CIVIL SOCIETY AND CHANGE IN THE MIDDLE EAST



The Arab-Turkish Congress of Social Sciences

CIVIL SOCIETY AND CHANGE IN THE MIDDLE EAST

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With an Introduction and Conclusion by
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About SDE

The Institute of Strategic Thinking values contribution to the development of the relations between Turkey and the states in the region. Within this framework our strategic goals are producing policies that give priority to co-operation and economic, political integrations with a mission of peacekeeping and problem solving for Turkey; removing the prejudice between Turkey and Muslim world and the Western world; and creating grounds for mutual understanding and dialogue; developing the cooperation networks among the civil society and think-tanks in the region. Within the frame of these strategic goals, we organized this congress in cooperation with our partners in Osmangazi University and Cairo University. The contributions of the distinguished scientists participating in the Congress will have crucial prominence in accomplishment of these aims. We thank you for your contribution to this Project that we intend to traditionalize. We hope that the ATCOSS will be a means for the rapprochement of Turkish-Arab communities and for an intellectual accumulation.

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Foreword

Yasin Aktay

No one could predict that a few months later a series of revolutions would come out in the Arabic when we gathered in Ankara to hold the first Arab-Turkish Congress of Social Science (ATCOSS). Participants from Libya, Egypt, and Tunisia emphasized the lack of democracy in their countries. It was clear they were in search of a solution or a way out.

In the First ATCOSS a number of manifestations on the transferability of regimes, accountability, supremacy of law, importance of democracy and the dangerous growth of corruption in administration and among the people came out. These manifestations were giving the signs of this quest while yearning for a change in the respective countries.

We decided to hold the second of annual ATCOOSS meeting in Cairo with the title of "The new and non-governmental actors of change in Middle East. At that time, we couldn't reckon that these people would be the new actors acting as the pioneers of a great transformation only one month later. However, this strong desire and demand for change was making itself felt even at that time. Therefore, on this aspect, the idea of ATCOSS, perhaps, has started to function since its first gathering. It has made the portrait that would enable us to watch the change, name it and even predict its direction.

The Islamic world, instead of being an actor, has only been the object of social science so far. It remained as a world which was subjected to social science, defined through the science done on it and remained as a government on paper within the extensions of that definition. It started to be called "Middle East" in social sciences and in the whole literature later on. Muslim societies adopted the term themselves too, while there were many question to be asked. It was east according to whom? Whose middle east was the Muslim lands? As Muslim social scientists started to emerge in the field, they could get to ask these questions. The same societies were called "developing countries" or even "underdeveloped countries". They were called "societies without a history" and "societies falling behind of history and civi-

lization". They were addressed as "fatalistic", "populations without a civil society" and "people who can't make revolutions."All these definitions and descriptions were not only depicting Turkish and Arabic populations in a simple way but they were also shaping these societies. They were setting up the plot for them while defining them.

Indeed, with their fatalism, these countries looked even "cute" to others because it both made it easier to rule them and looked "exotic". However, as Muslim societies started to object the fate drawn for them and raise their voice to act independently, they became "bleak". From this point onward, the strange relationship between Islam and violence started to be the subject of the new social science studies. Islam started to be redefined, and Muslims were tried to be stereotyped. Despite being done in good intentions, recent studies on Islamic societies lay stress on the Islam-violence relationship for some reason. In a way, it is true that Islamic world has been trapped in violence for a long time, though. However, the source of this situation is a not a mystery.

Colonialism has consistently sustained its presence in Islamic world for the last two centuries. We all know better now what an orientalist literature emerged from the knowledge of Islamic societies that was generated at the start of colonialism. And when it comes to post-colonial era, it isn't possible to say that Islamic populations have been swift enough to develop their own knowledge paradigms.

While there was such a gap, western science kept generating ideas and knowledge about the East and Islamic world, because thriving for hegemony in these lands has never stopped. The correlation between "knowledge" and "power" continued, and the process of "middle easternization of Middle East" went on non-stop. Today, the necessity of a Middle East generating its own knowledge is more urgent than ever. We are all witnessing a transformation of consciousness and social change in Middle Eastern populations resulted by media, effects and results of which are felt more quickly compared to academic world.

It bears no doubt that the media is one of the most important actors of the transformation taking place in Middle East, and as an actor, media is changing and diversifies. The role played by the newspapers and television channels under state control -at best- in 90s was different than today. The Media of that time was serving the state. Today, the new horizons opened by satellite systems and the Internet media have resulted in a shift of role and put the media among the most important actors of social change. Besides, it is really easy to access to this media. Naturally, this new media system

has enlarged the elite class to a great extent and the number of employers in the market hit a peak. Today, almost every city in Turkey has at least one television channel and various radio stations. The total number of people employed in these sectors comprises an important part of society. These people have the opportunity to express their ideas and influence the public opinion about the events occurring in the country every day.

The Internet today is a domain that anybody can easily have an access to, and it plays a role in manipulating public opinion, determining policies as well as allowing intruders to get on the stage. Internet and social media don't only lead to new socialization channels but also gives a chance to everybody to become an actor in the social change. Just like the invention of printing press letting literacy starting from Europe and let bigger number of people to get into the discussion, it is thanks to the Internet today that bigger revolutions become widespread. So, the Internet serves as an important public domain.

But at this point, we should comprehend well what kind of public domain the Internet is and what kind of role it plays in the process of change. A claim that we heard quite often during Arab spring is that these revolutions are made through the Internet. To tell the truth, overemphasizing the role of the Internet in the revolution causes us to ignore the sociology behind the revolution. In addition, since the Internet is used as a symbol of western technology, such claims seems to be another way of saying that the revolution is made by the western powers. And as a consequence, this just repeats the idea that easterners can't make any revolution on their own and if there is any, it must have come from the West. However, the Internet is a media, while revolution is a decision. If there is no society to carry it out, technology can't help anything.

Actually this is just a complicated way of saying something much simpler that we have been hearing since the beginning of the revolution. It is based on the belief that people can't do anything on their own, and that there is always a superior Westerner behind whatever is happening. As a matter of fact, it is against the nature of substance in social sciences to think of such a great power that sees everything in advance and controls things (it is also against the Islamic belief) because this creates some kind of fatalism and consumes the power of man to be the actor and doer in social happenings. Now that everything is done by a "greater power", we don't need to do anything. Whatever we do, we won't be doing anything more than serving the purpose of that greater power. On the other hand, the most important thing needed for change is decision and will and these are what make us human.

And there is no single thing that a human's willpower can't change. As the Almighty Allah says Indeed, Allah will not change the condition of a people until they change what is in themselves." (TMQ, 13:11)

For this reason, we decided to call the subtopic of this congress as "the actors of change". By doing this, we wanted to question the approaches in social sciences that look down on human willpower, but we also wanted to highlight how determinative these little actors, namely people using the willpower that Allah has given them, can be. The revolution hadn't broken out when we decided on this topic. Thankfully, the revolution has answered this idea of ours in a positive way quite soon.

It showed us how little actors, willing to change themselves, can grow into real determining actors. And we also have seen that Allah has changed a tribe that changed things about themselves. We will be learning about and elaborating more on the details of this process.

Foreword

Beşir Atalay

Arab Turkish Congress of Social Science (ATCOSS) was first held in December, 2010 in Ankara. When we look back at it from here, the second ATCOSS, it has not been that long between the two congresses; ultimately there has been just 15 months, yet transformations we experienced during that time carry the prominence of changes over centuries. Indeed when looked from this perspective, we also see that this Congress has a perfect timing because it has the chance for witnessing history. Not every social sciences congress has the chance to be that close to history and witnessing what is happening in the center of it.

In fact between these two congresses the Arab world and our region has been through a radical transformation process. Although it has just been 15 months, today sociologically analysis of the transformation in the Arab world is quite significant. Even comparing the statements in this congress 15 months ago and those that has been presented here are adequately interesting.

I hereby express again my deep admiration, gratitude, and greeting to the people of the Arab countries that showed the will of that transformation.

The western world considering the Arab world unable and unsuitable for transformation, democracy, and will witnessed a “revolution” through this period. Today “Tahrir” has become a name for all pursuits of freedom in the western world, as well. Therefore, in Europe, the US and in other places where people give voice to democratic demands started to follow Tahrir and take it as a model.

