youth in the society instead of the leftist thought. but because of the coup d'état the thought of political Islamism turned to focus on religious education affairs and other liberties, that was the role of Welfare party who came after shutting down National Salvation Party.

Political Islamism after 1980 Coup D'état

Turget Ozel was the head of the liberal Party Motherland. He responded positively to these demands and granted too much liberated policies not only for Islamists but for all political ideas. Islamists found new space for expression by cancelling the articles number 163 from penalties law (anti-political Islamism law), and articles numbers 141, 142 (anti-leftist thought) in 1991. The cancelation of these articles let a big chance for having civil society, trade and business unions, and associations basing on Islamic basics, but not political parties. Welfare party at that time launched an initiative called "the just system". The just system is based on accepting the existence of the two contradicting fractions. Every fraction must admit the right of the other to exist and must admit differences. This initiative was not accepted because there is no place in the world for any secular regime who accepts a specific culture ruler ship. This system was trying to seek a new kind of aspiration beyond the western secularism. It was applied from before in the Madina era (Prophet Muhammad pbuh time) and during the ottoman era. This just system has no way to deal with secularism. It was calling strongly for more liberties for all political fractions not just Islamists. The just system had the principle of being inclusive to all people even not Muslims and not to form a system on an Islamic referent.

The economic dimension of this system was calling for applying an economic system which fit the Islamic Shariaa. Any Economic system must include the pure meaning of justice. The economic principles of this system were taken from some Islamic basics but at the same time they are not contradicting with the secular systems.

The just system was very popular at the end of ninetieth after the end of the cold war. There were no problems coming from the leftist parties because they were dissolved but the main problems were facing the society can be represented in poverty, illegal building and corruption.

Welfare party started to launch its Islamic policy from the poorest segments and class in the society as fractions in the society accepted this concept of justice positively. Municipalities were in a miserable status of corruption and this was a big test for welfare party. Istanbul was one of these Municipalities and there was too much problems in Water needs and rubbish. Racep Tayeb Erdoğan was the head of Istanbul at that time. He succeeded in solving all these problems and satisfied all Istanbul needs from water. These good actions taken by the party in face of corruption was a big push for the party to enter the elections in 1995. Erbakan became the prime

minister in the biggest coalition government. The economic indicators of the Turkish economy started to rise up. But the success of the government met by a big hostility from the National Security Council. The council was preparing a program to force Erbakan to leave what he thought about and to change his ideas. Erbakan was obliged to resign from his office after six months and cases were rose over his party in the constitutional court basing on that this party is against the secular principles of the Turkish state. Not only that but also "the just system" was called to be religious illegal system despite that it does not have any religious word.

The series of political discrimination is continued also with Felicity party who allowed a woman with a head scarf to run in elections as a member in parliament. This was a big transfer in the law of head scarf in 1986. Any party does not have the right to defend woman's right of wearing a scarf and if this party advocated that right so it is enough for this party to be shut down. Welfare party was dismissed from the political life. All high schools for Imams and callers for Islam were closed and this led to a big problem in Turkey. It was around 90% of people in the high school are going to lose their schools.

Virtue and Welfare parties were shut down by 2001. Too many divisions were originally founded in Virtue party. And this led to two separated parties, Felicity party and Justice and development party. Felicity party headed by Necmettin Erbakan but he was not allowed to work again in politics and Recep Tayep Erdoğan who led the AKP till now.

Felicity party adopted the same program of the last parties (Virtue and Welfare) but the AKP said that it is not an Islamic party, just conservative party and have a new vision. The AKP was in a big dilemma about the issue of being Islamic party in a Muslim country. If the party declared that he is an Islamic party, this means that any citizen won't vote for AKP is not Muslim. And if the party declared he is not Muslim so the other parties are the only parties who can take Islam responsibilities, adding to that the difficulty in declaring any party as an Islamic party.

Political Islamism during Justice and Development Party Era

Erdoğan tried to find a solution for this problem. This solution is crystallized in declaring his party as a democratic conservative party. He started to put a sound management system in the party. He is calling for freedom of wearing head scarf and more Islamic education. These social liberties were acceptable by the political elites in turkey as they perceive these liberties as politi-

cal Islamism demands. AKP was delaying any sensitive case demanded by the Islamic segments of the society till the opposition believe in AKP's good intentions and he is not coming to threat the secular system of the state, not to raise any tension within the Turkish system. Also AKP is taking in consideration the public opinion and it is highly responsive to it.

While concerning the relation with Europe and European Union, unlike the political Islamic doctrine directed previously by the Islamic parties toward the west, AKP adopted a policy that is supporting European Union. His idea is revolving around making the European Union not a closed club for just European countries but a home for Democracy, more liberties and welfare. Nonetheless AKP policy towards the European Union is good evidence that AKP is still seeking the western way and a well designed political maneuver by which the party can gain more legitimacy and popularity. It is clear now that European Union does not like to have Turkey as a member after fulfilling all requirements for gaining this membership. This refusal may be in the good interest of any Islamic nation on the long run.

Conclusion

Politics is not just about managing or ruling the state but it is all about knowing the exact role to play in an uncertain environment. Political Islamism in this way is about choosing what to do and how to do instead of what is happening. Thus it is available to find this political Islamism under a secular regime. Any policy that is concerning with the unity of Muslims, happiness and satisfaction of Muslims, or satisfaction of all humanity is a form of political Islamism and it is available everywhere.

The Islamic movement centralized and crystallized in all the segments of the Turkish society, from the lower class to the upper class. The Islamic movement prevailed and distinguished by a special style if life that adopted by the religious business men, bureaucratic and well educated people. There is no doubt that there is a big discussion on the Islamic concepts between different categories in the society. And there is no central authority that can include all there classy categories but there is the Justice and Development Party who is representing the interest of the biggest category in the regime. Justice and Development Party is trying to include the Islamic categories in the political system as they exist in the social system. The party is trying to repair any cracks in the regime through employing good policy that represents political, economic and social interests of all society categories.

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Islam and Democracy: Explaining Muslim Agency in Democratization

Birol Baskan

Introduction

From 1972 to 2009, the percentage of democracies –countries judged free by Freedom House, had increased from 29 percent (44 out of a total 151) to 46 percent (89 out of a total 194) (Freedom House, 2010). One classical book's title suggested that this was a global resurgence of democracy (Diamond and Plattner, 1996). It remained, however, short of a global phenomenon for it largely missed the Middle East. Although democracy made advances in diverse regions with different cultural backgrounds from Latin America to Eastern Europe, from Asia to Sub-Saharan Africa, only in the Middle East "has democracy failed to expand in the past three decades" (Brumberg and Diamond, 2003:ix). In fact, in the last three decades, the situation in the Middle East deteriorated. Karatnycky (2003), for example, calculated that the average freedom score of the Middle East and North Africa had increased from 5.15 in 1974 to 5.53 in 2002 on the Freedom House's 7-point scale.

A comparison of Freedom House standings of Middle East countries between 1972 and 2010 confirms the same finding. No significant change had occurred in the statuses of the Middle East countries in this period. Lebanon, one of the two countries judged Free in 1972, lost that status in 1975 and since then has oscillated between Partially Free and Not-Free statuses. Likewise, Bahrain and Jordan have oscillated between partly free and not-free, as of 2010, reverting back to not-free status (Freedom House, 2010).

The countries in the Middle East differ from each other in, among other features, ethnic composition, population, economic size, and natural resources. But, all share one common feature: Islam. The only exception is Israel, which is predominantly Jewish and which is the only country judged Free by Freedom House.

A huge literature since then has piled up addressing this relationship between Islam and the persistence of authoritarianism in the Middle East. The approach in this literature has remained predominantly ideational, and to an extent, polemical. It certainly added to our understanding of the issue, but also obstructed further analysis.

This paper focuses instead on the potential agency of religious actors in democratization (Kalyvas and van Kersbergen, 2010). More specifically, my dependent variable is a binary one, asking whether in a given Muslim country some religious groups or actors, single-handedly or in coalition with some other groups, helped that country's political regime move closer to liberal democracy. The paper comparative historical analysis[1] of two major cases, from the Middle East, Turkey and Egypt, to specify the conditions under which religious groups or actors help or obstruct democratization in the Middle East.

Turkey and Egypt are ideal cases for an analysis of this sort according to most similar systems design.[2] They sharply differ in my dependent variable. In Turkey, an Islamist-origin party, the Justice and Development Party (the JDP) supported by grass-root religious groups came to power in 2002 and initiated the most ambitious liberalization drive in the Turkish history (Cizre, 2008; Yavuz, 2009; Hale and Ozbudun, 2010) [3]. Turkey's improvement toward liberal democracy under the JDP is also visible in Freedom House scorings: in 2001, Turkey's political and civil rights scores were 4 and 5 respectively, while in 2009, Turkey scored 3 in both (Freedom House, 2010). In Egypt, on the contrary, religious groups failed to mobilize their resources to move the Egyptian state in a similar direction; instead, they sought to islamize the Egyptian state and society through channels available in the Egyptian state (Ismail, 2006; Bayat, 2007).

Turkey and Egypt also share many historical similarities. Both were successor states of the Ottoman Empire, went through similar historical experiences, such as, the rise of charismatic military officers, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk in Turkey and Gamal Abdel Nasser in Egypt, with similar nationalistic and secular agendas, pursued state-led industrialization programs until the 1970s, adopted neo-liberal economic programs after suffering through the crisis of the 1970s, and witnessed the rise of strong grass-root religious groups in the last four decades. Both countries are the allies of the United States and economically depend on manufacturing and agriculture, not on oil and natural gas revenues.

1 For more on Comparative Historical Analysis, see Mahoney and Rueschemeyer (2003).
2 For more on Most Similar Systems Design, see Przeworski and Teune, (1970).
3 Not all religious groups are alike in Turkey. See Kuru (2005).

This paper argues that institutional differences in state-religion relations instead explain the observed variation across Turkish and Egyptian religious groups / actors' attitudes toward democratization. In summary, the paper shows that prior to the rise of political Islamic and grass-root religious movements in the 1970s Turkey and Egypt differed in their institutional state-religion relations. More specifically, in the beginning of the 1970s, the Turkish state was in full control of the mosques but with no religious office attached to it to justify its policies. The Egyptian state, however, controlled only a tiny portion of the mosques with two religious offices at the top of them. These institutional differences then put Turkey and Egypt unto different historical trajectories, in the course of which religious groups in Turkey helped the Turkish political system move closer to liberal democracy while those in Egypt obstructed, not necessarily intentionally, the democratization of Egyptian political system.

My argument also emphasizes the importance of the timing of institutional change. Even though the Egyptian state nationalized overwhelming majority of the mosques throughout the 1980s and the 1990s, it did not have the same impact on the outcome. The paper argues that the highly politicized environment of the 1970s, privately-controlled mosques in Egypt turned into centers of agitation and criticisms, which forced the Egyptian state to rely more and more on religious offices to defend itself. Doing so opened a venue within the political system to be utilized by religious groups to Islamize the state and society. This came at a great cost, however. Religious groups in fact pushed further away the other societal groups with whom they could have collaborated against the regime. Hence, we have the great widening rift between the Islamists and the liberals in Egypt (Rubin, 2006).

Exactly the opposite occurred in Turkey. Institutional state-religion relations have not provided a venue for Islamic groups in Turkey to islamize the state and society from top to the bottom. Lacking state power to correct practices and norms deemed un-Islamic helped the Islamists and Islamic groups in the long run. Their relations with other societal groups have not deteriorated to the extent it has done in Egypt. Therefore, when the state turned against religious groups in the late 1990s, they found strong allies among the liberals, women's right activities, Kurds, Jews and Alawites. This broad societal coalition enabled and pushed the Justice and Development Party toward undertaking reforms that have liberalized Turkish political system.

The next section discusses the literature on Islam and democracy and deals with how this paper contributes to it. Then, the paper discusses what

institutional state-religion relations Turkey and Egypt had in the beginning of the 1970s and how their institutional structures shaped the playing ground in their respective political settings. The final section summarizes.

The Literature: Islam and Democracy

Scholars proposed different reasons for the exceptional resistance to liberalization of political regimes in the Middle East, reasons ranging from the presence of state violence (Crystal, 1994; Bellin, 2005), to the weakness of civil society (Ibrahim, 1995; Langohr, 2004) and to rentier economy (Beblawi and Luciano, 1987; Anderson, 1995; Ross, 2001).[4] Islam is also found to be responsible. Several studies have shown that there is a strong negative relationship between Islam and Democracy (Barro, 1999; Midlarsky, 1998; Karatnycky, 2002; Fish, 2002; Ross, 2001). Fish (2002), for example, shows that there is a big difference between Muslim countries and non-Muslim countries in Freedom House and Polity scores, the former scoring far worse than the latter in both measures of democratization. Likewise, Ross (2001) found that controlling all other factors Islam negatively affects the democratic prospective of a country. Only dissenting voice, Przeworski (2002) could not find a negative relationship between Islam and democracy.

Whether religions can play a role in transition to democracies has attracted scholarly attention (Huntington, 1991; Marquand and Nettler, 2000; Diamond, Plattner and Costopoulos, 2005; Bruma, 2010). The approach in the literature to Islam's potential contribution to democracy is generally ideational, the debate mainly turning around the question, is Islam as a religion compatible with democracy? The hitherto debate confirms Alfred Stepan (2005)'s observation. That is, no religion is inherently pro-democratic or anti-democratic. Like all other religions, Islam is quite open to multiple, sometimes conflicting, interpretations. Reflecting this, scholars in the field have expressed two opposite views on Islam and democracy: one view sees Islam as incompatible with democracy (Huntington, 1993; Kedourie, 1994; Long and Reich, 1986; Pipes, 1983), the other view sees compatible (Esposito and Voll,1996; Abou El Fadl, 2003).

Islam's position on democracy is truly a conundrum. Even the same principle might lead the scholars to quite opposite conclusions. For example, drawing upon Bernard Lewis, Judith Miller (1993:50-51) argues,

4 For a collection of articles on the exceptional resistance of authoritarianism in the Middle East, see also two edited volumes by Posusney and Angrist (2005) and Schlumberger (2007).

> "Devout Muslims believe that legitimate authority comes from God alone. And since the ruler derives his power from God and the holy law, and not from the people, defying authority has been tantamount to defying God… Against such a backdrop, autocracy has been the norm, and the notions of plurality, self-criticism and disagreement –all essential features of democracy –face an uphill, though not impossible, battle in winning widespread cultural acceptance."

John E. Esposito and John O. Voll (1996:25), however, argues that the very same principle, "the absolute sovereignty of God makes any human hierarchy impossible, since before God all humans are equal… A hierarchical, dictatorial system has historically been condemned as non-Islamic. As early as Muawiya… the label "king" (malik) was a negative term for arbitrary personal domination. A dictator or king who claimed sovereignty was not a legitimate ruler."[5]

This dominant ideational approach, therefore, is not useful in tackling the negative empirical relationship found between Islam and democracy.[6] Instead some other scholars have adopted an alternative approach. Rather than asking whether Islam as a religion is compatible with democracy or not, these scholars wonder how the Muslims view democracy as a political system (Inglehart and Norris, 2001; Rose, 2002; Bratton, 2003; Melia, 2003; Jamal and Tessler, 2008; Rowley and Smith, 2009). The findings unanimously point out that the Muslims are not necessarily against democracy. Inglehart and Norris (2001) in fact argues for a stronger statement, which is reproduced by Rowley and Smith (2009). In the words of the latter (2009: 277), "Muslim populations are more supportive of democracy on average than are non-Muslim populations."

These two approaches represent two potential research avenues the Islam–democracy relationship gives rise to. Yet, there is another, and more fruitful I believe, avenue. That relates to the question of Muslim agency in democratization: can Islamic groups or institutions take part in the democratization of the Middle East? As Asef Bayat (2007:6) notes, "the compatibility

5 In presenting Islam as compatible with democracy, John Esposito and John Voll draws upon several Sunni and Shi'a Islamic thinkers and scholars, among whom were Abu al-Ala al-Mawdudi, Muhammad Hamidullah, Fazlur Rahman, Baqir al Sadr, and Muhammad Iqbal.

6 See Anderson (1995) for a powerful critique of this approach. Eva Bellin (2005:24) also raises a critical challenge: "other world cultures, notably Catholicism and Confucianism, have at different times been accused of incompatibility with democracy; yet these cultural endowments have not prevented countries in Latin America, southern Europe or East Asia from democratizing."

or incompatibility of Islam and democracy is not a matter of philosophical speculation but of political struggle. It is not as much a matter of texts as it is a balance of power between those who want a democratic religion and those who pursue an authoritarian version." Neither an abstract theology nor atomized individuals in the Muslim world, but organized religious groups can give material power to democratization. Therefore, when religious groups do or do not espouse democracy is critical to understanding the democratization of the political regimes in the Middle East.

There are two strands of scholarly analysis tackling the question of Muslim agency as a democratizing force in the Middle East.

One strand emphasizes the proto-modern character of contemporary Islamist movements a la Michael Walzer's the Puritans in his *the Revolution of the Saints*, or, Nilufer Gole's veiled girls in her *the Forbidden Modern*. Drawing from the works of Sami Zubaida (1993), James Piscatori and Dale Eickelman (1993), and Bjorn Olav Utvik (2003), Nader Hashemi (2009) powerfully claim that contemporary Islamist movements destroy the associates of traditional order and bring modernity to the Islamic world. Aware of the possibility that modernity does not necessarily bring liberal democracy only, but might also fascist-totalitarian systems, Hashemi then argues, based on the examples of Indonesia and Turkey, that a secular understanding of Islam is necessary to reconcile Islam and democracy and Muslims should adopt that understanding to be agents of democratization in their countries. But, that is precisely the question. How do Muslims develop and adopt such an understanding of Islam? This paper rather emphasizes the importance of secularity of state institutions, which is, at the basic level, the state does not legitimize itself on religious grounds through a religious office. Such an arrangement creates a more conducive environment for Muslims and Muslim religious groups to help democratization. In and of itself, secular understanding of Islam does not lead to Muslim agency of democratization.[7]

The other strand singles out the example of Justice and Development Party in Turkey as a democratizing force and argues that Islamist religious actors can play decisive roles in bringing democracy to the Middle East under certain conditions (Turam, 2007; Yavuz, 2009; Hale and Ozbudun, 2010). However fruitful they might be, these studies suffer from that they are one-case studies, making only occasional references to the other Muslim countries. Because no systematic comparison is made, these studies fail

7 A further research inquiry on why Muslims in Turkey and Indonesia have adopted a secular understand of Islam is going to be fruitful. The type of secularism these two Muslim countries have historically adopted may be a good starting point. See Kuru (2009).

to see that the conditions that are singled out as critical to Muslim agency in Turkish democratization also exist in other Muslim countries. For example, Yavuz (2009)'s critical variable, the emergence of a Muslim bourgeosie class, is equally valid observation for Egypt. At the end, Turkey turns into an exceptional and unique case in the Islamic world.

In an attempt to go beyond Turkish exceptionalism and uniqueness, Berna Turam (2007:154) argues, "the Turkish trajectory cannot be explained by either the unique characteristics of Islam and Islamists in Turkey or by Ataturk's heritage of authoritarian modernization and the laicist Republic." However, Turam (2007:154)'s suggestion is not equally helpful, it is too general: "I argue that the source of change was the shifting linkages between the state and Islam, shifts that have motivated both sides to revise and readapt their attitudes and responses towards each other."

This paper fits into the second strand. To avoid the latter's weaknesses it adopts comparative historical analysis. Asef Bayat's remarkable work, *Making Islam Democratic*, provides a good example of how comparative approach helps shed lights on our question. Comparing two cases from the Middle East, Iran and Egypt, Bayat (2007) asks why post-Islamism produced a pro-democracy movement in Iran, but not in Egypt. Bayat (2007) persuasively argues that Islamism brought an Islamic theocratic regime in Iran through a revolution. Not born as a social movement, Islamism in government has tried to Islamize the society. A pro-democracy movement then emerged as a reaction to it, bringing together youth, women and intellectuals. But, in Egypt, Islamism emerged as a social movement and has failed to topple down the regime. Post-Islamism failed to generate a pro-democracy movement in the Egyptian society for its predecessor successfully islamized the society and the state. Therefore, simplifying Bayat's elegant argument, a pro-democratic movement would be futile in Egypt because there was nothing to react. By looking at Turkey, which also witnessed Islamism as a social movement, this paper provides an alternative trajectory of democratization in the Middle East and also shows that the nature of Islamic revivalism in a country alone does not adequately explain Muslim agency in democratization.

Kalyvas (1998, 2000) points out the centrality of the moderation of religious groups for them to play a constructive role in the consolidation of democracies. My paper introduces one additional, and more stringent, condition: religious groups should not only moderate, but also will to work with other societal groups.[8] But, how do we get there? The context definitely

8 Turam (2007)'s contribution is critical on this point.

plays a role. Kalyvas (1996) and Yavuz (2009) find out that the existence of a threat to, and a direct attack on, religious groups motivate them to take part in the political system. But, this does not necessarily turn them into democratic forces. In Egypt and other Muslim countries, religious groups have been regularly subjected to state violence. Likewise, Gill (1998)'s argument does not help in understanding the variation between Turkey and Egypt: in both countries, there is no historically dominant one giant religious organization, like the Catholic Church in Latin America, facing competition from newly emerging religious groups. Influential religious groups, such as, Fethullah Gulen movement in Turkey and Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, are pretty recent phenomena, and cannot be compared to the Catholic Church.

My paper emphasizes the centrality of institutional state-religion relations in bringing out Muslim agency of democratization.[9] I argue that institutional state-religion relations in Turkey paved the way for the formation of a coalition between Islamists and Liberals in Turkey, on the shoulder of which the ruling party, the Justice and Development Party, has implemented liberalizing reforms. On the other hand, institutional state-religion relations in Egypt prevented the formation of such a coalition and drove a wedge between Islamists and Liberals. My argument echoes Lust-Okar (2005)'s finding that the authoritarian Arab regimes effectively manipulate the opponents so as to divide, and thus weaken, them. My argument also points to the divided nature of the opposition in Egypt. But, unlike Lust-Okar (2005), the division among the opposition in Egypt is the unintended consequence of institutional state-religion relations, not of some manipulative strategy of the regime.

The next section looks at how institutional state-religion relations in Turkey and Egypt differed from each other when a wave of Islamic revivalism engulfed both countries in the 1970s.

Institutional Dimensions and the Historical Evolution of State-Religion Relations in Turkey and Egypt

Throughout the 20th century, the states in the Middle East expanded their activities into the domains formerly controlled by religious institutions (Owen, 2005). Especially in education, judiciary and social services, the state made the furthest inroads, either completely eradicated or drastically reduced the role of religious institutions in these fields. Like all other states in other parts

9 There is a huge and growing literature on how institutions impact politics. See, for example, Steinmo, Thelen and Longstreth (1992), Thelen (1999)

of the world (Fox, 2008), the states in the Middle East also made inroads into purely religious services, however, under different institutional arrangements structures.

At the institutional level, two dimensions are particularly salient for the Middle Eastern states. The first dimension asks whether the state employs a religious body or an office, in case needed, to issue religious rulings or fatwas in support of its policies. Either the state has a religious office, like the office of grand mufti, or a body of religious scholars, like a council of religious scholars (ulama). Or, the state simply does not have such an office. The second dimension asks to what extent the state controls and owns religious institutions, particularly mosques. On one extreme the state has no control, mosques, seminaries, and other religious institutions operating on their own resources and discretion. On the other extreme, the state has complete control, expelling potential rivals from the market, nationalizing mosques, seminaries, and other religious institutions, and paying the salaries of the clergy.

How have institutional state-religion relations in Turkey and Egypt developed along these two dimensions? The idea of a religious office issuing religious rulings on state policies is not alien to the Middle East. Historically, the office of sheikh al Islam[10] in the center and its provincial partners, the offices of grand muftis, had served this function in the Ottoman Empire.[11] Therefore, when the modern state builders came to power in the formerly Ottoman provinces, they found a religious office as already attached to the state bureaucracy: sheikh al Islam in Turkey and grand mufti in Egypt. Between the two states, only the Turkish state abolished the office of Sheikh al Islam in 1924, and has not instituted a new one to serve a similar function. The Egyptian not only kept the office of grand mufti, but also continued to rely on the religious support of Al-Azhar institution of higher Islamic education and established a new institution, Supreme Council of Islamic Affairs, to reconcile Islam and socialism.

On the second dimension[12], the two states differed as well. Between the two, only the Turkish state established full control over religious institutions, all mosques and their employees being incorporated into the state appara-

10 For the evolution of the office of Shaykh al Islam, see Bulliet (1972)

11 Ahmad Bey (1837-1855) of Tunisia granted the title of Sheikh al Islam to the senior Hanafi mufti while the senior Maliki mufti continued to have the title Bash Mufti (Head Mufti in Turkish). Green (1978:33).

12 Baskan (2011) surveys state-religion relations on this dimension across all major Middle Eastern states and relate the difference in their different initial positions to the strength of the state at the beginning of the reform period.

tus through the directorate of religious affairs. In addition, the state banned all Sufi orders and forbade any religious activity outside the state, severely punishing any private religious activities. The Egyptian state was not as ambitious as the Turkish state in controlling the mosques. For example, in 1962, the Egyptian state controlled only 17 percent of the total mosques in Egypt, extending aid to another 7 percent (Moustafa, 2000:8).

In the rest of the century, the Turkish state remained as the sole provider of religious services. Independent religious groups tried to enter into the religious market in Turkey by especially opening Qur'an schools. However, the Turkish state periodically nationalized these private schools (Gokacti, 20005). The mosques have remained the exclusive property of the Turkish state, no independent religious group getting a hold over any portion of it. The only serious attempt was effectively thwarted by the state.[13] In Egypt, the ratio of state-controlled mosques among all mosques remained almost the same until the 1980s. In 1983, the state directly controlled just 19 percent of all mosques and extended aid to another 27 percent of mosques under private control (Moustafa, 2000). However, after 1983, the Egyptian state pursued an ambitious project of putting all mosques under its control, increasing the number of state mosques to 61,000 out of a total 70,000 mosques by 2001 (US Department of State, 2001).[14]

In short, in the pre-1970 period, institutional state-religions in Turkey and Egypt stood at opposite corners. In the post-1970 period, the Turkish state managed to keep its position while the Egyptian state moved toward Turkey's side only on the second dimension. How did this difference between Turkey and Egypt impact the attitudes of religious groups toward democratization? This is the question now we turn to.

Shaping the Context: Muslim Agency in Democratization

In the 1970s a wave of Islamic movements engulfed the whole Middle East, Turkey and Egypt being no exception. Both countries witnessed the reemergence or reappearance of religious groups of all sorts demanding more presence in their respective public spaces. There was a critical difference between the two countries though. As discussed in the previous

13 For the details, see Mumcu (1987).

14 In Egypt, it is more likely that this state control is simply on paper. It does not mean that mosques lost their independence vis-à-vis the state. I thank Ibrahim Arafat for pointing out this for me.

section, both countries stood at opposite corners in terms of institutional state-religion relations and hence were endowed with different capacities to cope with the crisis.

In Egypt, to start with, the state had put only a portion of the mosques under its control by the 1980s. During the 1950s and 1960s this had not presented a problem to the state as the regime under Gamal Abdal Nasser had undertaken numerous populist measures, from the nationalization of Suez Canal to the distribution of land. Expanding educational system and health services, the regime strongly entrenched itself finding no difficulty in eradicating its opponents, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood. With the defeat in the 1967 war against Israel, the authoritarian coalition formed under Nasser began to crumble and completely shattered under Anwar Sadat. By implementing neo-liberal economic policies –a part of which was cut back the subsidies to the basic food items-, flirting with newly emerging Islamic groups and supporting them, making peace with, and paying a visit to, Israel, Sadat alienated almost all sectors of the Egyptian society.

In the highly politicized environment of the 1970s, the private mosques eventually became highly politicized. Especially, after Sadat's historical visit to Israel in 1977 the mosques turned into centers of political agitation against the Sadat regime. Not only the independent clerics, but also all grass root religious groups raised heated criticisms of the regime on religious grounds. The believer-President of the early 1970s began to be charged with committing to acts of an unbeliever. When he was assassinated in 1981, his assassin, Khalid Islambuli, would say, 'I have killed pharaoh' (Esposito, 1984).

To ward off political criticisms raised in the mosque pulpits, the regime in Egypt has adopted two strategies. First, it initiated an ambitious project of putting all mosques under state control. As a result, by 2001, close to 90 per cent of all mosques in Egypt were put under the control of the state in Egypt. With this move the Egyptian regime in fact closed down a critical institutional channel to the forces of opposition, which could pose a serious challenge to the regime. New graduates of al Azhar were thus politically pacified through state employment, in return, they themselves served to depoliticize the masses through state-owned mosques.

Second, in the face of increasing religious criticisms, the regime needed to polish its Islamic image. In this vein it began to rely more and more on the office of grand mufti and al Azhar to justify its policies. It was not new in Egypt that the regime sought religious sanctification for its major policies. Nasser did so, for example. Anwar Sadat simply continued this strategy. Under Hosni Mubarak, the reliance on religious offices became more regular

(Esposito, 1984). In tandem with this reliance religious offices have gained stronger voice in the process of political decision-making in Egypt. Reflecting this shift, the Shaykh of Al Azhar acquired the status of prime minister financial affairs and in state protocol in 1993. One year later Al Azhar obtained the final authority over censorship in Egypt as the Council of State made Al Azhar's suggestions binding for the Ministry of Culture.[15]

In the meantime, the Muslim Brotherhood had expanded its supporters among professional classes. By the end of the 1980s, the Muslim Brothers were in control of major professional syndicates. The last major syndicate, that of the lawyers, also fell into their hands in 1992. Under the leadership of the son of Hasan Al Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, the Muslim Brothers managed to win eighteen of twenty-four seats of the board of the Lawyers' Syndicate (Bayat, 2007; Moustafa 2010).

The impact of all of these changes is not hard to predict. The religious offices in reality turned into legal venues to be utilized by the Muslim Brotherhood to Islamize the Egyptian legal and political system. It worked quite well to the extent that the government and the opposition agreed on the Islamic nature of the Egyptian state. For example, in 1992, the Minister of Interior assured that the "Egyptian government would never allow the establishment of a secular state." In a similar tone, in 2000, a Muslim Brother leader acknowledged, "Egypt was an Islamic state."[16]

The Islamization of the Egyptian state was not solely the work of the Muslim Brothers. The state was also willing to change accordingly. In fact, the Egyptian regime and grass-root religious groups have been competing with each other to prove to the public that their religiosity is more resolute than the other side.[17] Still, the Muslim Brotherhood joined the state in its self-Islamizing project by utilizing the venues within the state, waging a cultural war against practices deemed un-Islamic through fatwa-issuing religious offices, and, finally, public morality policing (Ismail, 2006). However, it proved to be self-defeating strategy. In the long run religious groups in Egypt missed

15 These moves should not be seen as the fatwa-issuing religious offices have overpowered the regime. Such a view will assume a dichotomy between the two. They are part of the regime in Egypt. Hence, these moves are just re-distribution of power within the regime's institutions.

16 Cited in Bayat (2007:169).

17 A telling anecdote is the strong reaction by then the Minister of Culture, Farouk Hosni, received when he publicly criticized the increasing number of Egyptian females wearing veil and indicated his unwillingness to work with a secretary wearing a veil in his office. More than the Muslim Brother representatives, members of the ruling National Democratic Party criticized him for his comments. I thank Ibrahim Arafat for bringing this case to my attention.

a historical chance to build a strong societal coalition against the regime in Egypt with other groups, especially with the liberals, who were equally critical of the regime. Therefore, when the Egyptian state turned brutally against the Muslim Brothers in the mid-1990s (Bayat, 2007), they were practically alone against the regime armed forces.

Among all initiatives the Muslim Brothers had undertaken, probably the most fatal ones to their relations with other groups in Egypt were their extensive initiative of 'hisba' cases and strong opposition to secularization of women's rights in Egypt.

Several verses and hadiths encourage, even oblige, individual Muslims to take action into their hands to promote the good and prevent the evil. The term 'hisba' refers to this individual Muslim obligation in Islam, which, if interpreted accordingly, opens the way for public morality policing. If hisba remained exclusively an individual endeavor, its impact could be contained. But, in Egypt, the court system declared its willingness to provide state power to individuals who want to promote the good and prevent the evil. In 1995, the Cairo Court of Appeals decided, a decision also confirmed by the Court of Cassation, "Hisba, according to the Court and the Islamic scholars, is for God, and is for the regulation of good and the prevention of evil, and is therefore a necessary practice for all Muslims. It is the duty of all, and all Muslims should practice it by going to the court to file suits, or to provide testimony."[18] Supported and even encouraged by the court system, Islamist lawyers began to utilize this venue to correct things deemed un-Islamic and initiated hundreds of hisba cases against prominent Egyptian scholars and intellectuals. Islamist lawyers filed fifty-four cases in 1995 alone and another eighty cases between 1996 and 1998. Even the acclaimed Egyptian Nobel prizewinner in literature, Naguib Mahfuz, could escape the wrath of Islamist lawyers (Bayat, 2007; Moustafa, 2010).

In the most publicized incidence, Islamist lawyers achieved an infamous victory against Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd, professor of Islamic studies and Arabic Literature, a victory that in fact started the whole Hisba wars. Shortly, in 1992, Abu Zayd applied for promotion to professorship position in his department at Cairo University. A member of the Promotions Committee, Sheikh Abd al Sabur Shahin, described Abu Zayd's work as blasphemous, on which ground Abu Zayd was denied promotion. From then on, a group of Islamist Lawyers took up the cause and filed a hisba case against Abu Zayd, demanding the local court to annul his marriage with his wife, Ibti-

18 Quoted in Moustafa (2010:21)

hal Yunis. Upon the dogged pursuit of Islamist lawyers, the Egyptian court system eventually declared Abu Zayd an apostate and divorced him from his wife on the ground that a Muslim woman cannot marry to an apostate (Sfeir, 1998). Abu Zayd's tragedy did not end there. An Islamic group, Ayman Al Zawahiri's Islamic Jihad, declared that he should also be killed on the ground that a Muslim couldn't abandon Islam. Left with no choice, Abu Zayd and his wife left Egypt and settled down in the Netherlands. On July 5, 2010, Abu Zayd passed away in Cairo.

Religious groups, including Muslim Brotherhood, have always been at the forefront of opposition to changes in the Personal Status Law, the only field of law that has not been secularized in Egypt. Thereby, they stood against the Liberal-Feminist project to improve the legal status of women in Egypt. Even on a minor issue, let alone secularizing the whole personal law, the Feminists had to go through prolonged struggles to introduce any change. One such seemingly minor issue concerned the rights of women to divorce their husbands. In a progressive move, Anwar Sadat introduced a change in the Personal Status law, named after its progenitor, his wife, Jihan. According to the Personal Status Law of 1929, women could get divorce on the ground that marriage was harmful. Jihan's law extended the conditions under which women could claim harm to polygamy. Despite the opposition to the law of Islamic groups, including Muslim Brotherhood, Sadat went ahead and passed the law.

The law stayed in effect until the High Constitutional Court abrogated it in 1985. In 2000, the Feminists managed to introduce a change in the Personal Status Law. Women's right to divorce was expanded, which, however, came at a cost: women could "obtain a divorce by a court order, even without the husband's consent, if she agrees to pay him back the dowry and the rest of her material rights" (Mashhour, 2005: 583). Even more telling is the fact that the support of Al Azhar was critical to the victory of the Feminists as they brought old court cases supporting the practice.[19] Even the support of Al Azhar did not change the position of Islamic groups on the issue.

The Islamic groups continued to oppose the initiatives celebrated by the feminists. For example, in 2008, some Muslim Brotherhood representatives in the parliament opposed the law that criminalized the female genital mutilation. Likewise, in 2008 and 2009, MB representatives objected to "the application of legal penalties for marriage under the age of eighteen years, which the Brotherhood considered a violation of the Shari'a-based legal age of

19 I thank Amira Sonbol, Professor of History and Islamic Law at Georgetown University, for her insights, which made otherwise complicated topic easier for me.

sixteen years," and to the law that enabled "mothers –including single mothers- to pass their family names to their children." In 2009, they also objected the law, which specified a quota for women in the parliament (Hamzawy and Brown, 2010:27-28). In their 2009 party program, Muslim Brotherhood denied women and Copts to be the head of the state, arguing "duties and responsibilities assumed by the head of state, such as army commanding, are in contradiction with the socially acceptable roles for women."[20]

Hisba wars and opposition to changes in women's rights were in fact part of the broader Islamist struggle in Egypt. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, Islamic groups in general and Muslim Brotherhood in particular had waged an unending cultural war against movies, books, music and billboards (Ismail, 2006; Bayat, 2007). In 2000s, the Muslim Brotherhood representatives carried out the same struggle in the parliament, attempting, for example, to increase punishments for adultery, consumption and purchase of alcohol and gambling (Hamzawy and Brown, 2010).

With every victory they claimed and every attempt they undertook, Islamist groups in Egypt in fact burned all the bridges with other societal forces in Egypt with whom they could have collaborated in forcing the regime to move more closer to liberal democracy. Instead, they widened the deep rift that had already separated the two groups. As a result, the regime in Egypt could entrench itself even more strongly in the face of a fragmenting civil society at war with each other.

The 1970s were also Turkey's crisis decade. Faltering state-led industrialization, crumbling economy, deteriorating living conditions in shantytowns that had mushroomed around big cities in the preceding decades, increasing unemployment rates, soaring inflation, widespread bankruptcies in the informal economy that employed the majority of the urban populations created a restless urban youth agitating for a socialist revolution in Turkey. The 1973 Oil Crisis, the 1977 debt crisis and the second Oil Crisis of 1979, and US' arms embargo all added further strains on the Turkish society. In the face of this overwhelming pile of problems successive coalition governments could not bring political stability. Reflecting this fact eleven different governments were formed between 1971 and 1980, the longest lasting for two years and two months only. The escalating problems eventually brought street violence between the left and the right. In the most tragic case, more than one hundred Turkish Alawites, including children and women, were killed in December of 1978.

20 Quoted in Abdel-Latif (2008:1).

In the same decade, Turkey was also engulfed by a powerful wave of religious activism. This activism also found a political outlet as an influential Sufi Sheikh, Mehmet Zahid Kotku, encouraged and supported the formation of a political party, National Order Party. Under the leadership of Necmettin Erbakan, the party managed to be a partner in three coalition governments between 1973 and 1980.

Both Turkey and Egypt therefore were passing through similar socio-economic challenges. However, their highly politicized environments differed in one critical way, the difference stemming from the differences in prevailing institutional state-religion relations. Unlike Egypt, where the state controlled only a minority of the mosques and kept a religious office in the beginning of the 1970s, in Turkey, the state had managed to keep intact its institutional relations with religion established by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. All mosques in Turkey were under full control of the state and their staff was state employees. More importantly, there was no religious office to be utilized to justify state policies in case of a necessity. The state institution running the mosques, the Directorate of Religious Affairs, had remained largely as an administrative institution without any jurisdiction to judge state policies on religious grounds. This configuration of state-religion relations radically changed the playing ground for religious groups in Turkey.

First of all, in that politicized environment, the mosques and their staff remained largely apolitical. The Islamist Party-in government had attempted to politicize, but simply failed to mobilize them behind its cause. As noted, all mosque officials and religious counsels were already state employees having possibly no desire to follow a professor of mechanical engineer, Necmettin Erbakan. Therefore, a counter-movement within the Directorate of Religious Affairs easily and swiftly took effective measures against the politicization campaign of mosques.[21] As a result, throughout the 1970s, the pulpits had remained as weak grounds that raise religious charges against the state.

Mosques had not only remained neutral, but also demobilized and depoliticized the masses as the more activist mosque preachers, for example, Fethullah Gulen, called for order and respect for authority. In its struggle to combat the communist-socialist threat, the state also enjoyed the voluntary activity of religious groups. Many leading religious figures in Turkey saw

21 One of the leading figures in the politization campaign of the Directorate of Religious Affairs was Cemallettin Kaplan, who served as a religious counsel in the province of Adana, later moved to Germany and declared his caliphate. For the details of this incidence, see Mumcu (1998).

atheistic communism as the real threat, not secular Kemalism. Therefore, they spearheaded the formation of hundreds of local organizations to combat communism in Turkey. Many of them also being employees of the state, these religious figures refrained from criticizing the Turkish state on religious grounds.

In a sense, the Turkish state had never been forced to defend itself on religious grounds. With no religious office to do so, the state had never been obliged to create a new one or to convert the Directorate of Religious Affairs into such an office. Therefore, the concessions made to appease religious revivalism have remained minimal in Turkey compared to the other Middle East states. The military coup of 1980, which effectively ended the crisis decade, just instituted a mandatory religious course in school system. It was such a major concession that one influential religious leader, Fethullah Gulen, claimed in an interview with Mehmet Gundem of Milliyet Newspaper that the leader of the coup could even enter the heaven even if he does not do any other good deed.[22]

The 1980 military coup was a total coup. It not only stopped the street fights, but also destroyed the social networks that sustained them. The left and the right in jail, religious groups filled in those social networks. Thereby, the military coup, even though unintentionally, paved the way for further strengthening of religious groups in Turkey. Economic liberalization the coup leaders had started under their authoritarian grip eventually created a strong and independent bourgeoisie class. This moneyed class would be the financial backbone of religious groups[23]. Because mosques have remained closed to any organized religious activity, religious groups had expanded their activities into other fields, such as, education, business, finance, and media. By the mid-1990s, religious groups were running newspapers, TV channels, radio stations, private schools, university and high school dormitories with supporters from a wide range of societal groups, including state officials, petty traders, big businessmen, workers and university students.

The high echelons of the Turkish state did not remain neutral any longer in the face of this rising religious activism. Supported by a strong aggressive media campaign, they forced the Islamist party, then in government, in February 1997 to sign a document, known as February 28 decisions, which

22 Fethullah Gulen, "Zorunlu Din Dersi Evren'in Sevabi," Milliyet Newspaper, January 17, 2005. The relevant part of the interview can be found at http://tr.fgulen.com/content/view/8298/15/

23 See Yavuz (2009) on the effect of economic liberalization on the rise of religious groups and the Justice and Development Party in Turkey.

asked the government to take strong measures against the Islamic groups. Four months later, the prime minister, famous Islamist, Necmettin Erbakan, resigned from the office. The Constitutional Court closed down his party in January 1998 and banned Erbakan and his close associates from politics for five years. Done with the Islamist political party, the state turned against grass-root religious groups. A wave of negative media campaign started especially against Fethullah Gulen, the leader of the strongest religious group in Turkey. He timely left Turkey in 1999 and settled down in Pennsylvania, USA. Shortly thereafter, the chief prosecutor of Ankara State Security Court accused him of being in complicity against the regime and demanded death penalty for him.