Leading the way in the world race of civilization the Egyptian people, started the 21st century not that strongly, yet they fascinatingly came back to the stage in the second decade of the 21st century. I greet all our Arab brothers in Egypt that showed what the struggle for freedom means to the world with all my heart.

Since the beginning, Turkey has watched Egypt's Tahrir with excitement, appreciation and hope. It was quite pleased with the roar of freedom. Turkey saw closely and realized that it was about the will of the people. Thus, the Turkish people supported their brothers in Tahrir. Announcing that there is no room in this world for the rulers who do not give ear to the people in their country since the very beginning, Turkey obviously supported the Egyptians. This attitude was also a great opportunity for the Arab-Turkish brotherhood to be strengthened.

Actually Turkey's last ten years under the governance of AK (Justice and Development) Party has been a period in which Turkish-Arab relations have improved in any sense and the distance because of century-long mutual negligence started to be narrowed. As Justice and Development Party, we knew that improving these relations would have a significant role in providing transformation, development, and integration and showed maximum effort to improve these relations.

During this period Turkish and Arab societies coming from the same cultural and social backgrounds, made breakthroughs in order to improve the relations between both the states and the people sophisticatedly; external interventions, mutual prejudices and generally "radical break" because of "western modernist" tendencies/attitudes started to gradually give place to a meeting and reunion where historical and cultural integrity is felt again.

Organized with the title of "NGOs as the actors of the transformation in the Middle East" Arab-Turkish Social Sciences Congress should be seen as a reasonable quest of more stability in aforementioned meeting and uniting. Of course this Congress should also cover the efforts to make the unity between the two nations more stable and try to have the intellectual content needed for this unity to be built on strong relations.

We know that the states and governments are not the only determinative actors of the transformations in the world any more. Although the relations between governments are significant in improving the relations between the countries, it is needed to be strengthened by the unity of the people of both countries. Without doubt, herein the NGOs, particularly social scientists have more responsibilities in terms of having communication bridges between societies. The annually organized Congress will make these efforts persistent and institutionalize them.

Whether the new conjuncture raised by "Arab Spring" or the period of transformation in global sense has brought new spaces of risk and opportunity. It is a historic responsibility, which cannot be out casted by our social scientists, to analyze possible advantages and disadvantages of interaction between Turkish-Arab societies objectively in the light of scientific criteria.

We are the members of the same civilization and the most dominant and constructive subjects of history, thus we cannot be contented with watching history passively. From now on we need to reveal our own power of discourse to get involved in the period directly. We cannot consider it through the concepts and theories about us suggested by the others. We need to develop our own science and concepts about our history and society on our own.

The solutions to this problem are abandoning the attitudes that came out as the outcomes of some reasons such as “external interventions”, “mutual prejudices” and “western modernist tendencies/attitudes”, which are the causes of “radical break” between two countries as I mentioned before, and questioning the imposed definitions of reality. In this period, in which the world order is being reshaped, some of the most important tools of making the closer relations between the two societies sustainable are creating paradigms that are in accordance with our historical mission and vision, forming analysis units, and doing a research in order to determine the common ground.

By considering imposed approaches to the states in the region, our social scientists should never relinquish their responsibility of doing enough research and suggesting original paradigmatic approaches. Hence the only way to move away from Western-based approaches which continued up to the turn of the 21st century and are determinative in all spheres from history to politics, from cultural attitudes to economic relations, is developing our original approaches and following “current truths” that surround us instead of “fictional truths” based on “external mind”.

It should be kept in mind that the external approaches in social sciences which were influential and alienated us to each other used to create a kind of “fictional reality”. Certain finance, ideological, and cultural worries became the major motive of these approaches. When considered from this perspective, it can be seen that these approaches which were influential during almost all the 20th century, aim to turn the people in the region into the carriers of certain ideological and cultural world views. Worries about social constructivism to transform/change people in certain ways rather than to try to understand what is going on in the society, dominate these approaches. It can be claimed that these approaches use the data in social sciences as tool, thus they function as something to incite discriminative dynamics among the people in the region.

In a sense the nature of social sciences requires it. We also talked about this at the first congress. Indeed any information produced affects reality and changes our perception of reality directly or indirectly. Although information does not have this motive, it has such an effect.

Therefore, social sciences should not only care about doing researches about the outer world which it is interested but also it should care about questioning himself constantly and about thinking continually on the effect of the things they are doing. What kind of a person does the discourse through the information produced target? For instance how are ideal forms in all spheres of life developed through the approaches trying to express the truths about our societies in a manipulative way? How is our mind prepared to see some of these "modern" and "reasonable" and some "archaic" and "ineffective" through social sciences? There have been some theories claiming that the Easterners cannot have a revolution. Moreover, it has been argued that all considerable changes have been experienced only in Europe's history. Therefore, it was also claimed in these modernist theories that eastern societies could not have a history. In other words it was implied that nothing that happens in the East is considerable. Today we can see more clearly that ready-made behavioral patterns about what is normal and what is not are planted deeply in our minds.

Therefore, the models of "ideal woman", "ideal man", and "family/society types" are created and normality criteria about personal preferences from eating habits to clothes can even be determined. Thus, these external paradigms based on the dream world of ideologists, go beyond the hypothesis/ analysis and fictions used in social sciences literature and turn into the truths that determine the social agenda and its mechanism.

Our social scientists have a great role exactly at this point. Our social scientists face with the responsibility to create new and original social paradigms in order to indicate the negative connection between "the fictional reality" designed by the external approaches and "the current reality" developing in the natural flow of life. It should always be remembered that this responsibility of social scientists is the greatest power that can have an effect on the general behaviors of human beings, values and political preferences, the family structure and the progress of individuals, the relations between men and women, shaping the perception of past and future, forming a democratic, pluralistic and peaceful society-state structure, having a unity among all Muslim countries in every respect and making it sustainable.

With the help of this symposium today I gladly see that there are some great and enthusiastic NGOs that care about the improvement of the relations optimally among these friend and brother countries which have the common civilization, believe in the same religion, and have the same background. In addition, there is also great academic interest that is seeking new and original paradigms to be created in accordance with the perspectives of the country.

You can be sure of the fact that the increasing number of NGOs, which are showing an effort to overcome the artificial barriers between Turks and Arabs and supporting a strong unity as it was in the past, and their stronger demands affect us, the politicians, deeply and encourage us to seek for the opportunities for more lasting cooperation. Moreover when the activity of NGOs goes beyond demanding and has some concrete actions like this extraordinary program, it is something praiseworthy. This can be taken as a live example to show the roles of non-state actors in this transformation.

I would like to thank Institute of Strategic Thinking and Cairo University Civilization Research Center both for their efforts and inviting me to both meetings as a social scientist rather than a politician and I would like to send my compliments to those who contributed.

Actually it is possible to evaluate the practice of politics as a sphere of observation for social sciences. On the other hand I witness the fact that politics supported by social sciences brings a different vision and quality to politics. Probably one of the most important differences of Justice and Development Party administration, in which I take part in, from other administrations, is its ability to base politics upon social science.

We can say that taking the pulse of the society is particularly important both for the activities of the party and the administration. We have tried to take the pulse of the society by frequently applying to surveys and other techniques in social sciences. Therefore, we can be seen as the pioneers in terms of our performance in understanding history, foreseeing the way of transformation and keeping up with it, and canalizing it for the benefit of society when needed.

I believe that the positive outcomes of Arab-Turkish Social Sciences Congress –planned to be organized in a different country each year- which started to be felt since last year will contribute not only to the cultural dialogue and academic cooperation between the two cultures but also to the policy making processes.

Finally I would like to thank again those who contributed to this work for bringing us all together in this friendly and brother country again; I hope you would have an efficient congress and I greet you with love and respect.

Arab Turkish Congress of Social Science

At the time when the economic, political, cultural relation between Arabs and Turks is getting wider and developed, it was noticed that the academic and intellectual relations between those great nations is still weak and poor. Thus it became an obligation on us to work on enforcing the academic and intellectual bilateral relations between The Arab Nation and Turkey; mainly these great nations are living in the Middle East where they possess a consistent and homogeneous history, civilization and future. Through ATCOSS we can get rid of the historical misunderstanding that accompanied intellectuals from both sides, recognize the real reasons that have led to such long misunderstanding and break up in the academic relations then to work on establish an intellectual bridge between The Arabs and Turks that can be more fruitful for both sides.

The Arab Turkish Congress of Social Sciences is an annual congress where a bunch of social scientists from Turkey and Arab Nations and other nations, who are more interested in the civilization studies of Middle East, meet together to discuss and share their points of view and their scientific perspectives in dealing with the current social and political issues that faces Middle East. Every year, the advisory board of ATCOSS chooses a topic through which scholars gather and discuss their approaches to this topic. In the congress we are adopting a **critical** and **constructive** approach in handling every year's concept; scholars are criticizing the usual research tools, methodologies and constructing new methodologies which can be more useful in explaining what is going on in Middle East and in Predicting what can happen.

In 2010, The Congress launched its first session in Ankara, Turkey where the Arab and Turk Scholars discussed together the topic of "**Culture and Middle Eastern Studies**". Choosing this topic as the first topic for the annually congress came as the culture plays an important role in understand-

ing Middle East. Besides that, studying The Middle East from the cultural perspective will tie the academia with the great social developments going on in Middle East and tie them also with the cultural and civilization context, scientific heritage of this region.

The second congress came at a critical time after the broke out of the Arab spring revolutions. It was important to study the role of civil society in the Arab revolutions. The second congress took place in Cairo where Tahrir Square and its slogans swept other countries in what we call Domino Effect. Such congress started to discuss and handle out the different roles played by different figures of civil society like social movement, Islamic movements, alternative media and virtual public sphere in achieving great social and political development in this important region in the world, Middle East.

In 2013, ATCOSS is gathering in Istanbul, Turkey at a critical time when the Arab spring countries are building the state institutions from the beginning on principles of justice. There by topic of "Justice, State, Society" has been chosen to be the grand topic of the third gathering. In this time, topics of transitional justice, Justice and Islam, Justice and globalization, Immigration, Urbanization, etc. will be discussed along 3 days by around 160 Turk and Arab scholars sharing their visions, discussing their experiences in achieving justice in their societies.

At the end, we will work hardly to make the Arab Turkish Congress of Social Sciences a permanent intellectual and academic bridge between the Arab world and Turkey so that we can form a comprehensive vision for the future and common understanding for the settings of our region.

Introduction

Cenap Çakmak

In the contemporary global system, change is so pervasive that it has been transformative, creating differences in kind, sharp discontinuities with the past. The impacts of change in global system are undeniable. It has been creating transformations in many fields. Global politics is visibly transforming as evidenced in the retreat of so-called nation state. State, which has been occupying a central place in global politics over the course of nineteenth and twentieth centuries, is not a point of reference anymore. Although they still exist and play significant roles in some certain respects, their dominant positions are highly controversial.

Paradoxically, while they have been retreating in importance, their number has sharply increased with the de-colonization period (Held et al, Chapter 1). In addition, the gaps between states have been widening. In the former state-system, power was somehow distributed among the actors almost equally. However, in contemporary global politics, there are many states with little power. This implies that power is not the sole determinant in global politics anymore. This is also paradoxical: there are a number of states with huge power, but they do not affect the existence and emergence on small states. Therefore, such notions as superpower, hegemony and the like become obsolete (Ferguson, Illusions of Superpower).

One of the most controversial issues in the general debate about globalization and its implications for governance concerns the present and the likely future of the state. As such, especially theorists of world politics have attempted to resolve the controversy on the fate of nation-state in the midst of globalization. In his seminal book Distant Proximities: Dynamics beyond Globalization (Princeton U. Press, 2003), James Rosenau, an ardent proponent of postinternational theory which minimizes the role of state in world affairs, asserts that in contemporary globalized world, states are not the only authorities governing the peoples of world and the interactions at all levels.

In this regard, Rosenau asserts that states are not enjoying their dominant position, once they used to, in global politics.

Rosenau's stated reason is that many new entities, in his conceptualization spheres of authorities (SOAs), have emerged, and even are still emerging. There are countless of SOAs in amount and in kind. Considering the large number and variety of actors playing their own roles in global stage, Rosenau contends that global politics is so complex and sophisticated that states cannot be regarded as the sole authorities and conductor of all kind of global or local activities anymore. Unlike his many arguments, he is very clear on that matter: "the central institution of modern society [the nation-state] may no longer be suitable as the organizing focus of inquiry" (p. 294).

An SOA can be "an issue regime, a professional society, an epistemic community, a neighborhood, a network of like-minded, a truth commission, a corporation, business subscribers to codes of conduct,…a social movement, a local or provincial government, a diaspora, a regional association, a loose confederation of NGOs, a transnational advocacy group,…a terrorist organization,…and so on across all the diverse collectivities" (p. 295). In Rosenau's view, those SOAs came up with their own legitimacies; reducing the number of states that once had extensive authority the same as their counterparts had long enjoyed in the past.

Rosenau argues that the view that stability in global system cannot be maintained without strong and effective states' dominance is a misperception, thus, is not true (p. 296). To put it differently, stability does not require limited number of authorities, some of which are assumed to ensure the continuity of established system. With SOAs are actively and effectively involved in global matters, which have long been addressed by mainly states, it is quite possible to maintain a long-standing stability.

Therefore, for Rosenau, the issues of whether states are losing control and new authorities –either as supplement to or substitute of states- are emerging is not controversial. What is debatable, however, is that how the new social contracts between SOAs and public, and states and the rest of authorities will be maintained and how they will be interacting and arranging the relationships between themselves (pp. 302-307). It is worth recalling that 'social contract' is a renowned notion developed by Rousseau to explain the relationship between 'state' and 'society'. Hence, Rosenau would indirectly suggest that this notion needs to be reformulated so as to embrace SOAs.

Proliferation of actors involved in global politics is another indication of rapid change in global politics. As states have been retreating, the void they left began to get filled up by numerous newly emerged actors. Decisions to be taken concerning global politics became more complex, requiring substantial contributions from various entities. NGOs have been actively involved in decision-making since the end of Second World War. They are taking place in norm creation processes, undermining the sovereign right of states. Intergovernmental organizations are also playing a crucial role in various fields of global politics. Probably the most striking example for non-states actors is global civil society. Emerged as a result of dire consequences of globalization from above, the network of transnational social movements is increasingly becoming influential in decision-making processes. We are facing another paradox with regard to global civil society: it is a product of globalization and a global network in nature; however, it rejects globalization. Even some components of that network demand the return of state into global politics. The existence of such a network ensures the participation of as many individuals as possible into global politics. It mobilizes the mass, and channels their common demand to decision-making bodies.

Shifts in the focus of global politics also tell a lot about the ongoing dramatic change. Focus in international human rights is one such example. Human rights issues began taking place on the agenda of global politics by the end of Second World War. Prior to that, human rights violations were hardly addresses, due to the principle of non-intervention, which was based on the assumption that states were sovereign and therefore had the right to treat their citizens in the way however they wanted. However, states are not free anymore to act brutally even against their own citizens. Strong regimes for protecting human rights emerged thus far. First, the issue of human rights was included in the language of UN Charter. Then, Bill of Universal Human Rights was introduced. Afterwards, regional human rights regimes began taking place. One universal and three regional regimes are worth mentioning respectively: the UN System, the one under the Organization of American States, the one under the Organization of African Unity, and most importantly, the European Convention system established under the auspices of the Council of Europe.

Individuals have the right to file a complaint against their own state, claiming a violation of their fundamental rights. These are promising breakthroughs toward the global protection of human rights. Likewise, there is a growing concern about environmental degradation. States are forced to comply with the provisions of international agreements. Though, there is no comprehensive regime guaranteeing the protection of environment, as in the case of human rights.

Even though growing concerns are global, regional regimes, like the one under the Council of Europe, are much more promising then the global one, namely the UN system. In addition, the European Union requires both the member states and the prospective members to comply with both its own standards concerning human rights and those set by the Council of Europe. In the case of European Union, human rights issues are important components of foreign policy.