It was a long and painful period, but not a fatal one. Fethullah Gulen's group continued to expand their activities, especially abroad. After Central Asia, the group has expanded its educational activities in East Europe, Far East Asia, Africa, Latin America and North America. Along with educational activities came business relations, the group's merchants and businessmen undertaking ventures in new continents. The international environment of the group has thus remained predominantly secular. The group has made no strong effort to enter the Arab world, for example. This is in great contrast to the main environment of the Muslim Brotherhood, which has remained predominantly conservative Arab societies.[24] The group even strengthened its position in Turkey as its newspaper, Zaman, reached record daily sales and became the largest newspaper in Turkey.

In the meantime, political Islamic movement in Turkey gave birth to a new party, Justice and Development Party in 2001, led by the triumvirate of three dissident pupils of Erbakan, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Abdullah Gul and Bulent Arinc. The party scored an impressive victory in 2003 elections and formed a single party government for the first time since 1991. Failing to finish off Fethullah Gulen's group, the high echelons of the Turkish state became even more alarmed. Now, they were to face even a more formidable opponent, a popular religious party supported by almost all grass-root religious groups, especially their recent target, Fethullah Gulen group.

Since then the high echelons of the Turkish state have not refrained from constraining themselves in expressing their distaste, disfavor, and disappointment with the ruling party in Turkey. The generals used the opening

24 Sayyid (2007:216) makes the same argument for all opposition groups in the Arab world: "democratic opposition groups in Arab countries do not entertain friendly relations with political parties and civil society institutions in the West and therefore receive any substantial support from the West."

and graduation ceremonies of high military schools, the high judges the opening ceremonies of the new legal year, and university presidents opening ceremonies of the new education year, to bash the prime minister and other ministers attending these events over the direction Turkey has taken. The Constitutional Court came very close to shutting down the party in 2008, the closure decision missing one vote only. In the next seven years, the Justice and Development Party has not only held onto power in Turkey, but also scored critical victories against the Kemalist forces situated in high offices in the Turkish state. Given its recent victory in the referendum held in September 12, 2010, it is not going to be a wild expectation that the party is going to stay in power.

The survival of the Justice and Development Party has critically depended on the strong support it enjoyed from grass-root religious groups. In addition to the party apparatus, religious groups, especially, Fethullah Gulen group, massively mobilized their supporters to support the amendments the party wanted to make in the constitution.

Unlike their counterparts in Egypt, the Fethullah Gulen group and the Justice and Development Party have managed to isolate their opponents, the Kemalist forces, not only within Turkey but also in the international arena. They have built bridges with almost all other societal forces, including the liberals, the Kurds, the Alawites, the Armenians, and the Jews, in Turkey, and especially, the Fethullah Gulen group massively invested in interfaith dialogue in the US and Europe. A glance at the columnists and op-ed writers of two newspapers, Zaman, owned by the Fethullah Gulen group amd Yenisafak, owned by people close the JDP, will be sufficient to see the broad coalition at work against the Kemalist establishment. Zaman Newspaper's most recent recruitment, for example, is Joost Lagendijk, a former member of the European Parliament for the Dutch Greens.

In building domestic and international alliances against the Kemalist forces, the credibility of the group and the party and the trust invested in them by domestic and international actors owed a great deal to both actors' stubborn dedication to liberal values. As Yildiz Atasoy puts it into the title of her book, both actors married their understanding of Islam with Neoliberalism (Atasoy, 2009). They could credibly do so because of the way the prevailing institutional state-religion relations have shaped religious discourse in Turkey. Religious activities have remained the monopoly of the state in Turkey. Religious groups have undertaken them in private and instead diverted their energies to expand into other fields. This diversion necessitated that religious groups separate their private piety from their public engagements.

Then came along secularization of their public discourse. No religious figure in Turkey has ever recommended, for example, polygamy, or implementing full implications of Islamic jurisprudence for women's rights.[25] Likewise, the Justice and Development party has employed not a religious argument, say, to lift the headscarf ban in universities, but a liberal one, which view it as freedom of religion. Some views of Fethullah Gulen have even angered the conservatives in Turkey. In the heyday of state aggression toward religious groups, Fethullah Gulen made a statement that some interpreted as giving an implicit approval to university students who have to take off their headscarves if necessary to continue their education. Despite the fears expressed by even prominent Turkish scholars, such as, Serif Mardin, religious groups have never become the moral policemen of the streets in Turkey. Therefore, unlike their counterparts in Egypt, the liberals, the feminists and the others have not experienced great tragic encounters with religious groups. I know of no single case in Turkey, for example, any liberal, or any feminist, or any movie producer being declared as apostate by any religious figure. Some secular Turks sincerely feared the increasing public visibility of religious symbols and life-styles. But, unlike their counter-parts in Egypt, their fear has been grounded not in what religious groups have done, but in what they can do in the future. Not all Turks shared the same fear, finding no compelling reason not to ally with the party and religious groups in liberalizing Turkish political system.

Conclusion

Starting in the 1970s, a region-wide Islamic activism engulfed both Turkey and Egypt. Since then, its agents, religious groups, have made inroads into different fields of life, from education to business, from public service to civil society. As they accumulated more and more social power, they have shaped their political systems. In Egypt, religious groups have managed to Islamize the state, with the unfortunate consequence of entrenching authoritarianism in Egypt, while in Turkey religious groups managed to push Turkey toward more liberal democracy. What explains this variation?

This paper argues that different institutionalization of state-religion relations in both countries provides the key to explaining this variation. Two

25 In a personal interview, held in New York, in April 2010, a follower and a disciple of Fethullah Gulen told me that Fethullah Gulen believes that no one can justify polygamy in the modern world on religious ground.

dimensions of institutional state-religion relations are particularly important. One dimension looks at the extent the state in any country controls the mosques and employs their staff. The other dimension looks at whether the state has a religious office to justice its policies. Institutional state-religion relations impacted the nature of Islamic revivalism, and hence, the playing ground, and endowed respective states with different capacities to cope with the problem.

In the beginning of the 1970s, Turkey and Egypt stood at opposite poles in terms of institutional state-religion relations. Turkey fully controlled the mosques and employed their staff with no religious office attached to the state. Egypt controlled only a small portion of the mosques with two religious offices attached to the state. In the highly politicized environment of the 1970s, the mosques had remained apolitical and neutral in Turkey while they turned into centers of agitation and criticism against the state. As a result, while the Turkish state, ironically the most secular of the two, faced no religious criticism, the Egyptian state faced strong religious criticism raised from the pulpits. Because of the lack of religious criticism, the Turkish state did have no incentive to re-create a religious office or convert the Directorate of Religious Affairs into one to defend itself. On the other hand, the Egyptian state had to rely more and more on the religious offices to defend its policies.

The Egyptian state's reliance on religious offices opened a venue within the Egyptian political system for grass-root religious groups to Islamize the state and society from the top to the bottom. Grass-root religious groups utilized this venue to wage a war against societal practices and norms they deemed un-Islamic. In proving its religiosity, the Egyptian state positively responded. As a result, Egyptian religious groups have pushed away other societal groups, the liberals, the Copts, and the feminists, with whom they could have collaborated in democratizing the Egyptian regime. Calculated or not, the Egyptian regime thus divided the opposition.

That opportunity arose in Turkey. Unable to play the role of moral policemen in the streets and devoid of any public power to inform state policies, religious groups in Turkey have turned their attention instead toward making inroads into education, finance, business, and media. In these diverse public and secular settings, as Berna Turam (2007) rightly observes, religious groups found plenty of opportunity to work with other societal groups. Therefore, when the Turkish state turned against religious groups, the latter could muster the support of a broad coalition of societal groups in thwarting off the state offense and initiating a new and more ambitious round of liberalizing the Turkish political system.

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Sufi Ethics: Answers of the Tradition to Contemporary Issues[1]

Huseyin Caldak & Kubilay Akman

Sufis from the East and the West have sought "the truth" through their mystical journeys towards "Unity" with the Divine Presence for centuries. Muraqaba (Sufi meditation), Dhikr (Remembrance of God) and other rituals have been practiced for spiritual growth and enlightenment in Sufi lodges (zawiya, khangah, tekke, Etc.). Although Sufism was born in Muslim civilization, it has spread around Europe, USA and other parts of the world, especially during late 20th Century and first decade of this century. Its peaceful message and emphasis on love reflected in the West through the poetry of Rumi and many other classics has allowed it to evolve into a global spiritual movement. In this paper, we are going to focus on Sufi Ethics, dervish lifestyle and the possible moral answers of this profound tradition to the problems of modern era. We are going to follow the ethical lines defined during history of Sufism, through works of Ibn Arabi, Mowlana Jelaluddin Rumi, Abdul-Qadir Gilani, Bahauddin Naqshband and other grandmasters of this spiritual/mystical movement. This paper will provide us with the basis for a discussion on the compatibility of these traditional moral codes with contemporary issues. Sufi lifestyle based on middle-path, modesty, contentment, peace, love and tolerance maybe the answer to the needs of contemporary individuals and societies. The purpose of this paper is to analyze this issue in terms of Ethics with an inter-disciplinary approach.

Throughout history, spiritual knowledge was an integral part of different civilizations. Sufism, as a spiritual discipline, evolved in the Arab civilization, as a mystical dimension of Islam. The words of Sufis followed the same routes with the spread of Islam reaching new Muslim societies. It has acted as a bridge between the different Muslim societies whether Arab, Persian, Turkish, Indian.etc. The universal message of Sufism is connecting these

1 Dedicated to Robert, for his Love to spirituality

societies together and as well as western societies during the 20th and 21st century.

In this paper, we will discuss basic Sufi norms for ethics and moral values and their potential to offer answers to the challenges of modern societies. In general, benefits of the modern life style are accepted globally, however, despite these benefits there are negative symptoms that have appeared on the social, cultural and environmental/ecological levels. In light of this several questions emerge: Can the Sufi message function as an alternative to the challenges faced by modern individuals and societies? Can the wisdom acquired through centuries be valuable in an entirely different social composition? What is the meaning of "the tradition" in a contemporary context?

1. Way of the Sufis

Sufism or Tasawwuf is an inherent dimension of Islam and has found its expressions from the early days of Islamic history till today. According to Islamic understanding of religious knowledge (Ilm), there are two other levels of "science": *Zahir* (external side of meaning/regulations) and *Batin* (inward/esoteric meanings). *Zahir* indicates everything seen and perceived without any esoteric initiation, as for *Batin,* it is not open to everybody and requires special training and rituals in order to reach awareness of this secret message. *Sufi*s have been devoted seekers of the latter for centuries, although they have been respectful to external regulations of religion. Sufism, as a part of Islam, was born in Arab civilization and has reached other societies thus becoming an international spiritual discipline. In the rich history of Sufism, many important Sufi masters (*Sheikh* or *Mursheed*) have written their works in many languages such as Arabic, Persian, Turkish, Indian, Urdu, English, etc. The Sufi way of life and knowledge is as universal as Islam, and is open to people from any background and any part of the world.

Sufi masters usually indicate that there are four piers/stages of religion and four corresponding positions based on them: *sharia* (Islamic law)*, tariqa* (mystical path)*, marifa* (spiritual knowledge) and *haqiqa* (truth) (Hüdâyî, 2006: 64, 86). According to Hajji Bektash Wali, founder of the Bektashi Sufi Order, human beings are created by God in four divisions and people in these four divisions have four ways of prayer, desires and states: First division consist of the *Abid* worshippers. These are the people of *sharia* and their origin is metaphorically "wind". Wind (air) is both a healer and power;

for this reason they worship to the *Haqq*[2] day and night. Second division is the *Zahid,* ascetics of Islam. They constitute tribes of *tariqa* and their origin is "fire". As it is expressed through this metaphor, they need to burn themselves symbolically all day and night. Third division is the *Arif,* knowers. They are originally from "water" and they are people of *marifa.* Water is clean and is a cleanser at the same time. For this reason, the *Arif* should be both clean and a cleanser. The fourth division is the *Muhib,* lovers. They are people of *haqiqa* (truth) and their origin comes from "Earth". Earth represents submission and resignation. Therefore, the *Muhib* should be in submission and resignation too (Velî, 1996: 2-5). Hajji Bektash Wali's definitions indicate that the four stages of religion complement each other. They are integral parts of Islam, although different but related levels of the spiritual seeker's journey. Ethics constitutes the cornerstones and framework of this spiritual journey.

Abu Hafs Al-Haddad declared that Sufism (Tasawwuf) consists of only good manners, i.e. ethics systemizing moral values. Good manners are like a crown of divine light, after you put it on your head, you can reach wherever you demand (İz, 1990: 54). In its essence, Sufism asserts nothing about shape, dress, attire and ceremonies. It is only about ethics: as it is explained by the *Hadith*[3]*,* Muslims should have moral values of Allah and his prophet Muhammed (pbuh) (İz, 1990: 57, 66). Sufi Master Ibrahim Efendi defined Sufism to be "*the secret of Glorious God, in the house of heart*." He believed that Sufism means to witness divine presence in everything around you. The Dervish (Sufi) experience of this feeling would lead to the admiration of Gods' secrets that dervishes see in everything (İz, 1990: 76, 77). When Sufis reach this level they would resign from the ornaments of the world and protect themselves from the temporary tastes to which people are usually inclined to.

The main purpose of Sufism is to cleanse the *Nafs* (self, ego, and soul) in order to earn the consent of God, to strive for obtaining virtues, therefore achieving the ethics of God and Prophet Muhammed (pbuh). For this purposes, Sufis' follow the example of Prophet Muhammed (pbuh) in order to reach the highest level of moral perfection. Under the guidance of Sufi masters, dervishes aim to heal their hearts and purifying it with beautiful attributes (İz, 1990: 31-34). Struggle of Sufis' against their individual *Nafs* is the crucial point of their *sayr u suluk*[4]*.*

2 Truth is one of the names of God in Quran.
3 Hadith means the words of Prophet Muhammad (pbuh)
4 Spiritual journey and initiation in Tasawwuf

2. Surpassing the Nafs

Grandmaster Abdul-Qadir Gilani proclaimed that the essence of all worship is to oppose your *nafs* and desires. All goodness comes from the struggle against *nafs*. People, who see only blessings, but forget their creator, are mistaken. Things- except God- should not make people turn away from God; anything except God should not be chosen over God (Geylâni, 2005: 48, 49, 53, 55). Sufi masters have emphasized for centuries that love of anything other than God is the biggest obstacle facing human beings in their path towards spiritual enlightenment. People desiring to reach figurative beloveds would have to break with God eventually. Whoever has a heart bound to any object in this world, would experience the sorrow of separation from it at the end. Therefore, dervishes should only love God, whose love is endless. Sufis believe that if a dervish sincerely follows the moral values of *tariqa* and fight against the challenges imposed by his/her *nafs,* God would help him/her in the "*suluk"* or the spiritual journey toward the divine unity (Hafızalioğu, 2000: 26, 94). *Nafs* is overwhelmed in a long and complicated process in which the *mureed* (seeker) cannot proceed alone is in need of the guidance of his/her sheikh to be successful. There is always the risk of falling back and because of this reason this struggle remains till death.

If a *mureed* still has even little a demand for peace, silence and happiness after terminating his/her *nafs,* discarding desires, being purified from dirt, mess and earthly pleasures; that means his/her purification is not yet complete (Geylâni, 1996: 114). The important stage of *suluk* is *fana fillah*[5], in order to reach this level the seeker should terminate all of his/her expectations, desires, demands or fears. Thus the only aim is the journey towards the Divine Presence. Everything apart from this is just an earthly temptation. Grandmaster Ahmed ar-Rifa'i said that only the ones who abandon everything for the sake of God would be able to reach the Supreme Highness. If a heart thinks of objects, it would not be sufficient to discover the secrets. According to the Grandmaster, substance is the dungeon of believing heart. When the heart breaks its relations with this substance it is then saved from its disasters and there is nothing to be feared for this heart for it has gotten out from darkness into the light (Er Rufaî: 137, 164,165). Keeping distance with earthly desires and pleasures, in order to have a higher divine pleasure, has been the key for Sufis' for centuries whether in the East or the West.

5 Extinction in God. After this level, there is *Baqaa billah*, which means eternity in union with God

Baha-ud-Din Naqshband, one of the influential Sufi Grandmasters and founder of the Naqshbandi Sufi Order, stated that the person who has the honor of resisting his/her *nafs* would have greater progress in the spiritual journey. Resistance against the *nafs* is difficult, however the seeker should try and be persistent in this path. (El-Buhârî, 2003: 74) As Mowlana Jalaluddin Rumi expressed, Sufis should run away from their nafs as a baby gazelle would escape from lion. They are not stuck to the zahir and their utmost interest is the "universe of meaning", which is forever permanent. According to Rumi, when explained metaphorically, in this journey there is no writing in the notebook of the Sufi, it is as white as snow, just a clean heart. However the provisions of the scholars are not the works created by his/her pen but their footsteps. (Rûmî, 2007: 165,188,342) This is why Sufis are not so keen on expressing their experience verbally through words. If you want to understand what they experience you should follow their footsteps.

Nafs is quite a complicated phenomenon and appears gradually in human beings. Sayr u suluk, in a sense, is a transformation of nafs from a lower to a higher level according to many sufi orders. From this point of view, there are seven positions (maqam) of nafs growing gradually and the moral trainings needed to reach them:

- **Nafs-i Ammara** this is the beastial nafs inciting to do evil and sinful things. This kind of nafs is a natural power dispatching people to ugly things and worldly pleasures.
- **Nafs-i Lawwama** This is the self-impugning nafs, partially connected to the previous level, although it is regretful sometimes and blames its owner for his/her sins.
- **Nafs-i Mulhama** Mulhama means “inspiring” thus we can call this level as an “inspiring nafs” which warns its owner with some divine inspiration about what is “good” and what is “evil”.
- **Nafs-i Mutmainna** In this level of nafs, the Sufis heart is cleansed from evil and ugly attitudes and enlightened with divine light. This peaceful level is idealized by Sufi literature.
- **Nafs-i Radiyya** When the seeker reaches this position, his/her *nafs* is pleased and accepting what is realized on him/her or others, without any objection.
- **Nafs-i Mardiyya** this is the *nafs* level based on mutual consent between God and the subjects. In this level the *nafs and* the Lord of Universes is consentient and the subject is contented.

• **Nafs-i Safiyya** *Nafs-i Safiyya* is the highest level of *nafs* in moral training. When the seeker has reached to this level, he/she is in the position of guiding others in their mystical journey (Çelikoğlu, 2001: 61, 73, 76, 83, 92, 100 and 113).

Tariqa is the way in which dervishes learn Sufi and ascetic life style. This is the authentic, individual, pious, ascetic, spiritual and moral life style, which is a mystical path (Uludağ, 2006: 190). Sufi masters teach these particular techniques to their disciples in order to reach this level of enlightenment. *Sayr u suluk* is the way of unification with the universe and the Divine Presence. For the seeker, at the end there is no observer, audience. Nothing is out of this process. Even if you think anything is outside it is just a fantasy, nothing else. We are all in the process, we are the process itself (Es-Sufî, 1993: 17). When this knowledge and is established, the dervish tastes pleasures of eternal divine life beyond his/her mortality. This is the final aim of divine love in Sufism, considered to be an award for this devoted life styles of dervishes in many Sufi orders.

3. Sufi Ethical Values and Life Style

Sufi training is based on taking a sheikh as an example. This is sometimes called *fana-fi-sheikh*, which means “vanishing in sheikh” and to become defragmented with the spiritual guide in *sayr u suluk*. Seekers keep their connection (*rabita)* with their *murshid* (guide / teacher), continue to *dhikr* (remembrance of God) under their guidance and attend wisdom talks (*suhba*) or preaching provided by the master (Gözütok, 1996: 102,121). Obedience to the master is the essential rule in Sufi training. However some outsiders can attend the *suhba* of sheiks or watch some particular rituals performed by dervishes.

Ethical maturation is the essence and purpose of Sufi life style according to different traditions in the history of Tasawwuf. Sufism has been defined as “ethics” and anybody in a higher level of moral values is considered to be in a higher level of *suluk*. Each time, level, position and state in this progress has a particular set of manners and the dervishes are expected to abide by it. If one follows these manners and moral values strictly, he/she would reach the position of God’s friends, but if he/she fails to follow this path properly disappointment eventually results and he/she remains far away from the final target.

The beginning of Tasawwuf is knowledge, the middle is practice, and the end is benefaction. Knowledge reveals the purpose, practice discloses the demand, and benefaction transmits to the goal (Sühreverdi, 2010: 47, 50, 54). People who seek recovery should continuously sermon and advise to their *nafs,* accustom it to ascetic life style and struggle with its impulses. Sufi ascetism requires, first to leave *haraam*[6]*,* afterward to leave suspicious things which are clearly not *haraam,* later allowable ones and finally the *halal*[7] too. In this manner everything is left behind. Real ascetism is to leave the world, its desires and pleasures, to leave existence, the state, the spiritual degree, the miracle, the demand for any position, to leave anything except God. For lovers, losing the *Haqq* means losing everything and this they try to avoid.

The world is temporary for Sufism, which asserts the permanent experience of heaven which is much more valuable. *Tawhid* (oneness of God) is like a fire that burns everything and the more dervishes realize this, the less they are connected to the world (Geylâni, 2009: 24, 49,148,152). Love of God is the profound meaning of the dervish's journey. In this sense, it is an individual journey, which means that even if millions of Sufis gather together, they would remain as "individuals" not constituting an organic community in modern sense.

Tasawwuf requires healing vices in the heart. Grandmaster Muhyiddin Ibn Arabi warns the seeker about vices such as libertinism, greed, inferiority, lethargy, blather, exaggerated love, hardness, unfaithfulness, treachery, not guarding secrets, arrogance, lies, malice, scowling, parsimony, cowardice, rush and impatience, half-heartedness and injustice (Arabi, 2007: 72-80). Najmuddin Kubra, founder of Kubrawiyya Sufi Order, conveyed that there are ten methods in the *tariqa* to heal the souls of believers who are devoted followers of Sufi tradition: repentance, ascetism, submission, contentment, seclusion, focus on *dhikr,* rotating toward God only, patience, consent and *muraqaba* -which means Sufi meditation (İz, 1990: 117). First the seeker should be familiar with his/her hidden faults rather than trying to know the unknown esoteric secrets of the universe (El-İskenderî, 2008: 67). After such diagnosis of the guidance of the *murshid* would realize the process of healing, based on the methods mentioned.

Sufis believe that the real beauty is reason and morality, not the beauty which appears in the *zahir*. Physical beauty belongs to earth and will return there eventually. Internal beauty and elegance are the essence of the soul.

6 Forbidden things according to *sharia*.
7 Permissible things in *sharia,* opposite of *haraam*.

If people would like to be enlightened and reach the heaven of Allah, they should follow the ethics of angels and leave all immoral behaviors. For Sufis, basic worship is not enough for they want to go further to reach higher spiritual improvement. In this spiritual journey, dervishes leave the created ones to reach the creator. At the beginning of this journey they see only the created but at the end they realize that everything seen is just a reflection (*suret)* of the Lord (Şirin Baba, 1999: 57, 73, 81,117). After reaching this a dervish would be in permanent peace, respectful to every created being and tolerant to everybody, as they are all reflections of God in the World. Love, peace and tolerance are essential principles for all Sufi orders.

According to Grandmaster Abdul-Qadir Gilani, Sufis struggling against their *nafs* in a high level should avoid swearing and should never lie. They should always keep their promises, never to curse any creature or diagnose them. Jealousy, malediction and sins are away from followers of this mystical path. They avoid being a burden to somebody and renounce cupidity. The Sufis honor and glory are improved through humility and modesty (Geylâni, 2005: 172-175). When people are not in the level of witnessing the Creator of the Universe, they are subject to properties of the universe. However, the moment they witness the *Haqq*, all the visible entities of the universe would become subject to them (El-İskenderî, 2008: 306). This resigning from the world connections is the threshold for all dervishes of the East and West, which is a crucial point to experience mystical improvement. These tenets of Sufism provide a suitable intellectual, social and cultural basis upon which the Sufi believes can be the answer to contemporary alienation.

4. Possibilities for Modern Impasses

Around the world, modern social structures are in crisis everywhere. Intellectuals, scholars, philosophers, writers, artists and critical politicians from the West and East have spoken out about the challenges of this crisis for decades. Economic progress and saturation of material needs have been supposed to be the “answer” for humanity for a long time. They reject all traditional values and social phenomena, which has caused many important social and ecological problems. The modern individual has lost the meaning of his/her life and fall into a kind of nihilistic insignificance. Pragmatism destroyed our inheritance of millenniums. Are people of the modernized part of the World happier than traditional societies? Critical minds are not entirely sure. However, today nobody can claim that tradition may emerge in contemporary context- as they did in the past- without any change or trans-

formation. Maybe, it is better to say that some of the traditional values- in our case Sufism- can take place in a modern social environment without any contradictions to the "basis" of contemporary societies. These societies need a type of spiritual reform, or at least some spiritual aspects, rather than a radical change.

The crisis of modernity can be healed if *"the one-dimensional view of man's need for material goods, namely the tendency to prefer more rather than less, can be substituted by a multi-dimensional view concerned with balancing material and spiritual needs*" (Ab Razak-Sanusi, 2010: 26). Actually this balance is substantially harmed in contemporary societies. Secularism is not the cure of uneasy souls. Spiritual values and approaches can provide guidance for a more sustainable society, as the essence of religion is not only about rituals, but also about a positive relationship with the environment and society. As indicated by Ab Razak and Sanusi, "*Religion is important for people's personal development, as it provides a manual of how human beings should conduct themselves on the shared planet. Additionally, it gives values and meaning to their lives. The fundamental teaching of most religions in the world is to engender goodness among people in this world*" (Ab Razak-Sanusi, 2010: 27). In this context, Sufism, like other spiritual traditions, can be reconsidered for self-fulfillment, spiritual growth and peace of human beings. Dervishes of all ages have provided their wisdom to people for centuries. They have warned people about passions and their possible harms, suggested withdrawal from earthly greed and advised seekers to prefer a chosen "poverty" or in more positive expression modesty, rather than being stuck to fortunes and material gain.

Of course history cannot go backward. We remember the words of a Khalwati Sheikh *"How can we invite individuals to Khalwat*[8] *today? Modern life has turned into a khalwat itself?*" Actually, when we look at the seclusion of the modern "self" we can see that he was definitely right. However, the inevitable modern seclusion is a secular one, and far from being a way toward spiritual growth and inner peace. According to the statistics of the American Foundation for Suicide Prevention, over 60 % of suicides are due to major depression. There are many reasons for depression and primarily it should be examined and treated by psychiatrists. However, especially after Durkheim, we know that there is a deep connection between dissolution of religious identities and suicide.

Sufism can be considered one of the universal, peaceful and tolerant alternatives that can take place in a modern context, with its old traditions,

8 Sufi seclusion traditionally performed 40 days, full of *muraqaba, dhikr* and *rabita* (connection, communication) with the sheikh.

without any contradiction to main values of modern societies such as democracy and human rights, which are actually inherent in Sufism already. Sufism could be an alternative to the negative sides of modern alienation and their harmful symptoms.

Conclusion

We have explained the details of Sufi ethics based on the classical works of Tasawwuf. Grandmasters such as Abdul-Qadir Gilani, Ahmed ar-Rifa'i, Baha-ud-Din Naqshband and Muhyiddin Ibn Arabi warned us centuries ago about the possible harms of human greed covetousness. They suggested a temperate middle-way, much more focused on spiritual progress rather than on obsession with material developments and endless exploitation of resources. Sufism, besides its value as a mystical tradition leading to divine knowledge and the experience of Oneness and love of the Lord, can be considered as a sustainable life style for a more livable society and a universal peace with nature and all living creatures.

Islam means peace, and Sufism is the best dimension of Islam to express this peaceful essence. Tasawwuf is ethics or an ethical discipline that includes powerful moral values represented by dervishes of all ages. Today khangahs, tekkes or zawiyas are everywhere and there are mureeds in every continent of the world without exception. Mureeds- seekers of the divine truth- come from different religious backgrounds, colors, nationalities, genders and ages, all have met in Sufism. This is a proof that Tasawwuf is a universal and colorful spiritual tradition that can adapt to challenges of contemporary societies. It is not a great prophecy to say that Sufism will keep spreading in modern parts of the world, Muslim or Christian. However, the possible scenarios regarding relations between Tasawwuf and a more conservative interpretation of Islam, mostly focused on sharia (Islamic law) is not that clear. It is very interesting to see that the most radical criticizers of Sufism is comes from inside the Muslim world and probably they would be more reluctant to the universal Sufi message.

There is no technical or scientific innovation to fill the metaphysical and spiritual emptiness of human beings, located in the "heart" if we use the Sufi terminology. In this respect, the Sufi tradition will remain as a response to the feelings of people. However, it is a living movement, like all intellectual and cultural phenomena, and is open to new syntheses. In this sense, there have been fruitful relations and exchanges between Arab and Turkish scholars and dervishes. The essence will remain the same, seeking the truth and oneness of God.

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International Relations and Middle East:

Fethullah Gulen Reforming Thought and Turkish Relations with Its Cultural Neighborhood

Shaimaa Bahaa el-Din

For a long time dividing the Islamic world and tearing it was a goal for the big powers. This goal is directed to this region which includes both of the Arab world, Turkey in addition to that Iran. But through the time line we can see different forms of achieving this goal. it started during the time of the Ottoman Empire under the name of the eastern problem thus calls for nationalisms started to get higher and higher between Turks and Arabs, between Turks and other nationalities which were all under the umbrella of the Islamic civilization (which included both Muslims and non-Muslims). And now we see the new concept of the (New Big Middle East) which aims to divide the region into different ethnicities and races. These intentions usually come to our region under the slogans of "reformation calls".

From here we have to relook at the concept of the Middle East in order to revise the concept of the cultural neighborhood and the great unity that includes this big diversity. Since that the first aspect of civilization is the cultural one so the first confrontation in that way would be through enforcing the awareness of the nation "al-Umma". In this way we can find "Fethullah Gulen" thought and his vision concerning Turkey from inside and outside it. This vision is mainly concerned with the way of child rising up and education in order to build an individual aware of the main concerns of his nation, state and his world also. This thought is considered to be a methodology for his movement.

The Main Question of the Research

In the time when the Turkish foreign policy is witnessing a noticed vitality towards its cultural neighborhood, and the Turkish official elite are paying attention towards the valued and civilized orientation, it is a must on us

to study the same reforming orientations from the perspective of the non-official elite, especially the elites which the official elites came from. So the main question is did "Fethullah Gulen" contribute to what is appearing now as a rapprochement from the Turkish side to its neighbors (Arab-Iran-Turkish world) facing the great challenges? And what about the European cultural neighborhood that Turkey sees itself as a part from it? On which level this influence can be founded? How this informal movement can cooperate with the official side and affect the thought of the official elite? Did this influence of this thought cause any effect in the Justice and Development government from 2002 than the other secular governments?

The Importance of the Study

The scientific importance: this study comes in the framework of the great attention paid to the importance of the cultural factor in studying the theory of the international relations, politics and foreign policy. There is a scarcity in the studies from this kind that are specialized in studying these dimensions of the Islamic countries and societies. The study of the cultural neighborhood comes in an organized way as a respond to the civilized perspective of studying the new regionalism and the modern studies of the level of analysis.

In addition to that, the Arab and Islamic world are in need to restore their organized awareness about Turkey in its both faces (internal and external) and the relation between them.

The practical importance of the research comes out of the big danger that is facing now the region represented in trials of cultural divisions which may lead to more political and economic fragmentation. This intimidation must be faced through a cultural & civilized entrance. Thus the concept of "Cultural Neighborhood" may contribute more in enhancing the relations between the societies in the region and then the states.

While concerning the concentration on Turkey in this research, this comes as a result of its strategic and cultural importance. And what it is presenting every time from good experiences in the dialogue between cultures from the days of the Ottoman Empire. The main important part is to know the role of reforming thought and its institutions in this frame.

The Theoretical Framework

This will help in exploring how “Gulen” thought influenced Turkey’s relations with its cultural neighborhood in the following two sections:

1- The importance of the emergent new actors can renew the Turkish role in the international relations and foreign policy. There are some actors within the state like social movements and some other actors between the states like the international organizations and multi-national corporations.

2- Constructing the concept of the “cultural neighborhood” which is presented by Prof. Nadia Mustafa (IR professor in Cairo University) and Prof. Mona Abo el-Fadl who sought to compare between this concept and the other neighborhoods through systematic, realistic and national perspective.

The research process will carry on in the regional and trans-regional cultural systems through news fields in the international relation theory. For example we can see the new orientations in studying level of analysis which gives a good area for the values' dimension. Especially we need to contribute more in the values' dimension as a level of analysis in our society. Thus we can see the great attention paid by foreign policies towards the cultural and civilized sides of societies to form nowadays what is named by “Identity Regions”. These also are highly related to the concepts of “cultural interest” and “cultural security”.

The Methodology

There is a big need to use two methods

Discourse analysis in order to discover the reality in the reforming thinking discourse of “Fethullah Gulen”. This will be tackled through discussing the main texts of him, mapping his ideas, making network between all concepts in his writings, besides reading the main intellectual and real context for this thought, particularly because of the specialty of the Turkish case. In addition to that Gulen thought is considered to be an extension for “The Nutsi” thought raised at the end of the Ottoman Empire days that thought the Islamic unity without any nationalist calls.

Destination methodology: by protecting (Religion-Soul-Money-Mentality-Race) through a guiding presented by Prof. Seif El-Deen Abdul Fatah for studying Gulen thought and its influence from the values perspective.

The Theoretical Framework

Cultural Neighborhood

This study mainly focuses on and tries to approach the Turkish foreign policy, in the light of the Justice and development party governments or other governments, basing on the concept of cultural neighborhood. This concept is not popular and need a strong conceptual building by getting closer to the popular concepts which comes from the systematic, realistic or nationalists perspective.

The concept of neighborhood[1] can be comprehended from different views. It may take the form of neighborhood between countries as a regional system. So it takes the geographical dimension which may call conflict rather than cooperation because of different reasons like water, borders or minorities. The concept of neighborhood can take also the form of the qualitative reaction between countries in this neighborhood which may add another cultural and value dimensions, like the historical, cultural and religious ties, to the neighborhood.

So this issue pushes us towards studying the relation between these ties, between the national interests and the ties' reflection on the level and nature of either the conflict or the cooperation.

New concepts to be studied are raised from this neighborhood, like the “Regional System”[2] which is defined as a set of reactions and political, economic and social relations in a specific geographic area between countries common in some cultural, economic or social elements. These reactions are characterized by subjectivity and independence from the international system but it must come in an agreement with the international system. So as these reactions are not just only a respond to the policies of the super powers.

These reactions between countries in one region can make coherent borders between this region and other regions, between this region and the international system at all. Also any change in a part of the international system can lead to a big change in the whole system.

So the most obvious element to the regional system is the geographic connection, condensation of the reactions and its distinctiveness, similarity

(in language, nationalism) but away from the broad cultural meaning of it which includes ties related to same doctrine, values, culture and history. It is just the patterns of the economic, political and social relations. And thus we can find that Turkey and Iran are considered to be regional neighbors to the Arab region. Or by another meaning we can consider the countries in the Arab region are the core and the other neighboring countries are in the peripheries.

When we try to handle the relations between Turkey and Iran with the Arab region or the policies of these states towards this region, this falls under the name of "Middle east regional system"[3]. This concept is a trial from lots of trials of reshaping the Arab region on a middle east base by which it became famous from the days of 1950s to serve the Zionist project in the Arab region through including Israel and excluding some other Arab countries like Sudan. There are lots of names appeared like the "big middle east" and "new middle east".

This Middle East system is based only on a geographical tie but mainly on a geostrategic base from the sight of the west as an axis to the world, At the time which countries like Turkey and Iran are related to the region with strong cultural ties through the unity of values, history, doctrine and the recent reality. And in spite of the conflicting national interests of these states, still there are belonging to a common cultural frame.

And thus we can be able to speak about cultural regional systems or cultural trans-regional systems which can include many nationalist neighboring regions.

This also related to re-conceptualizing other concepts like the regional security, the national interest, So that we can find new definitions for the traditional concepts of security and interest. And thus there must be a study for the cultural security and the regional security in which the state security is related to its perimeter and its cultural neighborhood, not to stand in its national borders or its narrow regional borders. Also the "cultural interest" and what it oppose from compromises, different choices which differs from the usual narrow and known definition for the national interest. Of course these dimensions leave its effect on foreign policies of some countries.

We can put the concept of cultural neighborhood and its studies in the frame of three new fields in International Relations Theory and Foreign policy which are:

1-The new orientations in studying the level of analysis in the International relations: The new level of analysis started to exceed the traditional levels of the nation-state, the international and global system, regional and sub-regional system. The diversified western schools tried to override these levels by other comprehensive levels out of the "Traditional Realistic Westphalia Model" which dismiss all values, religion and culture, starting from the international society school to theglobal society and the global community, adding to that the neo-constructive school of Linklater and Wendt and their being interested in studying the influence of ideas, cultural values in International relations as they see it as a social structure.

This rise in the influence and focusing on the cultural dimension in the international relations left the door open for more contributions to the Islamic cultural perspective on the level of analysis. This contributes more to make the best usage of the concept of "al-Umma" as a level of analysis.

Thus we can see the Islamic perspective comes from "The System-Al-Umma", The Marxist Perspective comes from "The System-The world", The Liberal Perspective comes from "The System-The States". This entails that there are many different visions in the cultural Islamic perspective towards the relations with the other and the foreign policies of the Islamic countries and relation between these countries[4].

But the concept of Umma cannot be exclusive only on the Islamic nation as a level of analysis. It has its own elements (Religion, Culture...) which can be applied on other nations and can interact with the international system which include all of the regions and also the states as components of this system[5].

2-The appearance of the value and cultural dimension on the level of the international relation theory specifically in what is related to the level of analysis, also in studying foreign policies by which lots of attention were paid to the religious and cultural consideration in the foreign policy of the state. The attention was highly paid to the cultural and religious dimensions of the foreign policies. This comes after the end of the cold war and the emergence of the "Clash of Civilization" discourse besides the prominence of some cases that have a cultural nature in the globalization discourse. There were some attempts to study the effect of culture on the foreign policy but it took the traditional form by just studying the cultural determinants of the political elite.

The most prominent study in this trend is for Martin W. Sampson titled by "Cultural influence on Foreign Policy"[6] which studied the influence of the elements of the national culture on the decision making process in the Foreign Policy. While the study if Valerie M. Hudson titled by "Culture and Foreign

Policy: Developing a research agenda"[7] affirmed the importance of developing the research methodologies in order to suit the nature of cultural cases in the foreign policy.

While concerning religion, lots of researches were studying this side but always from the conflict perspective either on the level of the western foreign policies or the level of the Islamic countries. Some problems aroused during studying religion especially the Islamic religion. For example we can find a study for Prof. Nadia Mustafa on "Islam and Egyptian Foreign Policy"[8] and argued in the effect of Islam on the Egyptian foreign policy in the orientations, targets and problems comparing by the three presidents.

One of the main contributions of this study is redefining the Islamic circle as the Islamic nation is not based on a geographical connection, in order to get away from the crisis of defining it in the Islamic state relations and also the crisis of the foreign policies if the big Islamic countries besides defining the Islamic state.

This study defined the Islamic Circle away from the spiritual side to a more wide range of studying cases and interactions in the international system.

This Led Us to The Third Field

1-the emergence of "Identity Regions": the concept "Identity Region" must be studied since this research is trying to research in new levels of analysis, also at that time; we are refocusing on the role of religion and culture in Foreign policy studies. This trend was totally mentioned in a research study about the new trends of tackling regions. The study of Raimo Vayrynen under the title of "Regionalism: Old and New" [9]studied the different patterns of regionalism like the functions of regions (military, economically, environmentally) and also explained new methodological ways in studying new regional patterns.

And thus we can see that the research is in the identity of region and how the common value ties between states affected the pattern of relations between them in comparing to the other ties.

This study also discussed this issue in the experience of ASEAN in South East Asia besides discussing the different trends about the weight of ASEAN, what ASEAN achieved and critiques opposed towards them.

Also in this frame we can refer to the Islamic World but through a trans-regional identity by which the Islamic world would be an international system or trans-regional cultural system[10].

Summarily we can say that the concept of Cultural neighborhood based on revising the concepts regional neighborhood and the traditional regional system. This issue is coherent with references of level of analysis generally in the theory of international relations, and with references of studying foreign policies which stemmed from renewing the importance of the religious, cultural dimensions in studying international relations.

The concept needs building a new methodology or theory, the study hopes to be based on it and on the results of studying a real model from the Turkish experience.

Some of questions aroused and needed to be answered like who is forming the concept of neighborhood in order to be cultural neighborhood and to reflect the cultural traditions? Are they the elites who are making the decision in the foreign policy, are they far or near to the official elite or the orientation of the elite? What about the international system, opportunities given by this international system for these orientations or obstacles, limitations opposed on them?.

By another meaning: the official and non-official regional relations of turkey are changeable according to the change of the high elites in power and in the society. It is not just a geographical input but the answers of these questions are related to the research questions without any comparative study with other corners of the Islamic world, Iran and Egypt.

Prof. Mona and others from political science scholar disproved the traditional approaches in defining the region and how to deal with it. She reasoned the existence of these approaches to the crises facing the region which make it lost its influence in its cultural circumference. This issue disagrees with the nature of Arabism which is refusing limitations. Because it is a cultural structure which includes many colors and races away from the obstacles of geography, it doesn't matter if it's ruled by others or not. But at the beginning of the twentieth century the political elites and high educated people tried to present adaptation attempts seeking for finding a new identity for this structure like:

1-The National Adaptation of the Region (Arab Nationalism)

Some attempts tried to define Arabs nationally on the level of action and movement in a special historical moments related to three main partners in the region (the ottomans, Arabs, Europeans) in addition to that the movement of the nationalist Turks till the break out of the first world war and the map of alliances set up.

We can say also the Arab nationalism was highly related to the political systems and the external element at that time. The discourse of Arab nationalism was not familiar at that time because other famous calls were stronger appeared calling for holding an Arab caliphate and reforming the ottoman state by people like: Mustafa Kamel and Abdul Rahman El-Kwakebi.

But because of special political circumstances in 1950s, 60s, 70s the thought of Arab nationalism was developed but these calls cannot represent the identity of the region because:

Nationalism is not a main component in the structure of the region and was not a main element in the emergence of the region.

This nation has no one race to go back to. Arabs are too much diversified in different cultural patterns united by the language first, doctrine second. In spite of the same language but it contains many religions and doctrines that are absorbed in a cultural big frame.

This movement forced non-Arabs like Negros and Berber to go back to the history in order to search for another identity as long the main criteria is the race and ethnicity.

And building on what mentioned from before, we can see that nationalism played a uniting role in Europe but led to two contrary effects in the Arab region:

- Dividing the Ottoman Empire which represented a political unity for the Muslim countries.
- Dividing the Arab countries themselves into several entities, by which there relations are highly ruled by conflict determinants more than co-operation motivations. Not only that but also we can see some of these countries are suffering the scourge of internal conflicts.

Nationalism in its Arabic framework is too vague and ambiguous. There is an internal contradiction in defining what Arabism is besides the main controversial between Islam and Arabism.

2-The Regional Adaptation of Area: (Arab Regional System): This approach is built on the main arguments of the other trend but it looks at the region from three dimensions

- This region is forming one geographic region and that's came as a result of the great influence by the concept of regional studies.
- The Arab world is consisting of states as main units. This is the main

trend in adaption of the region.

- These states are highly related in an organized relation through a generally specialized regional organization called (Arab League),

This point was retreated in front of other adaption attempts and Prof. Mona defended that way through:

- This approach is not a strong base in the region's history or formation. The geographical dimension is not a main determinant for it and we cannot confirm that the Arab borders and ending where the political maps, drawn by specific political powers, say.
- The adaption form is based on a notion that the systematic units (states) will form the Nation which is contradicting with the main thinking inputs as the states must be removed in order to form the Arab unity.
- Building four entities and sub-regions within the region puts some critiques in this approach. Also it may lead to the contradiction between the interests of these sub-regions and the interests of the region.
- The Arab league which is an axis of this adaptation is a failed organization and its bases are corrupted. Because its member states are highly adhere to there own sovereignty and it is named to be a dividing league.

- The concept of the “Regional system” is not comprehensive. It can employ some anti-Arab will forces by example this system is excluding countries representing strategic depth from the nation like Iran and Turkey.

3- The Region Adaption from another Bas (Middle East)

This trial is highly related to the euro centrism but lots of critiques are addressed to it:

- There are no cultural or civilized characteristics for the region either from the human perspective, political perspective. It is just the western point of view about the region from the point of view of his interests.
- This definition is equalizing between Turkey, Pakistan, Iran and Israel as they are geographically neighbors with big negligence to the strategic cultural depth of Turkey and Iran unlike the occupying entity of Israel.
- This concept is dealing with the region by missing its identity and its cultural unity. It sees the region comprising lots of nationalists and races. And this entails confirming the concept of the small entities based on ethnicities or religion which drives the region to more divisions.

Defining the Region from a Cultural Perspective

Prof. Mona tried to redefine the Arab region from a cultural perspective. This definition based on that Arabism is a strong association between countries and individuals in the region. It has an internal subjectivity in no need for any transient values. The main content of this association was formed through a long cultural experience started from the prophet Muhammad immigration and Arabs being a nation with a mission and vision contained many different cultures.

This cultural frame is formed by Islam which protected and encouraged other doctrines to be present.

Thus defining the Arab region from a cultural perspective exceeds the previous definitions and includes them at the same time because:

-any cultural definition is considering diversities and pluralism as a main component of any cultural region. They are sometime considered to be factor of unity and similarities.

-this definition exceeds any introversion and renews bridges between people giving the cultural framework more strategic and cultural depth.

-the definition is re-evaluating the weights and standards in the light of the forming characteristics for the human entities melted together in a diversified melting point and thus we cannot make any equalize between Turkey, Iran from a side and Israel from another side.

-This perspective blocks the lacuna which Israel state is formed on and faces probabilities of dividing the region into small states.

-this definition shows the Excellency of the Arab region and its pivotal role in an original cultural frame.

The definition presented by Prof. Mona for the Arab cultural social entity is a commune human base with material and moral complex dimensions, come together on organic and bio vital origins in different times and extensions created through interaction and reaction through common situations[11] .

In spite of that, Prof. Mona knows what happened to the region from changes and tried to discuss these new changes n her book “Islam and Middle East” when she discussed the fake arguments resulted from the irresponsible and fault readings of the map of the region which led to systematic deformation to the Arab regional system.

One of the fake readings proclaimed that the region is inconsistent and there is an absence in the identity. And thus she restored the Islamic dimension searching for examples in the past experiences and different figures in Islam.[12]

The concept of the "cultural social entity" provided by Prof. Mona Abul Fadl is a reasonable approach for studying the Arab political systems. As it presents diversified and complementary introductions to comprehend the political phenomena in the Arab region which will certainly enrich the cultural studies related to this region.

As a result of the new outcomes provided by Prof. Mona, She added new concepts to the field like the "Cultural Environment" which is the melting-pot where all the social entity components melted together to give its final form. It consists of subjective and objective cultural components. She specified the existence of the Arab cultural social entity in the Islamic environment. This is a permanent forming factor, vital historical element and a new component highly related the effectiveness of the social entity In order to reshape the entity and develop it internally. There are some factors that rule the relation between the entity and its cultural environment forming some concepts like "Cultural effectiveness" which is the state by which the entity stays on it at a specific moment of time, and the concept of "Cultural Motivation" which is determined in two issues, adaptation and developing the base of authority as an issue and directing the point of the conflict as another issue. Prof. Mona compared between the logic of the materialistic dialectic and the cultural motivation through the historical development on that way:

From the point of the main source of motions and action, she said in the materialistic dialectic that materialism is the main source of the motion. Thus there is inevitability in the motion without any human interfere in any constructive process. So there is no sense of responsibility either on the individual level or the community level but all freedom is given to the "class" which has full freedom to get rid of limitations opposed on it. While about the Cultural motivation she said that it is all about the will which is the main source of motion and actions. This will may contribute more to enrich the individual prestige in his society. And according to that some elements must exist like the ability of making choice, Will, knowing that the Islamic civilization balanced between the responsibilities of the individual and the society.

Another point of comparison is the roots of the motion. In the dialectic side we can see motion represented in the development embedded in the situation since the dialectic method of thinking is explored historically in the frame of learning and modernization. The motion has giant material abilities embedded in it so that there is a strong belief in the strong rising progress towards more capabilities and power by any motion or action. While on the other side of the cultural motivation, motion is embedded in the renewal of the subjectivity of the entity. The historical frame to the motion presents factors, agitators which interact with the main subjective actors in the entity.

We have to separate between change comes on the situation (Frame) and change comes on the subjectivity of the entity. People reaction with this change can be represented in the adaption of the frame, dealing with it from a position enlarging the role of some MORALS that will detect how the new situation will be not from a position favoring NECCESITIES which will certainly oppose the current situation with its recent frame.

Discourse Analysis: Fethullah Gulen

Personal Background

His full name is Muhammad Fethullah, Bin Ramiz Effendi, Bin Shamel, bin Elmulla Ahmed, Ebn el Khorshid, Bin Khalil. His homeland is Anatolia. Gulen is his family name, means the most smiley. His friends are naming him Khoga effendi. He is popular by the name of "Fethullah Gulen". This binary naming style adopted by the Turkish system when Mustafa Ataturk came to power and tried to make a social coup in turkey after declaring the republic in November 1st,1923 and abolishing the caliphate system on March 3rd, 1924. This coup entails many procedures in the political, legislative, judicial, economic and scientific affairs also. And from these social developments is that the name just contains the person name and surname.

Fethullah Gulen born on November 10th, 1038 in countryside called Korojak related to the city of "Hosn El-Kalaa" in Erzurum governorate. This countryside is so small and winter last in it for nine months per year. Most of its families came from "Ahlat" city which is subject to Taplisgovernorate located within the high mountains of Anatolia.

The Anatolia hill represents about half the area of the Turkish republic and its people are religious, nationalists, following traditions in all social life aspects.

The first roots of his family go back to "Ahlat" city which include a huge diversified population from different places since a very old time. It was inhabited by scientists, military leaders, innocents and seniors from the family of Prophet Muhammad (Pbuh). All of them found Ahlat a safe stay for them but the grandparents of Fethullah Gulen left it and went to Kurojak in Erzurum.

Erzurum is popular by the great number of scientists who are adherent to the Islamic traditions, praying every time, obeying the rituals of Islam and the increasing love for Prophet Muhammed. Erzurum is considered to be a fortune full of mosques, fortresses which goes back to the days of the Seljuk

before there state in the fifth century. And now we can see Ataturk University which is one of the high education institutions in the modern Turkey.

His family is very social and not too much rich. They are moderate economically but there social prestige is higher that their economic position. They are highly conducted to religion, Islamic teachings, a little bit Sufi and working on Science and literature request.

His grandfather to his father Khorshid bin Khalil was a farmer from Korjok farmers who were famous by Science love, Piety and Devout. It was taught that in his last 30 years he was sleeping a little bit on the floor and all his time either in his farm or in worship.[13]

Fethullah Gulen was raised in a family which can afford their living and belongs hardly to the middle class. This economic and social level had the great influence on the cultural and intellectual formation of his character. It is highly known that the middle class is a saving container of the values, keen on customs and traditions. Also in it we can see initiatives of reform and change beside the continuous aspiration towards a better future by them. This case is the same on Fethullah Gulen's big family and his family also. He didn't inherit any real state or farms but inherited his family's keen on science, worship, science love and adherence to values and moralities [14].

The Education and Intellectual Arise

He studied in the religious school during his childhood and usually goes to (Tekeya). He received spiritual nurture besides his learning to the religious sciences in the hands of known scientists like Osman Baktash (one of the most famous scientists at the time). He studied Grammar, Fiqh, Eloquence, doctrines. And he did not neglect the philosophical sciences. He was highly influenced by Said Norsi and his renewal and rival movement in his "Messages of the Light".

There are four sources contributed to his intellectual and cultural formation which are the system of education he participated in his countryside then in Erzurum, being influenced by his teachers and scientists at his time through reading their publishing, admiring their work. In his article named by "The individual intellectuality and motion" he spoke a lot about them and it was obvious how he got effected by them, he recognize their merit on him, asks for following them, studying their ideas deeply, getting them introduced to the new generations, take them as a good example in seriousness, hard working and serving their religion and their nations. He described them as

the “heroes of the reality” and “straight men always showing us the light”.

He spoke about two groups of the pioneers in reform and thought who is highly influenced by them: the first group includes Ahmed Hilmi, Ferid Kam, Mustafa Sabri, Ahmed Naim Babanzade, Muhammad Akif, Muhammad Hamdi Yazir, Necip Fazil, Soliman Efendi.

The second group he named them to be the scientists who lightened the second half of the twentieth century which includes: Nureddin Topcu, Sezai Karakoc, As’ad Efendi, Sami Efendi, Al-Arouasi, Ali Haidat Efendi, Muhammad Zahid Kotku, Muhammed Rashid Efendi.

His appreciations and respect to those all , who are subject to the Islamic reference, defending it, comes not only as a result of their influence on his intellectual and cultural background but also it comes as his pride of his Turkish nation particularly, Islamic generally and the humanity from behind them.

We may notice some of these scientists who started their lives as westernized, secular neglecting the entire Islamic heritage and then returned back to Islam and its reference, contributed more in criticizing the western thought and presented his deep jurisprudence based on the Islamic references. This made Fethullah Gulen highly commended them, recognize their effort in opening new ways of thinking for him like Sezai Karakoç and Necip Fazil.

The third source is his free readings in the different knowledge sources available to him. As long as he got progressed in his age he had the chance to get more familiar with the western culture, philosophy and with the eastern philosophy also, besides other science like Physics, Chemistry, Astrology and Biology.

The fourth source is the cultural public atmosphere in the Turkish society, major cases he lived and got affected by them. His life was formulated with the events happened to Turkey especially after Ataturk death in 1938, the events of the second world war, the cold war between the western and eastern blocs till reaching the challenges of globalizations.

The Scientific Experience

When Fethullah Gulen reached the age of 20 years old he was appointed as an Imam for a mosque called "Üç Şerefeli" in Edirne. He stayed there 2 years and half in a spiritual atmosphere and intended not to go out to the street except for necessities.

He started his callings in Izmir in “Kastanah Bazari” mosque in a school of memorizing the holy Quran then worked as a walking preacher till he passed by all Anatolia. He was reminding the people of their god, how to purify their souls, how souls are thirsty for the guiding light to the god and his prophet way.

He was travelling everywhere to guide people, advice them in mosques and also he was ordering lectures in science, religion, society, philosophy and thinking.

He formed lots of conferences, discussion meetings so he could be able to answer all the questions in people’s minds which they don’t find any answer on it. His words are very touchable to hearts of people and youth which made them all revolving around him and ask for his advices. He also asked people who are keen on their future, responsible for it to focus on education, concentrate their effort on it. And starting from his advices, these people started to build lots of schools and internal sections, publish lots of newspapers, magazines, and establish printing presses, Media production without waiting for any profit. And after the collapse of the Soviet Union these schools spread all over the world especially in Middle Asia which suffered too much from the soviet occupation and the communism and atheism.

Application: Reading from the Purposes Perspective[15]

The services' institutions are covering the different aspects of life. It includes the institutions with the educational nature, research nature, industrial and trade nature. Institutions with the medical, media, relief nature are also included. For every group there are great marks of it in fighting poverty by which most of them are relief institutions.

First: The Institution with the Educational and Research Purposes

The efforts in this field are distributed on the educational institutions in different stages of education and students homes. These educational institutions included primary schools, preparatory schools, secondary schools, universities and reading halls.

The Public Educational Institutions in Turkey

It includes all the educational school in all the educational process stages from the kindergarten to the primary schools, to the preparatory schools, to the secondary schools including all specialties in the general educational system.

Private companies are the one building these schools through stocks. These schools are managed by the rules of the private sector, under the supervision of the Turkish ministry of Education. These schools are connected in the idea and having the service nature but they are separated and independent from each other. Each educational institution has its own company and independent administration. But also they are making use of their own scientific, career, administration experiences.

These schools are marked by their high scientific and educational quality. They are now representing Turkey in lots of international scientific competition. They reached the number of 500 educational institutions in Turkey.

Preparations Schools for Entering the High Schools and the University

The system of these schools mainly based on the idea of education for participating in the national competition that allow the winners to enroll in the secondary and university stage. This system is special for Turkey and supervised by the ministry of Education. According to that system the students should go to a national exam in order to enroll in the university. This exam is based on the accumulation of knowledge gained by the student in the preparatory and primary schools. There were lots of educational institutions preparing students for passing this exam. They became the most remarkable institutions in Turkey for these exams. These institutions are forming also companies like the previous ones in order to manage it. These companies fall under the laws of the private sector and they are independent from each others. They reached around 600 schools.

The University Education

People who believe in Gulen thought formed some institutions for the high education like Fatih University. Another four universities were built in this

year. They are seeking for building fifty universities in the coming 20 years with a trade nature but for presenting services.

Students Home

There is no city without students' homes. Its containment differs from 250 students to less than that. These homes host students from the secondary school and universities also coming from far areas and areas have bad services for good education. These homes are a little bit luxurious and students stay there either for free or few amount of money. Its number is countless.

Reading and Research Centers

There are lots of these halls in all the Turkish cities. It is opened in the rich and poor cities equally. Students in different stages are going to it. Those students, who do not have the financial capability to enter the preparation schools for the national exams, can go to these libraries, study there with teachers to help them for free.

There are some big centers for several services like the "Academy" in Istanbul. This institution is more featured by the research and rising up nature, beside the weekly lesson in advices, guidance, reading books. It is a good opportunity for enhancing the intellectual capabilities, mentality trainings.

The Educational Institutions Abroad

The number of the educational institutions based on the idea of belief service is very big. They are found in 140 countries and the number of schools not less than 1500 institutions in different fields, either in leaning language or Media.

They believers succeeded in opening around 15 universities all over the world and they are looking forward to open new universities in Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Bosnia, Albania, and Nigeria.

The Role of the Services Institutions of Education in the Following Fields

-helping poor in attending the educational institutions with partial or full scholarships funded by traders or industrial men who believe in the idea of

serving. Also the company managing the institutions may fund this process.

-these institutions are affording the expenditures of teachings, education and what is related to them. The rich people and traders are financing all of the issues related to this either the readings halls or the students' homes.

Secondly: The Institutions with Industrial and Trade Feature

The trade and industrial institutions are the most important pillar in for the other institutions who believes in Gulen thought. The educational institutions with all its stages are highly based on the affectivity of the trade and industrial institutions. These institutions are carrying all the funds of this educational process with teachers, students in all different stages. The philosophy based on service is the one adopted by them. They are following exactly what are the needs of the educational process. Thus there is a sense of competition between believers in the idea in the field of education. This competition leads to increase the efficiency of the educational process in Turkey. And we have to focus on the economic works in the inside and outside.

The service doesn't own any economic activities. It is based on the existence of traders and businessmen believed in the success of this service. Thus they started to finance these services by their own desire. Those traders have their own shops, factories in all sizes (big, medium, small). They spend from their profit what they want for building schools, students' homes, scholarships. The number of them exceed hundreds thousands and they are increasing everyday who believes in the idea of services.

The traders in turkey believe in the idea of service formed an association call "TUSKON". It is the biggest businessmen association in Turkey and they are trying to have conduct contacts between Turkey and the entire world. It is attracting the foreign direct investment in Turkey. There is no school except there is a group of traders responsible for it. Thus the TUSKON has a presence in the 140 countries with the schools.

TUSKON held lots of giant forums for business men as the first one with the African continent. Hundreds of traders and state men from 40 countries met together and lots of trade deals signed by them. Then another forum held with the Far East, Balkan states and Europe. This year a big forum includes the entire world held and 5000 traders participated with 60 countries representations on the ministers' level.

The trader who was afraid from leaving his countryside became now more courageous to serve the whole world according to the idea of services

they believed in. this seek has a great impact on helping Turkey pass from its economic crisis.

Third: Services Presented in the Field of Fighting Poverty Materially and Morally

The traders and industrial men shared the idea of "Service" all the schools, educational institutions, medical institutions in the whole world. Thus they will fund all its expenditures and they will help the poor people in an indirect way.

The traders and industrial men in Turkey and abroad are taking care about the poor in the religious occasions like Ramadan holy month, financial grants for the country where there is a good motion in the field of trade and industry.

The traders also are paying scholarships for students in the cities where there work is located. They may fund their languages education, media. Also it may reach the degree that they fund the costs of their treatment abroad.

The Service Institution that Works in the Field of the Medical Care

They are exerting great efforts to form a group of hospitals like the schools. But the effort of building these hospitals needs to be doubled because of the needs of the medical instruments. But in spite of these difficulties, lots of hospitals built in Turkey with a great success. These institutions ruled by the regulations of the private sectors. They were built in high populated cities like Istanbul, Izmir, Konya, Erzurum, Bursa, etc.

These institutions are managed by a very excellent administration which is responsible for financing all its expenditures, insuring all workers and employees in it. The best model of them is "SEMA" hospital which is famous by its distinctive and qualified services presented by it. They are organizing lots of journeys with other physicians in other hospitals in this "service" to exchange information and experiences.

The Presented Services in the Medical Field

They present a special treatment to the poor people, as they receive special discounts on medical examination, hospitalization and cure.

The activity of the medical service in Turkey is not exclusive only in the Turkish lands. They are organizing lots of campaigns to some African countries like Nigeria, Kenya, Congo, Tanzania, Sudan, Ethiopia, etc.

They are working on forming new hospitals in different places around the world. They are focusing on the poor countries or the countries living political and economic tensions and these led to bad depression in the general health level in these countries.

Fourth: The Service Institutions in the Field of Media and Publication

The media industry is one of most effective factors of forming the public opinion and protecting it. So the effort exerted in it is very high and effective.

The audio-visual media:

The set of (STV) channels Samanyolu which includes:

STV channel: it is an inclusive channel which covers 150 countries all over the world and it is one of the five most watched in Turkey. It has a streaming in USA by Turkish and a special broadcasting from Europe sometimes differ with the mother channel and sometimes not. It is also broadcasted in English and German.

- Mehtap Channel: channel for cultural dialogues.
- STV haber channel: a news channel.
- Yumurcak: a kid's channel.
- Hazar channel: broadcasted for middle Asia countries in Turkish and they contact with them in the Azeri language.
- Ebru channel: it is broadcasted from USA in American English.

Beside three satellite radio stations for culture, news, youth.

The Written Media (journalism)

Zaman Media Group which includes:

Zaman Turkish newspaper is a daily newspaper which is the most sold newspaper in Turkey. It reached the ceiling of million editions per day. It is printed in 14 countries in Turkish and the local languages. It contains local news.

Today's Zaman daily English and sells 30,000 editions per day. It is the first English newspaper in Turkey.

Cihan news agency: it's an international agency and has freelancers in all turkey and entire the world. It is the biggest news agency in Turkey.

The Publication Institutions Related to the "Service"

It is publishing all books related to the thought of Fethullah Gulen. It also translates his works into lots of foreign languages like Arabic, Urdu, Persian, English, and French besides the Asian languages.

El-Nile building for print and publication has branches in Turkey and its main office in Cairo, Egypt. It attends lots of the international fairs in the Arab gulf countries and the North African Arab countries, besides its presence in the Asian countries, Europe, America. Dar El-Nile is not the mere one but there are lots of publication centers who are also highly qualified in their work.

- Heraa' magazine: it is a cultural periodical published in Cairo Egypt. It attracts lots of the most excellent authors in the Arab world and in Turkey. This magazine is distributed in the scientific and educational meetings besides the trade and industrial one.
- Aksiyon magazine: it is a weekly news magazine. It mainly focuses on political analysis and its sells reached 30,000 copies.
- There are lots of other scientific and literature magazines based on the behavioral service of Gulen. It includes the veterans' writers and the rising ones too.

Notes

1 For more information:Prof. Helal, Ali eldin, "the problem of defining the states of geographical neighborhood", Nazli Moawad (Ed.), *Relations between Egypt and its geographical neighborhood in the ninetieth,* (Cairo:Center of political research and Studies), 1997, pp.23-38.

2 For more information: Gamil Motarrad, Helal, Ali eldin, *The arab regional system: study in the arab political relations,* (Beirut: Center of Arab unity studies), 1079, PP.16-20.

3 Prof. Mustafa, Nadia (editor*), Egypt and the new regional projects in the regions (the annual conference for political researches 1996,* (Cairo: Center of political researches and studies), 1997.

4 Dr Mustafa, Nadia, Building a new Islamic perspective in the international relations: problems of research and studying, Seif El dien Abdul fatah (editor), *The Islamic methodology in the social sciences: political science as an example,* (Cairo: Center of civilization for political studies, the international institute for the Islamic thought), 2002, p.224

5 Saleh, Amani, The nation: as a level of analysis in the international relations, in Mona abul fadl & Nadia Mustafa (ed.), *International Relations: the religious and cultural dimension*, (Damascus, Thinking house), 2008, PP.44-47.

6 Martin W. Sampson, Cultural influence on Foreiga Policy, in Herman Charlcy, Charles Jr Kegly, James N. Rosenau (eds), *New Directions in the Study of Forecgn Policy*, London, Washington: Boston, 1987.

7 Valerie M. Hudson, " Culture and Foreign Policy: Develeping Areseach Agenda, (in), Valeri M. Hudson (ed), *Culture and Foreign Policy*, USA: Llynner, publishers, Inc, 1997.

8 Nadia Mustafa, Islam and Egyptian foreign policy, Ibid.

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10 Nadia Mustafa, un published lectures for graduate students for Master degree in the year (2006-2007)

11 Ibid.

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14 Gulen, Mohamed Fethulla (2010), *"Words in Politics"*, P.76.

15 The researcher depended on a conference by Prof. Samir Bodinar, Prof. Amar Gaydal, Ayman Shehata Abdullah Erfan, (the reform conference in the Islamic world), www.kim-seyokmu.com.

The Iranian Role in the Arab-Israil Conflict (2000-2010) As a Model for a Third Partner in a Conflict

Ashraf Abdul Aziz Abdul Kader

The third partners' role is one of the very important cases in the international peace and conflict studies. These partners play important roles in different stages of conflict. They can contribute in the continuity of the conflict, escalation of the conflict, limiting it, solving it and conflict resolution. The third partners usually influence the international interactions more than the main partners of the conflict themselves and their influence. Thus the third partners may play an effective role in the interest of any partner or the whole partners of the conflict.

The Arab-Israeli conflict is named to be “Protracted Conflict” because it is multidimensional and there is an entanglement between its dimensions for a long time. Thus the history of the third partner interference in this conflict has a big complicated and diversified record. So it would be very important to study the roles of these third partners in the Arab Israeli conflict to know the nature of this conflict, how they affect the direction of the conflict and their affectivity. This paper is focusing on the Iranian role in the conflict as a partner from the third partners who are affecting the developments of this conflict directly and indirectly.

First: The Theoretical Framework

This study is trying firstly to crystallize theoretically the figures of third partners’ interference in the conflict generally. Then it will analyze the nature of the Iranian role towards the Arab Israeli conflict. It also tries to figure out the reasons beyond this intervention in the conflict, besides evaluating the role of this partner on this way:

1-the motives beyond the interference in the conflict:

In order to analyze the role of the third partner, we must know the vision of this partner to his role and the nature of the conflict. This knowledge came from analyzing the reasons beyond its involvement in the conflict. And some other general motives like the geographical location of the state, its historical and traditional role, the cultural and ethnical formation and its history of being involvement in conflicts. Christopher Michel adds also the rational perspective to it. The main essence beyond these motives is that the outcomes of being involved in the conflict must over exceed the costs of not being involved. This is highly consistent with the concept of the "intensive Mediation" presented by Mauz Wealthly. He spoke about the necessity of the mediator interfere in the existence of the other partners wisdom and his thinking about his success[1].

Some other motives can be founded like enhancing the domination in the region or the prestigious position through intervention in the conflict. Also the third partner may feel that there is a threat on its interests because of this conflict. Thus this partner must interfere in a proper way without supposing that this partner will help in solving the conflict, stop it or its escalation.

Figures and Tools of the Third Partners' Intervention in the Conflict

There are many classifications for figuring out the figures of this intervention, either classifications focus on the tools of intervention or others focus on the interests from the intervention. The third classification is focusing on the official or non official intervention. The interest of this topic is to focus mainly by analysis on two figures:

A) The Mediator Role

This concept receives lots of attention as a main concept in studying Conflict Management. The third partner role is responsible for achieving coincidence between the conflicting fractions. The concept of mediation is used broadly to include all figures of third partners' intervention in the conflict. Some other studies narrow the concept. They consider it as a political or diplomatic tool for the third partner intervention in conflict management with excluding the economic and military tools.

1 For more information look at: Ali Gelal Moawad, "The regional Turkish role in the Middle East 2002-2007", Master, Faculty of Economics and Political Science, Cairo University, 2009, PP. 51-52.

B) The Spoiler

There is no necessity for the third partner to resolute the conflict through its intervention. Its interest may be escalating the conflict or keeping it continued or also solves it for the interest of one conflicting fraction. But this solution must come in the interests of the third partner. The intervention may be neutral not tending to any fraction or may be supporting on fraction on the interest of the others. And here we can speak about the spoilers of mediation, the tough partners who are involved directly or indirectly in the conflict. Those spoilers adopt situations leading to abortion of conflict resolution efforts. It may push toward the continuity of the conflict or escalating it, through refusing the mediation process, efforts of general peaceful resolution or objection on a specific mediator. The partner totally believes that the achieved results of the peaceful resolution will not achieve its interests.

About the tools of the third partner's intervention in the conflict are the tools of the foreign policy used in intervention like the political-diplomatic ones, economic ones, security and the cultural ones. These tools are shaping the attitude of the foreign policy of the state. This classification is capable of including different forms of intervention (for escalating or resolution the conflict) despite its simplicity. This classification also shows that the third partner role is mainly representing its foreign policy towards specific conflicts.

C) Evaluating the Third Partner Role in the Conflict and Its Effectiveness

The effectiveness of the third partners in the conflict is highly depending on some important variables. These variables are the relations between the three partners, the degree of coherence or divergence between their attitudes, the capabilities in the hands of each one. The more capable partner is the more independent in facing pressures of the third partner and its intervention. Also the strategies of the third partners and the recourses devoted for the effectiveness of the intervention play a great role either these resources are military, economic or political resources.

And thus the evaluation standards of the intervention can include the proportionality between the capabilities of the actor, his predicted and actual roles and the positive or negative influences on the visions of other partners (the conflicting fractions and other third partners). The third partner can af-

fect their actual roles generally and their situation towards the main partners especially. And thus analyzing all these factors helps in exploring the main dimensions of the pressures of this partners. Also it definitely will lead to predicting the role of the third partner in the future and limits of its predicted influences.

The Time Framework of the Study

The study is focusing on analyzing the Iranian role in the Arab Israeli conflict in the first decade of the new millennium. It is trying to concentrate on the new outcomes of like these roles without neglecting the historical dimension to these roles. In addition to that the study wants to address the events witnessed in the last ten years. These events entail Al-Aqsa uprising till the regional and international peace initiatives till the unilateral withdrawal from Gaza. These events also involve the Israeli attack on Lebanon in 2006, the Syrian-Israeli negotiations through the Turkish mediation till the Israeli attack on Gaza in January 2009 and increasing the process of building settlements in Jerusalem. Besides any other regional and international developments that affect the conflict and the third parties' roles through many ways.

The Research Question and Its Classification

This study seeks to analyze the Iranian role as a third partner in the Arab Israeli conflict through answering the following questions which reflects the main dimensions of the proposed analytical framework:

1- what are the motives and reason beyond the Iranian intervention in the Arab Israeli conflict?
2- what are the (political or diplomatic or security or etc.) tools that Iran utilized in order to practice this role?
3- finally what is the efficacy of the Iranian role in the Arab Israeli conflict?

In order to answer these questions, this paper is classified into three sections. The first section is the Iranian motives for its involvement in the Arab Israeli conflict. The second section is about the Iranian tools of intervention in the conflict. While the third section is concerned with evaluating the Iranian role in the Arab Israeli conflict during the time framework of the study.

The First Section

The Iranian Motives for Its Intervention in the Arab Israeli Conflict

The Arab Israeli conflict occupies a special position in the Iranian foreign policy after the broke up of the Islamic revolution. This high position not only comes on the level of ideology but also on the level of policies and the tools of executing it. And now we can say that it became one of the main pillars in the Iranian foreign policy and one of the main vocabularies in the political discourse of Iran.

There are two main motives of Iran to interfere in the Arab Israeli conflict. The first one is the motives on the ideological level. These motives help Iran to demonstrate its declared policy toward the conflict. The second one is motives related to the regional position of Iran and to the Iranian goals on that level. These goals are not declared in the Iranian political discourse but they may be considered as determinants of the Iranian role towards the conflict.

The ideological motives: the ideological identity for the Islamic revolution in Iran played an important role in the orientations of its foreign policy. It decreased the choices in front of the decision maker as the principles of the revolution represent now the reference for its external attitude[2] . In this context, we can say that the ideological motives are the first motives for Iran to intervene in the Arab Israeli conflict and especially the Palestinian issue. The Iranian ideology, as what is mentioned in the Iranian constitution and the recommendations of the supreme guide of the revolution Khomeini or Khamenei, is based on principles that oppose on Iran "supporting the victory of the weak and Muslims all over the world". The text of the third article in the Iranian constitution says that supporting the weak people is a goal for the Islamic republic. Also the article 154 refer that Iran is responsible for supporting the legitimate resistance of weak groups against the imperial powers, besides some principles that calls for uniting the Islamic nations, unity of the Islamic world and advocating the rights of all Muslims[3].

2 Sarei Elkalm, Mahmud, *the Theoretical Framework of the Iranian Foreign Policy*, the Middle Affairs Magazine, Issue no. 121, (Lebanon: Strategic Studies Center for Researches, 2006), P 12.

3 Medhat Ahmed Hammad Ibrahim, "Iran and the Arab Israeli Conflict" in *Egypt and Its Neighborhood Countries in the Ninetieth, (*Cairo: Center for Historical Researches and Studies, 1998), PP.3-4.

According to these principles, Iran is considering its role in supporting the Palestinian resistance movements, Syria and Hezbollah in there conflict with Israel are not only legal but also a duty. All the other must respect these duties because the Iranian system must execute what is included in the constitution and the recommendations of the leaders of the Iranian revolution. Iran became able to gather the most two important resistance movements in the Middle East. One of them is Hamas represents the Sunni way and Hezbollah represents the Shias way.[4]

The revolution presented a new rare political discourse for the Iranian system to represent its view from the international issues. The Islamic rhetoric of the system is full of best and well chosen quotations from the Holy Quran which can influence all people listening to it. This rhetoric plays a great role especially in the crucial cases that concerns all the Muslims like the conflict with Israel and especially the Palestinian case[5].

On the other hand, Iran looked at Israel and the United States from its ideological perspective as enemies for Iran and Islam. They are entitled under the imperial powers. This is considered to be a big transformation for the relation between Iran and Israel since the broke up of the revolution. Israel was considering Tehran as a part from the Arab neighboring countries which are named by "Doctrine of Parties' strategy". Tehran was sharing Israel because both of them were afraid from the development of the Arab military forces. Thus we can see a large base of cooperation between the two partners at that time like the "Operation Flower" which worked on developing the ballistic missiles[6].

And thus we can see Iran was trying to vindicate itself from what is related to Shah era towards the Arab Israeli conflict and alliance with Israel. It was trying to start a new page in its orientation towards the countries in the region.

Israel was trying to keep on the good relations with the Islamic system in Iran after revolution. It supported it with weapons during the eight years war

4 Yaakov Amidror, "The Hezbollah Syria - Iran Triangle", *Middle East Review of International Affairs*. Vol 11, n.1 (March 2007), p.1.

5 Pakinam El-Sharkawy, "the Iranian Foreign Policy",http://www.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/A3A589ED-901B-428A-B0EC-AA98FFBD6A10.htm, retrieved at:3/10/2004.

6 Iran and Israel reached an agreement in 1977 in order to develop the ballistic missiles they have like "Arega 2". This agreement sait that Iran will pay 260 million dollars in the form of oil while it will let the Israeli aircrafts to do trainings on its lands. Look at: Jeffery Arunson, *"Israel and the Strategic Reflections for Iran's Possessing a Nuclear Weapons*", in The Iranian Nuclear Program: Events and Outcomes, (UAE: Gulf Center for Researches, 2007), P-110.

against Iraq under the name of "Iran contra". But all these attempts failed because of the nature of the Iranian system. This nature became a decisive factor in determining the hostile attitude towards Israel and the Israeli attitude towards Iran[7].

Third: Motives Related to the Regional Position of Iran

In spite of big comprehensive transformation happened to Iran after the Islamic revolution. Its political system changed from the secular form and complete subordination to the west to a republic theocratic distinctive system. It adopts a hostile external attitude against the west unlike the other political systems in the region. But the Iranian insistence on playing the role of the regional power still exists. The ambitions of the Pahlavi systems lasted but with the religious and political leadership of Khomeini under the Islamic revolutionary thought brought by the revolution[8]. According to the theory of Holisty, Iran has a strong belief that it can play the role of the regional power despite its limited economic power[9].

Iran found that in order to have a regional role and to enter the core of Middle East interactions. It has just two ways, either to join the Arab side or the Israeli side in the conflict between them. It chose facing the Israeli side because of the considerations opposed by the revolution on the relations between the two countries. It is a normal result for the ideological orientation pro the Palestinian case as a case for all Muslims not only the Arabs[10].

Iran is always trying to create an influential and strong role in the current affairs of the Arab Israeli conflict. It is completely sure that there are other regional powers competing Iran on that role like Egypt and Turkey. The Turkish diplomacy was very active in the last period. It became an actor in many cases in the Middle East. it entered the Arab Israeli conflict as a mediator between Israel and Syria, while Egypt was trying to keep its traditional influence and domination on the Palestinian case. It is supporting the Palestinian Authority and mediates in exchanging prisoners between Hamas and

7 Abdul Aziz,Ashraf (Sep. 2008*), "The American Management to the Crisis of the Nuclear Spread Case Study: the Iranian Crisis"*, (Unpublished MA), Cairo University, Faculty of Economics and Political Science, p.178.

8 Sayed Ahmed, Refaat (1989), "The Islamic Movements in Egypt and Iran", (Cairo: Dar Sinai for publishing), P.13.

9 Ahmadi, Amir (March 1994), "Iran Regional Policy", *the Middle Affairs Magazine*, Vol. no. 27, (Lebanon: Center for Strategic Studies and Researching), P.8.

10 Rubin, Barry (Sep. 2006), "Iran: the Rise of a Regional Power", *Middle East Review of International Affairs,* Vol 10. No. 3, P.27.

Israel in Gaza. Iran is seeking to enter on this line through many tools will be discussed in details later. These tools are considered to be an important factor for the continuity of playing this effective role as a regional power[11]. Iran is highly convinced that these countries are seeking for limiting the Iranian regional domination in the hot spots in Middle East represented in Palestine (the Israeli occupation and conflict between Fatih and Hamas), Lebanon (the Israeli occupation and the relation between Hezbollah and the Lebanese government) and also Iraq[12].

Generally the situation from the Arab Israeli conflict and specifically the Palestinian issue is the center of motion and regional roles in the Middle East. Each state has its own tools and ways to prove its position, increase its relative power and own source of pressure from all ways. Nonetheless the Palestinian case has a special position because of its relative religious historical emotional feelings that highly mixed with the general spirit of the Arab and Islamic.

The Second Section

The Iranian Tools in the Arab Israeli Conflict

Firstly: The Diplomatic Tools

Generally the Iranian diplomacy adopts a position based on the illegality of the Israeli entity. They only recognize the borders before 1948 (before declaring the Israeli state). They refuse all treaties signed between Israel and Arab countries. This position for a general framework for the Iranian situations towards the three pillars of the Arab Israeli conflict:

A) The Iranian Diplomacy to the Palestinian Aspect

The religious institution in Iran adopted a supporting position to the Palestinian case before the broke out of the revolution. There is a book for Ali Akbar Wilayati who mentioned this position in his book titled by “Iran and Palestine

11 Abu Talib, Hassan, “Egypt, Turkey, Iran and Their Reactions in the Middle East”, http://www.swissinfo.ch/ara/index.html?cid=314124&rss=true, retrieved at 23/05/2009.

12 Jahangir Amizegar, “The Ahmadinegad Era: Preparing for the Apocalypse”, *Journal of International Affairs*. Vol 60, no.2, (Spring/Summer 2006) p. 48.

1897-1937". He mentioned the situation of the religious Iranian men from the Israeli suppression towards the Palestinian people. He also recorded sending volunteers for Jihad in 1948 war and their objection for Palestine division[13].

El-Khomeini cultural vision towards the Palestinian case as a fateful conflict must be ended by the destruction of the other side. He considered Israel as a tool for the western and American schemes in the region. Especially United States advocated Israel since 1948. Khomeini believed that the Iranian situation from the Palestinian case stems from a religious and historical obligation. Thus Iran tried to translate its political discourse as main pillars in its foreign policy after the Islamic revolution[14]. There were some slogans adopted at that time by the Iranian system after the broke out of the revolution like "Today Iran, Tomorrow Palestine", and Khomeini declaration "No value for our policies if we don't have a hand in the Palestinian case"[15].

The zero sum game for the Iranian vision to the conflict influenced its situation from the settlement of the conflict especially after the end of the cold war. This was reflected on its relation with the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). Thus a sense of stagnation affected the relation after the alliance linked them from before. Khomeini asked Yasser Arafat to declare the Islamism of the resistance. Arafat refused that because Muslims and Christians participated in it equally[16]. Not only for that reason but also because the organization took an orientation near to the Arab nationalism orientation more that the radical Islamic one. Iran refused all efforts for any settlings to the dispute from the decisions of 242,338 till all agreements signed after that[17].

Thus, Iran held a conference in Tehran in October 1991 at the same time of Madrid conference for peace. This conference included many Iranian and Palestinian characters. They decided to withdraw the legitimacy from the (PLO) after accepting negotiations with Israel. They also decided the necessity of transferring all support to the new Islamic organizations that are based on the radical Islamic thought like Hamas and the Islamic Jihad. They were the most beneficent from this conference especially after Oslo agreements in 1994 which showed the backwardness of the Arab nationalism at

13 Abdul Moneim Musaid, Neviene, "Decision Making Process of Iran and the Arab Iranian Relations", (Lebanon: Center for Arab Unity Studies), P. 37.
14 Abdul Nasser, Waleed (1997), "Iran: Study on the State and the Revolution", (Cairo: El-Shouruk Publishing), P.85.
15 Medhat Ahmed Hammad Ibrahim, Ibid, p.5.
16 Waleed Abdul Nasser, Op,Cit, p.86.
17 Ibid.

the time Israel was enforcing its existence in the Middle East. Iran tried to attract the Islamic resistance movement in order to change its conception about the Arab Israeli conflict to a more broad frame which is an Islamic Jewish conflict[18].

Actually, the split in the PLO between the stream calling for negotiations and a stream calling for the Islamic resistance gave Iran the chance to enter in the Jihad side. It supported the Islamic Jihad at the beginning of 1990s, but the increasing active role of Hamas made Iran change its support to Hamas. Thus we can look at Hamas win in the election of the Palestinian parliament 2006 by majority and its formation to the government as a big turning point for the Iranian role in the Arab Israeli conflict and towards the Palestinian issue.

The Iranian diplomacy can be noticed on three main important events in the Palestinian case during the period of study. These events include the second Palestinian uprising 2000, the Israeli attack on Gaza in 2008 and beginnings of 2009 and on the domestic Palestinian issue (we will refer to Iran's situation from the Palestinian conciliation).