Changes in global economy should also be taken into account. With the end of Second World War, a new global economic order was established. That order was strengthened by global economic institutions, including, International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, and GATT (later World Trade Organization (WTO)). These institutions were established to maintain stability in global economic order. While they helped the states remain integrated with global economic system on the one hand, they were highly criticized for being the sole responsible for inequalities and poverty all around the globe on the other.

Along with other factors, those institutions helped to minimize trade barriers, including tariff rates. While protectionism was a very common tool used by the states to stay away the devastating impacts of various crises in the interwar period, today's world is enjoying much freer trade. Global economic institutions were the major players in the process. The existing barriers before completely free trade are likely to be eliminated in the future, depending on the effectiveness of the global economic institutions. Although existed in "nation-state" era, multinational corporations significantly changed the global economic relations after 1960s. They did not recognize national boundaries and infiltrated into states' domains. While states have been the main responsible units for managing and regulating their economies for about two centuries, with the proliferation of MNCs worldwide, and their growing effects, they started losing their control over the economic order. There are many MNCs with aggregate revenue greater than the GDP of many states. This made them significant actors in global arena. MNCs led to a substantial increase in the whole production.

Growing salience of MNCs in economic order is undermining sovereignty, the primary aspect, which has long been believed only the state has had. MNCs impose global community to use global products. Consumption patterns are changing. The degree of interdependency is increasing. Contemporary global economy became more technologically driven. With the rapid advancements in technology, production patterns also changed. It is now a common premise that we are living in the information age. Communications

technology made the world more integrated than it used to be. Technological revolution changed many things, including the way people communicate and transport goods. The revolution created an integrated market economy and made the people a part of it.

Shifts in identities can also be interpreted as a strong sign of change; identity possessions became more and more complex. There is no single identity that people have. Almost everybody can identify himself or herself with multiple identities. Although national identity still exists, it is not sole and central anymore. Many regard themselves as global citizens. For many others, religious identity comes first. There are sometimes overlaps among different identities. This makes the picture more complex. One might be a national of a state, an executive of a national company, or a diplomat in an international organization, working as a volunteer in an NGO at the same time. To this end, religion has emerged as a source of political and popular identity. Islamic identity replaces national one in many Islamic countries. This leads the rise of political Islam and subsequently repression. Also, false religious identification is a source of global terrorism.

Most importantly, as the recent popular uprisings in the Middle East once more confirm, the people now tend to speak up more openly to challenge the domination of tyranny and authoritarian regimes. Only time will tell whether they have been and will become successful after transition. It appears that the initial goals have been fulfilled in Tunisia and Egypt while revolution was made by reliance on violent action and external interference in Libya. Syrian case, on the other hand, has gained a whole different dimension, becoming a case of civil war where it is no longer possible to take side with any party for the sake of revolutionary purposes.

These all tell us that the sphere of the study of international relations should be expanded to include the social movements, transnational advocacy networks and grassroots movements. Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, in their book “Activists Beyond Border”, attempt to explain transnational advocacy networks. Even though this study is not purely theoretical, it surely provides the future researchers with a good base, where applicable theories could be built on. The book mainly examines how transnational advocacy networks emerged, how they work, and how effective they are. The authors assert that the advocacy networks are quite effective, as they promote norm implementation. They do it by pressuring to target actors, usually states, and by monitoring their compliance with the established rules. Given the dominance of states in global politics, the fact that the advocacy networks, which normally have no formal power or authority, are able to alter the states’ practices is of considerable importance.

The power of transnational advocacy networks derives from the cooperation and convergence among the individual or local activist groups. When the local groups do not regard themselves as powerful enough to alter the state's practices that they are not in favor of, they seek international allies. In that case, local groups bypass their governments and acquire the support of like-minded groups abroad. In so doing, they have political leverage to have the state comply with their demands. The authors called this process "The Boomerang Pattern". This is quite lucid and strong analysis, which explains the emergence of networks and why the states often meet the demands of local activist groups, even though the latter have a certain authority over the first.

In answering the question of "how do transnational advocacy networks work?" they introduce, or more accurately classify and formulize, the tactics those groups exercise: "information politics", "symbolic politics", "leverage politics", and "accountability politics". The solidarity among the groups from many parts of the world results in the accumulation of information. The accumulated information provides those groups with strength to realize their objectives. They use the information they have collected against the target, by disseminating it. The groups have also used some symbolic events to generalize the issue and to draw public's attention. Leverage politics has been used against relatively weak states. The activist groups convinced the "strong" states with the information they have that the states receiving various forms of aid are violators of fundamental rights. Therefore, the sates giving aid often cut their aid based on the information they received from the transnational advocacy group concerned. When a government makes a certain commitment on a certain issue, the advocacy groups monitor the practices of this government. If the government acts so as not to comply with its commitments, those groups publicize these failures. This kind of strategy is called "accountability politics".

For long-term success and survival of revolutionary acts, reliance on nonviolence methods also seems to be relevant and essential. Nonviolence can be best explained by examples, rather than theory or definitions. Gandhi's famous march is the best example to be mentioned first. US civil rights movement in 1950s and 1960s is another good example for nonviolent resistance. Thirdly, nonviolent action has been extensively used in worldwide peace movement. One recent example of nonviolence is the environmental movement. Analyzing the situation, preparing for action, nonviolent action training, mobilizing support and coordinating the action are the key factors behind effective actions above. Nonviolent action has also been used in cases of military coups. Furthermore, it has been successful against repres-

sive governments. When it comes to social revolution, Iranian revolution is a proof that nonviolent action can result in a drastic change, attracting the majority of society.

Gene Sharp defines nonviolent action as “a generic term covering dozens of specific methods of protest, noncooperation and intervention, in all of which the actionists conduct the conflict by doing –or refusing to do- certain things without using physical violence”. There are many methods of nonviolence. Sharp mentions in his book 198, and then he also discovered hundreds more. In short, nonviolent action is “action rather than nonaction, and it avoids physical violence”. However, it should be noted that nonviolent action does not include violence, but it might be harmful in some respects.

Strengths of nonviolent action include that it is self-consistent, allows maximum participation from different social backgrounds, works better than violence, leads to more lasting change and to fewer casualties. However, it should also be noted that it is hard to sustain, sometimes it may be difficult to obtain support for the action, it has an image problem, as it seems, and thus, is regarded as weak, it may not lead to lasting change, if it is used as a pragmatic method for reform. But still, unlike the argument that nonviolence cannot work against severe repression, it can be successful. Iranian revolution and resistance against Nazis in several countries are examples for that. In addition, under the military regimes in Argentina and Chile, people continued their resistance.

Use of nonviolent methods is justified by the consent theory of power. Introduced by Gene Sharp, the theory states that people in society can be divided into rulers and subjects; the power of rulers comes from the consent of subjects. Nonviolent action offers the withdrawal of consent. Because, “without the consent of the subjects, the ruler would have little power and little basis for rule”. However, the ruler-subject model is unlikely to work against capitalism, as power relations in a capitalist society are quite complex. It is hard to exactly determine the ruler and the subjects. “Many workers both exercise power over subordinates and are subject to superiors”.

This volume contains several case studies showcasing the overall roles of the non-state actors in the Middle East politics which has attracted attention from IR scholars for its oil resources and conflicts so far. In other words, the region has been viewed as a good example of realpolitik considerations and assumptions. However, the Arab Spring process also demonstrates that this may not be the case all the time, suggesting that non-state actors may also have a voice and hold considerations that are not relevant to regional politics or realpolitik.

An eclectic study, the volume presents cases of political groups, grassroots movements, violent groups as well as the political environment where these groups make themselves heard. All articles in the book have been previously presented in the second meeting of the Arab-Turkish Congress for Social Sciences (ATCOSS), a prestigious and apparently promising endeavor that seeks to bridge the gap between the Arab world and Turkey and take the academics from both sides closer to each other. Hopefully, this volume contributes to this goal as well.