1-Iran and Al-Aqsa Uprising 2000

The followers of the Iranian attitude towards the uprising since its broke out in September 28th, 2000 till Sharon's invasion to the territories under the Palestinian authority will notice that the official Iranian doctrine includes[19]:

1- Iran refused naming the Martyrdom operation by members from Hamas and Jihad as terrorist operations.

2- It called the Islamic countries exporting oil to stop exporting it as a kind of declaring solidarity with the Palestinian people. Also this is a method of practicing more pressure on the west to force Israel stop its attack on the Palestinians.

3- Iran declared its full support and financial backup to all movements like the Islamic Jihad, Hamas, some battalions of Al-Aqsa martyrs related to Fatih on the level of training, financing, support and supplies.

The Iranian attitude on the level of policies was very calm. Despite Hamas and Jihad's being as the main active powers in the Palestinian uprising, the

18 A.Noushira Van Etesian, Raymond Hinnebush, (1997), *"Syria and Iran: Middle East Powers in A Penetrated Regional System"* (London& New York). P.188.

19 El-sergani, Khaled, Iran and the Palestinian Uprising, http://acpss.ahram.org.eg/Ahram/2001/1/1/C1RN12.HTM, retrieved at July 2002.

Iranian support to them did not exceed the level of speeches. All the words by the revolution guide in his Friday's speeches were condemnation words. This attitude did not include any practical steps that can be transformed by the executive authority to a practical policy supports the Palestinian people in their uprising[20].

When the revolution guide asked the Islamic countries producing oil to stop exporting it, he did not adhere to this call. Even after Iraq initiated by cutting exporting oil for 30 days which embarrassed Iran, Iran tried to escape from that by saying that it will not stop exporting oil except after another Arab and Islamic countries stop that (it was referring to the Gulf countries)[21].

Iran and the Israeli Attack on Gaza at the End of 2008 and Beginnings of 2009

There were a great noticed diplomatic efforts from Iran to mobilize the Arab and international efforts to stop the Israeli attack. The Iranian president sent 22 envoys to the European and Asian countries leaders carrying messages asking for more pressure to stop immediately the Israeli attack on Gaza. Also some Iranian representatives made some visits to Syria, Libya, Turkey and Japan[22] .

Despite that also, the Iranian role did not exceed the political discourse. Iran get contended by its condemnation speeches, damnation words and sending messages to the Islamic nation calling for supporting the Islamic resistance movement Hamas in face of Israel. There are some analysts said that the Iranian diplomatic movements came in order to balance the Turkish diplomatic movements and not to leave an empty space for Turkey. They added that it is a desire for gaining more regional gains from this attack. Lots of researchers are supporting this point as the Iranian movements precede Recep Tayip Erdogan visits to Syria, Jordan, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia and after Turkey's participation in Doha summit, Sharm El-sheikh summit, the economic conference in Kuwait and meetings with leadership of Hamas[23].

20 Ali Ansari, "Iran Under Ahmadinejad: Populism and Its Malcontents", *International Affais,* Vol 84, No.4 (2008), Available at: (http://www.uis.edu/newsbureau/events/IranunderAhmadinejad.pdf).

21 Ibid.

22 Abdul Kadir Mohamed (2009), "The Regional Power for Turkey and Iran", *Iranian Selections Magazine*, Vol. 103, (Cairo: Center Political and Strategic Studies), Available at: http://acpss.ahram. org.eg/Ahram/2001/1/1/CIRN88.HTM.

23 Ibid.

Some western American readings for the situation are accusing Iran of being involved in Gaza events in 2008-2009. Some experts are convinced that this operation is over than Hamas capabilities and they wanted to put events in a framework away from its original one[24]. Some others considered it as an attempt for Israel to take revenge from its defeat in July 2006 by Hezbollah in Lebanon. There is another vision which says that it is a new chapter from the international conflict on the Iranian nuclear program. Iran made use of Hamas for special calculations directly related to deals with Obama administration. It wanted to oppose a new equation on the arena to push the American administration to rethink about its approach towards Iran. It wanted the new administration to change its policy towards it unlike the previous one, after knowing the new cards that Iran owns in the region and how it can employ them in the way it needs[25].

Iran and the Palestinian Conciliation

Iran did not play any obvious role in this issue except for declaring its willingness for mediation between the Palestinian fractions, for achieving the Palestinian conciliation, on the tongue of officials from the Iranian foreign ministry. Also the official Iranian news agency declared on march 15th 2010 "The Islamic republic of Iran is willing to support achieving a common understanding between Fatih and Hamas", as an official said, "the principled position for the Islamic republic is to support the unity of the Palestinian fractions" he added[26]. But Iran did not propose officially any practical initiative for that purpose.

Actually there are lots of points of view that defend the absence of the Iranian role in this issue. Iran has an interest in not achieving this conciliation in order not to lose its domination and influence on the Palestinian case, through its relations with Hamas. The conciliation process will push towards a peaceful settlement for the Palestinian issue and this issue is not welcomed by Iran because of reasons will be mentioned later.

One more reason is that the relation between Iran and the Palestinian fractions make it not fit for this role. Hamas is welcoming the Iranian role

24 Hossam Swailam, Ibid.

25 -"The Middle East Conflict After the Gaza War", CSS Analyses in Security Policy, No. 49 • March 2009, Available at (se2.isn.ch/serviceengine/Files/.../css_analysen_nr49-0309_en.pdf).

26 "Iran presents help in achieving the Palestinian conciliation:, *El Wafd Newspaper* (Egypt, 14/3/2010).

in the Palestinian issue generally from a perspective that it may led to lots of gains on the Palestinian domestic level and on the regional level, from Hamas point of view[27]. As an evidence we can refer to some declarations from the head office of Hamas confirming that "Tehran support has no price in Hamas", some other declarations to Al-Arabiya TV "since the broke out of the Iranian revolution, Iran takes serious positions and principled situation towards the Palestinian case in face of the Zionist project … I consider the Iranian policy towards the Palestinian case is a perpetual policy since it comes as an extend to an official and popular recognized methodology. We are highly evaluating that. We are certain about the Palestinian right of resistance and never giving legitimacy for the Zionist entity. If Iran is standing by the Palestinian right, all the Palestinians with their fractions are standing by Iran, its right for defending itself. We are in the same trench against the western greediness, against any threats of any attacks either were Americans or Israelis"[28].

On the other side, we can see Fatih was not welcoming this role and does not accept it. There are some accuses from leaders of Fatih that there is an Iranian role in blocking the conciliation through the relation between Hamas and Iran. Mohamed Dahlan, the official speaker of Fatih and a member in the central committee declared that Hamas blocked the efforts of the Egyptian conciliation because of relations related to Iran[29]. Also Nabil Aburdaina ,the official spokesman of the Palestinian presidency, accused many regional hands mainly Iran of trying to prevent Hamas from signing the Egyptian document of the Palestinian conciliation. He said to the Kuwaiti policy newspaper "the Palestinian authority signed the Egyptian document and ready to execute it but there are some regional hands headed by Iran prevent Hamas from signing it"[30] . there are some official accusation from the high level in Palestine, as the Palestinian president Mahmud Abbas said in a meeting in Tunisia March 2010 that" Iran don't want Hamas signature on the conciliation document in Cairo"[31].

27 "Yehia Musa to the Middle East Newspaper: Iran Relation with Hamas is Obvious and on the Surface", *Middle East newspaper*, (London: 21/2/2006), available at: http://www.aawsat.com/ details.asp?section=4&article=349380&issueno=9947

28 "Meshaal: Iran Support Has no Price from Hamas", *El-reyad Newspaper*, (KSA: 5/1/2010), available at: http://www.alriyadh.com/2010/01/05/article487203.html.

29 "Who is the obstacle in the Palestinian reconciliation process (Qatar-Syria-Iran).. Or Goldstone?", Vision Newspaper, (Kuwait: 20/10/2009), available at: http://www.arrouiah.com/node/209522.

30 "The Palestinian presidency accused Iran of being obstacle to the Palestinian reconciliation", available at: http://ar.trend.az/news/arisc/1611838.html

31 "Abbas charged Iran by its being reason for the failure of the Palestinian reconciliation", Aljazeera News, (KSA: 14/3/2010), available at: http://www.al-jazirah.com/178665/du17d.htm.

B) The Iranian Diplomacy on the Lebanese Pivot

The close relation between Iran and Hezbollah in Lebanon is the main determinant of the Iranian role in Lebanon dimension of the Arab Israeli conflict. Thus we must refer to the type of this relation. Lebanon is a complex state from many Islamic and Christian fractions. The system is mainly based on dividing Authority, Fortune and domination; also the foreign relations are classified according to the doctrine classification. Some of these relations exceed the known relations between the other states. This situation led to the presence of the other countries sponsoring the components of the Lebanese people either because of the historical or religious relations. Iran is from those countries because of the Shiaa in Lebanon and Hezbollah who is know representing , as some people says, "the intellectual and military Iranian base on Israel border"[32].

Despite the Iranian confirmations on the independency of Hezbollah and there is no ability for Iran to press on Hezbollah, or to interfere in its internal or foreign policy. Iran also confirm that its relations with Lebanon originally through the Lebanese state with its different constitutional institutions. But these relations cannot deny the tight relation between Hezbollah and Iran. This relation goes back to the beginnings of the 1980s when Iran supported this fraction militarily, politically and through media during establishing it. This happened either before the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon 2000 or after it[33].

Iran is advocating the existence and continuation of Hezbollah in its foreign policy towards the Lebanese dimension in the conflict as a military armed force. Iran reasoned that because the permanence of the threat represented by Israel on the Lebanese territories despite the 2000 Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon. Iran did not consider the Israeli withdrawal as an end of the Israeli threat on Lebanon and thus the Lebanese resistance must be ready and permanent represented in Hezbollah[34].

About the Iranian role in the new outcomes on this dimension through

32 Shakir, Shafik (2007), "Lebanon and Irab .. towards a direct relation", Aljazeera website, available at: http://www.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/6F483EE9-C76E-4B7B-98FD-EC59ABBDA0A3.htm

For more information look at: Güneş Murat Tezcür, "Religion and Politics: Iran, Iraq, and Lebanon", Spring 2008, Available at: (http://www.luc.edu/faculty/gtezcur/files/Tezcur.Shiism.pdf)

Mansour, Abdul menam (2009), "The influence of the Arab Israeli Conflict on the Egyptian Iranian", the civilized dialogue magazine, Vol. 258, available at: http://www.ahewar.org/debat/show.art.asp?aid=194112

33 Ibid

34 Mousaid, Nevine (2006), "Regional Implications for the Israeli war on Lebanon: Iran", the Arabic future magazine, (Lebanon: Center for the studies of the Arabic unity), P. 66.

the time framework of the study, especially on the Israeli attack on Gaza in summer 2006 which preceded the Hezbollah kidnap of the two Israeli soldiers. There is an American western analysis reading to this issue that claims that Iran incited Hezbollah to kidnap the two soldiers and Hamas to kidnap a soldier in order to achieve some goals. Iran, by this action, would be able to take the sight of the international society away from its nuclear program before holding the eight states meeting in Petersburg. This came after Iran's refusal of the project proposed by the permanent states in the Security Council and Germany. There were talks at that time to oppose tough sanctions on Iran at that time. Another reason, to embarrass the Arab systems by putting Iran in the first countries supporting the resistance movements. It wants to install an Islamic face to the conflict with Israel rather than the Arab national face which became accomplice with it in order to break the Islamic opposition movement in the Middle East. Thus we can see Henry Kissinger words highly fit here to Washington post" all the world focus was on Gaza and Lebanon but the context leads to Iran"[35].

Another reading to this war is that it was a part from a big confrontation between U.S., Israel from a side and Iran from the other side about the project of the new Middle East. This new Middle East is trying to cut the Iranian hands in the region and remove away the blade which Iran can draw it to Israel from Lebanon[36].

Either the first reading or the second reading is good. But both of them reflect the Iranian presence in the Lebanese dimension in the Arab Israeli conflict to a very great level either directly according to the first reading or indirectly through the second reading.

C) The Iranian Diplomacy on the Syrian Pivot

The Syrian Iranian relations are the main determinant of the Iranian role in the Syrian aspect in the Arab Israeli conflict. The relations between Tehran and Damascus is the only Arab relation that changed after the revolution from common understanding and interest relations into a strategic alliance reached it top rates during the Iraqi-Iranian war 1980-1988. But there were

35 For more information look at: El Batnegi, Aiyad (2008), "The Syrian Iranian Alliance: history, Present and its future", The Arabic magazine for political science, Vol. 20, Lebanon, P. 20-22.

36 Shaker, Shafik (2007), "The Syrian Iranian relations from exchanging interests to alliance", available at: http://www.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/6A4AB141-A1EE-4111-8BDC-921316CD895D,frameless.htm

some hard times to this relation when their interests clashed during the war named by “brothers' war in Lebanon” between the two shiaa fractions Hezbollah supported by Iran and Amal movement support by Syria[37] .

Concerning what is related to the Iranian role towards Syria, the Iranian diplomacy often confirms Iran's solidarity with Damascus in its conflict with Israel to restore back Golan Heights. They are in the same trench to the degree that made the Iranian president said “Syria security is considered to be Iran security”[38] .

Iran usually affirms its willingness to stand beside Syria against any predicted attack from Israel. As following the Israeli war on Lebanon In summer 2006, Iran warned Israel. The Iranian leaders confirmed there solidarity with Syria if the conflict broaden and it is attacked by Israel. This issue was stated by the official spokes man of the Iranian foreign ministry Hamed Reda Asefy as he said” Iran stands by the Syrian people hoping for Israel not to make a mistake and attack Syria, because this system (Israel) will carry lots of loses cannot be estimated if the conflict broaden”[39] .

One of the main determinants on the Syrian aspect is the revival of the negotiations between Syria and Israel, which has a big significance according to Iran. These negotiations were supposed to reach a peace agreement in 2008 under through Turkish mediation between the two parties[40]. There were four rounds in these indirect negotiations between Israel and Syria but these negotiations hanged because of the war waged by Israel on Gaza in December 2008 and January 2009. But in May 2010, the Turkish president Abdullah Gul declared that Syria is willing to resume peace negotiations with Israel through Turkish mediation but Israel did not say a word in that.

Iran did not take any official action towards these Syrian Israeli negotiations through the Turkish mediation. But it was hoping that these negotiations won't lead to any settlement or any agreement. Thus it lowered the importance of attending Annapolis conference called by the previous Ameri-

37 Abdul Elmenam Mansour Ali El Horr, Ibid.

38 The direct negotiations between Syria and Israel stopped in 2000 because of Syria refusal of Israel keeping to the east bank of the Golan Heights. The situation more freeze because of the 11th September events and the new policy of the united states in the region. Israel found in it a chance to escape from the requirements of the peace process. The situation with Syria was consolidated till the Syrian declared their desire in the resume of peace talks. Israel related the start of these peace talks by stopping supporting the terrorist groups like Hezbollah and Hamas. But the Lebanese war in 2006 put an end to the calling for resuming peace talks between Syria and Israel.

39 “Syria Confirms the strength of its relations with Iran after Annapolis”, available at http://Arabic.people.com.cn/31663/6309418.html

40 Washington confirms that Tehran critiques to Annapolis meeting is not surprising”, available at: http://www.news.gov.kw/a/51117

can administration, and some resources confirmed Iranian attempts from the Iranian president to the Syrian side not to attend this conference. But Syria was keen after the end of the conference on mentioning the tight alliance relation with Iran as the Syrian deputy foreign minister Faisal Mikdad said. In the same context, the president Nijad said that "enemies are not able to damage the honorable and perpetual relations between Tehran and Damascus"[41].

Actually there are lots considerations that make Iran not enthusiastic about any negotiations between Israel and Syria. It has no desire in settling the Syrian aspect from the Arab Israeli conflict. This no desire represented in:

1-one of the main demands will face the Syrian regime in any settlement with Israel, beside stop supporting the militarily groups in Palestine, Lebanon and some other issues in the Iraqi issue, is to cut its strategic alliance with Iran. at the same time Iran, who have the nuclear ambitions and highly threatened more than any time before from any surprising Israeli or American bombing to its nuclear infrastructure, wants to keep its relations with the Syrian regime as a pressing tool it own on the regional level[42].

2-this kind of settlement between Syria and Israel will reorder some important issues not in the Iranian interest. It will present a new reality in South Lebanon may lead to dismantling Hezbollah weapons. Thus Iran may lose a pressing card in the confrontation with Israel. This situation may lead to weaken the Palestinian resistance movements that are related strongly with Iran and they represent an important entrance of the Iranian influence entrances in the Palestinian internal issues[43].

3-as a result of a settlement between Israel and Syria, it will lead to Syria joining to the moderate countries in the region. Thus it may enter a confrontation with Iran and try to eliminate the Iranian influence. So Iran will lose the most important ally which it can depend on like the Syrian regime[44].

41 Shakir, Shafik, Ibid.
- Alfred B. Prados and Jeremy M. Sharp (January 2005), "Syria: Political Conditions and Relations with the United States After the Iraq War", CRS Report for Congress, Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, Available at: (http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/42483.pdf)

42 Abdul Aziz Abdul Kader, Ashraf, Ibid, P. 261.

43 Kayhan, Barzegar (January 2010), "Iran's Foreign Policy Strategy after Saddam", The Washington Quarterly, pp. 173-189, Available at:http://www.twq.com/10january/docs/10jan_barzegar.pdf.)

44 Elfayad, Khaled (2008), "The Syrian Iranian relations: interests fulfillment and forgiving the disputes", *International policy magazine*, vol. 184, (Cairo: center for political and strategic studies), P. 184.

So according to what mentioned from before, Iran's interest is to remix the cards in the region and to keep on the tension between Israel and Syria. Thus we can say any change in the Iranian attitude towards the Syrian aspect is highly related to any fundamental changes on the path of negotiations between Israel and Syria.

But it is important to mention that any settlement between Syria and Iran doesn't mean cutting the existing alliance between Syria and Iran. There is highly predicted that the Syrian and the Iranian sides will try to keep on the common form of relation between them. Both countries may make use of this relation, for Syria it may press by it on Israel and for Iran it may press on United States. The alliance between Syria and Iran has a kind of flexibility and elasticity which leave a free space for both partners to form his own private policy according to his own interest. So we can see their policies are contradicting at a time and common at another time[45].

Secondly: the Economic Tools

This part is dealing with the Iranian economic tools used in its policy toward the Arab Israeli conflict through its three aspects of the study according to this way:

A) The Palestinian Pivot

Iran is highly supporting Hamas economically and financially because of the type of the relation between them as mentioned from before. Iran is not satisfied with the way Fatih is dealing by with Israel.

We can classify the financial support from Iran to Hamas and the other militarily Palestinian groups into three types. The first type is the secret financial assistance undeclared given by Iran. This kind of information comes through estimations of Intelligence and political sides. There are lots of ways for Iran to conduct them like the bank of Iran Exports. The second type is the declared assistance through the official visits by the Palestinian officials to Iran. The third type is the assistance presented by unofficial Iranian institutions.

45 Matthew Levitt, "The Real Connection between Iran and Hamas", Website of the Counterterrorism Blog, 12/1/2009, Available at: http://counterterrorismblog.org/2009/01/the_real_connection_between_ir.php.

For the first type: the estimations are varying in a huge form, as a result of its secrecy type. But we can refer to many sources tried to estimate this kind of assistance. For example the Israeli evaluation says that Iran presents 3 million dollars annually to Hamas. While according to the Canadian intelligence, it says that the annual assistance of Iran to Hamas ranges between 3-18 million dollars. Palestinian sources say that the Iranian assistance annually reaches tenths of millions of dollars. Some other sources mentioned that the financial assistance for Hamas raised from 20 million to 5o million dollars during the period from 1990 to 2000. There are other unofficial estimations refer that the financial assistance in the period of 1995 and 1996 reaches 100-200 million dollars[46] .

For the second type: as what mentioned from before that they are declared assistances in the official visits, like what is declared by the Palestinian prime ministry in December 2006. Ismail Haneya succeeded in getting 250 million dollars from the Iranian government during his visit to Iran. But it was not certain if Iran executed its promise Hamas got the mentioned amount or not[47].Khaled Meshal declared that the Iranian support still exists during his visit to Iran in 2007 but he did not mention the amount Hamas receive from Iran after Haneya visit in 2006.

For the third type: there are some unofficial Iranian institutions like the Martyr Iranian institution which presents monthly assistances to the families of the injured and victims in Gaza sector. After the final Israel attack on Gaza, it started to distribute one thousand dollars on Martyrs family in the sector[48].

B) The Lebanese Pivot

According to the economic assistance presented by Iran to the Lebanese Hezbollah, it is unlike the assistance presented to Hamas and other resistance movements. This type of assistance is declared officially from Hezbollah who is giving some religious reasons for it related to the Shiaat doctrine. In order not to relate this money to politics, as the institutions of Hezbollah receiving a legitimate money from the shiaa guide Ayatulla ali Khameni the

46 The researcher faced lots of difficulties in gaining information about the military aids of Iran to the resistance organization.

47 -Gad Nafea, “Iranian Support to Hamas by 250 million dollars”, available at http://www.almotamar.net/news/37795.htm

48 “The Iranian martyr institution presents financial aids to the Palestinian”, available at :www,a;quds.com/node/141069.

guide of the Islamic republic. This money is a part from contributions presented to all shiats all over the world to the Islamic referent (Al-Khoms). It is specified for the general interest and groups suffering from some problems and injustice all over the world. The leader of Hezbollah Hassan Nasrallah is saying that this money is pure and clean because who present it does not need any political gains from it. These assistances are recognized from Iran side as one declaration of Ali Akbar wilayati said that"all our friends and enemies know that we are financing Hezbollah and Hamas in their conflict with Israel"[49].

Originally the money transfer operation is done through "Bank of Iran Exports". But as a result of the international sanctions on this bank and the sensitivity of the banking operation, the Iranian embassy in Beirut is doing the operation of transferring the money to Hezbollah[50].

In spite of the official recognition of financial assistance given by Iran to Hezbollah, there are no official records from both sides about the value of this support but according to some evaluations we can divide these assistances into two types. The first type comes in the figure of annual financial assistance presented from Iran to Hezbollah and its estimations are varying. Israel estimates it by more than 100 million dollars per year[51] . There is a report raised up from the American minister of defense, Robert Getz to the American congress in April 2010. This report mentioned that Iran is financing Hezbollah by 200 million dollars annually[52].

The second type from assistance can be described as urgent assistance. This type is served to Hezbollah in the crisis times in order to support its continuity and to preserve its position in Lebanon and in the region. For example, after the Israeli attack on Lebanon in June 2006, Iran took the action of rebuilding most of south Lebanon in order to preserve the popularity of Hezbollah inside Lebanon. Estimations of the amount of money given by Iran are varying for this issue. Some Iranian sources say that the Iranian government sent four hundred million dollars for Hezbollah as contributions of rebuilding Lebanon operation. Some other reports from a newspaper say that the amount of this money is just 300 million dollars[53].

49 - David Menshri, (spring/summer 2007), "Iran regional policy between pragmatism", Journal of International Affairs, vol 60, n.2 p. 160..

50 El-shark El awsat newspaper, 18/12/2006.

51 These evaluations came in the file of Hezbollah made by "Information center on intelligence and terrorism". This file explain the Israeli point of view on the events from the first Lebanese war focusing on the Syrian support and the Iranian support to Hezbollah, available at: http://www.arraee.com/modules.php?name=News&file=print&sid=15278

52 Michael Rubin, (December 2009) " The Enduring Iran-Syria-Hezbollah Axis", Aei Outlook Series, Website of The American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research Available at: http://www.aei.org/outlook/100098

53 "400 million dollars from Iran to Hezbollah and Hezbollah members are participating in

C) The Syrian Pivot

The type of the economic tools used by the Iran in this aspect is different than others used in the previous two aspects. Syria is a state with sovereignty and not militarily resistance groups. So it is usual that the economic relations tie the two countries are representing the framework of the Iranian policy in this aspect.

What is noticed now is that the size of the existing relations between Syria and Iran is not consistent with the strategic alliance between the two countries. According to what is mentioned by the Iranian vice president Parvez David, during his last visit to Syria in February 2010. He said that the trade balance between the two countries is 300 million dollars annually while tourism represents around 500 million dollars annually[54]. He added that the amount of the Iranian investment in Syria reached 1.5 billion dollars in different fields[55].

Despite the small size of Trade balance between the two countries, the economic ties are witnessing marked advances in the last few years through fourteen agreements most of them were Iranian initiatives[56]. Tehran is keen on providing Syria all privileges and opportunities thus Syria will be keen on keeping its strategic alliance relations with Iran, at the time when the United States is trying to dismantle this existed alliance.

Generally we can say that the Iranian policy towards the Syrian aspect in the Arab Israeli conflict depends mainly on the political strategic alliance between Iran and Syria more than the limited and small economic cooperation ties between them, despite its development in the last time.

Third: the Security-military Tools

What meant by the security-military tools in this part is the tools used by Iran in order to influence somehow the developments of the Arab Israeli con-

halting down demonstrations in Tehran", available at: http://www.metransparent.com/ spip.php?article9311&lang=ar&id_forum=10642.

54 -" Iran and Syria look to closer ties", Website of Arab Times, Mar 18, 2010, Available at: (http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/LC18Ak01.html).

55 Nimond Rafael & Bianca Gerstein, "the Iran Syria alliance: the economic dimention", available at: (http://www.globalpolitician.com/25060-Iran-syria.

56 According to declarations of the head of the Syrian Iranian council Mohamed Borhum, 18/2/2010, available at: http://www.menafn.com/Arabic/qn_news_story_s.asp?type=all&storyid=1093306138

flict in its three aspects. These tools include the financial assistance for the military purposes, assistance by weapons, troops or signing military agreement. It may also include common military maneuvers or some declarations that suggest some military obligations to the other partner. There are some other tools that we can speak about them in this concept.

A) The Palestinian Pivot

The military tools employed by Iran in its policy toward this aspect mainly depend on the military support by weapons, the military trainings to some militias in Hamas and other Palestinian militarily groups. But the available information for making a comprehensive and accurate evaluation to the Iranian military support of Hamas is not available. This information is top secret especially because Iran is not declaring directly that there is a military support for Hamas and Hamas is doing the same. Thus there are not official resources we can rely on in determining the size, kind, value of this support.

But we can rely on declarations from some officials in the Palestinian Authority. They said that Iran trained some of the military branch of Hamas on some high fighting techniques. For example the head of the Palestinian intelligence Tawfik El-Tabrawy who said that Iran is playing “a big role” in Hamas domination on Gaza. He said that “there was a big role for Iran in what happened in Gaza either through financing or execution” also he added “we know hundreds from Hamas went and trained in Iran”[57].

Some western intelligence reports say that releasing the Israeli attachment to Gaza in August 2005, the electoral success of Hamas in 2006, Hamas domination on Gaza in 2006 contributed in Iran's military support to the movement. The reports evidenced that by the marked rise of Hamas military capabilities from 2005. They mentioned the Iranian rockets like Grad and Katuysha and reaches around 20 to 40 kilometers. They are being smuggled to Gaza parted and then the parts are gathered together there. Also Hawn rockets (80-120 ml. Calibers) sent to Gaza which are manufactured in Iran and mainly used for attacking the Israeli army or on the Israeli settlements[58].

57 “In Gaza: Hamas or Al-Qaieda … the best is sour”, 27/6/2007, available at: http://www.annabaa.org/nbanews/64/168.htm.

58 “Hamas new rockets: from Tehran to Gaza”, 23/11/2009, available at: http://www.alawsati.com/news_view_36452.html

According to a report from the Washington institute for the near east policy that Hamas might has received from Iran new kinds of rockets that reach targets on 40-60 Kilometers.[59]

The Lebanese Pivot

According to the Iranian military tools employed by Iran in its policy towards the Lebanese aspect and the type of the military support presented to Hezbollah, the situation is more complicated and very difficult. The difficulty of the process aroused after the issuance of the Security Council resolution number 1701. This resolution is imposing a ban on weapons entry to Lebanon except what is allowed by the government. The government will not accept any weapons coming to Hezbollah from Iran. But this doesn't mean that Iran will stop supporting Hezbollah militarily after the issuance of the resolution. It became more careful in doing this process in order not to be accused by violating the decree. This is also a point of difficulty for those who are trying to analyze or search this point.

But there are lots of American accusations to Iran and Syria for their continuity of militarizing Hezbollah after issuance of Security Council resolution 1701. From these accusations what David Walsh, the American deputy foreign minister for the near east policies, he said that Iran is still providing Hezbollah with weapons in Lebanon. He added that "it's obvious that Hezbollah is trying to militarize itself and no source for support can be seen except from Syria and Iran". Lots of charges repeated especially in the report of Robert Gets the minister of defense to the congress at the end of April 2010. The report observed the Iranian active role in militarizing lots of armed groups in the Middle East, especially Hezbollah[60] .

And thus what is available about the kind of the military support from Iran to Hezbollah is represented in some western American charges. The charges about providing Hezbollah with weapons and violating the United Nations resolution number 1701. These charges cannot be completely credible and also at the same time cannot be completely uncertain. The kind of the conflicting relationship between the United States and Iran and the organic strong relation between Iran and Hezbollah cannot decline these charges.

59 Uzi Rubin (November 2006), "The Global Reach of Iran's Ballistic Missiles", Institute for National Security Studies, Available at: (http://www.inss.org.il/upload/(FILE)1188302022.pdf)

60 Ibid.

The Syrian Pivot

The military tools employed by Iran in this aspect come in the frame of the bilateral military relations that relate it to the state of Syria. Thus we can speak about the military cooperation treaty signed by Syria and Iran in 2006 which costs around 800 million dollars. According to this treaty, Iran provided Syria by military deals from Russia, China and Ukraine; it also supported the Syrian army with shells, guns, military troops and missiles made by the factories of the defensive industries. It also gave a training chance for the members of the Syrian Navy. This treaty opened the door for having a consultation room between the defense ministers of the two countries concerning the military and security issues[61].

The treaty doesn't mention directly that Iran will stand beside Syria officially in case of any attack from Israel on the former. But this kind of obligation from Iran is founded in the declarations by the Iranian officials when the tensions between Israel and Syria rises up also during meetings between Syria and Iran. One of these declarations is the words of the Iranian vice president Mohamed Reda Rahemy at the end of the meeting of the supreme common Syrian Iranian commission held on April 2010 in Damascus. He threatened by cutting the "legs of Israel" if it attacked Syria. He added that his country will stand by the side of Syria in case of any attack. If the usurpers of the Palestinian lands thought about doing anything so there legs will be cut. He also said that in all cases Iran will be beside Syria and will never stop supporting it as Syria is a strong country and Iran will support it in all field and with all its power[62]. These commitments are not tested yet on the real land.

The Third Section

An Evaluative Vision to the Iranian Role in the Arab Israeli Conflict

It is obvious for us in this paper that there are some main orientations that manage the Iranian role in the Arab Israeli conflict. These orientations rep-

61 Abdul Aziz Abdul Kadir, Ashraf (2008), Ibid, P.123.

62 "Syria & Iran signed a military cooperation treaty to face threats", El shark El awsat News paper, (London: 16/6/2006), available at: http://www.aawsat.com/details. asp?section=4&article=368558&issueno=10062.
-"Iran is threatening by cutting Israel legs if it attacked Syria", 30/4/2010, available at: http://www.ammonnews.net/article.aspx?articleNO=59624.

resented in 1) the official support to the Palestinian case and the rights of the Palestinian people. They say it as an Islamic case mainly not just Arabic case. 2) Providing support to the armed resistance movement against the Israeli occupation either in Lebanon or Palestine and showing solidarity with Syria in restoring Golan Heights. 3) Refusing the principle of the peaceful settlement of the Arab Israeli conflict through negotiations and considering the resistance is the proper way for liberating he occupied land. They refused the Arab initiative for peace and any schemes for peace before it.

There is no suspicion that the first impression upon the Iranian role is representing a supporting factor for the resistance groups and the Arab position in their confrontation with Israel. But the realistic reading for the Iranian policies reflect different than that.

Thus in order to evaluate the Iranian role towards the Arab Israeli conflict on its three aspects, we can have it through three main points. These points are considered as evaluative readings to the Iranian role. The research is not saying that these points are right but they are exposed to discussions.

First: The Gap between the Official Iranian Discourse and Its Policies

In spite of the Arab Israeli conflict often represents a central position in the political discourse, especially the Palestinian case, since the broke out of the Iranian revolution. The followers of the Iranian attitude towards the development of the conflict in the Middle East can see a gap between the Iranian political discourse and its real policies. We can take the Palestinian case as a model for that.

Since the broke out of the Palestinian uprising in 2000, the Iranian attitude was not consistent with the official political discourse adopted by Iran at that time. Some views reasoned that to the conflict on the power in Iran between two wings, the moderate wing who is supporting pragmatic policies towards the conflict, this wing was in power at that time. The other wing is the revolutionary in the contrast and it was not in power. But this attitude if it is credible to reason the Iranian attitude during the time of Mohamed Khatami cannot be a reason for the attitude during the time of Ahmedi Nijad[63] who belongs to the conservative stream. He is supposing that there must be a consistency between the Iranian political discourse and the Iranian policies.

63 - Karim Sadjadpour, (2008), "The World View of Iran's Most Powerful Leader", Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Website, Available at: http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/sadjadpour_Iran_final2.pdf

But still the gap do exists, during the raid on Gaza, Iran contended itself by adopting condemning speeches, sending messages to the Islamic world to support Hamas against Israel[64]. In spite of its pledges of supporting the Palestinian resistance and defending Gaza district.

Second: Employing the Developments of the Conflict for the Interest of Iran in Other Cases

One of the main remarks on evaluating the Iranian role towards the Arab Israeli conflict is its trials to employ some new outcomes of the conflict in the way leads to achieving its goals on other topics like its conflict with the west concerning the Iranian nuclear program. Despite these readings are western American readings for the role.

All these analysis assume that the Iranian role is the main determinant in the Arab Israeli conflict and decline any independency in the decision making process in the Palestinian resistance movements. These vies also assume that there is Israel is just acting reactions and doesn't start any action[65] . at that time also we cannot say there is no role for Iran in any escalations witnessed by the aspects of the Arab israeli conflict. The Iranian role is not for just escalation but it is active affect appears in this escalation and how it can help the Iranian interests mainly. May be there is no direct role in the operation of kidnapping the Israeli soldiers from Hamas or Hezbollah but there is a great influence on the two movements which will lead naturally to the extension of the domain and duration of conflicts in all cases.

What also supports that is the Iranian interest in the continuity of the tensions and conflicts within the three aspects of the Arab Israeli conflict, broadly in the Middle East including Iraq and Afghanistan. This all will lead to gain more time in order to build the Iranian nuclear program. They will do this by moving the eyes from the Iranian nuclear case to the Palestinian case. Also the continuity of tensions and conflicts will lead to more complications on any negotiations related to the peaceful settlement of the conflict. Certainly all of these are in the main interest of Iran, because the opposite

64 Keith Crane, Rollie Lal, Jeffrey Martini, "Iran's Political, Demographic, and Economic Vulnerabilities", the RAND Corporation Website, 2008, Available at: http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG693.sum.pdf.

65 Gawdat Bahgat , (2007), "Iran and the United States: The Emerging Security Paradigm in the Middle East", Parameters, Vol. 37 (2007). http://www.accessmylibrary.com/article-1G1-167253997/Iran-and-united-states.html

scenario means narrowing the area of the Iranian domination in the region, losing some important cards especially is relations with Syria and Hezbollah. Iran is mainly depending on employing them in its conflict with the west through its nuclear program[66].

In all cases, the evaluations at the end are capable of being discussed and criticized. We cannot believe in its full accuracy or full fallacy.

Thirdly: Iran's Disability of Employing Its Relative Power in Serving the Cases of the Conflict

The author is giving an assumption by which if there is a direct hostile relationship between Iran and Israel, if Iran is refusing the settlement efforts basically, this cannot prevent it from playing an effective role in the other cases related to the Palestinian case like the Palestinian reconciliation issue. This case is not far away from the recent and the future of the Palestinian case. It can provide a justification for the Israeli policies as there is no real unified Palestinian partner.

Iran has very strong ties with Hamas that it can play a positive role in the reconciliation issue. This reconciliation may lead to ending the division happened since 2007 between Fatah and Hamas. But Tehran did not exert any real effort in this way[67] .

Summary

It was obvious from the paper that the Iranian role towards the Arab Israeli conflict mainly based on some goals. These goals include emphasizing the Iranian regional hegemony and confirming the status that Iran is an important state in the Middle East. Also it wants to confirm that it is a must for Iran to have its role relevant to its economic, scientific and military capabilities. Iran want to show itself in the image of the Islamic country which defends the Islamic cases especially the Palestinian case, it is the state which is challenging the western countries and Israel.

The Iranian policy is depending in this context on some tools for achieving its goals. The most obvious tools are represented in its seeks for the

66 Daniel Möckli and Andrin Hauri, (November 2008), "Iran Nuclear Crisis: Status and Options", *CSS Analyses in Security Policy*, Vol. 3 . No. 43, Available at: (http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0c54e3b3-1e9c-be1e-2c24-a6a8c7060233&lng=en&id=93729

67 Sowailam, Hossam, Ibid.

Islamization of the Palestinian case and take it away from the Arab framework. This will help in allowing Iran interference in the case and employing it for managing its policy with the regional and global powers. It also can make use of the case in order to enter a dialogue with the countries of the region for gaining its support. Iran is keen on finding a role and dominance on the conflict aspects with Israel. This role is being gained through supporting the shiaat entities in the region, demonstrating the resistance and bidding on the Arab regimes policies towards the Palestinian case. They also raise the slogans of Anti-Israel, countries supporting it, and considering Israel as a colonial entity founded in the region and this entity must be uprooted from the region.

It was obvious also the gap between the Iranian political discourse towards the Arab Israeli conflict and the real policies adopted by the Iranian administration towards the conflict. There are limits for this support presented to the Arab fractions in the conflict represented in what can serve the Iranian national interests in the first place. It is trying-directly and indirectly- to create political cards from the developments of the conflict in order to maneuver with the western and regional powers declining its right for possessing the nuclear energy. Iran till now did not make use of its real power in solving the conflict or serving the Palestinian case which may narrow the mentioned gap.

And finally we must emphasize on the growing role and hegemony of Iran in the Arab Israeli conflict. This growing role is related to the absence of the Arab role in the conflict or its regression at least. This point needs to be more discussed in independent scientific studies in order to touch the truth in this correlation.

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Turkey's Soft Power in the Arab World: Emerging Trends and Prospects

Omair Anas

> "*Providing security and stability not for itself but also for its neighbouring regions, Turkey should guarantee its own security and stability by taking on more active, constructive role to provide order, stability and security in its environs"* (Ahmet Davutoğlu 2008: 79).

Soft Power has emerged as one of the most frequently used conceptual phrases in AK Party's foreign policy discourses. The Turkish discourse on Soft Power has mainly focused on its sources and potential efficacy in its foreign strategy. The assessment of Turkey's Soft Power by Turkish and non Turkish analysts reveals that Soft Power is still a weak link in Turkey's pursuit for stronger and comprehensive national power; however it is becoming increasingly discussed. This paper consists of conceptual evaluation of Soft Power in international relations studies, its application in the Arab World positioning Turkey as Soft Power in the Arab World. Doing so, new era of Turkish foreign policy has appeared on Turkey's international engagement with some new priorities and new goals.[1] A new vocabulary of foreign affairs has been introduced by AKP and its vision makers particularly Ahmet Davutoğlu, an academician foreign minister. Newly introduced vision "Zero Problem with neighbours" to maximize benefits of available "Strategic Depth", is major source of emerging discourses. This paper will also figure out limitations of Turkish Soft Power in the region as a conceptual relevance and contextual efficacy. In Turkey, there is lot of excitement and enthusiasm among AKP constituencies and scepticism among some and pessimism among its western allies. These three discourses are clearly visible in all coming debate over Turkey's emerging status in the regional and global politics.[2] Sceptical are of the view that Turkey's secular history makes it an unattractive model for Arab states and it has prospects of failure similar

to that of in Central Asia Turkey's relations with Israel and its NATO role also make Turkey an unwelcome actor in the region. However Turkey's Soft Power has increased from its successes in social and economic profile of Turkey. Turkey stands far ahead of all of Arab and Muslim neighbours having improved its political and cultural institutions, human resources and cultural landscape. Turkey has more than 200 TV channels and nearly 1,000 radio channels which make it very different from what it was one decade ago. Turks own mobile phones twice the world average. Presence of foreign media in Turkey has also increased which include Al-Jazeera and other Arab TV Channels Bureaus in Turkey. For example bureau of Al Jazeera is second only to Al Jazeera's Washington Bureau in terms of team and stories filed from a non Arab country. There is growing sense of disappointment and pessimism among Turkey's NATO allies mainly the United States and some European countries as well as Israel who see Turkish shift towards Iran and Islamic world within project of political Islam. This paper surveys Turkey's New Arab Vision, current reform initiatives in Turkish politics and economy along with emergence of independent civil society and media. This concluded with a view that Turkish role in the Arab world is defined not only by external powers like the United States and NATO also by internal forces which are real force behind current transformation. Growing popularity of Turkish foreign policy among Arab masses and governments originates from its pro Palestine positions and its potential role as counter Iran. Despite this popularity, Turkey's role may face limitations when it will encounter with domestic problems of the Arab states mainly political reforms, human rights and security concerns.

Globalization, Nation State and Soft Power

Power became bedrock of post-Westphalian politics both in national and international system and balance of power became major basis of subsequent political analyses. Power was defined as 'the ability to coerce grows out of a country's military and economic might' which was also identified as hard power.[3] The post-Westphalian nation state system is primarily located within power relationship among units of the system which are derived by their "national interests". This comes through different forms of power in international politics and its sophisticated shapes in new globalised political environment. Most influential work on power and politics has been presented by Hans J. Morgenthau in his book *Politics among Nations: the Struggle for Power and Peace* where he defines power from realist perspective as

the ability of states to use material resources to get others to do what they otherwise would not. States have been exercising 'coercion and inducement' as major sources of their power. This comes as fact that:

1. Concept of Power is primarily identified in post Westphalian state system, particularly in relations among states of the European continent.
2. Power is also defined in relation with national interests of a state and its use varies according to primacy of national interests. Primary national interest, as Morgenthau indicates, is survival and sustainability of a state within international system as an independent and sovereign entity followed by resources to sustain.
3. Variability of national interest results in use of and definition of power and thus creating different forms of power struggle in different contexts.

Since there is growing understanding among scholars of international relations over explicit and logically systematic decomposition of the concept of power, limitations of realist power definition is facing theoretical and practical limitations in globalizing world. National interests are also being redefined in transnational context where interests of one state depend on the interests of other state and thus the national interests become transnational or global and sometimes universal by their nature. They are affecting citizens of several nations and continents and require coordinated efforts as well towards resolving them. This necessitates kind of interdependency which has emerged in the international system where Nation States are forced to relinquish some parts of their sovereignty.[4] This interdependency mainly in military, economic, ecological and social domains are serving as new source of power for nation states and helping to create transnational governance under aegis of a international, transnational or global body.[5] Failure of hard power generally came from its myths attached with invincibility of a state which could not stay as unchangeable unit.[6] Recent example of this is disclosure of WikiLeaks about American diplomatic practices around the world. The old statement of Winston Churchill about capability of the United States "the best hope of the world lies in the strength, will, and good judgment of the US" has failed for United States itself. The strongest world power since Rome, the United States failed to secure many of its crucial international interests like international financial stability, drug trafficking, the spread of diseases, and most importantly avoiding tragedy of September 11 in 2001. These failures underscore limitation of power of a single state and secure its 'national interests' alone. 'Ability to get others to do what they oth-

erwise would not do' is available to states as well as many non state actors like terrorist groups and transnational corporations.[7] The Great Transformation (Karl Polany: 1957) led to reconfiguration of modern world mainly because land, labour and capital became commodity and markets expanded from traditional territorial limits to transnational and even virtual limits. This led to another ever speeding intensification of worldwide social relations (Giddens: 1990) and creation of transnational communities, media, culture and corporations and thus creating range of *sacpes* (Appadurai: 1996, Rantanen: 2005). This change in power discourse has been said as fourth stage of discourse which Joseph Nye started talking about as Soft Power in 1990s to suggest corrective measures for failing Unites States' international standing. Discourses on power in international relations have come through mainly four faces identified by Peter Digeser who concludes that current debate is dealing with fourth face of power. The central question in first phase of power discourse was who, is exercising power? The second face was about 'what issues have been mobilized off the agenda and by whom?' the third face talked of 'whose objective interests are being harmed? The current debate on power concept comes from fourth face of this change which discusses 'what kind of subject is being produced?'[8] Measuring power in terms of the changed behaviour of others may be mistaken. Joseph Nye elaborates how power can be exercised in different ways. There are three ways to get the outcome:

- Coercion which comes through military power
- Inducement which is derived primarily from economic resources or other sources
- Attraction and co-option which comes through the model one state establish as successful state for its own people

His critique of American reliance on hard power intensified particularly after tragedy of September 11, which he called as failure of hard power. Joseph Nye's critique of American foreign policy in recent decade has led to revival of Soft Power as a foreign policy strategy to win hearts and minds of international community. Defining the concept he emphasises on co-option 'Co-optive power--the ability to shape what others want, can rest on the attractiveness of one's own culture and values or the ability to manipulate the agenda of political choices in a manner that makes others fail to express some preferences.[9] He does not separate soft power from hard power but points out the distinction of one degree:

Hard and Soft Power is related because they are both aspects of the ability to achieve one's purpose by affecting the behaviour of others. The distinction between them is one of degree, both in the nature of the behaviour and in the tangibility of the resources. Command power--the ability to change what others do--can rest on coercion or inducement. Co-optive power--the ability to shape what others want--can rest on the attractiveness of one's own culture and values or the ability to manipulate the agenda of political choices in a manner that makes others fail to express some preferences because they seem to be too unrealistic.[10]

In his description of Soft Power, the United States should focus on five critical areas: Alliances, partnerships, and institutions, Global development, Public diplomacy, Economic integration Technology and innovation.[11] In an earlier article, Nye says that the ability to affect what other countries want tends to be associated with intangible power resources such as culture, ideology, and institutions.[12] He reasserts that the Soft Power of a country has three primary sources: its culture (in places where it is attractive to others), its political values (when it lives up to them at home and abroad), and its foreign policies (when they are seen as legitimate and having moral authority).[13]

These definitions are also not free from problems and limitations which have been discussed when the context changes especially in the context of Turkish Soft Power. In this conception, hard power is visible in the practices of threat, coercion, sanction, payment, and inducement, whereas Soft Power is demonstrated in attraction, persuasion, appeal, and co-optation. Culture, ideology, values, and norms are also sources of resentment, repulsion, hostility, and even conflict. Hard power may not always be used for coercion, threat, intimidation, and inducement; rather it can produce attraction, appeal, and amity in certain circumstances. That makes a point for the argument that efficacy of Soft Power invariably involves a strategic marriage with hard power.[14] For example, if a country pursues an aggressive cultural policy, it may effectively result in fear of cultural hegemony or cultural imperialism. Americanization, Westernization or Cultural Imperialism discourses in social sciences have been sources of intense opposition and reaction. This dichotomy of Soft Power potential implications requires distinction when culture is soft and when it is hard. In fact, culture and values are very much part of a country's foreign relations. If culture, ideology, and values can be used for coercion, military and economic strength can also be apparently used for attraction and appeal. Another critique of Nye's conception is that the production and various expressions of 'attraction' remain unaccounted for.[15] Soft Power lies in the soft use of power to increase a state's attraction,

persuasiveness, and appeal. If a nation state (or any other actor) makes good use of its resources of power through various domestic cultural, economic, and political programs to bring well-being to its own nationals, it may produce a lot of admiration from other countries. As Pinar Bilgin points out, Nye's evaluation of Soft Power stems mainly from United States' experience and he rightly questions "how it was that U.S. culture, political ideas and policies came to be considered 'attractive' by the rest of the world."[16] Sources of Soft Power may vary country to country and region to region and so is the case of its appeal to other states. United State is accused for cultural imperialism for a long time and its attractiveness for other states mainly for Muslim and Asian countries fails, American Soft Power discourse is not very much relevant to the Turkish discourse.

Turkey's Soft Power originates from cultural values which are common to majority of Arab and Muslim states and respected by many Asian nations. Turkish foreign policy practices are not tagged as hegemonic practices for which United States and other Western countries are often blamed. The bigger problem lies within power discourse of United States' foreign affairs which has more alienating elements. American power is subject to intense criticism in the world politics which also failed to settle any of and long standing conflicts in the world like Arab-Israel conflict even in the post cold war period when the United States had full opportunity to resolve them. Turkey is among the emerging rest (Zakaria 2008) which is now actively engaged in regional politics to achieve 'Zero Problem with neighbours.'

Turkey's New Arab Vision

> Although we are talking different languages in this vast geography, we should not forget that we have one history, one culture and similar values. We have given a shape the history together. Be sure that we will give a shape to the future altogether. We are the members of a civilization that gives high importance to neighbourhood (Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan: 25 November 2010).

There is much talk in Ankara about "2023 vision," to mark the Turkish Republic's centennial which also includes 'active, responsible and successful foreign policy' whose first step as Davutuglo says is "to integrate Turkey's foreign-policy discourse into its national discourse." Turkey's current foreign policy moves have raised doubts and hopes among political analysts, ideologues, political activists and policy makers. There are mainly three scenarios being projected by Western scholars about Turkish foreign policy which

may be (a) Washington-oriented, (b) Brussels oriented and (c) independent Turkish foreign policy. [17] There are also perceptions that Turkey may leave Western camp and enter Islamic camp. How can this shift be described? Is this shift towards an "eastern axis?" a notion often defined by Western analysts? Some calls "eastern axis" manifestation of "West's inability to digest Turkey".[18] Many suggest that the foreign policy shifts are directed to restoration [19] Ottomanism and emergence of neo Ottomanism.[20] Ahmet Davutoğlu, academic turned foreign minister of Turkish republic in Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi–AKP) regime is considered as the architect of new Turkish foreign policy. Davutogulo prescribes successful foreign policy operation under strategic depth guided by five key principals (Davutoglu 2008: 79-84).

- Balance between democracy and security in Turkey
- Zero problem policy toward Turkey 's neighbours
- The development of relations with Turkey's neighbouring regions and beyond
- Adherence to multidimensional foreign policy
- Rhythmic diplomacy

With these principals, Turkey wants to achieve many gains. The AKP government is more serious about EU membership as a process between equals and by presenting Turkey as a role model in the world, Turkey is mounting pressure as well criticizing EU of violating principal of "*Pacta sunt servanda"*. Powerful in the region and having strategic depth with zero problems with neighbours, Turkey is better with and without EU membership and Davutoglu does not see any contradiction between vision for Europe and vision for Turkey [21]. Analysts see a Turkey with zero problems with neighbours, and active role in the region, is a strategic asset for the European Union and a win-win situation for EU and Turkey.[22] For example, despite the arguments that Turkey is overestimating its influence on Iranian leadership as well as acknowledgement of Turkish 'strategic depth' by Iran, (Lesser 2010a, Lesser 2010b) Turkey's efforts have been welcomed by larger global and regional community and Turkey's role in peace efforts has been recognized. Though Turkey is a secular and democratic country, Turkey didn't subscribe American project for democratization in the Arab world widely known as Greater Middle East Project. The project is based on top-down approach of reforms and exclude participation of Arab masses, civil society,

scholars and politicians in the process which support their perception that American project is only for changing the leaders; regimes; and the borders.

What are the Turkish priorities and expectations from the Arab World? Turkey's key concerns in the region are unresolved Iranian nuclear issue, instable and insecure Iraq, increased Arab-Israel tensions along with problems in Caucasus, Balkan and Cyprus.[23] A survey of current dealing with Arab neighbouring reveals that Turkey's priorities are derived both from economic and security considerations. Formation of High Level Strategic Cooperation Council with Iraq, and proactive relation with Kurdish Regional Government (KRG), settlement of water and border dispute with Syria and formation of visa free region with Syria, Jordan and Lebanon, Turkey has attracted more business flow from the region. Turkey has been helping Syria to reduce international isolation imposed by the United States and to get in negotiation process with Israel. Turkey's business environment has attracted Arab investors and banks to set up their operations in Turkey also. Turkey is actively engaged with regional and international groups with Arab states namely Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC), League of Arab States (LAS) as permanent invitee and African Union where it holds strategic partnership status. For example Turkish position on Darfur crisis reflects Turkish coordination with regional groups towards dealing with crisis like. Turkey has clearly rejected international intervention and supported OIC, AU and Arab League efforts in the crisis. Turkish parliament ejected United States appeal to allow Turkish air base for America's operation enduring freedom in 2003. The rapprochement in Turkish foreign policy is not sudden rather it has come out of failure of West oriented foreign policy, economic failures and insecurity coming from these failures. Painful Turkish experiences from the Jupiter Missile (IRBMs) Crisis, then the Johnson Letter Crisis in 1964 and the arms embargo on Turkey in 1975, the ban of opium poppy cultivation in 1971 which make Turkey think beyond West and to adopt a multidimensional foreign policy.[24] Progress made by Turgut Ozal paved the way to use untapped potentials in Turkey's Arab World policy.[25] One of the important issues which shape Turkey's foreign policy towards Arab World is also energy prospects. Turkey aims to be energy hub by making itself which requires Turkey to become buying and selling centre as well as a transit country. With regional energy hub status, Turkey will be strategic asset for European Union as well as for Arab oil producing nations. In his recent speech Turkish foreign minister has elaborated his 2023 vision which consists of multiple identities.

The first step of this vision is to integrate Turkey's foreign-policy discourse into its national discourse. Any possible contradiction, gap or contrast between these two will make it difficult to carry out an active, responsible, and successful foreign policy. In the coming era, Turkey plans to deepen and strengthen its democracy, place relations between Turkish society and Turkey's governing institutions on firm ground, and show the world the strength of its own domestic balance. There is a continuous need to integrate domestic political accomplishments into the vision of foreign policy (i.e. democratization and cultural respect) and to inject foreign-policy activism and self-confidence back into the domestic political scene. Turkey's foreign-policy objectives and its vision of how to achieve them are very clear. Turkey has multiple goals over the next decade: First, it aims to achieve all EU membership conditions and become an influential EU member state by 2023. Second, it will continue to strive for regional integration, in the form of security and economic cooperation. Third, it will seek to play an influential role in regional conflict resolution. Fourth, it will vigorously participate in all global arenas. Fifth, it will play a determining role in international organizations and become one of the top 10 largest economies in the world.

The Ottoman-Islamic bond has been said as ideological base for future cultural and political partnership by Islamic political parties of the region. Linguistic and ethnic proximity with pan Turkic communities in Central Asia and Caucuses is another connector for Turkey's regional role in Central Asia. In this scenario, Turkey has aspirations and ambitions for a dignified role in regional and global politics. Given the existing difficulties in managing balance of power as well as balance of security in the Arab World, Turkey's regional role and aspirations is not unchallenged. To achieve its interests in the region, Turkey requires support both from governments and their people.

Turkey's new start in the Arab world, despite all welcoming gestures, can not be defined by Turkey alone. Arab world as a region is unique in terms of number of stakeholders from within and without region. United States which is considered as security guarantor of the many countries like Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordon, Kuwait, Qatar and Bahrain has most intensive and extensive engagement with all Arab governments. So is the case of EU and Quartet and former colonial powers like United Kingdom, France and Italy which now maintain closer relation with their former colonies. China and India are also emerging markets for energy rich Arab states and have caused 'Look East' shift in their foreign policies. Turkey as Muslim country has some advantages over other non Arab states but it has also several limitations for which it can not disqualify western states' influence in the region.

The key defining features of Turkish role in the Arab world are Arab-Israel conflict, stability in Iraq, energy considerations and regional security. Turkey is engaged with two main rivals of the Gulf region Iran and Saudi Arabia. Iran has welcomed Turkey's role in its nuclear crisis and Saudi Arabia has also shown interests to support Turkey's role in the region. Other Arab States like Egypt might have reservations for Turkey's increased role in the Arab world. In this context Turkey faces many challenges from external and regional countries in the Arab world. Egypt with similar population, development requirements, and geopolitical importance has a kind of implied competition between the two countries though it is not explicit. Turkey and Egypt have recently enhanced their political, cultural transactions by undertaking various bilateral initiatives.

Turkish Soft Power: Emerging Trends

Turkish discourse of Soft Power encounters with series of questions about Turkey's changing role in the Arab World and other region and its effort to balance between conflicting roles. Though Turkish foreign policy regime calls its emerging and increasing role in all of major region as "consistent and systematic", Turkey's Arab vision may face number of challenges. Dovutoglu maintains that Turkey's new discourse and diplomatic style have resulted in the spread of Turkish soft power in the region. Turkey's new initiatives to strengthen its democratic institutions and intensifying relation between state and society aim not only acceptability for EU membership but also to be a successful model for international and regional community. According to Davutoglu, the new language adopted by Turkish diplomats 'prioritizes Turkey's civil-economic power'.[26] However Turkey's soft Power efficacy depends on several prerequisites as Phar Kim Beng and others have pointed out some of them. First prerequisite is strong Turkish understanding of the regional characteristics of its theatre of operation, secondly to undertake necessary reforms at home to make Turkey's development attractive and persuasive to others and thirdly, to reconcile emerging tensions between its strategic alliances and new roles in the region.[27]

Transformation within Turkey is derived by combination of EU membership process, economic and domestic political considerations. In an increasingly interdependent world, Turkey needs secured supply of energy for sustained economic growth and development projects, minimum or zero problems at its immediate borders and long term prosperity for Turkey's 27% younger population and 67% working population. Turkey's overdue eco-

nomic problems in pre AKP era mainly unemployment, high inflation rates has also provided an opportunity to policy makers within Islamic in order to set development based political discourse of Islamic parties. This resulted in immediate breakup of Sadaat Party and emergence of AKP. There were little hopes coming for early membership of European Union due to strong opposition from France and Germany [28]. Changing political discourse was more difficult for any old political party than that for new party like AK. The six Kemalist principals of republicanism, nationalism, populism, revolutionism, secularism and Etatism continued influencing Turkish national identities but recent changes have softened many of principals which worry many that Turkey is shifting away from its secular foundations. These observations have failed to figure out the fact that recent change is from within Turkish society. Some of these principals have been criticised for not allowing rural and traditional Muslim Turkish women to exercise right of higher education, employments and to join politics. Abolishing of nominal Ottoman Caliphate in 1922 and subsequent Westernization offensive by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk was never welcomed by Arab societies.[29] Today's reform process was initiated by Prime Minister Turgut Ozal in the '80s and speeded by the recent AKP government which has its root in political ideology of Islam.[30]

Now there is another debate whether Turkey's new ambitious leadership can project Turkey as role model for the Arab World or not.[31] AKP with Islamic credentials as well as successful capitalist economy has appeal for both Islamists and secularists of the region. Section of Western policy makers is also interested to project Turkey as role model for Arab governments in their democratization process (Altunisik 2005; Bal 2000; Fuller: 2004, 2008, Mohapatra: 2001). Compatibility of Turkish model of democratization in the Arab World is contested by many observers. For example, some Arabs call it "democracy of tanks"[32] and Western critics generally highlight its illiberal elements (Kamrava 1998; Tessler and Altinoglu 2004). Fareed Zakaria, argues that "the greatest danger that illiberal democracy poses—other than to its own people—is that it will discredit liberal democracy itself, casting a shadow on democratic governance" (Zakaria: 1997 24). Many argue that Turkey's model differs on historical and structural conditions with its Arab counterparts. The change within Turkish political space is different in many terms as Ashwani K Mohapatra (2010) describes:

First, the origins of Turkish democracy lay in a period when the country was largely agrarian and rural, accompanied by a high rate of illiteracy and low level of economic development. Therefore, it contradicts the argument of most modernization theories, which emphasize the correlation between levels of socio-economic development and propensity for democratic rule.

Second, despite all its structural weaknesses and institutional limitations, the success of electoral democracy in Turkey has disproved the notion of West Asian exceptionalism, which holds that political systems in the region would never fit into general patterns of democratization elsewhere. It has, at the same time, debunked the claim that Islam is incompatible with democracy. Third, the democratic framework in Turkey has offered political space for Islamist opposition and even led to a compromise between the demand for a secular state and the spiritual needs of the people, expressed in the 'Turkish–Islamic synthesis.' Last, but not the least, Turkey's historical and institutional linkages with the West and its resolve to maintain these linkages have made the military sensitive to external pressures.

Comparing Turkey's performance in the Arab World and in Organization of Islamic Countries, there is clear indication that Turkey's progress is worth of international attention. Turkey is becoming largest economy of the Muslim world without having enough energy resources. In 2008 Turkey reached 930.9 billion USD GDP followed by Saudi Arabia (600 billion USD) behind it. Turkey has become most popular tourist destination of entire Arab and OIC group which has earned nearly 15 billion annually in 2005.[33] It is also most favourable country for foreign direct investment in entire OIC and attracted largest amount of FDI from across the world.[34] Freedom's House ranking of press freedom counts Turkey as the only exception in the Arab World 52nd place in the world followed by Kuwait (57). Some survey says that 83 percent of those surveyed supported the people's right to openly criticize the government and 68 percent believed the media should be able to report without government censorship.[35] Global Media Monitoring Project in its survey of 70 countries in 2000 that proportion of stories focusing on women is increasing in Turkey.[36] Turkey's quest to become Soft Power in the Arab world and other regions can be measured by series of reforms and initiatives for reforms and foreign policies and cultural *scape*.

Reforming Turkish State

For a long time, turkey has been considered as conditional democracy, thanks to four military coups and rigid definition of secular character of the state which undermined individual liberty. On the other hand, Kurds' separatist movement had helped to create an ultra nationalist passion towards uniting the country at any cost. To be accessed into the European Union, Turkey is required to ensure individual freedom to the extent which may not

be imagined in Arab Islamic countries. In his address to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on January 27, 2003, Abdullah Gul made an explicit answer when asked about new government's intentions towards military.[37]

> "We are reformists, so our aim is to upgrade Turkish democracy so that it meets the standards of the Council of Europe. We have therefore amended the Constitution and changed the nature of the nation's executive council. 51 That is, of course, a process that I think will continue"

Turkey under AKP government has undertaken series of reforms and has also reconstructed discourses on many controversial issues. In October 2001, Turkish parliament reduced police powers of detention and relaxed many curbs on human rights. Showing bold steps, it also has removed ban on Kurdish language broadcasts and allowed Kurdish language s medium of education in Kurdish region. Towards strengthening democratic institutions, National Security Council (NSC) was reformulated and civilian representation was increased which gives an impression that Turkey is coming out of 'nationals security syndrome'.[38] A new Civil Code became effective in January 2002 which helped to improve freedom of association and assembly. Penal code reform package and anti-terrorism law were introduced in February 2002. This reform offensive actually helped European Council to initiate accession negotiations with Turkey in December 2004. The "Harmonization Package" has accelerated institutional and individual freedom of expression along with greater role for civil officers in the National Security Council. These initiatives were in consonance with EU membership requirements and were widely welcomed by EU community. AKP's pro EU position has forced other nationalist and secular party to review their positions towards military's role, domestic reforms and foreign policy etc.

Foreign Policy

One of the most talked-about stories from Turkey these days is its changing foreign policy scenario which has surprised not only Western counterparts but also the regional governments.[39] AKP's new start of foreign policy represents aspirations of new generation of Islamic movement which has long called European Union only a Christian Club and AKP government is asking

European leaders to disprove the myth by allowing Turkey to be part of the union. Recognizing European Union as its principal goal of foreign policy, AKP has sought legitimacy in its reform initiatives which otherwise could have been rejected as anti secular.[40] Curtailing military clouts in civilian politics was risky project which AKP has completed successfully convincing both secular parties as well as military establishment. The "the zero problem policy towards neighbours" is new ideology of AKP government engineered by Ahmet Davutoğlu who opened negotiations, and political engagement as major tool to resolve all outstanding problems at Turkish borders. Presidential visit to Armenia, close contacts with Iraqi government, opening doors for Syria, Lebanon, Jordon as visa free zone, settlement of water issue with Syria and active support for UN directed settlement for Cyprus are some indicators. This increased Turkey's trade with the region by six fold over the last seven years.[41] Turkey's role in bringing Syria and Israel on negotiating table was widely recognized which was marred by Israel's aggression on Gaza in 2008 and killing of nine Turkish peace activists of Freedom Flotilla in 2010.[42] Turkey's role in Afghanistan has support both from Pakistan and Afghanistan and other Arab nations which is not available for many Western NATO members. Turkey has closely worked to bring agreeable peace formula for Iraqi Sunnis and Shiites as well as Arabs and Kurds, Bosnian Muslims and Serbs, Opposing groups in Lebanon, Iranians and the international community.

With this scenario, Turkish parliament's refusal to allow the U.S. to station its troops on Turkish soil can be understood and recent disclosures have informed that the decision was carefully taken by Ahmet Davutoğlu.[43] Turkey has also rejected US pressure to isolate Syrian and Iran; rather Turkey sought to engage both countries to resolve all outstanding issues.[44] This new language of diplomacy has won support from Arab and Muslim governments as well as from their people which Altunisik says 'provides a win-win possibility'.[45]

Iran and Israel

Turkey's key defining policy remains in its close historical relation with Israel which makes it the first Muslim country which recognized State of Israel and maintained close military and economic ties. But the picture started changing after AKP's mediation efforts were sabotaged by Israel by sudden attack on Gaza which claimed 1200 lives and thousands injured. The outraged Turkey felt cheated by Israel and un-obliged for its peace efforts

between Israel and Arabs states and Turkish Prime Minister stormed out of a televised debate, on 29 January 2009, with Shimon Peres, the Israeli president telling Peres: "You are killing people".[46] Curtailing ties with Israel, Turkey postponed military exercise with Israel indefinitely. Turkish ambassador in Tel Aviv Ahmet Oguz Celikkol was summoned to hear complaints about a Turkish TV drama seen as anti-Semitic, and was intentionally humiliated.[47] Israeli attack on the Gaza aid convoy "Freedom Flotilla" proved disastrous for Israel Turkish relations which have been cut down until Israeli Government issues an apology admitting mistake of killing 9 Turks. Israeli campaign against Turkey has not benefited except Turkey which has won mass support both from Arab streets and international diplomatic community which has also confused Israeli's how to deal with Turkey's changing gestures.[48]

On the Eastern border, lies the historical rival of Ottoman Empire the former Safavid Empire and now Islamic Republic of Iran. The two empires; Ottoman and Safavid have fought many wars and have maintained deep sectarian and political differences over the centuries. Iran is placed with high importance in every regional security considerations. Iranian nuclear program and Iranian quest for greater regional role makes the region more complicated and creates uneasy diplomatic environment. In post Caliphate era, both countries underwent top bottom modernization process with leaders like Mustafa Kemal Ataturk and Muhammed Reza Shah Pahalvi. Turkey's Western orientation isolated Turkey from Arab and Islamic world.

Iranian revolution in 1979 and emergence of Islamic political parties in Turkey coincided and new beginning with was started. Given Islamic revolution's anti Arab rhetoric, Turkey stayed wary of the revolution and the Iranian revolution invited many international sanctions, war with Iraq and hostile relation with most of the Arab countries and Israel which subsequently pushed Iran towards isolation in the international community over last two decades, especially after disclosure of Iranian nuclear program in 2003. Conversely Turkey has become much more engaged and has revived its relation with all regions of the world. Turkey's emerging role in the Arab world is more welcomed than that of Iran's which many Iranians feel. Amid increasing international pressure on Iran, Turkey is the only Muslim country which has boldly came out to rescue Iran from declining into complete isolation. The question arises what Turkey aims at recent active engagement with Iran, is there a double game played by Turkey? With "Zero problem at border perspective" Turkey's main priority is to minimize possibilities of any military action on its eastern frontiers by any regional or international actor.[49] Iran's growing influence in Levant region and especially in Palestinian politics has

raised eyebrows of Arab governments which see threats of 'Shite Crescent' emerging onto the Arab horizon.[50] None other than Turkey can be better counterforce of Iranian influence in the region. Turkish and Arab interests in the region are not that much conflicting as Arab-Iranian interests is. One may observe implicit competition between Iranian and Turkish interests in the Arab World more visibly in post war Iraq crisis where Iran has greater influence over its formerly exiled Shite leadership.[51] Iran's territorial dispute with the United Arab Emirates and its unofficial claim on Bahrain and illicit support to Kuwaiti and Saudi Shi'a groups has disturbed many Gulf States.[52] A Nuclear Iran will only increase Iranian power to dictate the regional policy. Arab states particularly Gulf States may not find better option than Turkey to engage with Iran. Turkey has offered help to Iran and West to find out a solution. Turkey and Brazil issued a joint declaration on 17 May 2010 which is also signed by Iran to end the nuclear crisis however Western countries rejected Turkish efforts. Turkey has helped Iran to end isolation but many have blamed that Turkey is playing double game.

Turkish Culturescape

On the cultural front, Turkish soaps, tourists' destinations, music, novel and spiritual inspiration of Rumi and historical magnificence are attracting millions of people from across the world. Reports suggest that 22 countries are currently importing popular Turkish television soaps and some of them have made record sales in the Arab World and some of them have touched $3m annual sale.[53] Arabic dubbed Turkish soap opera "Noor" was all time hit in Arab streets during 2008 which attracted over 85 million Arab viewers mainly from young women. It was called as Noor mania which many newspapers reported, caused divorce over misbehaviour of Arab husbands [54]. The same was "Years Gone Past" which received nearly 67 million viewers more than 50% were women.[55] Millions of Arabs were ferried from Gulf States by Turkish Airlines and charter boats for whom who want a glimpse of the waterfront villa where "Noor" was filmed.[56] So much so was the Noor Mania that its popularity sparked reaction from Iranian columnist calling it an effort to counter Shia influence in the Arab world. Increasing popularity of Turkish soft products is being perceived as Turkish inroad in to Islamic world once again and the Noor was called "Return of Ottoman". An Iranian newspaper wrote that Saudis are supporting Turkey in the Arab World only to counter Shia Iran.

To counter the Shia culture and reduce its moral influence on the Shias of the Arab World, the Saudis shrewdly provided Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan access to their publicity organs so that Turkey could begin playing a more active role in the political, cultural, and economic life of the Middle East (Tehran Times 28 August 2008).

In education sector, single factor ranking of the 20 universities of OIC countries indicates that Turkish universities (14 out of 20) are publishing more research papers than any other Arab and Islamic country like Iran and Egypt. In composite ranking index, 6 Turkish universities are ranked among 20 universities of the OIC. Among top 50 universities of the OIC, 26 are Turkish universities, 9 are Iranian, 3 are Egyptian and Malaysian and 2 are Pakistani universities. Turkey has produced largest number of research papers 43630 in entire OIC group (85974) followed by Iran (11520), Egypt (7056), Malaysia (3665), Saudi Arabia (2315) and Pakistan (1905) in the period of 2005.[57] Similarly Turkish film industry is also growing at record speed. There were only 18 national films released five years ago, and now there are 43 in 2007 and 51 in 2008. According to *Sinema Gazetesi, Variety, Hürriyet, Timeturk*, OBS Turkish National films achieved a record market share of 60%, a long way from the 7.4% share registered in 2002 and well above the previous year's 38%. In 2008, Turkish films captured top 10 places US films had to take second place, with an estimated 32% of total admissions, down almost 17 percentage points from 2007. European films accounted for 8.1%, compared to about 11% in the previous year. Turkish government has also launched its Arabic television service TRT Al-Turkiyah on the line of BBC Arabic, Rusiya al-Youm, France 24 etc. Commentators says that inauguration of TRT Al-Turkiya recived much attention than the launch of BBC Arabic. Though TRT al Turkiye is not a news channel like Al-Jazeera or Iranian Al-Alam TV, it aims to target general audiences informing them about Turkish Arab relations, cultural and civilizational bonds, Ottoman Arab relations and Turkey's efforts for peace in the region especially for Palestine. TRT programming includes drama, the arts, news, and the economy and comedy. Turkish Prime Minister himself inaugurated the channel and made an appealing speech.[58]

Key indicators Turkey and the region

Heads	Turkey	Iran	KSA	Egypt	Iraq
Population in millions	73.0	72.4	24.7	80.1	29.5
Infant mortality rate (CIA fact book)	38.33	38.12	12.41	29.5	47.04
Adult Literacy Rate (% aged 15(UNDP) and above	88.7	82.3	85.0	66.4	74.1
Combined gross enrolment ratio in education (UNDP)	71.1	73.2	78.5	76.4	60.5
GDP per capita (PPP US$) 2007 (CIA fact book)	12955	8,700	13,800	4,200	1,900
Seats in parliament held by women (% of total (www.ipu.org)	9	2.8% (2008)	0	1.8% (2005)	25.2% (2010)
GDP US$ billions 2009(UNDP)	655.9	286.1	381.7	130.5	na
HDI Rank(undp,2010)	83	70	55	101	na
Tourist arrival(rank)	9th		21st	23rd	na
Phone	15th	22nd	38th	28th	na
Internet (rank wise) CIA fact book	15th	17th	33rd	27th	126th
Research Papers published (2004-2006) OIC Report	43630	11520	2315	7056	na
Patent (AHDR 2009)				1	
WTO membership(2008) wto.org	1995	observer	2005	1995	observer
Urban population	69.6	67%	81%	43%	67%
Life expectancy (UN,2005-10)	71.8	71.0	72.8	71.3	59.5

Sources: UNDP Human Development Report 2009, 2008, Turkish Human Development Report 2009, Arab Human Development Report 2009, 2008. CIA Fact Book,

Conclusion

Turkey's own international relations and priorities based on its primary and secondary interests also define limitations of its Arab vision. Turkey's inter-

ests in European Union is beyond ideological and identity politics. Its trade, cultural and social transaction with Europe is much intensified than its Arab counterparts. Also Turkey's NATO role and responsibility does not allow Turkey to be game changer in the region. Arab Israel conflict is not only opportunity for Turkey to become facilitator of peace process in the region but also a formidable challenge. Turkey has been close ally of Israel and has become peace broker with many of Israel's hostile neighbours in recent years. Turkey's role in European Union, NATO and its relation with Israel also define much of its Arab vision.

Turkey's next challenge is to uplift its growing population from unemployment, and poverty as well as better management of development projects within Turkey. Turkish economy has just started showing improvement which requires a long time to be a developed economy. Turkey's outlook towards Arab region is guided by these challenges and hence aimed to attract maximum resources from Arab World. European Union membership for Turkey attracts many Arab states to engage with Turkey so that Turkey becomes better channel between Arabs and Europe. Delay in membership process is another excuse for Turkish diplomacy to look beyond Europe and the West.

Political problems within Arab states originate from their undemocratic political systems and weak and dependent civil society. Arab states are undergoing serious human development deficit which require not only resources but also speedy economic and political reforms. Turkey is not only democratic country; it has also strong and independent civil society and freedom of expression is well secured. There is lot of pressure on Arab states from within and outside for political reforms and democratization. Freedom deficit has led to extremism and anger against their regime which is often represented by Islamic movements. Turkey's current success story has been written by a political party which has its roots within Islamic movement of Milli Görüş. In fact, AKP has successfully used network of Milli Görüş in its support[59]. This gives an opportunity to Islamic parties in the Arab world to use experiences of AKP in Turkey and also worries Arab states for resurgence of political Islam in the region. If Arab states approve political Islam in Turkey, it will also encourage Islamic movements in the Arab states. Given this worrisome prospect, Turkey's role in political reforms in Arab world may be limited.

Turkish ambition to be Soft Power does not mean that it has no immediate military threats in coming future. There is worrying scenario emerging from its neighbourhood where Iran is confronting American or Israeli military action threats. Iraq has already been engulfed in deep sectarian vio-

lence after unpopular American war against Iraq. Iraqi Kurdistan has gained more autonomy and independence in its state affairs which might encourage Kurdish aspirations for greater autonomy in Turkey. Turkey has to deal with Gulf States which are disproportionately spending on their military. Last but not least, protracted tension between Israel and Arab states is biggest source of future military threats in the region and very recently Turkish Prime Minister has announced that Turkey will not remain silent, if Israel tries to bomb Gaza again.[60] Hard power will still remain crucial for Turkey to guard its borders from any spill over of conflicts in the region. Being NATO member, Turkey's military capability is well ahead of any Arab state and Turkey is engaged in many international peace operations, however NATO status may not guarantee its unconditional support in case of Turkish intervention in Arab-Israeli conflict. With these prospects, current Turkish foreign policy shifts can be found as a careful effort for minimizing military threats in the region and enhancing its role in the region only through soft power tools.

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Economic and Social Aspects of Turkey and Middle East Cooperation

Javier Albarracín Corredor

Turkey and Its Path of Triple Diversifications

In the last decade Turkey has become an active trading state whose main vectors of international behaviour have evolution from a hard-security obsessed mistrust approach to an approach characterised by cooperation and interdependence through economy and trade.

Since AKP took power in 2002 there has been an economic process of modernization '*a la turca*' consistent on a triple diversification tendency, although the seeds of this evolution date back to the Turgut Özal era of the eighties.

First process of diversification is the spread of economic development to more cities located in less developed areas of Turkey, away from Istanbul, Ankara or Izmir. Konya, Gaziantep (half of its exports go to Iraq, Syria and other Middle East economies and only a quarter of them to the EU), Eskisehir, Adana, Mersin or Kayseri are cities whose economic power and development has increased dramatically in the last years, specially due to development of industrial sectors and the agriculture related business.

Secondly, the productive structure of the Turkish economy has been very successful in terms of the competitive diversification and development of new emerging sectors, as well as the revalorization of some other traditional ones. Today Turkey is a relevant multiregional player in sectors such as automotives, whitewoods household devices (one out of every three electro domestics sold in Europe is made in Turkey), agro-business, tourism or construction (out the top 225 international contractors, 35 are Turkish, second only to China).

But sectors like logistics, banking, energy or telecommunications have experienced an historic development for national and regional parameters.

The international diversification of the Turkish economy is the third relevant process occurred in this last decade. Not only the more *traditional* holdings like Koç, Sabanci, Dogus, Enka or Eczasibasi have intensify and diversify their internationalization, but also the new enterprises located in the emerging industrial centres of Anatolia mentioned before. It is especially significant to emphasise the active role played in this field by small and medium enterprises (SME) from all around Turkey. This is a new element that ten years ago, especially before the crisis of 2001, was not as significant in Turkish economic reality.

As a consequence of this Turkish economic openness the per capita ratio of imports and exports is twice the one of China.

This growing need of reaching new international markets for an increasing number of Turkish companies has meant that these entrepreneurs have been looking for more lucrative markets less '*evident and mature*' than the already traditional and saturated markets of the European Union and the United States.

This need for new business frontiers has been aggravated by the deep economic crisis in the traditional trade partners of Turkey, specially the US and the EU, that have shrunk dramatically their domestic demand.

In 2002 the EU markets represented more than 56% of Turkish exports, reaching below 50% in 2009. Meanwhile, the share of exports to Middle East countries was 9% in 2002, 12,5% in 2004 and accounted for nearly 19% last year, when exports to Syria and Iran together accounted more than those to the United States.

Based on Turkish Exporters Association (TIM) data, in 2001 the total number of sectors exporting more than $1 billion annually in Turkey was nine; by 2009 there were 18. Likewise, while in 2001 Turkish exports exceeding $1 billion went only to 5 countries, by 2009 jumped to 25 countries. In 2001 only 4 Turkish provinces were exporting more than $1 billion; by 2009 there were 12. The current number of Turkish companies exporting regularly is 50.000 by 2010.

Turkey's foreign trade in 2000 was $82.278 million (27.775 million in exports and 54.503 million in imports), while in 2009 it had multiplied by three, reaching an amount of $243.027 million (102.128 million exports and 140.899 million in imports), based on Turkish State Planning Organization figures.

These three different and complementary diversification processes, that have mutually reinforced each other, have shaped the policies of the different public institutions involved in the policy making, specially, but not exclusively, in the economic field.

Turkey's Economic Strength and Forecast

Thanks to fruitful synergies between the Turkish institutional actors and its national private sector, Turkey is going through a period of historical economic growth, and showing very promising forecast, whether it enters into the EU or not.

The OECD estimates that Turkey will grow and average 6.7% annually from 2011 to 2017, being the fastest growing OECD economy in this period.

Goldman Sachs released a report in October 2008 in which Turkey was projected to become the third largest economy in Europe and the ninth worldwide by 2050, whether it had joined the EU by then or not, reaching a population of around 100 million inhabitants.

Turkey is a member of the selective G-20. Another fact that shows this projection is that in November the IMF has upgraded the contributions of the main emerging economies to this institution, making Turkey contribute with nearly 1% to its budget, becoming the 20th most relevant contributor.

In the period between 2002 and 2009 Turkey has grown an aggregate above 36%, with a forecast for 2010 of around 6%.

All this economic development has made Turkey represent 50% of the GDP of the entire Middle East and North African region (MENA), including Israel and Iran, based on World Bank data of 2008.

Turkey and the Middle East Deliver, Converging

'*Axis shift', 'changing strategic depth', 'moving eastward', 'who lost Turkey?', 'axial dislocation'*… are all increasingly common titles in recent times in the west due to Turkey's increasing relations with the countries of its east and south east.

Some say this change in foreign policy is due to ideological-religious factors. Others argue that this new direction toward the Middle East is rather a pragmatic approach due to economic factors and needs: *realpolitik*.

The fact is that there has been a significant development and strengthening of the relation between Turkey and the Middle East in recent years.

Being true that there are certain cultural affinities among these Middle Eastern sociological realities, it is also true that there are cultural, historical and sociological differences between the peoples living in Turkey and the peoples of the Middle East states, specially the Arab countries.

But the development of fluent relations between the peoples of Turkey and its neighbours response more to tangible factors than to sociological ones, such as geographic proximity and economic complementarities in a win-win relation.

Turkey's people are strengthening economic relations with all the neighbours of the Republic, and not exclusively the Middle East. A very significant example is what is happening with the other relevant economies of the Black Sea basin. This is especially true in the case of Russia (with whom Turkey has developed deep relations in many fronts: energy, trade, investment, visa-free agreements, university exchanges…) and Ukraine, but also Bulgaria, Rumania and Greece, all of them EU members and with differentiated sociological and religious background.

In fact, Turkey is behaving as any other powerful emerging economy in the world is doing, conditioning its foreign policy by the need to find new markets to feed their growth.

In this sense, there is a growing social backing of the steps taken by Turkey's Government in the Middle East. This 2010, the German Marshal Fund released the results of a poll carried out in Turkey in which the respondents that could see real benefits from going on with the EU negotiations reduced by 9 points compared to the previous year, accounting for 13%. Meanwhile, the respondents seeing benefits in advancing relations with the Middle East were 20% double the number of the previous year.

In parallel to the processes happening in Turkey of empowerment of the civil society, the private sector (specially SMEs) and of the emerging cities in Turkey, in the Middle East, there has also been an evolution of the elite of these societies and the governments toward an awareness of the need to strengthen relations with the neighbours as a significant way of achieving self-development and stability, nationally and regionally. This is especially true in the cases of Syria and Iraq, and to a certain extent also Iran.

One of the results of this tendency, and encouraged also by systemic changes at a regional and international level, is a (re)rapprochement among different relevant regional economic actors, despite the existence of insufficient and inefficient modern infrastructure interconnection.

This awareness has been followed by active policies taken by the main actors in the economic and politic fields. The adoption of policies to multiply relations with neighbouring countries has taken place at two different levels: at the level of central governments, from their political capitals, but also at a local and regional level, in the bordering areas, being active in this respect the governors, the municipalities, the chambers of commerce… of the areas nearer to the borders.

One of the best examples is the Turkey-Syria Regional Cooperation Program dating from 2006. This agreement, with a budget of $20 million split in half among the two countries and with a Project Coordination Unit in Gaziantep, has the aim of promoting trade, tourism, training and border cooperation among other fields between the cities of Gaziantep, Kilis and Aleppo. This project has been so successful that last year was extended to Sanliurfa, Mardin, Rakka and Haseki, studying the possibility of including also Hatay and Lazkiye.

Syria is one of the most active regional players in this economic co-operation process, establishing strong ties with some key regional actors, especially with Turkey.