Part I

State, Citizenship and Civil Society

State-Media Relations: Transformation of Arab Public Sphere

Omair Anas

Introduction

The making of Arab Public Sphere has been considered exceptional preposition which has not followed the Habermasian way in the Arab World. That Arab Public Sphere is controlled by Arab authorities and rationale deliberations and critical discourses are not taking place is a common preposition. However current uprisings and unprecedented people's mobilization for political changes have shown flaws within theories of Arab exceptionalism. Uprisings are not merely reaction of some incidents; rather they are culmination of some processes which were continuing for a long time and have transformed nature of public sphere. This was not possible without change in state-media relations within Arab countries.

Arab Media laws have given much power to the authorities to control flow and nature of information within their societies. However the changes in the nature of media, first, and nature of flowing, second and limitations of authorities to restrict them, have all transformed state-media relations in the Arab world willingly or unwillingly. Transnational Arab media has required transnational regulation which have further undermined national regulation as it is proved in case of Arab Broadcasting Charter passed in February 2008. Media as profession and business for investors is becoming more favorable as it used to be. States' responses to these changes have come from their recognition to the change. Looking at the history and making of the public sphere in the Arab world, its constituents are different from that of the European public sphere. Religion, government, cultural institutions of the society, family institutions and tribal solidarities and now media are all part of making of public sphere. Without clear demarcation of public and private as precondition, Arab Public Sphere has become space of critical

deliberations. Though Face Book Twitter, and many other social networks have played crucial role in informing and educating people on virtual space, change is beyond virtual space and sphere is not just mediated one.

This paper aims at finding changes in State-Media relations in the Arab world and their contribution in transforming the public sphere in the Arab world. Looking at major changes in media laws in last ten years and emergence of media environment through recognized measures and states' response to and against media; state-media relations will be examined. Contesting the idea that Arab media does not have capability to press for political change, an effort to establish theoretical ground for Arab public sphere will be made.

This paper is divided in three parts. First part of this paper discusses survey of legal frameworks to regulate Arab media and their inability to restrict flow of information and subsequent political and social consewuences. Second part of the paper discusses reasons of failure of Arab media laws to restrict information flows which inherit in the nature of modern media rather than capability of nation states, though many still argues supremacy of nation states when it comes to control media, and the third part of this paper deals with transformation of Arab public sphere in terms of quality of discurses and quantity of participants as well as quantity of contents production. This transformation, though comes on different trajectory of the ideal path of liberalism and democratic change, has been recognized .

(I)

Media and states in the Arab world have developed in a complex political, cultural and social environment where states have played dominant roles and media remained largely under the state. Most of the Arab media scholars have already identified development of Arab media in its specific political environment which has allowed four typologies of media in the region namely (a) Mobilization media, (b) Loyalist media, (c) and Diverse media.[1] The satellite era and new social media phenomenon in the Arab world have reconfigured not only media society transaction, but also forced to review state media relations. On th societal side, Adel Eskender observes, satellite channels have driven pan-Arabization of the region's media and has been complemented by the pluralization of access to new channels (such as Al Jazeera, Al Arabiya, Abu Dhabi TV, Rotana, and so on). On the state-media relation side, many of the Arab governments have either revised their laws, or relaxed some clauses or have opted not to apply them to some extent, though self-censorship and other crucial issues towards ensuring freer media remains unresolved.[2] Above mentioned typolgoes of Arab media systems were developed when states were alone able to control information

and they do not include, as Adel Iskandar observes, substantial diversity that exists between Arab nations, their political institutions, and their publics which suggests that Rugh's typological undertaking is in fact impossible.[3] Now when national government' ability to restrict information has substantially decreased and many of media and publication laws may not be arbitrarily applied, many of the government are in the process to change their media laws. In last five years. To address their limited power to control satellite media, Arab states tended to adopt multipronged stratigies without giving up much of their power. Strategy to adopt broadcast media in their regulatory regime was manifested by four different ways mentioned by M. I. Aiyesh, the strategy deeply embedded with Arab politics.

1. Re-invent state broadcasting in to more independent structures in place of centralized and tightly controlled bodies.
2. Emulate private broadcasters' practices, especially in entertainment.
3. Launch alternative "state affiliated" broadcasting services to operate alongside state services.
4. Permit "non-state affiliated" broadcasters to operate on the basis of pure commercial revenue.

These strategies resulted in increase of satellite channels at national regional level along with Pan Arab networks. The strategies further pushed restructuring of the media regulation according to newly arrived satellite media. Arab governments responses to satellite television regulation can be seen within these strageties. In Kuwait, for example, print media is private since a long time the first private Kuwaiti satellite television channel Al-Rai was only allowed in July 2003 and started in October 2004. Al-Rai has tried initially to compete pan Arab networks like MBC, LBC and also considered to join Dubai Media city for the purpose but it failed. Bahrain and Oman are also reviewing their press regulation 'to accommodate the new political, security, economic considertaions. Similarly, Saudi investement in Lebanese entertainment television, and in many London based media ventures likeMBC and Al Sharq Al Awsat have allowed offshore media phenomenon. This trend further went ahead after Saudi sponsored MBC shifted its office from London to Dubai Media City, a afree zone created for international media organizations.[4] These trends have all contributed to the rejuvenation of public discourses on Arabism.[5] William Rugh has highlighted the primacy of the state in the emerging Arab media systems, other writers have tried to locate this phenomenon into dependency theories of the media and relating the phenomenon with uneven distribution of information in the Arab world and subsequent dependency on foreign institutions.

(II)

After the transnational broadcasting has gained central position in modern media, nation states are forced to adopt transnational mechanism in order to secure their national interests. Arab states which see itself a separate cultural zone and national identity have maintained full control on television and have not allowed private ownership in television sector unlike news paper publication where they have allowed private ownership long ago. Before transnational satellite channles have come, terrestrial TV have had full support of their governments but satellite channels have changed the television politics anad have allowed non state players attracting much suspicions and regional preoccupations (Sakr 2001 133). Joining satellite industry, Arab world started corporatization and privatization of telecom operations in 1990s (Sakr 2001 135). Preoccupations and protectionist tendencies for national sovereignty, Arab States joined Arab League's initiated and Saudi administered Arab Satellite Communication Organization (ArabSat). Following the expulsion of Egypt from Arabsat in 1979, due to later's peace treaty with Israel, Egypt had also launched its own satellite NileSat in 1995. ArabSat is still main satellite regime in the region which governs majorty of the communication industries (Sakr 2001 136). UAE and Kuwait have also launched their own satellites EamarSat and Noorsat in 2004.

On its international obligations towards freer media excercises, was aticle 19 of Universal Declaration of Human Rights signed in 1948, declares right to "seek, receive, and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers. International Covenant on civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) came into force after its ratification by 144 UN members in 1976. The covenant along with other UN initiated human right regimes provided with software for journalistic activities. None except Kuwait in GCC countries signed or ratified the ICCPR till mid 2000. Among other Arab states who signed, ignored their obligations. However some Arab states have facilitated Arab Charter of Human Rights under auspices of Arab League in 1994. The charter included regional reservations like 'national security, preservation of public order, religious sentiments etc (Sakr 2001 149).

To ensure freer exercise of freedom of expression and press, the 27th session of UNESCO general conference in December 1992in Almaty conducted "the joint UNESCO/United Nations regional seminar on Promoting Independent and Pluralistic Arab Media" to be held in Sana'a, Yemen in early 1996. The Sana'a Declaration of 1996 is considered the only international document on freedom signed and adopted by by Arab states an dby

the General Conference of UNESCO at its 29th Session in Paris, in 1997. The declaration says:

We, the participants in the United Nations/United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization Seminar on Promoting Independent and Pluralistic Arab Media, held in Sana'a, Yemen, from 7 to 11 January 1996; "Bearing in mind Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which states that "Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media, and regardless of frontiers";[6]

Arab countries there pledged to enact and/or revise laws with a view to:

a. enforcing the rights to freedom of expression and press freedom and legally enforceable free access to information
b. initiate action to remove economic barriers to the establishment and operation of news media outlets
c. improve and expand training of journalists and managers, and other media practitioners,
d. Seek the assistance of national, regional and international press freedom and media professional organizations and other relevant NGOs to establish national and regional networks aimed at monitoring and acting against violations of free expression[7].

Arab states later on created council of Ministers of Arab country, Arab League is also responsible to design, regulate and check media developments in the region and to ensure service for Arab nation, Palestinian cause and informing the world with Arab views, promoting and approval of inter Arab media cooperation and tackling with negative effects of media posed by Zionist and Enemy media to the Arab states.[8] Out of this service exercise, Arab states have signed "Charter of Principal for Regulating Satellite Broadcasting in the Arab Region" on February 12, 2008. The Charter attracted intense criticism from media section as well as human rights groups from all over the world because of its certain clauses which further backtracks freedom of expression in the Arab region. The charter has come out of joint Arab struggle to face new challenges posed by pan Arab broadcasters like Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya. The charter outlined the code of conduct for satellite channels 'for the supreme interests of the Arab world and a common perspective for

human development and modernization in all fields'. Article four, five, six and seven of the 2008 charter consist of the detail of the do's and don'ts for satellite channels in which consideration of social peace, national unity, public order (article 4/5), compliance with comply with the religious and ethical values of Arab society and maintain its family ties and social integrity (article 6/9), refrain from insulting God, revealed religions, prophets, Mazhabs (religious sects), and religious symbols (article 6/10) have figured prominently. Beside it, the charter empowers states embers of the League of the Arab States to 'adopt in their domestic legislations all necessary measures to fix any violation by the parties referred to in the subject document according to the principles herein' (article 13). A long list of restrictions has been created in which "refrain from jeopardizing social peace, national unity, and public order"; to "respect... the sovereignty of each Arab country over its property, and acknowledge the right of each Arab League state to propose and pass laws [regarding the principles set out in the charter] at its own discretion..."; to "devote no less than 20% of their scheduling to [programs in] Arabic..."; to "refrain from programming that incites to terrorism or violence of any sort, while distinguishing between [terrorism and violence], on the one hand, and the right to resist occupation, on the other..."; to "preserve the religious and moral values of Arab society, [including] the family unit and social integrity"; to "refrain from calling for religious and sectarian extremism"; to "avoid all programming that disrespects God, the monotheistic religions, the prophets, religious sects, or the religious leaders of various groups"; to "refrain from producing or broadcasting materials that include explicit images or manifestations of wanton or sexual [behaviour]"; to "avoid programming that encourages smoking or consumption of alcoholic beverages..."; to "protect the Arab identity from the negative influences of globalization and to preserve the unique characteristics of Arab society..."; to "refrain from all programming that contravenes or jeopardizes inter-Arab solidarity or cooperation and integration among Arab countries..."; to "refrain from defaming their national and religious leaders"; and to "stress Arab abilities and strengths, especially those that receive international recognition and acclaim..." have been included with much emphasis. The adopted charter manifests emerging dynamics of Arab media landscape in which states are forced to allow private satellite channels as well as freer access to their citizens. However current uprisings in Arab world have negated the myth of states' supremacy in controlling the information flow. Despite creating new transnational legal frameworks to regulate Arab media, these frameworks have little role to restric domino effects of Tunisian uprising in Egypt, Libya, Syria, Yemen and elsewhere in the Arab cities. Niether states press laws nor transnational legal frameworks proved to be enough effective.

Arab Media Laws

Countries	Press Law	Last ammended
Bahrain	Law Decree No. 48/2002 Promulgating the Telecommunication Law	Proposed Law of 2003 Concerning Regulation of the Press, Printing and Publishing
Egypt	Egypt - Law No.96/1996 on Regulating the Press Telecommunication Regulatory Law No.10 of 2003	
Jordan	The System of Licensing and Monitoring Classified Audiovisual Materials No. 63 of 2004	Jordan - Law Amending the Printing and Publishing Law No. 30/1999
Kuwait	1961	2006
Morocco -	Press Code of 2003	Audiovisual Communication Law No. 77 of 2002
Occupied Palestinian	Territories - Printed Material and Publishing Law of 1995	Territories - Telecommunications Law of 2005
Qatar	1979 old law	Ministry of Information is abolished
Oman	1984	2004 Private Radio and Television Companies Law
Saudi Arabia	1963 Publishing and Printing Law	Communication Code of 2001
UAE	UAE Federal Law No. 15 of 1980 for Printed Matter and Publications	New Media Law is approved in Aoril 2009
Yemen	Amendment of the Press and Printed Material Law No.25 of 1990	
Transnational Regulations	Arab Broadcasting Charter passed in February 2008	Council of Ministers of information, Arab League
	Arab Satellite Communication Organization (ArabSat)	Arab League
	Arab States Broadcasting Union 1969	Arab League
	Arab Charter of Human Rights under auspices of Arab League in 1994	Arab League
	Sana'a Declaration of 1996	Arab states an dby the General Conference of UNESCO

Sources: adapted from Programme on Governance in the Arab Region (POGAR), http://www.pogar.org/resources/listlinks.aspx?lid=19, Media Sustainability Index , Middle East 2005 IREX',

States and Media

In the backdrop of satellite televisions and new media popularity among Arab audiences, states press laws are gradually becoming ineffective or irrelevant and subsequently Arab states are practicing fourth strategy, to avoid any direct clash with media. Current changes in Arab mediascape have been both on industrial, professional, discursive and political change. The conflict between states and media, though not direct, is felt every day. Self censorship, attacks on media, suspensions, and many more tactics have been used instead of direct threatening, assult and detention. In 2010 for example 10 journalists were killed, 111 were arrested, 192 were attacked or threatned, 36 media were censored and 6 journalists were kidnapped in the Middle East region according to Reporters Beyond Borders Report 2010.[9] The report is not as dismal as in many other countries and regions. Media Sustainability Index of the Middle East by IREX has surveyed key indictors of Arab media in which states' role has been examined in following indicators:

a. legal and social protections of free speech exist and are enforced,
b. licensing of broadcast media is fair, competitive, and apolitical,
c. market entry and tax structure for media are fair and comparable to other industries.
d. State or public media do not receive preferential legal treatment, and law guarantees editorial independence.
e. Libel is a civil law issue; public officials are held to higher standards, and offended parties must prove falsity and malice,
f public information is easily accessible; right of access to information is equally enforced for all media and journalists,
g. media outlets have unrestricted access to information; this is equally enforced for all media and journalists,
i. entry into the journalism profession is free, and government imposes no licensing, restrictions, or special rights for journalists.[10]

In terms of civil society's activism towards freedom of expression, there have emerged many groups demanding, discussiong and facilitating successful campaigns. In October 2008, a Civil Society Parallel Forum was organized on the sideline of the Fifth meeting of the Forum for the Future in in Dubai.[11] Egyptian Organization for Human Rights (EOHR) and the National Council

of Human Rights in partnership with the Center of Media Freedom in the Middle East and North Africa organized regional conference on "Information is a Right for All", in 2009 in Cairo.[12] "Cairo Declaration on the Right of Access to Information in the Arab World" had further paved for consititional right to information.[13] Jordan has become the first Arab country to introduce 'Law of Access to Information No. 47/2007'.[14] Egypt, Lebanon, Yemen, Kuwait have been discussing drafts on right to information. Council of Representative of Bahrain has adopted the draft law on access to information and sent the bill for further discussion to the Shura Council in January 2010.[15] A brief discussion of current developments in state media laws will follow here:

Algeria

The country still remains under state of emergency law which has obstructed any fundamental changes in the media and state control over broadcast media continues. Though there are more than 100 private daily and weekly newspapers, television and radio are completely state owned. But this is relatively sbdued by satellite dishes spread over 60 percent of households in Algeria which have provided alternative transnational media. In 2008 the government has established six printing presses under the direct control of the Communications Ministry.[16] However country couldn't escape from anti regime protests which erupted as domino effect of Tunisian revoloution. On 19 February Algerian capital witnessed "Bouteflika dégage!" (Bouteflika, get out!) slogans with Egyptian and Tunisian flags.[17] This pressed the government to lift 19 years old emergency to avoid people' uprisings.[18]