As a result of its active regional cooperation policies within the Middle East 42% of Syria's non-oil foreign trade is with other Mashreq countries and Turkey. Around half of Iraq's non-oil imports are from Syria or reach this country through its territory and Turkey has become one of its top trading partner, developing their relations in a scope that some refer to them as '*strategic partners'*.

Another relevant sign of Syria's option to strengthen economic relations regionally is the result of its banking sector reform, a key factor for national economic development through SME financing. This 2010 the Government approved a new law allowing foreign financial institutions to own up 60% of local banks, from 49% in 2009. The 16 projects under this new law approved so far are all from regional countries: seven from the Gulf, three from Iran and the rest from Lebanon, Egypt and Turkey.

Due to this favourable context of national and regional need for cooperation as a positive way to achieve selfish national development new frameworks and schemes are emerging in this last years.

This effort to develop new schemes of economic cooperation has a clear national background due to the social domestic concerns regarding the need to improve standards of living in the region.

In a survey elaborated in 2009 by TESEV, a Turkish think tank based in Istanbul, in Lebanon, Egypt, Jordan, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Iraq they obtained quite relevant data regarding the perception of this societies in reference to the main urgent issue facing their countries today, as well as the Arab world as a whole. The answer in all the countries, except for Palestine, was that the main concern was the economy. Unemployment, poverty and living standards were the most concerning issues both, as a national priority (with an average of 49% of the answers) and as a regional one (with an average of 26%, but well ahead of the second concern that was the Israel-Palestinian conflict, with 18%)

The more concerned with the national situation of their economies were the Jordanians (62%), the Egyptians (56%) and the Syrians (42%)

So the ground is fertile for the development of regional economic cooperation in the Middle East, both socially and economically, and by extension politically.

As cause and effect of this growing regional cooperation, and due to the strategic geographic location of the countries of the Middle East and Turkey (that makes them inevitable land transit routes for international trade, communication and energy supplies between the economies of Europe and the Gulf) an increasing number of '*hard'* vertebrating projects have been defined and put into place.


Some of the most relevant '*hard'* tangible projects, which require a strong economic and politic commitment by all the partners involved, that can give an idea of the increasing structural interconnection between the countries of the region are the following:

- Gas and oil pipelines from Iraq to Europe via Turkey; from Iran to Europe; from Egypt through Jordan, Syria and Turkey to Europe (the Euro-Arab Mashreq Gas Pipeline);
- Railway projects for passengers and cargo connexions from Syria to Iran trough Turkey; Aleppo-Gaziantep connexion; Turkish near future project to connect Turkey with north Iraq and Baghdad; and the North-South railway corridor from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Cooperation Council countries to Turkey, via Jordan and Syria, and then Europe.
- Upgrading and construction of roads and highways networks, especially from Turkey to Syria and north Iraq.
- Power grid interconnection among the economies of the Mashreq and Turkey.
- Advanced telecommunication infrastructure interconnection: the *JADI* project, connecting Jeddah, Amman, Damascus and Istanbul with strategic telecommunication underground infrastructure.
- New border gates opened to encourage and facilitate trade, especially in the borders of Turkey with Syria (that has implied the removal of mines in the border areas) and Turkey with Iraq. In this sense there have defined and implemented several simplified transit regimes to easer the transport of cargo between these countries and improve their performance.

And the future seems to be moving in favour of greater regional infrastructure integration.

The World Bank has just released in 2010 a technical study about the infrastructures existing in the Mashreq as well as the tendencies and needs in the region in this field (*Trade Facilitation and Infrastructure Assessment for the Mashreq Countries*). It has identified three logistic corridors key for this area:

- A north-south that links the EU to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States (via Turkey, Syria and Jordan) and with connecting links to Lebanon and Egypt;
- A east-west corridor that links the Lebanese ports of Lattakia, Tartous, Tripoli, and Beirut to Iraq via Syria, and
- A second east-west corridor that links the same ports via Syria and Jordan to Iraq



Source: World Bank, Regional Cross-Border Trade Facilitation and Infrastructure Project for Mashreq

In this study Turkey has not been included due to the fact that is not a Mashreq country. Anyhow, as the World Bank's map shows, Turkey is a *compulsory* partner for the full implementation of these corridors as a transit route, as an origin or as a destination market. Many infrastructures, existing or potential, need to be inevitably planned and implemented in full accordance with Turkey's infrastructure plans in order to optimize its performance.

The projections that the World Bank has done for these regional corridors are the following:

- By 2020 the daily transit in the North South corridor, that is to say from/to Turkey, will be about 12.500 TEU (Twenty-foot Equivalent Unit or *containers*) per day, 2.500 trucks and 15 trains in each direction
- The combined transit in the two East West corridors will be about 11.000 TEU per day, 2.200 trucks and 12 trains in each direction
- This volume of freight would overwhelm the road capacity and cross border facilities. Corridor rail links could attract between one third and one half of the longer distance traffic.

Accordingly, new rail links are planned for all three corridors.

Following this study the World Bank has presented the 'Mashreq Corridor Program' (MCP) to be implemented in two or more phases over fifteen years. The total amount of this Program will be about $6.8 billion.

The economic impact and the social gains, in terms of job creation, of all these projects are a powerful incentive to multiply and intensify the cooperation among the countries involved.

The Tacitly Accepted Regional Economic *Locomotive*

Turkey has known how to capitalise this cooperation synergies due to the size of its economy and its value added sector specialization, its population and its water and agricultural resources. It has pursued active policies toward the Middle East to promote stability trough trade and economic cooperation. Its '*zero problems*' with the neighbours has been implemented in this region under the idea of '*the more economic interdependent we become the less likely confrontation can erupt*'. And also the more economic benefit the Turkish competitive entrepreneurs will obtain.

The '*spill over*' effect expected from Turkey with this cooperation would mean to spread the socioeconomic gains of Turkey's national evolution to its

neighbours in a sort of win-win economic cooperation, and making Turkey become a regional economic locomotive.

In fact, it is an asymmetric economic win-win relation in which Arab economies are supposed to win due to potential investments and employment benefits, but Turkish entrepreneurs win more, due to their higher competitiveness and internationalization.

The case of Iraq, especially north Iraq, is significant. Iraq finds in Turkey a needed transit route to transport its energy resources to Europe and world markets. Meanwhile, around 80% of the consumer goods in the Kurdish autonomous area of Iraq and around 50% of the foreign companies established there are from Turkey, making big profits from the strengthen of the relation.

Accordingly, Turkey has emerged as a new and active vector of economic development and cooperation in the region, mobilizing around itself the other actors that are receptive to this dynamics.

The Middle East is deeply interlinked from a politic, security and increasingly economic point of view. No single regional actor can deliver permanent and self-sustained positive results by its own in terms of socioeconomic development in the mid term, neither at a regional nor at a national level. And this evidence has made some actors start to pursue a new innovative approach in the region and for the region, moving from chronic economic statism and bilateralism to a more promising economic multilateralism and encouraging private sector development and involvement.

This process is relatively recent, so the results in terms of the increase of intraregional trade, job creation, infrastructure implementation and other development parameters will be able to be analysed and contrasted in the mid run.

Anyhow, the institutionalization of this process has gained new momentum with the signature the 31st of July of 2010 of a multilateral regional free trade agreement between Turkey, Syria, Jordan and Lebanon, the so called '*Close Neighbours Economic and Trade Association Council'* (CNETAC).

From Turkey's side, this agreement has been legally possible because the other three countries already have similar trade agreements with the EU, a legal prerequisite binding Turkey that derivates from the Custom Union between Turkey signed with the EU on 1996.

The CNETAC includes the establishment of a visa-free area among them (a special treatment Turkey has already established with other countries like Libya and is negotiating with Egypt) as well as the commitment to cooperate

and advance together in the fields of trade, transport, tourism and energy by appointing one country as the responsible for the coordination of the advancement of each of these fields.

Jordan and Lebanon are small economies (6,5 and 4,5 million respectively), with quite weak productive structure (specializes in services), making them chronic importers of the main consumer goods, and subsequently, quite internationalised. With this economic idiosyncrasy they shouldn't suffer too much from Turkish competitor's penetration in their domestic markets, while the usual suppliers of these economies should suffer this competition.

Syria is a medium size economy (22,5 million) but with urgent need for development to cope with domestic challenges (demographic growth, oversized and inefficient public sector, regime legitimacy…), and in need of external cooperation with value added know-how partners to face this reality, but without political reform conditionality, pressure or compensations (which is what other partners do ask, specially the EU)

The three of them can greatly benefit from any very likely increase of transit of any kind between Europe, Turkey and the GCC economies, in both direction (road cargo, railway cargo, gas, oil…) In fact, Turkey's trade with the GCC has multiplied by 8 since 2002, reaching more than $16,6 billion dollars.

Moreover, the four members of this agreement can greatly benefit from the Pan-Euromediterranean cumulative rules of origin that, in the framework of the Euro Mediterranean Process in which the four of them are partners, is included as one of the key issues to promote trade in the area.

CNETAC is a significant process because it exemplifies the different drivers mentioned before in the region: Turkey as the accepted regional economic locomotive leading the cooperation with the aim of getting spill-over effects that spread to the other small economies involved, and the political will to opt for the strengthen of cooperation within the region and for the region.

This open regionalism emphasizes trade as both, a mean and as an objective in itself. As a mean because through reinforcing trade, greater economic interdependence is developed, promoting stability among the most intensively traded economies and making them have to rely in each others.

And as an objective in itself because in a region thirsty of economic development, the encouragement of entrepreneurship is welcomed in order to generate economic gains for the business community involved.

In this regard, we might be in front of the seed of the Middle East economic cooperation organization, seen its first steps in the institutionaliza-

tion of the cooperation between Turkey and the north Mashreq countries. Some analysts agree that the best, if not the only, way to really make things advance in this area of the world is trough the creation of intergovernmental institutions that has the responsibility and the commitment to make the agreed issues advance.

In this sense, some voices involved in this CNETAC process suggest the need to create a sort of secretariat to try to guarantee the advancement in strengthen the fields of cooperation.

Turkey's Long Term Success Requirement: from a Government to a State Policy

Turkey as a whole is emerging as a (multi)regional power: its Government, its economy, its society and its culture. It is becoming an integral power with growing projection in the Middle East. And all this comprehensive national reality has decided not to be in the periphery of any system anymore but to create its one sphere on influence, being at the centre of it.

But this has turned into a polemic issue, both in Turkey and abroad. This approach to the Middle East is contested domestically by a part of Turkey that has automatically and systematically neglected this area of their neighbourhood, considering it a burden and a backward influence, and that is obsessed with the exclusive western orientation of Turkey.

Once seen the economic benefits that this pragmatic approach is bringing to Turkey, and the increasingly popular support it has at home, it should be turned from a Government policy into a State policy, in order to avoid zigzags in foreign policy.

This is already happening by the intensive and extensive involvement of private, non state actors in this cooperation framework. Institutions like TOBB, DEIK, TUSIAD, MUSIAD, different think tanks like TESEV, ORSAM, TEPAV, USAK, universities, municipalities, governors, a proliferation of enterprises and NGOs, among other actors, are giving real multidimensional content and real *strategic depth* to these relations with the region, beyond the government implication. And by doing so, are guaranteeing the continuity of these reinforced relations.

Conclusion

Some of the dynamics we face today from an economic point of view can be seen as the initial steps to construct Middle East economic cooperation

architecture. In the case of this region, Turkey is playing the tacitly accepted role of economic leadership and locomotive due to its size, a role that might appear clearer in the mid run if economic forecasts are accomplished.

Having this in mind, it has to be understood that Turkey might be really considering CNETAC a needed first stage in the creation of a greater economic organization in the region. Turkey is likely to have global interests and needs in the next decades, becoming one of the most relevant emerging powers. As such, it might be envisaging CNETAC as a first step that needs more critic mass in the mid run to become a relevant regional economic organization, by including new powerful members like Egypt and Iraq. By doing so CNETAC will really become an attractive project for Turkey, with the potential to deliver considerable economic benefits and acquire international economic attractiveness for investors, producing powerful economic and development synergies.

Its ambition should even be to include, in the long run, Israel and Palestine, creating a coherent and comprehensive Middle East Economic Community.

But perception does matter as much as facts. Perceptions matter at a domestic level (to avoid that this rapprochement is seen by some powerful internal forces as religious–ideological rooted and oriented), at a regional level (to avoid that the political and economic elites of the other countries involved perceive Turkey's approach as neo-ottoman imperialism) and at an international level, specially in the West (being the West a needed partner in the ongoing process of modernization and reform of Turkey but where some elites are getting nervous regarding Turkey's moves in the Middle East).

In order to achieve these objectives perceptions are to be taken into account. Turkey should explain better in international and national forums its policies. Turkish non-state actors should involve outside counties counterparts in some of their activities in the Middle East to strengthen their relations and make them see that it is a pragmatic approach to new economic frontiers in Turkey's neighbourhood.

And Turkish Government has to make the effort to involve the domestic critics in this process, making them feel the socioeconomic and politic gains Turkey can get from this reinforced involvement in the area.

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Arab – Turkish Relations:

The American Policy towards from the Egyptian-Turkish Rapprochement in 1957

Magdy El-Sayed Hashish

Actually we cannot see the development of the Turkish-Egyptian relations in this period of time in step arable from the American role in the Middle East. Especially we can see that this role inherited the British domination from a side and leading the western alliance against the Soviet Union from another side. This is the main motivator for monitoring the American attitude towards this relations and its direct effect on it positively and negatively. Despite knowing that the American interference in the region is done through the Turkish gate for many reasons, there is a big difference between the Turkish and Arab behavior towards this interference and its goals. The study tries to answer many questions to be considered main goals of this study:

- The nature of the rise in the Egyptian-Turkish Relations and goals of each state from it.
- The American effective role on this relation.
- Rapprochement atmosphere between Egypt and Turkey in 1957 and real reasons behind it.
- The United States Monitoring to the steps of rapprochement between Egypt and Turkey and its effect on opposing isolation on Nasser.
- The American direct interference to abort the rapprochement between the two countries because of its threat on the American goals in the region.

The Development of the Egyptian-Turkish Relations before 1957

We should stop at some main development points in this relation as an entry to the topic. This relation witnessed lots of clear differences during the Sec-

ond World War era till 1957 because any trial to enhance it must be met by events and actions that led to its deterioration.

The fall of the Ottoman Empire led to the deterioration of the relations between Turkey and Egypt. This can be reasoned to the new Turkish orientations towards Europe [1]and its being away from the Middle East, adding to that the cultural and national differences which were enlarged by time and was enhanced by the negative points of view towards the Arab after the First World War[2].

There is a clear absence of common and big interests between the two countries that led to a big diverge between them. But this reality led to holding relations between Egypt and Turkey through signing a friendship treaty in April 1937. This relation was deteriorated in 1939 because turkey conjoined the Syrian Iskenderun and the broke out of the Second World War[3]. The area of difference between the two countries got larger at the beginnings of the cold war because of the two blocs and alliance policies adopted at that time. Thus the situation became more complicated in the region by the emergence of the United States as a super power against the Soviet Union.

The American role is one of the main determinants of the relations between Egypt and Turkey. In spite of there were American movements to strengthen the relations with both countries, these movements did not succeed by the same outcomes. United States movements went directly towards Turkey and succeeded but it used the British channel in order to reach Egypt and persuade it to get into the western bloc. This policy was favored and received lots of momentum especially with Dallas policy about the northern belt idea[4].

After the Second World War, the American role in the region was very obvious and had a great effect on the relations between the two countries. Also we cannot dismiss the interests and motivators for both countries in developing this relation. Simply we can see that the two countries raise up their diplomatic representation level from commissions to embassies in September 1948 in order to reach a conciliation about on gaining a Security

1 This led to a big contrast within Turkey because of the big difference between the People and the State, especially in its external orientation. Philip Robbins, *Turkey and Middle East*, Translated by Mikhail Negm, (Cairo: Kurtuba for publishing), 1993.

2 Somaya Wahba Elmenawi, The *Egyptian-Turkish Relations between 1923 and 1961*, unreleased PhD, Faculty of Arts, Ain Shams University, 1997.

3 Somaya Wahba Elmenawi, Ibid, P.73.

4 Jeffery Aaronson, *The Egyptian American Relations (1946-1956),* Translated by El-Sayed Amin Shalabi, (Cairo: Madbuli Bookstore), 1996.

Council seat[5]. But the relation witnessed tensions again after Turkey's recognition of Israel[6].

By the year of 1950 the relation witnessed a new improvement after the Democratic Party came to power in Turkey and declaring its desire of enforcing the relations with Egypt and the Arab World. This improvement suddenly stopped by the American intervention. The Egyptian side refused to enter a military alliance with Turkey to defend the region[7].

In 1952 the Egyptian revolution broke out in order to present a new phase of the disagreement between the two countries. The Turkish ambassador in Egypt was expelled from Egypt and this led to a big crisis in the relation between the two countries[8]. But there were intentions from both sides to have warm relations; As Egypt was trying to form an Islamic alliance against the colonization forces. Turkey looked at Egypt steps positively from its own national security especially the evacuation step of British colonization from the Egyptian territory 1954[9].

The development of the relation reached its high levels when Gamal Abdul Nasser wrote the introductory chapter of a book called "Turkey and the Arab policy" in 1955. He emphasized on the waves of cooperation and the common interests between the Egyptian and Turkish people. This rise in the relation attracted the sight of the United States as its foreign minister Foster Dallas requested a translation for this book or three copies from this book, one of them by airmail[10] .

But as soon as the politics of alliances and Baghdad alliance came on the stage, the relations between the two countries deteriorated. Egypt saw this alliance as an attempt to surround the Arab region and to limit Egypt strength in order to serve Israel and the western interest. Lots of tensions aroused between the two countries ended by withdrawal of the ambassadors of the countries[11] .

5 Egypt was trying to convince turkey about its withdrawal from running to the empty seat in the Security Council by which not two countries from one region run for the same seat. The external factor played the major role in this by which United States and Western Countries encouraged Turkey but Egypt succeeded in gaining the seat by the help of Soviet Union.

6 Mohammad Mahmud El Dudani, *The Israel Turkish Relations between 1949 and 1960*, unreleased PhD, History department, Faculty of Arts, El Mansoura University, 2006.

7 Somaya Wahba Elmenawi, Op.Cit. PP 82-89.

8 The Egyptian government reasoned that because the ambassador's irresponsible attitude towards Egypt and Gamal Abdul el Nasser especially his wife's property was nationalized because she belongs to Muhammad Ali's Family.

9 Somaya Wahba Elmenawi, Op.Cit. PP.91-93

10 The US Department of State, Dulles to American Embassy Cairo, Secret, No A - 178, January . 18 , 1955, Confidential , Central Files, Box 3593, Egypt 1955 – 1959, Foreign Affairs , Reel 1 of 7

11 Somaya Wahba Elmenawi, Op.Cit. PP.91-93

At the beginning of this stage, it was obvious that the United States was following the details of the development of this relation, through its representatives in Europe. But what was shocking is that the Turkish side was a main source for getting this information, through meetings held in the American embassy in Ankara. Unlike the Egyptian side who was keen on keeping the United States away from this issue.

At that time, Adnan Mandaris was keen on halting down the crisis with Egypt after his meeting with Nuri El Saeed in January 2955 and issuing Baghdad statement. He sent Ankara's Governer Kemal Ugon to Cairo for meeting Nasser to remove any doubts about the last step taken by Turkey towards entering Baghdad alliance.

Also the Egyptian military attaché in Turkey met Kemal Ugon and affirmed Nasser's positive emotions towards Mandaris. Ugon from his side replied that Mandaris showed his good intentions towards Egypt and his persuasion that the good relation between the two countries is in their interests. He also added that Mandaris idea about meeting Nasser still exists to endorse a strong relation between the two countries[12].

But what was said in these meetings is not reflecting the real emotions between Nasser and Mandaris or the two countries at all. Mandaris quickly asked Nuri el Saeed to reach an alliance agreement and to send his greetings for the American government which supported this agreement strongly and to persuade Lebanon and France to enter in this alliance[13].

In spite of the pacification attempts through the diplomatic channels, the Media waged lots of severe hostile campaigns from both sides. These campaigns extended to represent an enemy ship between the two countries. This action forced Turkey to ask the United State to mediate and stop the Egyptian campaigns especially on the Turkish officials[14].

The American respond to the Turkish calls was not positive especially at that time[15]. The American ambassador in Egypt said that the tensioned atmosphere because of the Turkish-Iraqi deal would make any American interference at the Egyptian government worthless. Not only that but also it

12 The US Department of State, Embassy Ankara to Secretary of State, Secret, No 874, February, 4, 1955 , op. cit

13 Ibid.

14 The US Department of State, Embassy Ankara to Secretary of State, Secret, No 904, February. 10, 1955, op. cit.

15 In spite of the big aids presented by the United States to its allies and its seeks for adding them to the Baghdad allies, its vision ended to that the alliance is political more than military. That's because of the big absence of Egypt from it. This is the reality Dallas was convinced by and was thinking about the ability of adding Nasser as the best who can represent the Military bourgeoisie and Egypt joining issue will is just an issue of time.

may be misunderstood. He added that what is most effective is to stay away from the Arab problems' circle[16].

There were some signs that refer to a stop to the deterioration of the relations. Both leaders exchanged mails and invitations for stopping the campaigns and to hold a friendly relation between the two leaders rises over the based tension[17].

The hesitated initiatives can be reasoned to the Egyptian success in stopping the expansion of Baghdad alliance through its active actions and motions in the Arab world and its campaigns against it. On the other hand, Turkey looked at this step as a way for having more freedom away from the competition atmosphere and with high support from Britain and United States.

The contacts for strengthen the relations did not stopped in the following stages but took the maneuver form from Nasser side. The Turkish officials rapidly recognized the reality of Nasser situation when the general secretary in the Turkish foreign ministry said that nothing valuable has happened yet. And his country is not able to comprehend what Nasser need with his strange insincere behavior[18].

In 1956 a new tension in the relations with Egypt appeared. When Mandaris gave a speech in Baghdad alliance meeting in Tehran April 16th and he insulted Nasser hardly[19]. The Egyptian foreign minister requested the Turkish ambassador to tell him Egypt's objection on this speech. He added that Egypt will take all the proper actions in case of the certainty of what came in this reverse from attack on Nasser.

Then the minister requested the ambassador again in May 1st asking him for presenting the text of Mandaris's speech with an official explanation to its contents. He added that the Egyptian ambassador will not go back Ankara after investigation. And here The American ambassador refers to the role of the media in directing the crisis through orders came from the government[20]

16 This event took place in February 28th 1955 led to increase in the tension in the region, it was related to the Baghdad alliance, its goals and especially persuading the Arab countries to enter it. It was made to send a message that Cairo is no longer able to protect itself and also helping the others..

17 Mohamed Hassnin Haikel, Suez files (the thirty years war), Third Edition, (Cairo: Al-Ahram Center for translation and Publishing), 1996, P.340.

18 The US Department of State, Byroade American Ambassador to Secretary of State, Cairo, Secret, No 1277 , march . 3, 1955, op. cit .

19 The US Department of State, Embassy Ankara to Secretary of State, Secret, No 1105, March. 19, 1955, op. cit .

20 The US Department of State, John Goodyear Counselor of political affairs to Department of State, Embassy Ankara , Secret , No 439 , March 14 , 1956, op. cit .

After a month, the Ministry of Foreign affairs received the text and its explanation and they reached a deal for halting down the tension between the two countries. The Turkish ambassador mentioned that the Egyptian media calmed down its intensive campaigns against Turkey and it's a good sign for starting a warm relation between the two countries and back of the Egyptian ambassador[21].

The triple attack on Egypt, took place in 1956, increase calming down the warmness of the relation. Egypt welcomed the Turkish attitude as Turkey condemned highly the attack and asked Israel for withdrawing its forces from Sinai and requested its ambassador from Israel on November 26th 1956. Egypt saw this action as a big transformation in Turkish attitude towards it[22].

This transformation seen by some analysts cannot be separated from the general change in the American policy towards the region. The new doctrine of the United States to the region is to take the action directly and not to stand behind the allies who proved their failure and left an empty space in the region must be filled[23].

We must confirm that the Turkish transformation towards Egypt was not highly approved by all the Turkish circles. Some still criticizing the Egyptian policy generally and say it is responsible for the recent events while some others speaking positively on Egypt and support it to a high degree[24].

The Turkish-Egyptian Rapprochement 1957

The year of 1957 represent the best stages in the Turkish-Egyptian Rapprochement stages since the tension founded by the establishment of Baghdad alliance. At the beginning of this year there were new tensions especially after the emergence of the new American policy in the region under Eisenhower principle[25] and joining officially Baghdad alliance in March 1957.

The most marked signs of tension founded in the Turkish leaders opinions when president Gelal Bayar accused Nasser of being Blackmailer in January 24th and hopeless case in March. While the Prime Minister Adnan

21 The US Department of State, Byroade American Ambassador to Secretary of State, Cairo, Secret , No 2192 , May. 3, 1956 , op. cit .

22 The US Department of State, Embassy Ankara to Secretary of State, Secret, No 1914, May. 15, 1956, op. cit

23 Philip Robins, Op.Cit, P.96.

24 Mohamed Hassanin Haikel, Op.cit, P.585

25 The US Department of State, John Goodyear Counselor of political affairs to Department of State, Embassy Ankara , Secret , No 2203, august. 5 , 1957, op. cit .

Mandaris said that there is no hope in Nasser or changing him. All these situations came from personalities who criticized Nasser, looking forward to Baghdad alliance and Eisenhower principle for restoring stability in the region[26].

Despite the foggy status of this relation in the first four months in the year, a new start took place in May and highly developed. The general secretary in the American embassy in Ankara mentioned that there is a change in the relation through an Egyptian initiative welcomed by the Turkish government. The Turkish government received that by showing its desire of pushing the relations forward to be friendlier and its capability of controlling the situation[27] .

This desire from the Turkish prime minister took the form of attending a football match between the Egyptian and Turkish team in Istanbul in the presence of the Egyptian first secretary of the Egyptian embassy. Also The Prime Minister sent a delegate with the Egyptian team to the airport before their going back to Cairo.

The Egyptian secretary highly praised Mandaris initiative and how the Egyptian team was welcomed by him. He said that this event is a symbol of the historical friendship between the two countries. Also the Turkish journals were keen on presenting this piece of news as first page news titled by “The Turkish Egyptian Friendship”[28].

The American embassy in Ankara mentioned this event as a sign of changing the enemy image of Egypt from Turkey. It said that these events came as a result of the efforts of the Afghani leaders[29] when the president of Afghanistan visited Egypt[30].

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26 Eisenhower principle was calling for filling the gaps that will emerge after the withdrawal from the region. It also calls for the right of the US of using power to defend countries asked for help against any attack. Also it has the right to defend countries from the communist extension. This principle calls for making lots of economic agreements to ensure the domestic stability in these countries. The Arab countries were not afraid of that. But immediately after United States joined NATO they thought that it is an enemy partner for them. As they are refusing allies' politics and western domination. Mahmud Riyad, the Arab National Security between Achievement and Failure, (Cairo: Dar Elmostakbal El Arabi), Part 2, 1986, P165.

27 The US Department of State , John Goodyear Counselor of Political Affairs to Department of State, Embassy Ankara ,Secret , No 2203, august. 5, 195, op. cit .

28 The US Department of State, John Goodyear Counselor of political affairs to Department of State, Embassy Ankara ,Secret , No 2203, august. 5, 195, op. cit

29 The Egyptian newspapers did not pay more attention to this event and just mentioned it in the sport section as a usual event. This is a usual attitude from the Egyptian newspapers and can demonstrate how the Egyptian government was dominating them.
Al-Ahram, El-Gumhuriya, May 15th 1957.

30 The US Department of State, Embassy Ankara to Secretary of State, Secret, No 2666, May. 23, 1957, op. cit .

In a more advanced event, the Egyptian minister of trade phoned the Turkish representatives in the Turkish embassy and said that the circumstances became more suitable for increasing the trade balance and the political atmosphere between the two countries. And after few days, Mandaris told the American ambassador that the Egyptian government asked for nominating a new ambassador in Ankara after two years of leaving this position empty. He was very content and happy by this news and considered that as a decrease in the Egyptian emotions of enemy ship towards the west.

He was keen on confirming the role of the United States in making a suitable atmosphere for this rise by encouraging King Saud and helping Jordan. This pushed him to predict the success of Baghdad alliance in Karachi. While the American ambassador said that he is very content by Mandaris enthusiasm and his reaction towards the rise in the Egyptian-Turkish relations[31] .

This rise in the relation was highly supported by the Iraqi ambassador who confirmed that the arrival of the Egyptian ambassador will have a great impact on the trade and political relations between the two countries and working on advancing it[32]. This news made a good impact in the diplomatic circles in Cairo. Lots of names nominated for that position in advance was Osman Eid the former Egyptian ambassador in Japan and he was appointed after a short period in that position and Turkey appointed Mr. El-Sayed Zaiyni Akdor as a Turkish ambassador in Egypt[33].

In the same frame, Baghdad alliance meeting in July 1957 was an indicator for that. Mandaris didn't refer to Nasser or Egypt by any word in spite of the actions taken by the alliance to isolate Nasser.

The American ambassador was keen on following the details of this rise and confirming it, he referred to the prime minister visit to the Egyptian embassy to participate in the national day of Egypt[34] . This event was highly welcomed in Cairo and was highly issued by the newspapers in Egypt. The Egyptian newspapers unlike the previous time delivered this news under title of “Improvement of Relations between Egypt and Turkey”, in Al-Ahram “high ranked people of the Turkish government participate in the national

31 Al-Ahram, May 19th 1957.

32 The US Department of State, Embassy Ankara to Secretary of State, Secret, No 2705, May. 27, 1957, op. cit .

33 The US Department of State, John Goodyear Counselor of Political Affairs to Department of State, Embassy Ankara, Secret No 2203, August. 5, 1957, op. cit.

34 Al-Ahram, June 4th 1957.

celebration in the Egyptian embassy headed by the prime minister, his foreign minister, etc."[35]

On the Egyptian side, Nasser welcomed the Turkish trade delegation headed by the Turkish minister of trade and economy to form a new stage from the Egyptian-Turkish rapprochement. The invitation was sent from the Egyptian minister to the Turkish minister for attending the Egyptian trade fair. The Turkish minister accepted it and came with a big delegation including the biggest Turkish economic officials who are receipted warmly. The media was following the movements of the delegation and its activities, contacts with the Egyptian official. In addition to that, the speeches of the Turkish minister and his appreciation to the good spirit founded in Egypt and the Egyptian advancement in the field of trade[36].

During his meeting with the political advisor of the American embassy, the Turkish general secretary of the Turkish foreign ministry Zaki Konrlap spoke about the Turkish Egyptian relations and the visit of the Turkish trade delegation to Egypt. He referred to the obvious change in the relation and added that the initiative came from Egypt. He thought that Egypt want to improve its relations not only with Turkey but also with the western countries. Thus it directly went to Turkey because of its special position and especially when Nasser demonstrates his tendency in improving the relation between the two countries[37].

The United States was very cautious from the rise of this relation. The American political consulter mentioned that he is studying the recent developments besides the decisions of Baghdad alliance meeting in Karachi calling for enforcing the isolation of Nasser. Konrlap added that he discussed this issue with the American consulter and present his point of view about the Egyptian rapprochement. He said that Egypt is exerting great efforts to improve relations with Turkey and this point cannot be neglected. He also mentioned the Turkish minister opinion about the there is no need for more pressure on the Arab countries to enter Baghdad Alliance especially Lebanon and Saudi Arabia. These countries must be encouraged to strengthen their relations with the west by persuasion not by waging the alliance flag[38].

In his meeting with the American ambassador on July 27th, Mandaris talked about Egypt in a satisfied manner emphasizing that the relation with

35 The US Department of State, John Goodyear Counselor of political affairs to Department of State, Embassy Ankara, Secret , No 2203, August. 5, 1957, op. cit .

36 Al-Ahram, June 20th 1957.

37 The US Department of State, Embassy Ankara to Secretary of State, Secret, No 2705, May. 27, 1957, op. cit .

38 Al-Gumhuriya, July 18th 1957.

Egypt is good and based on Affection. He demonstrated that since the football match between the two national teams and Nasser meeting with the Turkish trade delegation. Nasser confirmed to the delegation his friendship to Turkey and his opposition in the past was a natural result for its membership in Baghdad alliance in a hard time. He added that the situation is going on easily and he is not a communist. He said that the United States and the west must comprehend the Egyptians and their problems. Baghdad alliance developed after expelling Britain from Egypt. He said also that his contact with the Turkish prime minister will make the previous events memories in the past.

At the end of his talks to the American ambassador, Mandaris refereed to the trade agreement signed between Egypt and Turkey to increase the trade balance between the two countries and added also that the Egyptian minister of trade will visit Izmir Fair in Turkey soon. He said that he predicts receiving an official invitation for visiting Egypt at that time and it will be a proper chance to talk with Nasser closely[39].

Here we must mention that Mandaris content about visiting Egypt after receiving the invitation represented the most important advances in the relation that grasped the attention of the United States. Not only that but also it pushed it to take more tough actions towards the Turkish government concerning the rise of relations with Egypt.

The Official Turks did not notice the signs of an American fear from the rise in the relation with Egypt. This fear was mentioned by the American consulter in his meeting with Konrlap in July 24th. This required the Interference of the American department of State and sending instructions for its embassy in Ankara and Egypt. The department of state sent its fear and vision to its embassy in Ankara about the recent situation and thus any talks or meetings with the Turkish official must be taken in consideration. The same step was also taken towards the embassy in Cairo.

The message of these instructions mentions the Department of state's concerns by the Turkish friendly transformation towards Nasser, Especially after Mandaris confirmation about his intention of visiting Egypt if he is invited. The message paid the attention that the hostile behavior of Nasser towards the west still exists through his speeches and mainly the last one in July 26th. The message added also its concerns about the variety of the Egyptian opposition to the Middle East countries cooperating with the west and Nasser's confirmation about his capabilities of causing a change in

39 The US Department of State, Embassy Ankara to Secretary of State, Secret, No 2705, May. 27, 1957 , op. cit .

these countries' policies. All these situations state clearly that it is hard to cause a rapprochement between Egypt and the west in these circumstances[40] .

The department highly emphasizes and affirms the results of the final Baghdad alliance meeting. Promoting the policy of isolating Nasser represents the first step in a series of steps must be focused on. And Nasser's last action of approaching to Britain is an attempt for breaking this isolation. They said that this rapprochement is fake and don't reflect Nasser's real intentions as long as he is not changing his tools[41] .

And after these clarifications, the department of state asks its representatives in Turkey to discuss this issue with the Turkish prime minister and to persuade him with this vision before visiting Egypt. And if he is convinced by this vision he must recognize well that his close relation with Nasser, without any evidence, will give Nasser the best chance to influence Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Sudan policies towards Baghdad alliance[42]. These countries will not comprehend Mandaris visit to Cairo well.

At the end of the report, the Department of state was keen on lowering the Turkish fears about Greece, the effect of the growing relations between Greece, Cyprus and Egypt and the recent rapprochement between Greece and Egypt. It mentioned that the large numbers of the Greek people in Egypt don't represent any importance in that situation as long as Greece is not from the Arab neighborhood countries and not in Baghdad alliance. They added that Keramanlis – the Greek prime minister – visit to Egypt doesn't have any value and doesn't represent anything in the recent time[43] .

The General Secretary of the American embassy "John Joudior" in Ankara made a detailed report on the development of this issue generally titled by "Tendency towards close relation between Egypt and Turkey. This report was made in order to calming down the concerns of the department of state. He was keen on mentioning in the introduction of the report, the occurrence of a massive real change in the Egyptian-Turkish relations. This change started by an Egyptian initiative highly and warmly welcomed by the Turkish officials.

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40 The US Department of State, Embassy Ankara to Secretary of State, Secret, No 192, July. 24, 1957, op. cit .

41 The US Department of State, Embassy Ankara to Secretary of State, Secret, No 226, July. 28, 1957, op. cit .

42 The US Department of State, Department of State to Embassy Ankara, Cairo, Secret, No 287, July. 31, 1957, op. cit .

43 The US Department of State, Department of State to Embassy Ankara, Cairo, Secret , No 287 , July. 31, 1957, op. cit .

Judior started to follow the details and stages of the rapprochement between the two countries since May 1957 from the change in the leaders' perspective, to restoring the ambassadors to their works in the two countries, till the signs of near visit of Mandaris to Cairo. While there is a silence in the media and the campaigns against the two countries were off. He spoke about many variables must be mentioned:

- Greece continuous seek for enhancing the relation with Egypt and the soon visit of its prime minister to Egypt.
- The emergence of an Iraqi orientation toward Egypt in order to achieve common understanding for recent issues.
- Renominating Fatih Rushdu Zorlo in the internal political circle in Mandaris Administration and his tendency to practicing more pressure on the United States as a way for achieving the political goals of Turkey[44] .

Judior ended his report by reviewing the real factors that led to achieving this change from the Turkish side. He issued them in three points:

- The desire of improving the relation with the Arab countries while the proper tool for that is approaching to Nasser. Then he referred to Turkey's attempts for improving the relations with Saudi Arabia. But these attempts failed after Kind Saud demand of taking a positive action towards Israel. The economic and diplomatic relations between Israel and Turkey blocked Turkey's efforts in that way.
- Gaining the support of Egypt or its abstain concerning the Cyprus issue which were supposed to be discussed in the United Nations. As Egypt has a great influence in the African and Asian region.
- Practicing a pressure on the American administration according to Mandaris new policy and to show a kind of independency in managing the Turkish foreign policy.

Judior is speaking in this issue about the core of the meeting between the general secretary of the Turkish foreign ministry Milg Isenbel and the French ambassador in Ankara on June 27th. The former told the American embassy about the new Turkish vision. He said that the American policy in

44 The US Department of State, John Goodyear Counselor of political affairs to Department of State, Embassy Ankara Secret , No 2203, August. 5 , 1957, op. cit .

the last six months left an impression on the Turkish officials that Baghdad alliance is no longer the corner stock of the Middle East politics[45].

-if there are good relations with Nasser, there is a guarantee for preventing the domination of the communists in Syria[46] especially after Nasser big prestige in Syria.

-This new trend is highly related to Turkey's attempts of achieving its goals from its relations with the United States[47] .

Judior was trying to giving hints for the last factor. He meant that getting close to Nasser is a maneuver from the Turkish government to achieve more gains through its relations with the United Sates.

In his followings to the development of the Egyptian-Turkish relations and in the shade of the department of state instructions, Judiors highly emphasized on the role of Fateh Rustu Zurlu in the new Turkish orientations. He added that the change towards Nasser in this issue is highly coincided with his certain return to the Turkish political events.

While concerning Mandaris movements towards Nasser and the big transformation emerged on the relations with Egypt, the American ambassador “Warren” suppose giving Mandaris a plenty of time till he revise his calculations and relook at the that issue. He is confirming that he is still has suspicion about the prime minister visit to Egypt in the nearby. He added that the embassy did not change its ideology and there is a prevalent idea confirms that it will be good if the United States knew that Turkey changed its tools[48].

Warren added that the Embassy tends towards simplicity and silence towards any change happens to any rise in the Egyptian-Turkish relations. Because they are sure that there is no comprehensive change in this issue, besides asking Mandaris and his government to revise their policies. Warren raises the idea of giving Turkey a space for movement in the regional politics, till they became convinced by the importance of the relation with the

45 This took place when the United States entered the military committee of the ally. It presented all its support through Eisenhower principle. The US Department of State, John Goodyear Counselor of political affairs to Department of State, Embassy Ankara, Secret, No 2203, August. 5, 1957, op. cit .

46 Nasser confirmed that he is not a communist during his meeting with the trade Turkish delegation on July 18th. He said that he knows communism well.
The US Department of State, Embassy Ankara to Secretary of State, Secret, No 226, July. 28, 1957, op. cit .

47 The US Department of State, John Goodyear Counselor of political affairs to Department of State, Embassy Ankara, Secret , No 2203, August. 5 , 1957, op. cit

48 The US Department of State, Warren American Ambassador to Secretary of State, Ankara, Secret , No 331 , august. 8, 1957, op. cit

United States and the continuity of cooperation and freedom in all fields. And there are no demands or requests from the embassy except this demand.

The ambassador ended his report by mentioning that what can frustrate Fatih Rushdu enthusiasm, and make his ideas towards the United States fail, are two methods:

- An issuance of a decision from the United Nations concerning Cyprus but in the interest of Turkey.
- The results of the General elections[49].

The American ambassador was seeking from these two proposals inviting his country to play a role in the United Nation in the Cyprus issue by issuing a decision satisfying Turkey concerning this issue, and to interfere in the upcoming Turkish elections through preventing Rushdu and his followers from gaining majority make him able to continue in his policy.

The department of state instructions didn't delay to the American ambassador in Ankara. Immediately it came clearer. They confirmed, according to his analysis, the importance of making use of the chance and clarifying the outcomes of Mandaris view about Nasser to the Turkish foreign minister. Mandaris must adopt the American points of view about Nasser and about the rapprochement between Turkey and Egypt. The Turkish Egyptian rapprochement must be limited at that time and he must learn well the results of his visit to Cairo on the Turkish interests and Egypt support to the Cyprus issue[50] .

The department of state paid Mandaris attention that his notion about Egyptian support for his country's issue about Cyprus is not sure, because the United States is aware about the close Egyptian Greek Cypriot relations and thus the Turkish seeking in that way is so weak.

While concerning the Turkish American relations, the department of state mentioned that Mandaris and his foreign minister must discuss this issue seriously before elections. It also will exert great efforts for enhancing the relations with Turkey and the Turkish chief of staff must do special tasks before these elections. It will issue some instructions for the American ambassador to work through them freely[51] .

49 The US Department of State, Department of State to Embassy Ankara, Cairo, Secret, No 439, August. 13, 1957, op. cit .

50 Ibid.

51 The US Department of State, John Goodyear Counselor of political affairs to Department of State, Embassy Ankara, Secret , No 90, August. 15, 1957, op. cit.

The instructions of the department of state show its positive response to the final recommendations of the ambassador concerning an American movement in the Turkish domestic affair. They must influence the results of the elections in order to maintain the continuity of the good relations between the two countries. It refereed secretly to the important role of the military institution in directing the Turkish policy.