Egypt

Being de facto capital of Arab media and media activism, Egyptians have long been ressiting emergency laws, censorship imposed by Egyptian rulers for decades. Emergency Law 162 of 1958, Assembly Law 10 of 1914, the Meetings and Demonstrations Law 14 of 1923, the Publications Law, and the Journalism Regulation Law have throttled the public deliberation on political and social concerns. The Press Law 96 of of 1996 prohibits censorship but article three of the same law disqualify it with state of emergency, national security and public order.[19] Article 48 of the constitution prohibits censorship, except under Emergency Law. Article 47 ostensibly guarantees the freedom to both express and publicize opinion via any technological medium, but approximately 35 articles in various laws specify penalties for the media, ranging from fines to prison time.[20] The Egyptian Radio and Tele-

vision Union (ERTU) has been under aegis of Ministry of Information to thorugh Law 13 of 1979, last modified by Law 223 of 1989 (ERTU Files 2001).[21]

There are laws which allowe for the detention of journalists pending criminal investigations for breaking censorship laws, together with a stiffening of the fines and prison sentences imposed for relaying 'false news', deemed harmful to the state, public officials or the economy but was slightly softened after huge public outcry against the drabconian law.[22] In 1997, the Supreme Constitutional Court declared article 195 of the Penal Code unconstitutional under which an editor in chief could have been considered criminally responsible for libel contained in any portion of the newspaper.[23] High Press Council which approve all new newspaper licenses is headed by the president along with the cabinet and security services. A draft of audiovisual broadcasting bill that would assign penalties ranging from one month to three years in prison for "attacking social peace, national unity, public order and society's values" remained under consideration in parliament.[24]

In thepresence of these heavy handed laws, Egyptian press has played vibrant role in intellectual deliberations and has defied state laws. 25 January Egyptian revoloution led by Egyptian youths and middle class was vehemently supported by private media and state media, the Nile TV apologized to the nation on the eve of revoloution saying that Nile TV was misinformed. Following the successful revoloution, the NDP dominated parliament dissolved and constitution was suspended and State Security Investigations Service was finally disbanded.[25] Egyptian have watched live trial of Hosni Mubarak and his son, a scene unimaginable for majorty of veterans. The scenario of Egyptian media is most likely to change and Cairo may again take central position in Arab media replacing Dubai and Doha.

Bahrain

From 1930 to 2005, press laws have been passed, drafted and amended at various times. The 2002 Press Law is currently enforced which still restrict the rights of the media and an alternative law drafted in 2005 by a group of member parliaments is under consideration of the the parliament. In August 2005, the government announced that it would replace the Information Ministry with Bahrain Radio and Television Commission, which would be the new regulatory commission for the media. The announcement has indicated possibilities for private broadcast media. Though private print media is allowed, broadcast media outlets are still run by the government. A special draft law regulating the licensing of private television and radio channels

was endorsed by the Shura Council in 2004 and submitted to the parliament for consideration. But there is no fix deadline to reach the decision.

There are 17 categories under which Journalists are accountable to their editors, media owners, and to the government, and can be penalized. According to the 2002 press law, offences "against the Islamic faith, the unity of the people, and the person of the king" and "inciting division or sectarianism" and undermining country's security and libel are punishable by prison sentences of six months to five years.[26] The upper house of the parliament passed a revised draft press law that would decriminalize press offences, protect the confidentiality of sources, ensure access to official information, and end criminal responsibility for publishers. Nevertheless, the draft law still needs to be passed by the lower house, an elected body heavily influenced by conservative religious perspectives, which rejected a similar bill three years prior.

The government in May 2008 proposed amendments to decree-law number 47 of 2002 to parliament which is to study them at its next session starting in October. According to these proposals all prison sentences for media workers will be abolished along with other offences. Appointment of an independent monitor, rather than government official, would look after media businesses.

Among key articles amended in recent media reforms are article 16 and 86 according to which prison sentences are abolished for distributing publications without a licence, before they are granted or after being banned or cancelled (Articles 16 and 86). Abolition of Article 21 under which foreign publications could be seized and even though distribution of these publications still has to be authorised, a refusal can in future be appealed (Article 17). Likewise, under Article 4 paragraph 5, a reason must be given for any refusal to grant a licence to a printer. Opening up printing, publishing and press activities for foreigners has been allowed with some precondition in Article 7.[27] Arab spring has also touched the tiny country and caused much bloodshed unlike Egypt and Tunisa.

Iraq

Despite American claims to make Iraq a model of democracy for Arab world, Iraq failed to prove anything and its state of press and media remain largely unchanged. In 1981, the ministry of information and culture was reorganized in accordance with Law No. 94 for 1981, which effectively made the

ministry a branch of the Ba'ath Party and a mouthpiece of the 17th July 1968 military coup and an instrument for the propagation of the principles of Ba'ath ideology. In 1992, Uday Saddam Hussein, became the president of the journalists' syndicate, winning the 'elections' by default, because all other candidates withdrew their candidatures in awe and fear for their lives. That article was amended on June 4th 1986, to include life imprisonment and the confiscation of property, and even capital punishment if the insult was outspoken, provocative and meant to incite people and mobilize them against the state.[28]

The post Saddam media laws are just change of ruling class and main articles remain intact. The 2005 constitution declares freedom of the press with the precondition that "does not violate public order and morality." A new legal framework National Communications and Media Commission has been created to regulate broadcast media. Libelity, defamation, the disclosure of state secrets, and the spreading of "false news" are still part of press-related offenses which attract huge fines and up to seven years in prison. The U.S.-led Coalition Provisional Authority had prohibited support for the Ba'ath party; inciting violence, rioting, or civil disorder; and demonstrating support for altering Iraq's borders through violence. The 2009 draft of press law designed by some independent academicians, journalists and experts was also criticized for curtailing freedom.[29]

Kuwait

Kuwait has been considered most liberal country for media in the Gulf Ccoperation Council countries. Many reports have given better ranks to Kuwait for its freedom for press and media. Kuwait is in process to revise its 1961 press law in which first package of amendments has been introduced in 2006. The 2006 Press law has the prohibition list in which publication of material that insults God, the prophets, companions of the prophet, family of the prophet, Islamic beliefs, criticism of the King, disclosing secret or private information, or calling for the regime's overthrow are prohibited and subject to criminal charges. Citizens also can point out such charges and press legal action against press persons, authors. Ministry of information control and regulate the media, the ministry approves license to media outlets. However the new law includes that license is issued within 90 days of application or gives an explanation of delay or refusal. The new law also restricts ministry's right to cancel the license without approval of a court order.[30]

Article 36 and 37 of Kuwaiti constitution protect freedom of speech and freedom of press; “Freedom of opinion and scientific research shall be guaranteed. Every person shall have the right to express and propagate his opinion verbally, in writing or otherwise, in accordance with the conditions and procedures specified by law.” But the conditions of “in accordance with the conditions and in the circumstances defined by law” restrict the freedom. (UNHCR) Now Kuwait seems most tolerant country for media where private broadcasting has been allowed in 2006. Private newspapers were already allowed. (IREX 2008, IREX 2005 182-193, Freedom House 2008)

Qatar

Qatar is known for its forthright pan Arab satellite Al-Jazeera network and many political reforms carried out by the Emir Khalifa after his accession to the power in 1995. The 2003 constitution includes freedom of expression as constitutional right. Among most striking feature of Qatari media regime is revocation of ministry of information which was earlier controlling body of all media activities. Qatar became first Arab country without ministry of information since 1995.

Before revocation of the ministry of information, Law no. 8, 1979 was enforced which included 102 articles with similar features that of other GCC countries. (IREX: 2005: 211). In absence of any formal press law, the old press law is still being practiced which allows the Qatar Radio and Television Corporation, and customs officers to censor both domestic and foreign publications and broadcast media for religious, political, and sexual content prior to distribution. Criticizing the government, the ruling family, or Islam are subject to prosecution under the penal code for such violations. By law, all publications are subject to licensing by the government. Qatar had opposed charter of Arab broadcasting proposed by jointly Egypt and Saudi Arabia in council of Ministers of Information of Arab League in February 2008.[31]

Saudi Arabia

Saudi media has evolved evasive media strategies by allowing many private news papers and offshore televisions. Vertually Arab mediascape is controlled by Saudi media through Saudi princes have hugely invested in Beruit and Dubai and London based media. Saudi’s Print and Publishing regulation was first passed in 1963 which regulates both print and electronic

media. The Press law elaborates three main areas; establishment of any media outlet, rights and responsibilities of journalists and penalties. Ministry of Culture and Information is empowered to issue the licenses, regulate media activities, revoking licenses and controlling the Saudi Journalists Association's governing board through allowing only approved candidates to run in its elections. The Ministry also appoints the editor-in-chief and the chairman-of the-board in all companies from among candidates chosen by each board. It also has the power to dismiss those chosen for these positions.[32]

Tunisia

The change is set to come in Tunisia after Tunisian people have set greatest precedent of Arab uprising by uproting Bin Ali regime in December 2010. Tunisia was ranked 176 among 195 countries in the annual Freedom of the World survey of Freedom House. Reporters Without Borders had called Bin Ali regime as "Predators of Press Freedom" and "Internet Enemies" in 2008. There are some 5 daily papers; 4 main radio stations, 2 main broadcasters (1state, 1 private).