In the framework of following the rise of the Turkish Egyptian relations, John Joduer (the political consulate) raised a report titled by the Egyptian-Turkish relations. he talked about information reached the embassy on the continuity of the Egyptian-Turkish rapprochement like:

- Closeness of the Egyptian minister of trade arrival with a big delegation to open Izmir Fair in August 20th.
- Enhancing the position of the Turkish Military attaché in the Turkish embassy by appointing two new assistants for him. One reached Cairo and the other called Abdul Rahman Argak who is supposed to depart to Cairo within weeks[52].

During his meeting with members in the American embassy in August 13th, Abdul Rahman Argak paid the attention of the Americans to the increase in the military representation in Cairo which exceeds the Egyptian representation in Turkey. He reasoned this by saying that the Egyptian government is ruled by the military. Thus the Turkish government founded in increasing the Military representation, than the civil representation, a way for improving the relations with Cairo.

He spoke also about confirmations for the Egyptian military attaché in turkey about a visit of a Turkish military delegation to Egypt at the end of 1957. While Turkey refused more than one times the Egyptian request for inviting an Egyptian military delegation.

Judiar mentioned that Abdul Rahman Argak is in the fortieth of his age, married and from the big supporters of the United States because he received a military training in the American college of military command from many years[53].

52 The US Department of State, John Goodyear Counselor of political affairs to Department of State, Embassy Ankara , Secret , No 90, August. 15, 1957, op. cit.

53 The US Department of State, Warren American Ambassador to Secretary of State, Ankara, Secret , No 415 , August. 18, 1957, op. cit .

Till this stage all the previous movements revolve around monitoring the rise in the Egyptian-Turkish relations, discussing with the department of state about this issue and receiving instructions from it.

While the real change in the general situation for the rise in the relation can be noticed through the American ambassador warren message to his foreign minister about his meeting with Mandaris in August 16th. The two partners did not meet since July 27th since Mandris spoke kindly and warmly about Egypt and waiting for an invitation for visiting Egypt and telling him the department of state message and its vision on the rise of the Egyptian and Turkish relation on July 27th 1957[54].

Warren mentioned the positive response of the Turkish prime minister and the general secretary of the Turkish foreign ministry on the American vision in the region. But the Turkish prime minister commented on two points:

The first is that inviting him to visit Egypt is a predicted issue but it won't be answered except after an essential change in the Egyptian policy. Thus the visit will be fruitful but immediately he turned back and said Nasser will not invite him[55].

And here we can see Mandaris clear backward from the issue of invitation and visiting Cairo. At the previous times he was speaking good and warmly about Egypt and Nasser. He was showing no bad emotions towards him. And He was saying that direct contact with Nasser will turn tensions between the countries into past memories after answering Nasser invitation to him[56].

The second point is the relation with the Arab countries and their relation with Egypt. He mentioned that all Arab countries are content with Nasser and highly concerned with his position and activities. But he added in spite of the Arabs became anger when Nasser attacked, they are unhappy by his actions.

Concerning the relations between the Arabs and Turkey, Mandaris refereed to the importance of preventing any hostile campaign against Turkey or imaging it as an enemy to the Arabs. He said that Arab emotions towards Turkeys started to change rapidly. And in the short run there will be a great influence of Turkey on the Arab countries concerning their relations with the west. Turkey will be their gate to the west and Turkey is setting itself for this mission in the near future. This will lead to isolate Nasser more and making

54 The US Department of State, Embassy Ankara to Secretary of State, Secret, No 226, July. 28, 1957, op. cit .

55 The US Department of State, Warren American Ambassador to Secretary of State, Ankara, Secret , No 415 , august. 18, 1957, op. cit.

56 Mahmud Riyad, Op.Cit, P 182-185.

him lose his popularity and his leadership. At the end of the meeting Mandaris told the ambassador that he will keep Washington posted by all what is going on with Egypt[57].

The transformation concerning the relation with the Arabs took place and Nasser was isolated. This was completely different to Mandaris idea about Nasser as a good mean for enforcing the relation with the Arabs.

Actually the change in Mandaris situations concerning the relation with Egypt cannot backed to only the pressure practiced by the United States on turkey. But also we must see this change in the shade of new variables came to the region at all in this region. These changes in the region go in the direction of stopping the rapprochement with Egypt and enhancing the cooperation and ally with the United States in order to stop the communist extension.

The most prevalent change is the American success in aborting the Arabic alliance through intrigues and conspiracies. Jordan approved Eisenhower principle. Saudi Arabia joined the Iraqi Jordanian Axis. Lots of pressures practiced on Syria to isolate it from its neighbors[58].

On the contrary of the previous stage, the American embassy in Ankara lowered its concerns about following the rise of the Egyptian-Turkish relations. Warren was just refereeing in his messages to Washington that he is following the relation. This is a sign for the regression in the Turkish Egyptian relations[59].

At that time, a great change happened in the Turkish Egyptian Relation because of the tension increased in the region and the emergence of the Syrian Crisis. Owing to the great pressures and conspiracies made by the united states on Syria which led to its isolation from its neighbors (Lebanon, Iraq, Jordain), Syria directly went to the Soviet Union in August 1957 and signed a cooperation agreement in the military and economic field[60].

After the failure of a plot against the Syrian regime and knowing that the United States was standing behind it, the former sent the assistant of the American foreign minister to Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq and Turkey to set a plan for attacking Syria and removing the ruling regime. But the Arab countries immediately withdrew from this plan to leave executing the mission on Turkey. Turkey sent its troops on the Syrian borders. Egypt waged a giant

57 The US Department of State, Warren American Ambassador to Secretary of State, Ankara, Secret , No 427, August 19th, 1957 , op. cit .

58 Mahmud Riyad, Op.Cit, P 185-186

59 Mamdouh Mansor, The American Soviet Conflict in the Middle East, (Cairo: Madbouly Bookstore), 1995.

60 The US Department of State, Warren American Ambassador to Secretary of State, Ankara, Secret, No 1119, October. 16th , 1957 , op. cit

media campaign succeeded in mobilizing the Arab countries to stand beside Syria. As a result of the regional and international pressure, the United States asked Turkey to step back in order to end the crisis by September 1957[61].

And thus we can see that the Syrian crisis and the American direct interfere represented a rapid end for the Turkish Egyptian rapprochement in 1957. It turned into a big enemy ship when Egypt sent troops to defend Syria on October 13th. Nonetheless what was being said about the function of these troops or that the crisis was ended before its arrival, this action had a great effect on the development of the events.

At that time, there was a Lebanese, Saudi, Turkish contact for discussing the issue of the Egyptian troops in Syria. The Lebanese president and The Saudi King showed their concerns about this change. While the Turkish commander in Chief assured them through the Turkish ambassadors and said that the Egyptian troops don't exceed a phalanx. He asked them not to show any weakness in front of the Egyptian pressures as Turkey will support them.

But what is grasping sights here is that the tough intension in the Egyptian-Turkish relations is not the end of the story. As there were few initiatives for calming down the situation. But all the followers of the region politics were surprised by these initiatives.

The most prominent initiative was at the end of 1957 when the Egyptian foreign minister and Egypt representative in the United Nation showed a warm attitude towards the Turkish delegation. This paid the attention of the UN attaché in Turkey who asked the Turkish Commander in Chief about the core of this unusual understanding between the two delegations. This understanding also paid the attention of the other delegations[62].

Actually this initiative from the Egyptian side or others would not change the reality everyone knows. This reality that the warm relations between Turkey and Egypt is ended clearly owing to the American role or the rapid changes witnessed by the region and caused great difference between its countries.

61 The US Department of State, Warren American Ambassador to Secretary of State, Ankara, Secret , No 1119 , October. 16, 1957, op. cit .

62 Ibid.

Conclusion

The study at the end reached these results:

1. There were obvious contrasts in the Turkish Egyptian relations after 1924 because of the new Turkish orientations marked by signing a friendship agreement between the two countries in 1937 and diplomatic commissioners to embassies in 1948.
2. Under the rising role of the United States, the relation between the two countries deteriorated at the beginning of the cold war, besides the big contrasted policies towards allies' politics. The situation continued after July 23rd revolution till the expulsion of the Turkish ambassador in 1954. The two sides failed in removing fears about Baghdad alliance which led to more deterioration ended by ambassador withdrawal.
3. Aggrevation of the atmosphere at the beginning of 1956 and threat of another ambassador's withdrawal before the rapprochement between the two countries because of the Turkish attitude from the 1956 attack on Egypt and withdrawal of the Turkish ambassador from Israel.
4. The United States is highly welcoming the Tide in this relation with big relaxation and close monitoring of the relation. They remind Turkey about Baghdad alliance results about opposing isolation on Nasser. The Turkish officials were keen on presenting the details of the Turkish Egyptian relation for their American friends in the American embassy in Ankara. They told Mandaris that the American movements on the Arab arena were behind the rapprochement with Egypt.
5. Mandaris declaration of welcoming the Egyptian invitation raised lots of suspicions from the side of the United States. US ordered its instruction to its embassy in Ankara to make calls and hold talks with Turkish officials on this issue. The embassy must make it clear that Nasser hostile attitude towards the west still exists, his intentions towards Turkey is not honest and it may help him influencing the other Arab countries positions.
6. The American embassy succeeded in monitoring the real reasons that pushes the Turkish official towards approaching relations with Egypt. It called its administration to interfere and take actions in this issue. These reasons can be summarized in the Turkish desire of improving relations with the Arab world. It also wanted to gain Egypt support in the Cyprus issue. Turkey wanted to show bit independence in its foreign policy from

the United States or to press on the United States for achieving its goals. We must also mention the big role of Fateh Rushdu in this issue.

7. A great backward in the attitude of the Turkish government towards the relation with Egypt took place as a result of the direct and decisive interfere of the American ambassador according to his government instructions. The great developments happened in the region and United States success in the failure of any Arab alliance contributed to the deterioration in the Egyptian-Turkish relations, besides the American conspiracies in Syria.
8. The Syrian Crisis at the end of 1957 put a rapid end to the Turkish Egyptian rapprochement especially after sending Egyptian troops to defend Syria against Turkey.
9. The relation between the two countries was not cut. But it appeared weaker that before especially after the rapprochement between Turkey and (Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Jordan) in contrast to their tensioned relation with Egypt.

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The Role of Turkey in the Palestinian Case (2002-2010)

Rajab El-Basel

During the last few years, the world witnessed a noticed increase in the Turkish role either on the regional level or the international level. One of the most obvious roles played by turkey is its role in the Palestinian issue. By which this role aroused lots of questions and assumptions especially in the period of Justice and Development Party who has Islamic tendencies in power.

Some one can say that the Turkish role supporting the Palestinian case comes from the party's leadership orientations which are based on their Islamic background. This background makes them allied to the Palestinian side; also it helps the Turkish government to have a strong floor and popularity internally and externally.

Others can say that the international politics don't recognize ideologies, but it just recognizes interests. The Turkish foreign policy represents the supreme interests of Turkey nonetheless all its steps seek this way even if the opposite appears.

Actually the increasing role and growing hegemony of turkey in the region is one of the Turkish interests which aims to gain lots of domination areas on the interest of other roles started to contract and to face other new roles started to expand. So the prestigious regional position and these domination areas can be gained through the Palestinian case.

Another third point of view presents that the Turkish role in the region comes naturally according to the American desire of presenting an example for the Islamic democratic state by which Islamists can hold the power in the existence of a secular constitution without any contradiction with the supreme American interest in the region.

So according to this framework and as a trail for finding a scientific explanation for the Turkish role in the last seven years, I made this paper to

be presented for the Arab Turkish Conference for Social Sciences which include the elite of the Arab and Muslim researchers from our Islamic and Arab world. I hope this paper will represent a contribution for this conference which is one of the features of the Turkish role through extended bridges of contact between the Islamic and Arab world.

And Thus This Paper Tries to Answer the Following Questions

What are the new developments in the Turkish role in the Palestinian issue?

What are the determinants of the recent Turkish role – Officially and popularly – towards the Palestinian case?

What are the reflections of the Turkish role on the fractions in this case and on the relation between Turkey and these fractions, between Turkey and the active regional and international actors?

The Methodology Used

The researcher gathered between the historical and analytical approaches which can serve the targets of the research. This research started from history and then analyzes reality and finally it can predict the features of the future.

First Chapter

The features of the recent Turkish role through the historical experience and the new outcomes of the domestic, regional and international situation: The first chapter tries to follow the Turkish role from the beginnings of the Palestinian case especially with the declaration of the Israeli state in 1948 then turkey's recognition of this state passing by the influential events in the history of the case in order to know what is new about the Turkish role during the government of Justice and Development.

1-The Historical Background to the Turkish Role in the Palestinian Issue

Turkey was related to the Palestinian case from a long time when Palestine was a part of the Ottoman Empire till the British colony 1922. Also Turkey

was attached to the Palestinian case through the general Islamic correlation to the case and this attachment is permanent till that time.

In the Ottoman Empire period (1299-1924), the role developed according to the strength and weakness of the state. When the empire started to get weak, it accepted the foreign privileges in its region under the pressure of the powerful countries and thus the British Jewish business man Moshe Montiviori was able to receive guarantees of protection and privileges from the Ottoman Empire. By which he built lots of settlements from 1839 to 1840 as the number of Jews was increased from 1500 in 1937 to 10000 in 1840 to 15000 in 1860 till 22000 settlers in 1881 mainly centralized in Jerusalem. Moshe received an ottoman declaration in 1859 to buy a piece of land out of the fences of Jerusalem by which he built on it a hospital and buildings for Jews then it was transformed to be the first settlement for Jews called "YAMIN MOSHE"[1].

When Sultan Abdulhamid the second hold the caliphate (1876-1909) and wanted to enforce the Islamic State and oppose the idea of the Islamic league, he succeeded in resisting the Zionist project in Palestine, hanging it out during his period.

For example in 1901, Tudor Herzl tried to gain the approval of the Ottoman caliph Abdulhamid the second to let Jews live in Palestine but the caliph refused and said "the head of the Zionists will not be able to convince me with his ideas, the Zionists will not just practice cultivations but will need more issues like forming governments, electing representatives, I know their greedy interests well". And he sent to Tudor Herzl saying that "I can't withdraw from any Inch from the holy land because it is not my property".[2]

After Kemal Ataturk come to power, cancelling the Islamic caliph system he ensured the principle of *peace at home and peace in the world* by which the relation lasted with the Palestinian case but in an isolationist framework through intentions of Ataturk period under the name of "Kemalist isolation principle", because at that time he was focusing on changing the domestic politics of Turkey.

The Turkish policy towards the Palestinian case passed by different stages by which we can find a set of determinants that limit the Turkish action in the Palestinian case like:

1- Turkey's keen on its close relation with the west and knowing that supporting Israel is a gate for this goal is one of the determinants of its policy, represent one important key for that. So Turkey recognized the state of Israel in 1949 and it is named to be the first country with a big Islamic majority to recognize Israel. Then they welcomed Ilyaho Sason as a delegated min-

ister to Turkey and then they held diplomatic relations in 1952 and signed security treaties between the two countries on 1951. The two states signed in addition to Ethiopia “The Ocean Belt” treaty in August 1958 and that's for accepting Turkey's membership in North Atlantic Treaty Organization 1952.

While about the relation within Turkey and the west wither the European side or the American side is representing a big request either from the military institution or the Turkish people who see in gaining the membership of the European Union is the starting point for raising the economic level in Turkey.

2- The level of coherence between turkey relation with Israel and the national security for turkey and some sensitive issues like cases of the Armenians, Kurds, Cyprus and Syria is one big determinant also, there is no argue about their existence but the argues may be exist in its detailed issues.

For example when Israel tended to the Turkish position, they signed a security treaty in 1951 in exchange for having some security information about Kurdish organizations, Armenian organizations and the Greek activities in the Middeteranian Sea.

When Israel tended to Greece against Turkey especially in the period (1963-1964) during the Cypriot crisis, Turkey refused the Israeli attack on Egypt, Syria and Gaza strict in 1967 and condemned this action, asked all conflicting fractions to respect the security council decisions number 242 and 338 which called for going back to territories before 1967 attach. Also it refused the Israeli decision of adding Jerusalem administratively to Israel but it didn't reach the ceiling of cutting the diplomatic relations with Israel and refused the decision of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) by cutting the diplomatic relations with Israel after burning Al-Aqsa mosque in 1969 and also it refused to allow the American planes to support Israel with weapons during October 1973 war.

3- The nature of the Turkish political system and the relation between what is religious and what is secular and how these answers is far or near to the Kemalist principles, not only that but also the dominance of the military on the system: taking in consideration that there are high limits and lower limits by which any system must work through them nevertheless its orientations. At the end any system cannot clash with the first two features the high interests of turkey and the relation with the west. Also the tough secularism in turkey that is protected by the military institution and other active actors in the Turkish system according to 1982 constitution makes any trial to lower its intense a very difficult trial to any social or political power in turkey wanted to change it.

About the religion-especially Islam- it represents a main component in the Turkish people. In spite of the tough policies from the Turkish system since Ataturk days, Islam still has its role, sanctification, acceptance and greetings from many fractions in the Turkish people and thus it is a must on the political regime to reach a point of balance between his people's aspirations and restricts of the secular security state.

In case of having a tough secular regime or the domination of the army, the relation with Israel becomes strong but it doesn't reach the degree of neglecting the Palestinian rights – except in some special cases – also getting far away from the tough secularism and near to the civilian form doesn't suppose a complete cut in the diplomatic relations with Israel or freezing cooperation with Israel in many strategic fields.

4- The type of the international system, the Turkish policy in the cold war era is different after the fall of the soviet union and the hegemony of the united states to form a uni-polar system and also different from the weakness that started to appear on this pole after the war on Afghanistan and Iraq.

Some said that that strategic importance of turkey will be weak in the American vision towards what after the cold war but Turkey was capable of proving that its importance is rising not declining especially after its perfect reading to the new outcomes on the international situation and changes that appeared on the international system especially after Bush administration initiative of the big middle east by which Bush saw that Turkey can represent an example for the Islamic world in achieving coincidence between Islam and the western values.

Turkey Position from the Arab-Israeli Conflict (1948-2002)

Some researchers see that [3] there are lots of approaches and methodologies can be used to analyze the Turkish behavior towards the Arab Israeli conflict. Like the cold war perspective, the voting behavior perspective, the usage if the concept of balance in behavior between conflict partners or the concept of change in the foreign policy.

Some of them tended to the cold war perspective to explore the Turkish policy toward the conflict between the Arabs and Israelis. As Turkey was calculated on the western bloc, in comparing to the Arab countries by which they were officially non-aligned but they seemed to get near to the eastern bloc under the Soviet Union leadership. And thus we can see that turkey was located in the bloc which supports the Israeli policy.

While according to the voting behavior we may found a sense of balance of turkey's voting in the international organizations in what is related to the Palestinian case and that what is can be explored by the double faced Turkish policy through belonging to the west and obedience to the west.

And finally we can summarize the overall Turkish policy from this conflict, who looks for the first time can see that turkey is the first Islamic country to recognize Israel but we deeply concentrate on the overall situations can find that there is a little bit balance towards the major cases in the conflict but sometimes this balance tends towards Israel.

Turkey recognized Israel in 1949 but refused the tri-lateral attack on Egypt 1956 then refused the outcomes of June 1967 war and supported the Arab side despite of the differences with the Arabs at that time. Also it refused the Israeli decision of adding Jerusalem to Israel administratively or recognizing it as a unified capital for Israel in 1980. Also it refused to be a bridge for the American military aids to Israel in October 1973.

The Situation from the Resolution Process

Turkey declared its full support to all the peaceful initiatives to resolute the Arab-Zionist conflict totally or partially.

It supported Rogers initiative (August 1970) and the decision of seize firing during the October 1973 war, and also welcomed the calls of holding an international conference for peace in Geneva with the presence of all conflicting parties and under American and soviet supervision, not only that but also after the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel in 1979 and confirmed it’s word calling for the quick Israeli withdrawal from the occupied Arabic land on 6 June 1967.

Turkey recognized the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1975 as the mere legitimate representative for the Palestinian people and allowed the organization to open an office for it in Turkey 1979 and then recognized the Palestinian state in 1988.

And after the Second gulf War 1991, the Turkish president Turgot Ozel declared his country desire for holding an international conference for peace on the Turkish lands. Turkey found after having the conference in Madrid a good chance to flourish and develop its relation with Israel as the Arabs now sat with Israel whom criticized turkey because of its relation with Israel. And some of them also held diplomatic relations with Israel, (PLO) entered peace negotiations with Israel in Oslo, Gaza and Areiha4.

Thus we can see the last decade in the twentieth century is the best periods of the Israeli Turkish relation by which they signed a strategic cooperation treaty between the two sides. This treaty aroused lots of critiques from the Arab side especially Egypt.

The Position from the Palestinian Resistance

There are some determinants that manage the Turkish position from the Palestinian resistance in different eras like:

1- The declared Turkish foreign policy which was mainly focusing on the close relations with the west and the protection of the national security of Turkey, and thus if Israel succeeded in proving that there is a relation between the Palestinian resistance and PKK military operations on the Turkish lands it would grasp the attraction of turkey towards Israel on the expense of the resistance. That happened when Israel proved that there is a relation between the resistance fractions and the Kurdish party, especially in the Lebanese war 1982 when Israel affirmed that Palestinian liberation organization intended to train members from PKK and the secret Armenian army ASALA in Lebanon.[5]

2- The popular internal pressure in turkey which supports the Palestinian right in resistance and liberating the Palestinian territories as a right protected and claimed by all the international charters and declarations, adding to that the economic side especially in the period of the seventieth and eightieth of the twentieth century when there was a big eruption of Oil in the Arab land. This made Turkey tending towards Palestine by words not on the real ground.

Turkey recognized the liberation organization in 1975 and allowed it to open an office in 1979 and described the Israeli reaction towards the first Intifada (December 1987) as “an intervention to the humanitarian rights for the Palestinians and asked for stopping this behavior” while on the real ground, turkey did not take any effective decisions against the Israeli actions.[6]

And according to some people sayings that “turkey allowed some private agencies to send some Turkish workers to work in Israel by low wages during the first Palestinian uprising in order to lower the Israeli dependence on the Palestinian labor force and these numbers were valued by three thousands Turkish labor in 25th January 1989”[7]

The Features of the Recent Situation of Turkey during the Justice and Development First and Second Government (2002-2010)

The general elections were held in November 2002 and the Justice and Development Party gained 34% of votes and had 365 seats from 550 while the (CHP) gained 176 seats and 19% of votes. The other seats gained by independent candidates. And in the local elections held on 28th march 2004 the party gained 42% from the votes all over the country.

AKP reached the power in time which the internal political situation and the international situation opposing lots of restrictions on its movements, which pushed it to follow some political tactics to achieve its goals and reach it. And we can draw the environment by which the AKP reached power in different sides:

A-The Relations between Turkey and Israel before Reaching Power

When AKP reached power, the relations between Turkey and Israel were very good and at the top as a result of lots of developments in the last decade of the twentieth century by which the Turkish foreign minister Tansu Ciller visited Israel in 1994 as the first visit for a high prestigious Turkish official on that level since Turkish recognition with the state of Israel and after 2 years the Turkish president Suleyman Demirel visited Israel and signed the security strategic treaty between Turkey and Israel (Feb. 1996) and also there was a big rising in the economic ties between the two countries.

This cooperation was supported by later agreements like the one which is about modernizing the Phantom Turkish aircrafts in August 28th 1996 and also another agreement in December 1st 1996 by organizing common military trainings between the two armies in addition to that they reached an agreement in April 4th 1997 by which they can evaluate together dangers represented by both Iran and Syria on Israel and Turkey and they reached fourteen agreement and project in the military cooperation between the two countries.[8]

The trade balance between the two countries reached the ceiling of 1500 million $ in may 2001 knowing that this price is not including the price of weapons deals between the two countries.

The Environment of the Turkish Political System

AKP came to power in a very special environment by which there were official institutions inside the system like the Parliament, the Executive branch (Prime minister and the President), the judicial branch, in addition to that the articles in the constitution by which it gives the national security council some privileges to protect the secular system and the relations with the west. This council was dominated by the military.

Taking in consideration that the political role given to the army in the constitution is one of the obstacles for turkey to enter the European union and thus as long as their role was limited so the chance of turkey to enter the European union is very high.

When AKP party came to power, the popularity of the other parties was going down either those who made coalition governments or who formed a majority government before the 2002 elections. The Turkish economy was deteriorating, high rate of corruption, the government failure in facing the economic crisis and that forced it to resign and ask for early elections.

Adding to that, the Turkish people emotionally attachment to the second Palestinian uprising in 2000 and declared their big refusal to the Israeli actions against the Palestinian people during the uprising, this attachment also increased during the American war on Iraq and then occupying it in April 2003, the appearance of the Israeli role supporting this war and the Israeli role in north Iraq and its relation with the Kurds.

The Ideological Background of the AKP

AKP is insisting on naming itself as a democratic conservative party and refuse the Islamic description to its ideas. And it saw that his position from the Palestinian case comes as a result of the cultural and historical factors which describe the Turkish people whom they elect the party.

But what is sure is that the founders of the AKP are from the Islamic party (AL-FADILA) who left this party and formed a new party with new incentives more responsive to the demands of the Turkish people. These initials are based on studies made by the party by which there political discourse will be the most close to the Turkish citizen and his aspiration.

And the main idea of the AKP is that they must get rid of the religious discourse adopted by Erbakan and to follow a new discourse coherent with the Turkish reality and the international reality also.

So the founders adopted an approach by which "they can coincide between the western values and the Islamic values, may be the change will happen on the level of tools and the regional partners but not in the main stream of the foreign Turkish strategy"[9]

"The party became able to keep adopting the ottoman traditions by which it can live and coincide between many choices. This Erdoganic policy is more successful that the Ataturk principles that failed and more than Erbakan revival policy which is withdrew. This policy led to the appearance of the Erdoganic way in the democratic conservative figure with the ottoman feature on it to reach power"[10].

The party consists of 3 million members and has more than 80 branches all over the Turkish state. It mixes lots of trends like the Islamists, businessmen, the Turkish nationalist and all of them represents good sources for the parties political and economic positions.

The Features of the Recent Turkish Policy towards the Palestinian Case

The party determined his foreign policy according to its minister of foreign affairs Ahmed Davutoglu who was able to melt all the previous determinants and to extract one new theory for the Turkish foreign policy which is based on "Zero Problem neighboring policy" which is declared in his book "the Strategic Depth".

Davutoglu said in foreign policy "Our vision for the Turkish foreign policy depends on three majors; the first is our state which is based on the balance between freedom and security hope for turkey to take its ordinary position between the strongest countries all over the world. The second major is related to the regions around us and is mainly concerned with the effective influence in the Middle East, the Balkans and the Caucasia. We are not just concerned with the 75 million Turkish citizen but we are concerned with all places where Turkish people live in or lived in from before. The third major is the global major in which Turkey must have a role and a word in all the global issues starti9ng from the climate change to the different political cases from Chile to the Philippines"[11]

"Turkey – according to Ahmed Davutoglu – is not in a clash or contradictory position with the United States or Israel but it is searching for the best ways and roles for achieving peace in its regional politics including the peace between the Arabs and Israel"[12]

As professor Ibrahim Bayiomi – expert in the Turkish affairs – said that professor Ahmed Davutoglu has three main theories represents his vision to the international relations and this representation is coming from his Islamic civilized origins and these concepts are the theory of the civilized transformation, the strategic depth theory and the new ottoman theory.

He proved in his first theory – civilized transformation – that what is happening after the fall of the Soviet Union is not a victory for capitalism or liberalism but it is a big transformation will lead the world into a mulit-lateral world.

He is also defending his second theory by extracting Turkey from the brief by which it's role is only limited in specific trends and streams to be in the core and to be related to all partners and to be a country which has an effective role and initiative in all the regional and international cases.

The third theory is based on three main standards. The first is that turkey must restore back its Islamic civilization heritage peacefully. It must feel pride in its ottoman history which comprises plenty of cultures and different ethnicities. Also turkey must broaden liberties within the domestic affairs, keep securing its external borders.

The second base is backing the ottoman sense of pride and greatness, self confidence while dealing with an issue related to the foreign policy. The third standard is keeping the continuity of having open relation with the west besides holding balanced relations with the Islamic east [13].

We Can Distinguish the Justice and Development Party Action toward The Palestinian Case in Two Complementary Stages

The first stage starts when the party came to power in November 2002 till the Israeli attack on Gaza December 2008, as the Turkish situation was kept in AKP era by supporting the declaration of the Palestinian state in 1988 by which turkey recognized the state once it is declared and also in the case of Jerusalem, Turkey stayed declining the Israeli occupation to the eastern part of it.

The second stage starts since the Israeli attack on Gaza in December 2008 till November 2010 as the Turkish situation began by refusing the siege on Gaza and welcoming the head of the political office for the Islamic resistance movement –HAMAS- Khaled Mishal after his win in the parliamentary elections 2006. Abdullah Gul said - according to his position in the party not officially – “this meeting comes from turkey’s keen on playing a big

role in the Middle East and it will not stay as an audience, confirming that turkey is highly concerned with the Palestinian case and will keep working on stopping violence between the Palestinians and the Israelis".[14]

According to Gul declarations we can see that the party took the siege on Gaza as a gate for playing an important regional role adding to that the emotional attachments of the Turkish people towards Gaza strict, And encouraging popular initiatives to release the siege on Gaza.

The Intense of the Turkish Action was Increased after Three Main Events

1 . The Zionist attack on Gaza strict December 2008 and January 2009 when Erdogan described what is going on "as unreasoned shameful attack" and who don't condemn this attack are dual standard people.[15] In addition to the Turkish foreign minister Ali babagan when he said to Tesibi Livny "our doors are opened but you have to tell me about the conditions of seize firing before coming to Turkey" in Hurriyet Daily news.[16]

2 . The discussion between the Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan and the Israeli president Shimon Pieres in DAVOS conference after ending the attack on January 29th, 2009 in the session held specially for discussing the outcomes of the war on Gaza, Erdogan said "I feel so sorry that people are clapping for what you said because lots of people have been killed and it is inhumane to clap for an operation led to these results" and then he withdrew because he was not allowed to take time like what the Israeli representative took.[17]

3 . The final attack on the ships of breaking Gaza siege on May 31st 2010 and leaving 9 turkish as killed with cold blood on Mavi Marmara ship. This operation was highly valued by the Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu.

Erdogan said inside the parliament that "humanity received one of the biggest hurts along the time" and "it deserves all figures of condemnation" , "this is the state terrorism" warning Israel from any trial of testing the patience of Turkey as it know that "Turkey's friendship is expensive but also its enemy ship is highly expensive" .

He confirmed that "turkey will not give its back to the Palestinian people or Gaza district".[18]

And as a quick response to this attack, Turkey requested its ambassador in Tel Aviv and cancelled three common military programmed maneuvers

between the Turkish army and the Israeli army. Turkey also asked the Security Council to prepare for a special session to discuss the attack. It cancelled the football matches that were supposed to be played between the two national teams in Israel at that time besides asking the NATO council for an urgent meeting.

Also Turkey boycotted the conference on tourism held for the state members of the organization of the economic cooperation and development held in the holy city.[19]

Turkey put some conditions for normalizing the relations with Israel can be figured in an official apologize for the Israeli attack, paying compensations for the families of martyrs and approving the formulation of an international committee for investigation.

Second Chapter

The determinants of Justice and Development party from the Palestinian case and the future of the Turkish role: There are some determinants that will affect the Turkish foreign policy especially towards the Middle East and what is related to the Palestinian case. These determinants can be summarized in four points by which they can influence the nature of the role, its future, limits and dimensions.

First: the Domestic Turkish Situation from This Role

We can classify the Turkish internal into many overlapped branches like the different orientations of the Turkish people between the secular, Islamic, nationalists, Business men, military institutions and others.

Each power from those has its own response and own impression towards the role played by Justice and development party government.

The Turkish street can be classified into a big majority supporting the policies of Justice and Development party towards the Palestinian case. Some others may take other actions more intensive than the governmental actions based on their Islamic background or the Turkish nationalism.

There is a political minority that has a secular orientation and sees that the Justice and Development orientation towards supporting the Palestinian rights is contradicting with the Turkish secular principles and being neutral in the Arab - Israeli conflict. Not only that but also some of them may re-

store the history and the Arab action from the revolution of Elsharif Husayin against the Turkish state and their alliance with France and Britain in the first world war against the ottoman empire.

By Summarizing we can consider the Turkish street is supporting the AKP policies and making pressure on it to support the Palestinians' rights especially in the new rapid outcomes of the conflict, exploring the role of Israel who supports Kurdish people in northern Iraq and accusing it of playing a role in the plot made by some retired officers to make a coup d'état against the recent Turkish government (ERGENEKON). The organization used a set of systems (MAGLAN-S-313) Israeli made to help their connection. This set was het from Israel through the northern Cyprus “according to Takvim news paper”.[20]

The second power can be seen is the secular power which is represented either in highly secular power in the CHP (the people party) or another secular power which is not intensive but wants to keep the secular side of Turkey.

As a result of having lots of coup d’état seeking for ensuring and maintaining secularism, making it the first article in the Turkish constitution, enforcing the army and the judicial branch to secure and protect this secularism, some of those secularist see that turkey’s orientation towards the Palestinian case is an Islamic orientation against Secularism not a political orientation that seeks developing the Turkish role on international and regional level.

These secular fractions are making use of the Islamic orientation for HAMAS in order to accuse Erdogan of standing beside it and that's what is contradicting with the principles and bases of the secular republic and the strategic interests especially the relation with Israel, United States and the Jewish lobbying organizations.[21]

The third power can be represented in the Army who is guarding the constitution and the secularism of the state, who is guarding the relations with Israel and related with it by lots of military, security, intelligent agreements like the most important one which is the agreement of the security and intelligence cooperation agreement in 1996, In addition to that the fortressed role of army by the constitution after the coup d'état of Kenan Evren in 1980 which made a big role for the military institution in the Turkish political issues. In addition to that, the decisions of the National Security Council are mandatory for the government not for just advice.

The fourth power is the business men and they are influential in the Turkish foreign policy. They represent a big percentage from the supporters if Justice and development party.

Second- the American and the European Situation

Turkey is considered to be a strategic ally to the west and the United States. It is the mere Islamic state in NATO and was an important axis during the cold war and before the fall of the Soviet Union as it is the most nearest NATO member state geographically to the Soviet Union. Nonetheless the biggest American military base outside the American land is located in Incirlik, South turkey. After the fall of the Soviet Union, Turkey played a role in the second gulf war 1991 and contributed also in the American war in Afghanistan 2001 after the events of September 11th.

But after that there are lots of major events that influenced the relation between Turkey and United States:

- The American vision or initiative towards the big Middle East by which it makes Turkey as an example for the best relation can be founded between the Islamic world and the west as Turkey is gathering between the Islamic values and the western values. The United States wanted to create a state of strategic balance between Turkey and Iran in the Middle East after removing Saddam Hussien regime, besides decorating the image of the United States after invading Afghanistan and Iraq.[22]
- Some researchers see that the Turkish role is favored by Obama administration and Obama want to Turkey to support him in his policy towards the Palestinian case which mainly based on two bases, the smooth political discourse and the continuity of the Hegemony and transfer it into soft hegemony.[23]
- The American war on Iraq and invading it in 2003 in the existence of a Turkish refusal in entering the war or using Incerlik military base in this war, the rising role of the Kurdish and fear from their independence through a Kurdish state in Northern Iraq, and the Israeli role in Northern Iraq also.
- The new strategy of Justice and Development Party according to Ahmed Davutoglu which see Turkey as a core state and the world is moving towards a multi-polar system and thus the Turkish role and policy must be formed on that way.
- One of the American political scientists says that the “bipolar system of the cold war era is vanished and the United States cannot be sure that Turkey will seek staying in an alliance with it alone without trials of seeking close relations with other strong states like China or other states that Turkey can achieve high economic profit through its relations with”[24]

So there are two American visions for the Turkish role: The first sees that the American administration don't refuse the Turkish role in the Palestinian issue because it knows that there is a ceiling and a red line by which turkey can't exceed which is its relation with the west and Israel. While the ceiling of Iran – the strong actor in the region and in the Palestinian issue – is higher than the ceiling of turkey and United States wants a moderate Islamic example to attract HAMAS in order to face the Iranian hegemony which is threatening Israel security. United States become more sensitive towards the difficulties it is facing in the region and need Turkey as a strategic reserve by which they can lean on it as a factor of stability in the times of the complicated crises.[25]

The second vision sees that Justice and Development party is adopting the Islamic political vision in a complete way and according to "Soner Cagaptay" the head of the research program on the Turkish issues in Washington institute that "AKP is seeing everything from the perspective of the civilized conflict and it cannot be moderate somehow. And it was obvious when AKP interfered between HAMAS and the Palestinian authority and between Europe and Iran"[26]

The conservative commentators in America are dreaming about an alliance between Israel, Greece and Kurdistan Iraq to weaken Turkey. And in closed meeting for the members of "Heritage Foundation", they are saying Turkey must be punished.[27]

The Israeli Situation from the Rising Turkish Role

The Israeli position is semi near to the American position. They wanted the Turkish role by considering the historical and strategic relations with Turkey and knowing also that the political regime in Turkey will not maneuver on the Israeli relations because they know that Israel is the gate for the west.

But by admitting that there are some other explanations to the recent situation, they accused Democracy of bringing AKP to power in Turkey. They see democracy is danger on them if it is applied in the Islamic and the Arab world. And another view is saying that it is a conflict on the regional position by which turkey is not concerned with Israel but it is concerned with having an ally don't embarrass her in its people sight or its allies sight.[28]

So there are two Israeli views towards the Turkish role:

The first: is that Turkey will not sacrifice its relation with Israel and there are some limits to its relation with the Palestinians and to its farness from Israel.

Yuri Urdun – the first Israeli ambassador to Turkey - said to France press that he is not pessimistic about AKP reaching to power. According to him he thinks that turkey's desire in entering the European Union and keeping on its warm relations with the United States will force the new government not to modify its political relation and policy towards Israel.

Also the former Israeli president said that after AKP reaching power, there is no source for worry because the interests of the countries states that the relation must be good every time.

Alon Livin and Yuval Bostan – two Israeli researchers – are commenting on the Turkish situations; "Turkey is not concerned by entering a war with Israel, but it just wanted to achieve some of strength points in the region, in its domestic arena, to appear as the sincere advocator for the Palestinian rights and to be the mere state that can stand face to face to Israel".[29]

They also added that the new Turkish role is more favorable because it will attract Syria and HAMAS towards it not towards Iran. Turkey represents a more moderate and welcomed ally from the west and Israel perspective. And thus the Turkish pressure on Israel is just in formalities while the main joints in the relation are not as issue of discussion except there is a deep change in the Turkish foreign policy.[30]

And for that we can see the sour Turkish critique to the Israeli policy towards Gaza and towards the Israeli attack on Mavi Marmara is one of the most complicated compound to the Turkish-Israeli relations by which this compound gave each partner a limit to criticize the other partner, wage the wordy seasonal war between them either for lowering the intense of the domestic issues of each country or to send message with specific meaning to their surrounding region and the international space.[31]

The second sees that the Israeli Turkish relations which were till near time described as an alliance relationship were tensioned and there are probabilities for a big change in the regional politics in the Middle East. The Israeli National Security feels danger from Iran which was a big ally and turned to be the first enemy and now Turkey which became an ally for the enemies.[32]

According to the Israeli minister of state Benjamin Zayif Began -who represented the Israeli prime minister in the international conference for the climate change- as an answer on a question asked by the Greek newspaper Taniya about the deterioration of the Israeli Turkish relation, he replied that the situation is arousing lots of tensions because Erdogan party is clear in his position, he wants to make an alliance with Iran, Syria, Lebanon and this alliance is raising our concerns and Europe concern also. For example

Turkey voted in the Security Council against opposing penalties on Tehran because of its nuclear program. And thus this alliance includes new dangers on the whole region.[33]

The Arab and Palestinian Respond

Away from the popular respond which is highly influenced by Erdogan's words and declarations which are highly supporting the Palestinian people, lots of political scientists' readings and the Palestinian authority in Ramallah and Gaza varied between either to welcome these declarations in order to escape from the radical Iranian role towards a moderate role or to hesitate from this role as they are suspicious from the goals of the Turkish role.

The situation related to the Palestinian issue is like that, a more rising influential strong Iranian role in the region against a more shrunken Arab role and another rising Turkish role seeks occupying all the empty areas that were left by some traditional Arabic power rather than these areas to be taken by Iran taking in consideration that this Turkish role is going in the interest of the Islamic political powers that see in AKP is one of the main figures that represent these powers.

At the end the regimes chose the Turkish role in the existence of AKP not in other parties because the other parties were keen on their relations with Israel and this was on the interest of the Arab-Turkish relations. So the curve of the Arab – Turkish relations become high in the existence of the AKP and Refah Party.

Adding to that the Turkish confirmation on the importance of the Egyptian role as Ahmed Davutoglu said that "the Turkish motion in Gaza cannot exceed the Egyptian role" and Ankara affirmed that "The Turkish role may be a complementary to the Egyptian role and cannot replace it"[34]

So there are lots of explanations to the Turkish role in the Palestinian issue. Some are afraid from a new Turkish domination on the Arab world from the gate of Palestine and they called it a new ottoman domination [35]. Some others are welcoming this role as the rescuer from the Israeli attacks against the Palestinians in the absence of any effective Arabic role [36].between this and that the main question is what do the Arabs want? In the absence of any Arabic political institution that represents the Arabic will and also in the existence of the Arabic conflicts and differences. There are lots of upset points and fear from the Turkish situation also.[37]

AKP Strategies

In the light of the mentioned determinants and situations, AKP followed a strategy which mainly stands on greeting the role of the people – regardless its orientation – on the expense of the role of the military institution and the judicial branch institution and putting these roles in their supposed framework neither less nor more in the light of the main determinants of the Turkish politics which are keeping the strategic relations with the west and securing the supreme interests of the Turkish state.

So we can reach a thesis here by which when the government succeeded in broadening the privileges of the civilian government so we can see the government take more intensive actions towards Israel also in the light of the two mentioned determinants.

We can see that AKP sought in his first period to keep reassuring the internal and the external as he showed a friendly political discourse by which they showed their respect to the secular regime and they were keen on gaining friendliness with the army in spite of the army trials not to let them enter the elections but Erdogan said " I got rid of my old ideas " when he was a member in Erbakan party. While Abdulla Gul declined having any Islamic agenda and he declared that he is not an Islamist but a member in a conservative party and the most he can be described by is that he is Islamic democrats like the Christian democrats in Europe.[38]

AKP government also worked on enforcing its relations with the west by modifying the laws and policies which are appropriate to accept the membership conditions of the European Union. These modifications are the ones which will lower the army's intervention in the political life and the influence of the army institution. These policies sent messages to the west and the secular power that AKP needs the western way and decreasing the influence of the army is one of the conditions needed for more approaching to Europe. These policies are supported by the secular parties like CHP when it accepted having constitutional amendments in 2001 that cut the influence of the army and the National Security Council in some of the domestic affairs.

The second stage starts after the 2007 elections when the Turkish foreign policy designer took the post of the foreign ministry after being a political advisor for the prime minister. The government tried to maximize the civilian role on the expense of the military role and this policy was examined when it declared and announced the military plot, planned by some military people retired and officials -ERGENEKON- to assassinate some government's officials, by amending the constitution in order to judge these people

in front of the civil courts not military courts. And also the government practiced pressure on the military institution to declare that the army is an apparatus of the state not over the state.

In the frame of this stage the government permitted or gave the people the chance to go down streets in hundreds of thousands to condemn the Israeli attack on Gaza in December 2008 then allowed the humanitarian aids campaigns to Gaza during the attack and after it. Till the freedom flotilla events which left 9 Turkish people killed on Mavi Marmara ship and affirming that Turkey will not give its back to Gaza. This led also to the evolution of a strong pressing factor against Israel in opposite to the secular pressing factor which is always keen on the warm relations with the United States and Israel. So the government stayed in the middle of the way by not cutting the relations with Israel and also no stay in the warm relations with it. We also can see that what helped the government to adopt this cold relation with Israel is the Israeli tendency towards Greece on all levels within 2009-2010 and especially the Israeli role in northern Iraq and its secret relations with PKK and this can be named as a threat on the supreme Turkish interests and its national security. And so the Turkish role in Gaza can be seen as Turkish reaction toward the secret Israeli policies.

The Future of the Turkish Role

There are lots of scenarios presented now for the Turkish role in the short run which are varying from playing the role of the mediator, or adopting the moderate axis or adopting the axis of isolation. Away from the details of these scenarios the researcher sees that the best chosen scenario for the Turkish role is the active mediator based on:

1- Practicing the active role in the Middle East issues especially the Palestinian case without any effect on the main determinants of the Turkish policy but this role must not clash directly with any other regional or international power and keeping a minimum level of relations with it. As what is turkey is hoping for is to enhance its regional interests and to provide reserves for the old policy of heading to the west. And the Turkish government knows well that these interests cannot be achieved without exchange in on the political, economic and security interest level.39

2- Going towards cold relations with Israel especially in the civil fields in order to activate the relations with the Arab countries especially with the main countries like Saudi Arabia, Syria, Egypt and even also Iran by which it can serve Turkey's goals and interests. Also it may help in playing the role

of the confident mediator for these partners concerning their hot issues. According to Ibrahim Kalin – prime minister's advisor in the institute for Turkish studies – in front of a group of the American followers in June 9th 2010 "during the voting process on opposing penalties on Iran because of its nuclear program, Turkey voted by No for two reasons, the first one is that we don't want to contradict ourselves as we reached a material and real issue still presented on the table. And in order not to contradict ourselves we voted by no and after all of that we found our American and European friends asking us for keep talking with the Iranians so if we voted by yes, the confidence of the relation between Iran and Turkey would be vanished"[40]

3- Turkey's tendency towards the countries who are facing Israel: this step taken with a political discourse higher than what is opposed by the moderate power in the region by which turkey can give these countries the confidence in dealing with it and then it can oppose and take lots of initiatives in the region in different streams at the same time either the Syrian stream, Lebanese stream or the Palestinian stream.

4- Avoiding the clash with the moderate powerful states in the region like Egypt and Saudi Arabia in order to send them a message that Turkey don't want to take their role in the region and that was obvious when Ahmed Davutoglu said that the Turkish role will be aiding or complementary not replacing the Egyptian role"[41]

5- Increasing the probability of the flexibility of the Turkish action in the real floor and not on the level of official declarations, in the light of the changeable interests and strategies, so any change in the Israeli policies towards the sensitive issues of turkey either in the Greek relations or in the Kurds issue will be followed by another change from the Turkish side. Also any American or European pressure on turkey toward that sensitive issue will force turkey to step back and vice versa. But in the two hypotheses the Turkish role cannot go back to the zero point, and the rising activity in the foreign policy especially in the Palestinian case will not lead to a complete cut with Israel or the west.

An Israeli author can summarize that saying "in the last years, our relations with Turkey were highly tensioned and witnessed lots of challenges but any talks about cutting these relations is so earlier than its time. In the top moment of this tension between the two countries, Erdogan government came back to Israel and asked for taking the post of being a mediator between Israel and Syria and this intention is not an intention of a country need to cut its relations"[42]

Third Chapter: The Rising Turkish Role in the Interest of Whom?

The Turkish highly and noticed presence in the Middle East issues especially in the Palestinian case – they knew that it's their gate for this role – is raising lots of questions revolving around one big question which is "for whom interest is this role?" in the Arab interest especially the Palestinian people or in the interest of Israel ? There are lots of visions from the Arabic and the Israeli sides for this role:

1-**On the Arabic side:** the situations varied and differed between those who see that Turkey is occupying the weakness areas left by the Arab side from supporting Palestine at least on the wordy level not on actions and we can see that Erdogan speeches during any Palestinian events is usually not only higher that the moderate axis in the region but sometimes higher than countries on the facing axis with Israel.[43]

Some others see that Turkey is playing a drawn role by America by which it just can move through its frame in order to attract the confidence of the Arab partners especially the facing axis with Israel and to take away the carpet from the feet of the Iranian role in the region which is very active and deeply rooted in the region. What turkey is doing now is just words and not actions. [44]

2-**On the Israeli side:** they see that Turkey is a strategic friend that will never give up its relations with Israel or with the west for the Arabs and the Palestinians. And they believe that Turkey's increasing activity is in the Israeli interest because it is attracting the see sights to it from the Iranian model after the Arab people feed up with the situations of the moderate axis countries. [45]

Some others see that one of the predicted scenarios that may happen is that turkey's raisings against Israel is the real cut in the relations and Turkey will transfer to the facing axis.[46]

So we can see that it's a different role either from the Arab side or the Israeli side by with policy and political analysis we are concerning with phenomena and actions not intentions.

After reading the Turkish situation even also on the level of declarations and actions affirm that although the Turkish role is non allying, it falls in the interest of the Palestinian people and the interest of the case because it is not a monopoly on the countries of moderate axis in the resolution way also not a monopoly on the facing axis like Iran and Syria. People are waiting for

those who take actions and Turkey has the right to search for this role and occupy areas left by some others.

No one can deny that since AKP came to power in Turkey a sense of balance happened towards the relation between turkey and both (Israel and Palestine) but oppositely there is a tendency towards more emotional affiliations for the Palestinian case. The official visits to Palestine increased and the AKP found itself between two big trends either to respond to its big electoral base which is calling for more support to the Islamic and Arab cases especially the Palestinian ones while the other trend is the other factors opposed on it by keeping the relations with Israel from the military institutions in turkey and also the party tendency to enter good relations with the west and entering the European Union. In addition to that the secular influence on the media represents an obstacle to adopting more clear and opening Islamic policies. [47]

As a result of the deterioration in the Turkish Israeli relations we see the situation developed by which the Turkish military belief now is describing Israel as a source of threat and instability to the region because of its actions and its policies, these policies may lead to a militarization race in the region. And these threats are representing real threats to Turkey.[48]

Turkey declared its abstain from any information from Israel about the rocket defense system belongs to NATO.[49]

According to what is released in “Sabah Newspaper” that the Turkish intelligence cut its relation the Israeli intelligence “MUSAD” as a result of the tensions between the two countries. Also the news paper added that these two partners who worked together so closely are even stopped to exchange information and execute operations together.[50]

Some people accept the Iranian role and its occupying to the empty space as it is supporting the resistance but actually in some Arab regions it is killing the resistance and in all cases it is searching for its interest.

And also from the rights of Turkey to search for its own interests, to adopt a more positive situation even this situation giving a little of hope for the Palestinian people who missed the hands of support and tongues to defend his situation.

Conclusion

No one can differ on that there is a noticed rising regional Turkish activity started with the Justice and development party government from 2002 and become more effective during 2009 – 2010.

There are some circumstances that helped this role, the rising activation, exchange for other roles either were positive or negative. And no one can deny the great role played by the technical of the Turkish foreign policy in the third millennium Ahmed Davutoglu who is sometimes named by The Kissinger of the Turkish foreign policy, also our professor Ibrahim Bayoumi named him Ahmed Davutoglu of the Turkish policy confirming that comparing him to Kissinger is not efficient for many reasons towards him.

But the most important thing Ahmed Davutoglu did is his perfect reading to the role of turkey after the cold war and in the light of the successive outcomes since September 11th and his perfect reading to the real position of the United States and its predicted situation in the international arena.

All of that make Davutoglu present a complete theoretical vision by which he became able to apply it since he was an advisor for the prime minister or when he became minister of foreign affairs.

The Turkish role is sightseeing and attracted our intention to it, as a country capable of keeping on its strategic position in the international relations after the end of cold war and the fall of the Soviet Union. Not only that but also it proved that it is not a state in breifrey but it is a state of the core, it got lots of usage and knowledge from its strategic position that relates between the east and the west.

Turkey which said “Yes” to the constitutional amendments and the public opinion become one important issue in taking the decision there also said “No”, and persuaded the others that it is on a high level of independence in its decision making process by which it is only the national supreme interests and zero problem neighboring policy.

Although there are lots of writings in the changes of the Turkish role generally, its position and the future of its role in the Palestinian case, the field need more from research, study and analysis either on the level of conferences or studies or discussion meetings as Turkey presents a new experiment and example deserve to be studied and get experience from it.

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The Sociolinguistics Consequences of the Ottoman Rule on the Egyptian and Turkish Language and Culture

Nahed H. Awni

Every community has its norms, values and rules that govern its different aspects of life. However, these norms, values and rules may- for one reason or another- be interrupted or imposed upon. One of the most common features is the mutual influence which takes place between two countries as a result of mingling and interaction. Therefore, people with different culture and language, in their attempt to communicate with each other, try hard to avoid the occurrence of what can be called "socio-pragmatic failure".

The relationship between Egypt and Turkey is a good example and stands as evidence to such mutual influence of language and culture. At one point in history, Egypt was a province of the Ottoman Empire. Mohammed Ali who served under the Ottoman Sultan succeeded in taking power over Egypt and established a dynasty that effectively ruled Egypt until the British occupation in 1882. He laid the foundation of modern Egypt institutionally, economically and socially.

The Turkish and Egyptian case calls for comparison, not only due to the prolonged presence of the Turks in Egypt, but also because they display a broad range of common features while retaining some contrasts. The similarities are basically in size, historical and religious heritage, the economic status in the world and the geographical position. In terms of history and religion, both countries were Islamic, with a common history as part of the Ottoman Empire, and both gained their independence in beginning of the 20th century.

In terms of economic status, they are two of the most populated countries in the region, both having the same level of economic development. Touristic attractions and natural historical areas are plentiful in both countries.

One the educational level, although the literary rate in both countries has increased, Turkey remains having higher levels than Egypt. Moreover,

Turkey has a higher school enrollment ratio than Egypt. Even with the above mentioned similarities, differences between Turkey and Egypt are evident and can be summarized in two main aspects:

The first aspect is the transformation of Turkey from being Islamic country to a secularized society. The second aspects concerns the language, while the Arabic language remains without any change for 14 centuries, the Turkish language has been subject to major changes. This change was due to the policies established by Mustafa Kamal Pasha, whose popularity led his people to call him "Ataturk" meaning the father of Turks in reference to the name of "Um il'masriyyin" which the Egyptians at that time attributed to Safiyya Zaghlool- the wife of the famous Egyptian leader Saad Zaghlool[1]- who headed the women's movement for liberation.

The dramatic reform of the Turkish script in 1928 revolutionized the Turkish language and as a result literacy rate increased by 80%. This reform can be witnessed in two main features:

First: Turks use the modern mode of conversation rather than the old one. For example: the Arabic lexicon has been replaced by Turkish lexicon. This means that many of the Arabic words which were imposed on the Turkish language due to the Turkish prolonged presence in Egypt have almost been completely replaced by Turkish words with French origin. Yet, many words that are still part of the Turkish language which have Arabic origin remain. The Arabic language consists 30% of the Turkish lexicon. This is the main impact that the Arabs had on the Turks which stands till today without major change.

Second: The Arabic mode of writing in Arabic letters gave way to the Latin mode of writing which was viewed as being more simplified and more fitting within the Turkish articulation system. Eventually the increase of the number of literates was attributed to this change.

Contrary to that, the Turkish words which were internalized within the Arabic lexicon have not witnessed any deliberate attempt to exclude them and they are still being used today with minor changes. For example:

- Abla to address an elderly sister (or like)
- Ağbe to address an elderly brother (or like)

1 He was an Egyptian politician who organized the formation of a delegation called "Wafd" in November 1918 to voice Egypt's demands at the peace conference in 1918. He was also a member of the old "Ummah" party and headed the national movement and the population uprising in 1919 against the British imperialism.

There are many Turkish words that most Egyptians use today without knowing their origin or sometimes even their meaning. These words are used in the same context though but with little deviation in pronunciation and usage.

For example:

Turkish	Arabic	English
Peskir		hand towel
	Baçkir[1]	bath towel
Tentenele	Dentella	Lace
Karacol		Police officer
	Karacon	Police office

Also there are some Turkish words which have been excluded and replaced by Arabic words. These words are basically titles of positions.

For example[2]:

Turkish	Arabic
On başi	Ombaaşi (now sol)
Yuzbaşi	Yuzbaaşi (now naqib)

(Note that the difference in stress created a different dialect)

Other titles are used until today to rank position but not formally.

For example[3]:

Turkish	Arabic	English
Baş katib	Baʃ kaatib	Chief of clerks
Baş muhandis	Baʃ muhandis	Chief of engineers
Baş tamarci	Baʃ tamargi	Chief of male nurse

2 These are two military titles meaning respectively “the head (chief) of ten persons and the head (chief) of hundred persons.

3 The titles are assigned by subordinates informally to call the chief or the head of each position out of respect.

(Note the combination of terms between Arabic and Turkish)

The titles[4]:

Turkish	Arabic
Pasa	Baaʃa
Bey	Beeh

These titles are no longer used officially to rank positions, but people still use them for respect.

There remains the title “efendi”. This is also a title for manner corresponding to the English word “Mr.”

The use of this word has taken different features.

First: efendina[5] (A) Our Master (E)

“Efendi” is attached to the Arabic possessive pronoun “na” meaning “our”. But by connotation it means “your honour”. This is how Egyptians used to call all those who surrounded the royal family and sometimes the ‘pasa’ who worked for the royal court, as a kind of respect.

Second: efendim (A) My Master (E)

“Efendi” is attached to the Arabic possessive pronoun “m” which means “my”. Although “efendina” is no longer used ever since King Farouk abdications in 1952, the word “efendim” is used until today but under two different connotations:

1 . A sign of respect, as English speakers would use the word “sir”, for example:

Turkish	Arabic	English
Evet efendim	aywa ya fendim	Yes sir

2 . A summons-answer sequence, when someone is called upon, for example:

4 These titles used to be given by King Farouk (former King of Egypt) to rank them by position. The first title is higher in rank than the second.

5 This title was only given to Sultan Abd ElHamid in Istanbul, but when Mohamed Ali started to gain power and independence from Istanbul, he demanded the title “Sultan” for his descendents and eventually they were called efendina.

X : Ahmad

Y : efendim? (Meaning: na'am) (A) Yes? (E)

Or

X : Ahmad hina.

Y : efendim? (Meaning: eh) (A) What? (E)

It is important to note here that in contrast to the Latin borrowed words which are used mainly by people who belong to what is called "ammiyyit il-muthaqqafiin[6]" (educated colloquial) the Turkish borrowed words were used by Egyptians of all different levels and classes. This was due to the fact that the above mentioned group of people were the elites who were exposed to foreign communities and obtained their education in foreign language schools in Egypt, whether English or French.

Although no Turkish schools[7] were ever opened in Egypt, the direct attachment and interaction between the two communities in all different classes of society for an extended period of time made the second language transference and interference on both sides indispensible, the differences remaining only in pronunciation between the native speaker and the borrower creating diverse dialects and accents.

Normally when a word is borrowed it is made to fit the phonological system of the borrowing language.

For example:

Turkish	Arabic	English
"hiyar" ve "nane"	"xiyaar" w "ni ع na ع (pronounced ni'na'a)"	Cucumber and mint

(Note: the "x" corresponds t the "خ" in Arabic and pronounced "kh")

When the Turks borrowed theses two words from the Arabic language they made them follow the phonological principles of the Turkish language. The Turks cannot pronounce the sound "x="خ so they substitute it with the sound 'h'. Also, because the "ع" sound is a peculiarity of the semantic languages and does not exist in Turkish, the two "ع"s in the word were com-

6 There are two other levels of Egyptian colloquial Arabic "A'ammiyit il u'mmiyyiin" (illiterate colloquial) and "A'ammiyit ilmitnawwariin". This is a distinction from the "fuss'ha" language which in turn can be divided into two levels: "the pure fuss'ha" (the classical Arabic) which is the language of the Koran, and "the modern standard Fuss'ha", (the modern literary Arabic) (Badawi, 1983).

7 There is one Turkish school which has recently opened in Egypt called "Salah El-Dine International Turkish School".

pletely deleted. The reason is obvious, the Turks know Turkish, but they do not, for the most part, know Arabic.

Moreover, lexical borrowing leads to the partitioning of the vocabulary with respect to the operation of phonological rules. For example, the phonological rules of "vowel harmony" [8]that apply to native Turkish words. The Arabic borrowed words behave in one way, in regard to the Turkish phonological rules, and the native Turkish words behave in another way. An example of the vowel harmony that exists in the Turkish words:

Turkish	**English**
Ikindi	afternoon
Aksam	evening
Carçamba	Wednesday
Gunduz	daytime

Therefore, lexical borrowing leads to the production of foreign words but in native dialects.

Moving from vocabulary to language structure and how the Turkish structure was effected by Arabic. From the review of literature we know that although language and culture are closely associated in practice, there is no reason to believe that any particular type of linguistic structure is especially suited to any particular type of culture. Otherwise we would have ended up with several types of linguistic structure, which is not the case. All human languages fall within a fairly narrow range of structure possibilities. Unfortunately, the Turkish and Arabic language are of two different kinds. The Turkish people, who were residents in Egypt, in their attempts to speak Arabic, in order to communicate with the Egyptian, made their sentences appear like a Turkish structure that is dressed in Arabic Lexicon.

For example: A Turkish on wanting to say in Arabic

- fataht ilbaab — opened I the door

We would say something like:

- ilbaab Fataht — the door opened I

But in Turkish would say:

8 Means that the vowels of a word are similar in a certain way. In other words, all the vowels, to a certain extend, should agree in being either front or back. Thus, front vowels and back vowels hardly occur in the same word.

- “Kapiyi açtim The door opened I

This is in addition to the changing of the stress location and the shifting of “H” into “h”. (Note: “H” corresponds to “ح” in Arabic (pronounced “haa”)).

Another evidence of language mutual effect is the occurrence of what is called the “bilingual words”[9]. These words are the result of applying the morphological rules in which the native (Turkish) inflections are attached to the foreign (Arabic) words to create a bilingual which differs in meaning.

Following are examples of the Arabic morphemes attached to a Turkish word that has eventually been Turkinized:

For example:

Turkish	English
Adapsis	impolite
Arabam	my car

“Adap” (adab in Arabic) means “politeness” and “sis” means “without” in Turkish, and in “araba” (araba in Arabic) means car and “m” means “my” in Turkish.

On the other hand, there are Turkish morphemes which have been attached to an Arabic word and have eventually been Arabnized. Examples:

Turkish	Arabic	English
Nenam	Nenti	my grandmother
Ablam	Abliti	my elderly sister (or like)

The word “abliti” has been generalized to mean any elder female. Also, the word “teza” which literary means an aunt in Turkish, is used by Egyptians to call on any aged woman.

Similarly, in Turkish the “ci” morpheme is a suffix which is attached to a word to mean vocational expression. This morpheme was integrated within the Arabic language and has become part of its lexicon expressions.

Example:

Turkish	Arabic	English
mekveci	makwagi	Iron man

9 They are words that consist of two morphemes of two different languages.

"Mekva" means "iron" in Arabic and "gi", which is derived from the Turkish morpheme "ci", corresponds to the morpheme "er" in English. It is a vocational expression to mean the person who uses the iron, or iron user.

Note that "c" in Turkish is read as "j". It is important to mention here that the word baltaji (in Turkish: baltaci) is a very common word used by Egyptians to refer to a person who uses all sorts of unethical and illegal actions including violence and body harassment in order to achieve his goals. But the historical background for the word is that the word "balta" means an axe in Arabic, and as mentioned above, "baltagi" (in Turkish: baltaci) means axe user.

In the period of the Ottoman Empire, the Turkish soldiers used to be accompanied by a person to cut down trees and split logs which obstruct their way. This person in doing so used an axe "balta" and from this, the term "baltagi" is derived. But, how did this term change to its current meaning? There was an Ottoman ruler who was famous for his cruelty and was named "baltaci pasa. Ever since that time and until today this term is connected with violence.

This was in terms of the mutual lingual effect[10]. As for the social effect, many instances have been traced along the years among that reflect the misunderstanding that sometimes occur when two cultures are mixed together. For instance, the switching of a meaning exactly the opposite is viewed in the word "xism" which in Arabic means "opponent" and is used in Turkish to mean "relative". Except that the "x" is changed into "h" to fit the phonological system as mentioned before. Another good example of a mutual social influence is how some Egyptians use "si" before a name such as "si Ahmed" to mean "Sir Ahmed' or "Mr. Ahmed" in addressing men. Thus, when transferred the Turks addressed each other in Turkish as "Ahmed beh". Those Turks, in their attempt to imitate what Egyptians say, are actually over generalizing their own rule without realizing that "si" is the abbreviated form of the word "sidi" meaning " my master'. While, on the other hand, the Egyptians, on using the word "si" before a name are actually imitating how the Turkish address or call each other as "Ahmed beh". Nevertheless, this kind of odd misunderstanding appeared mainly in rural areas.

Also the word "aragoz" in Arabic means puppets . This word originally comes from the Turkish word "kara-goz" meaning black-eyed, as these pup-

10 According to the Arabic rule, any noun that ends with the vowel "a" sound (called "fatha") and which indicates femininity, necessitates the shifting of this vowel "a" sound into constant "t" sound before adding a suffix or being modified. Also a vowel is inserted to avoid the occurrence of three consonants. The vowel is usually an "i" (called "Kasra").

pets appeared at that time. Similar to this word is the word “karakon” which Egyptians use to mean police office. This word, too, originally comes from the Turkish word “kara-kol” meaning black-armed, as policemen at that time used to wear a black sleeve on top of their shirts.

The “tavla” is the most popular game in Turkey and it was brought to Egypt and is very popular till today under the name “tawla”.

It is worth to mention here that social gaps are distinctive in both countries. In Istanbul, the area of the rich, where the Café de Paris and the Café de Vienne lie, in which expensive foods are served and European songs are heard, is not so far from Ilhayy Ilfateh which is named after the name of Sultan Mohammed ElfaateH The Second and which lies in extreme poverty. Similarly, in Cairo the Zamalek area is a resident place of the rich and the elites and which is separated from the rural area of Bulaq by only a bridge.

A social effect is also evident in family relations. Generally speaking, the Turkish people are very polite, have respect of family members and give titles to one another.

For example:

• Tossun bey	(said to a husband)	Mr. Tossun
• Hikmat hanem	(said to a wife)	Lady Hikmat
• Bey boba	(said to a father)	Mr. Father
• Agabe	(said to an elder brother)	
• Abla (said to an elder sister)		

These signs of respect also go beyond family members. For example:

• Chauffeur bey	(said to a driver)	Mr. Chauffeur
• Nadin hanim	(said to a maid)	Lady Nadiin
• Çöpcu bey	(said to a garbage collector)	

This sense of respect among family members was transmitted to the Egyptians. The father was highly respected as well as the mother, elderly brothers and sisters. “Abeeh” (taken from the Turkish word “agabe”) and “abla” were the only intensively used titles in most families. Nowadays, the father has no longer the prestigious position he used to have, and that kind of respect among family members has taken a different shape. The titles among brothers and sisters have also been wiped out. There remained only the title “bey” and “hanim”, which are still very widely used but in very strictly formal situations. Generally, “bey” is now largely substituted by the Arabic title “ustaaz” and “hanim” by the French title “madame”.

For example:

Arabic	English
Ustaz Gamal	Mr. Gamal
Madame Zeinab	Mrs Zeinab

Another feature of respect is related to guests and what is known as good hospitality. Arabs, in general, are known to be very generous and excellent hosts. They receive guests with warm welcomes and offer them a lot of compliments. In Islam, there is a saying attributed to Prophet Mohammed (pbuh) in which he urged people to honor their guests as a part of their belief in God and the resurrection day[11].

The Turks, due to their prolonged direct contact with Egyptians, have gained this concept. Furthermore, Egyptians and Turks perform a lot of greetings before raising the main topic. Also, both languages make a distinction for politeness in casual conversations. The Turkish language draws the polite second person singular pronoun from their plural ones (as in French). While in Arabic the distinction for politeness is a completely different word from the second person pronouns and still corresponds to singular masculine, singular feminine and plural.

For Example:

In Turkish

- Siz hocamisiniz? (plural or singular polite)
  You teacher(s)?
- Sen hocamisin? (singular)

You teacher?

In Arabic

- hadritak mudarris? (singular, masculine polite)

You (mas.) teacher?

- hadritik mudarrisa? (singular, feminine polite)

You (fem.) teacher (fem.)?

- hadritku mudarrisiin? (plural polite)

You (pl.) teacher?

11 “man kaana minkum yu`min billahi w alyawmi l`axiri f alyukrim dayfahu”.

- inta mudarris? (singular, masculine)

You (mas.) teacher?

- inti mudarrisa? (singular, feminine)

You (fem.) teacher (fem.)?

- intu mudarrisin? (plural)

You (pl.) teacher?

From the previous examples, we notice that both languages make a distinction for politeness in casual conversations. In classical and modern standard Arabic, the second person singular may be derived from the second person plural pronoun “antum” in very rare occasions when the addressee is a very distinguished character and the conversation is carried on formally. This is equivalent to the French speakers on saying ‘vous’.

On the level of religious aspects, although in Turkey most of the Arabic lexicon has been replaced by Turkish lexicon (as mentioned above) yet the “Koran” -the holy book of Islam- remains intact. As a result, most Turks recite the “Exordium[12]” without knowing what it really means. All other religious rituals are similarly performed.

The world “Bayram[13]” in Turkish means “feast” and it is a very well known word to the Egyptians but very seldom used. Also, “Ramadan[14]” is the holy month of Muslims, in which most Muslims in Egypt and Turkey fast. Also, there is the Nayruz feast in Turkey which is similar to what Egyptians call Sham Il nisiim (Easter holiday).

There are some dishes that are equally popular and loved by both Egyptians and Turks such as “dolma[15]” and “Vawirma (pronounced Shawirma)[16]”. “Varkasiyya (pronounced Sharkasiyya)” and “kiVk almaz(pronounced Kishk Almaz)” are Turkish dishes that are no longer known by most Egyptians and very rarely cooked or even heard of.

12 It is the Moslems “ilfatha” which is recited at the opening of each prayer.

13 There are two bayrams, “büyük bayram” and “küçük bayram” meaning respectively big and small feasts. These correspond to what the Muslims call as “ʕiid il `adhaa” and “ʕiid ilfitr” which refer to two Muslim occasions “the sacrifice” and “the breakfast”.

14 Is called in Turkish “Ramazan” and it is the holy month of Islam.

15 Turks use the word “dolma” to mean stuffed vegetables such as eggplant, zucchini, and tomato with rice and meat. As a distinct from the word “mahʃi” which is filled with vegetables such as cabbage and veil leaf. In Egypt, the two words are used interchangeably without distinction.

16 Meat rotates on a spit in front of fire in order to be grilled.

In terms of songs and music, the Turks and Egyptians have almost the same scales in music except that the Turks have encompassed the western scale a long time before the Egyptians did.

Many of the names in both countries are similar especially the Islamic names such as Mohammed, Ahmed, Mostafa, Fatma, Zeinab, …, etc. The name "Mervat", for instance, is a very common Egyptian name, yet many people do not know that is derived from the Turkish name "Murvat[17]" which is a name of a flower.

In conclusion, Egypt and Turkey have a lot of things in common and this is attributed not only to the similarities in language, religion, values and traditions but also to the prolonged interaction among the two people.

This is about the two countries relation in the past, but what kind of relation is there now? In other words, how do both countries view each other today? Has the relationship of the past affected the relationship of today? And to what extend?

It is important to note that Egyptians make a distinction between the Turks who have lived in Egypt and have dissolved within the Egyptian community and therefore have become Egyptianized, and those who live in Turkey and are considered foreigners. It is also worth mentioning that although Egyptians think of the British and French presence in Egypt in the past as an imperialism, they do not look at the Ottoman era in the same way.

The last two generations did not witness the Egyptians-Turkish relationship in its broad sense but it is something they know a lot about from their grandparents, books, or media. There is hardly a film or a show in the past that did not include at least one Turkish character. Now a days these films run on Egyptian national TV which help new generations familiarize with how Turks behaved and acted, their manners and attitudes.

Many Egyptians today may use a Turkish word or comment in their conversation, but this code-switching is made only for the scale of fun, joke or sarcasm. This is despite the fact that a person referred to as having Turkish blood is looked upon as well bred, dignified and beautiful, but not necessarily rich or educated.

This is how the new generation in Egypt view the Turks in the past. But what do they know about the Turks today? Unfortunately, this generation knows very little about the Turkish people, civilization and culture. In short, they are far away from Modern Turkey.

17 Notice that Turkish does not have the "w" sound and instead it is produced as "v". So they are almost pronounced the same except with the difference in stress location.

Only currently through new media that people started to realize the existence of Modern Turkish civilization, for example by watching Turkish series on television. Also, people came to realize that Turkey is a wonderful place to visit with all its breathtaking views and sceneries, as well as its historical places.

Furthermore, most Egyptians have turned their back on European markets which have become very expensive and have headed towards Turkish markets as which has become famous for its high quality and reasonable prices. In fact, Turkey is now a shopping area and a holiday resort for many Egyptians. In return, many Turks come to Egypt to pursue their Arabic studies, many of whom are students in El-Azhar University[18].

Moreover trade is flourishing between the two countries through the mutual opening of factories and project investments.

In conclusion, no matter what or how the relationship was in the past or will be in the future, there will always remain the fact that each community – Egypt and Turkey – has the other's blood running somewhere in the family, whether they both like it or not.

18 It is the oldest university in the Middle East. It used to teach only Arabic and religious subjects but now all kinds of disciplines are offered.

About the Contributors

Ahmet Uysal is a Turkish sociologist interested in studying and improving Turkish-Arap relations. He is the founder and director of the Middle Eastern Studies and Cooperation Center at Eksişehir Osmangazi University, Turkey. He closely follows the developments in the Arab world and published several works on Arab affairs. He is the general coordinator of ATCOSS (The Arab-Turkish Congress of Social Sciences) since 2010. Dr. Uysal lived in Egypt prior the Revolution and analyzed Turkey's image in the country where he began to work on the idea of bringing Arab and Turkish scholars together. Currently he is coordinating and directing several projects about the Arab world. auysal72@yahoo.com, auysal@ogu.edu.tr.

Aida Mohamed is an Assistant Lecturer in the Political Science Department at the British University in Egypt (BUE). Aida has earned her MA degree from the American University in Cairo (AUC) in June 2011. Her thesis topic is "The Relationship between Human Security & the National Security of the State Case Study: Egypt & Saudi Arabia." Before joining BUE, Aida has worked as a Research Assistant in the American Studies Research Centre at the American University in Cairo (AUC). Her MA specialization is International Relations and International Security. Her areas of interest are Foreign Policy, Human Security and Hard vs. Soft power. She received her BA in Political Science and double minor in Economics and American Studies from AUC in 2005.

Amr G. E. Sabet is Docent in the Department of Political Sciences, University of Helsinki, Finland. He is also currently visiting scholar in the Department of Public Management, Vaasa University, Finland. He is also the author of *Islam and the Political: Theory, Governance and International Relations* (2008).

Andrew Bossone is a journalist based in Lebanon. He is a reporter for Nile International Television and a contributor to National Geographic News. He

is pursuing an MA in Middle Eastern Studies at the American University of Beirut. He is formerly a reporter for Al Masry Al Youm newspaper an adjunct faculty member of journalism at the American University in Cairo, a note sender and contributor for the Economist Intelligence Unit, and the founder and editor-in-chief of an Egyptian monthly technology magazine, ICT Business. He received an MS at the Medill School of Journalism at Northwestern University, specializing in broadcast journalism and religion, spirituality and ethics. He received a bachelor's degree at Temple University in communications and a minor in business administration.

Ashraf Abdul Aziz Abdul Kader *is* Political researcher at the Egyptian people's Assembly.

Ayşe Tekdal Fildis is an Assistant Professor, Department of Political Sciences, Halic University, Istanbul, Turkey. She started her PhD studies in the University of Sussex in UK on the subject of Middle East Politics for three years and obtained her PhD from Bogazici University. She conducted a research study on the Ottoman Trade Archives at the University of Sorbonne in France as her Post Doctorate study. She worked as a tutor in Beacon College in UK prior to joining Halic University.

Bahadir Ileri is PhD student in the Department of International Relations at Ankara University in Ankara, Turkey.

Birol Baskan is Assistant Professor at the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar. He received a B.A. in International Relations and in Economics from Koc University, Istanbul, Turkey in 1998 and a Ph.D. in Political Science from Northwestern University in 2006. Baskan taught at State University of New York-Fredonia in 2006-2007 and at Qatar University in 2007-2010. His research looks at the roles religion, religious institutions, and grass root religious groups play in creating, maintaining, undermining and destroying political order in the Middle East. Currently, he works on several projects, one of which is a book project analyzing the role of religion in state and nation building in the Gulf. At SFS-Qatar, Baskan teaches courses on comparative politics, religion and politics and methodology. Email: bb389@georgetown.edu

Hamid E Ali is Assistant Professor of Public Policy in the Department of Public Policy and Administration, School of Global Affairs and Public Policy at the American University in Cairo. His area of teaching is public policy

theories, Research Methods, applied quantitative analysis and globalization and development. Prior to joining AUC, he taught at Southern Methodist University. He holds a Ph.D. (2004) in public policy from the Lyndon Ben Johnson School of Public Affair at the University of Texas at Austin, a master's (2000) in macroeconomics and econometrics from University of Texas at Austin, and MA (1995) in economics and management science from the University of North Texas and Bsc. (1988) from the University of Khartoum. His most recent publication includes: "Military expenditures and Inequality in the Middle East and North Africa" Defense and Peace Economics; "Military Spending and Human Development: Guns and Butter Argument Revisted a Case from Egypt" Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy; "Reserve Requirements and Optimal Monetary Policy in Economies with Informal Sector" International Journal of Banking and Finance; "War food cost and Countervailing Policies: A Panel Data Approach" Food Policy. "Military spending and Panel Granger Causality Test" Journal of Peace Research. "Military Spending and Inequality: Evidence from Global Data" Defense and Peace Economics. "Political Economy of Grant Allocations: Case from U S Federal Highway Programs" Publis: Journal of Federalism). Finally, edited Book in progress "Darfur Political Economy: A Quest for Economic Development."He is regular commentator and contributor for NileTV; Voice of America,; Alhuda TV; Daily News Egypt and Sudan Tribune.

Heba Al-Sayyed Ramadan is a political researcher specialised in international relations. She published a number of articles and studies in the field political science related to various issues, besides articles dealing with cultural issues trying to redefine some cultural concepts.she participated in a number of academic conferences, local and international. She recently focused on Middle East affairs , changes in the international order and the position of man within the emerging order, and trying to analyse links between social sciences and the international relations science.

Huseyin Caldak is the Head of the Department of Philosophy at Bingol University. He was graduated from the Faculty of Divinity, Erciyes University (Kayseri) in 1994. He completed his MA (1998) and PhD (2006) at Ataturk University (Erzurum) in the field of philosophy. Asst. Prof. Dr. Huseyin Caldak is author of several articles on philosophy, pedagogy and logic.

Javier Albarracín holds a degree in Political and Administrative Sciences from the Autonomous University of Barcelona (UAB) and an MSc in International Relations, specialised in the Middle East. He contributes to confer-

ences and working groups in different institutions and economic organisations such as the OECD, the Union for the Mediterranean, ANIMA Investment Network, the Mediterranean Commission of the European Parliament, chambers of commerce, employers' organisations, economic research centres, think tanks and universities. He is also a member of different Euro-Mediterranean projects of the European Commission (MEDPRO 2030, SEARCH Project, JISER-MED). He was Head of the Mediterranean and Middle East Department at the Consortium for the Commercial Promotion of Catalonia of the Government of Catalonia (2001-2008) and had previously worked at the Economic and Commercial Office of the Embassy of Spain in Istanbul (1998-99). He had also worked with the Institut Universitari d'Estudis Europeus of the UAB analysing EU foreign policy in the Mediterranean and Middle East. His last *publicactions are 'Energy and revolts in the Mediterranean; moving scenarios' (Cuadernos de Energía nº 33, December 2011) Javier Albarracin and Senén Florensa, Secretary Foreign Affairs, Government of Catalonia, Drafting Committee member of 'MediTerra2012' of the International Centre for Advanced Mediterranean Agronomic Studies (CIHEAM)* and *Coordinator of the monographic 'What Economic Governance for Arab Transitions?', IEMed (2012)*

KubilayAkman is a sociologist and academic currently affiliated with the Department of Sociology at Bingöl University. He was graduated in Sociology at MSFAU in Istanbul and completed his PhD at the Institute of Social Sciences of the same university in 2006. He is teaching History of Sociology, Social Theory, Contemporary Sociology, Sociology of Arts and Culture.

Magdi el Sayyid Hashish is an assistant professor of History at the department of Modern History, Faculty of Arts, Al-Mansoura University. He finished his master's degree in modern history in the year 1995 and his Ph.D. in 2002. He studied the ranks and medals in Egypt between the years 1915-1953.

Maha Bali is a Senior Instructional Technologist at the Center for Learning and Teaching at the American University in Cairo. She received a Masters of Education in eLearning from the University of Sheffield in the UK in 2006 and is currently working on a PhD in Education, also at Sheffield. She has facilitated with Soliya twice and later coached and trained new facilitators, and her research interests include critical thinking, intercultural learning and eLearning. She also teaches Educational Technology for Classroom Teachers at AUC's Graduate School of Education.

Nahed Awny is a Professor of Arabic as a foreign Language at the Arabic Language Institute at the American University in Cairo. Obtained Phd in Arabic Linguistics from Azhar University. Taught several Arabic courses abroad in different universities at US and presented several papers in conferences in Cairo and abroad in US, Turkey and Greece. An author of a text-book for teaching Egyptian Arabic language to non-natives. Speaks four languages Arabic, English, Turkish and French.

Nevine Soliman is an Assistant Lecturer in the Political Science Department at the British University in Egypt. She holds a B.A. in Political Science with a Specialization in Public International Law and an M.A in International Human Rights Law, both from the American University in Cairo. She also has an LL.B in Egyptian law from Cairo University. She worked as a researcher at the Arab Organization for Human Rights, and participated in human rights training courses in the Arab region and overseas. Her research interests include economic, social and cultural rights, human rights and corporate responsibility, the linkages between human rights and the environment, as well as gender studies and child's rights.

Omair Anas is PhD candidate at the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University New Delhi where he is working on Transnational Arab Media Culture. He has widely published his articles on Middle Eastern issues, Islam and Politics in Indian and international newspapers, periodicals and journals which include Media and Democratization in the GCC Countries, Multiculturalism in Indian Islamic Scholarship: A Critical Analysis and Comparative Analysis of Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya. He has also presented several papers on Arab and Islamic Media in many international conferences. He holds Master degrees both in International Relations and Arabic Literature besides media writing training from Indian universities. He can be reached at omairanas@yahoo.com.

Ragab El-Basil is a Egyptian researcher and researcher. He is the managing editor of the website *Alamat Online*. He graduated from the Political Science Department of Cairo University in 1994. He edited *the Journal of the Kuwaiti Society* during the years 2004 and 2005. He was an advisor to the Doctors Union since 2005. He frequently publishes political analyses in the media and publishes articles in academic journals.

Saddek Rabah *is* Associate Professor in College of Communication at University of Sharjah, UAE. He received his Ph. D fro the University of Paris 2

Pantheon/Assas, Paris, France in mass communication in 1997. He wrote, translated, and contributed to, several books such as *Media & New Technologies* (2004) *History of Theories of Mass Communication*. (translated from French in collaboration with N. Layadi) (2005). *Introduction to Multimedia (translated from French in collaboration with N. Layadi)* (2004). The French Media Discourse on Islam Transplanted to France (in French) (1998).

Samir Abu-Zaid is a member of the Egyptian Philosophical Society and founder of Philosophers of the Arabs Website, he published two books about multiculturalism in science form An Arab/Islamic perspective. He is a laureate of 'the most important Arabic book' prize (2010) from the Arabic Thought Foundation headed by Prince Khalid Al-Faisal, he has a Masters of Civil Engineering from the Ohio State University, USA.

Yasin Aktay is professor of sociology in Selcuk University, Konya, Turkey. He is also the director of Institute of Strategic Thinking since 2010. He is the author of many books in Turkish and many articles in Turkish, English and Arabic. Two of his recent books are: *Tarihbozumu: Tarihyazımı ve Tarih Sosyolojisi* (Dehistorization: Historiography and Sociology of History, 2011) and *Karizma Zamanları* (The Times of Charisma, 2011).

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