Tunisia's Press Code was written in 1975 to regulate print media and was amended in 2006. Like other Arab states, Tunisian constitution states defines freedom of expression determined by the law. "The liberties of opinion, expression, the press [and] publication…are guaranteed and exercised within the conditions defined by the law" the consititution says. Article 7 reverses the freedom to maintain "public order," defend the nation, aid the development of the economy, or further social progress. And Article 5 states that the Tunisian Republic "guarantees…freedom of conscience and protects the free exercise of beliefs with the reservation that they do not disturb the public order." Disrupting "the public order" is a criminal offense which can attract three years prison. National Union of Tunisian Journalists (French acronym, SNJT) was set up in Tunisia but it was not allowed to access public information. Institutions to ensure independent professional exercises are not allowed. Even foreign media representatives can request government information only through the External Communications Agency while local and local journalists needs to approach interior ministry. In last presidential election in 2009, Al-Jazeera was easy target and its its team was not given accreditation.[33]

UAE

UAE has reshaped its media policy based on economic consideration and national security. Redrafting exercise of existing press law UAE Federal Law No. 15 of 1980 for Printed Matter and Publications was completed in 2008 and was sent to the president. The new law has cancelled penalizing journalists. The UAE press law like other GCC press laws prohibits criticism of government, rulers and ruling families, and friendly governments. All publications are required to have licenses from state. UAE Media can be categorized in private media, media cities, and state media. Media Cities are based in special economic zones which are exempted of national laws. Dubai Media City is home of nearly 550 media companies including CNN, Sony Broadcast and Professional, McGraw Hill publication, Al Arabia and MBC.

In 2006, ministry of information and culture was replaced by National Media Council (NMC) and creation of a separate ministry for culture, youth and community development. National Media Council's role is to supervise all media developments in UAE, all jurisdiction of earlier ministry of information came to NMC. Most of the private media is closely linked with ruling families.[34]

(III)

Can media bring a political change in a society is the last question to b edealt in this paper. In a region where Al Jazeera is designated more than atelevision channel, more than a company, it is called as phenomenon. Thomas Friedman, Robert Fisk calls Al Jazeera as a phenomenon and Ali Bayramoglu defines as this phenomenon engenders certain politicization across Muslim nations and rivals the Western media giants both technically and professionally.[35] The phenomenon is defined as decreasing states' capability to control and regulate the media like before. With such a big phenomenon, question of political and social change takes a serious note.[36] Marshal McLuhan presses that the means of communication have an impact on the trajectory of social evolution and social change. In Arab world context, sometime this is generalized without configuring socio-cultural context of the Arab societies. The debate well goes in the Arab world and many question whether Arab media is actually that much powerful? Can mass media really be considered the counterparts of a social movement like political Islam?[37] Can Arab media be replacement for political parties or social institutions

required for facilitating change from within a society? Contesting the simplified projection of Arab Media's ever increased power, Kai Hafez argues that the media show varying potential to contribute to political change within various types and phases of transformation. However, in all possible situations, the mass media are not primary political actors but rather mediators between the governments, the opposition and the people.[38] Among four of the suggested frameworks for media and social changes by Kai Hafez, Arab uprising in general and Egyptian revolution in particular has great deal of relevance. Since *Slow evolution, Self-induced regime change, Regime collapse, Enforced Regime Change and Negotiated system change*, a kind of reform from below can be seen in Egyptian case where social groups gathered and pressed for a change and media successfully mediated between the changing factors. According to Kai Hafez negotiated system change is achieved through pressure from strong opposition groups, parties and movements which have the capacity to engage with an authoritarian regime, that establish pacts and alliances within the ranks of the opposition, and that are able to force the regime to introduce political change. Though calling it revolution necessitates regime collapse, Egyptian revolution originated from united opposition's demands to implement political reforms. As one of the activists on Facebook exclaimed "it is unbelievable" some said "they didn't expect it so soon" the negotiated process has taken away Mubarak's support base within system and the society.

Though technological capabilities do not necessarily translate into social and political capabilities, the quality of discourses and quantity of participants has significantly improved in last some years and the change in the nature of public sphere and its discursive identity is clearly visible. This has also contradicted the earlier assumptions that the mass media are relatively weak in early processes of political transformation. Both televisions and new media have substantially enabled Arabs to express themselves in more than one forum and articulate themselves for better change. There are more than 500 Arabic speaking television beaming from ArabsSat and nearly 450 million Arabs across the world are target audiences of these channels and Arabic media. If taken into account, there has been 252,000 tweets have made every day during the Egyptian uprising which make 175 tweets each minute. Similarly on the Facebook, on the day of resignation nearly 100,000 comments and likes were made on "Kulluna Khaled" Facebook group which included congratulation as well as many political discussions. As Clay Shirky argues that internet has empowered individuals to organize outside the state and in case of Egypt, Facebook was crucial for coordinating Egyptian protesters. Marc Lynch has suggested four ways by which the new media

can be seen as challenging to the Arab states: (1) promoting contentious collective action; (2) limiting or enhancing the mechanisms of state repression; (3) affecting international support for the regime; and (4) affecting the overall control of the public sphere.[39] With these challenges, public sphere in the Arab world is on steady transformation where states ability to control and dictate the public sphere has significantly decreased.

On the quality of discourses developed during and after Arab uprisings, there are contradictory assesments of western and non western evlauations. A recent survey of The Economist projecting Egypt as highest in the rank of Caliphate demanding countries in the Islamic world, has again avoided powerful voices in virtual forums of Arab uprising where there is no sign of alarming so far question of Islamic extremism is concerned[40]. The day key Tunisian opposition Islamic leader Rachid Al Ghannaushi returned from London after 21 years of exile, he made very loud and clear statement saying that he and his party Nahda is not going to establish Islamic state. He stressed upon Turkish model of Islamic politics which have brought Turley both prosperity and international recognition.[41] "We'll go back to organising ourselves and contribute to the education of the new generation through our moderate, democratic thought. Our thought is similar to that of the AKP (Justice and Development Party) in Turkey, currently in government. Indeed my books have almost all been translated into Turkish and are widely read there."[42]

Unlike Iranian revolution in 1979, or other Arab uprisings in 2005, these uprisings remained largely free from Anti American rhetoric and focused on domestic politics. As Marc Lynch points out that these uprisings demonstrate the wisdom of the administration's efforts to downgrade the "war of ideas" and to deal with the Muslim communities of the world through a lens not defined by terrorism and al-Qaeda. It isn't entirely an accident that al-Qaeda has struggled to find a foothold in the Arab uprisings."[43] On the other side, United States' and Europe's domestic politics is fuelling and supporting clash of civilization by allowing Quran-burning to anti-sharia campaigns (or, offshore, Sarkozy's Hijab ban), Lynch says.[44]

Popular slogans at Tahrir Suqare were not "Death to America" or "Death to Israel" or even not a single flag of any western country was burnt which has been very common scene in the Arab world since the American alliance had attacked Iraq and Afghanistan. Soothing Christians and Copts concerns, slogan said the crescent and the cross say "no" my love / darling", "The crescent and the cross against murder and torture". When Muslim protesters offered prayers, Christian and Copt protesters built human chain to protect their fellows from any Police brutal action. Their most popular slogan

became "*Irhal Mubarak Irhal*" Levae Mubarak Leave" "I don't want, I don't want, neither his dogs nor his prisons", "Wake up Egypt and become aware, they had deprived your sons of sleep day after day", "They sold our blood, they sold our kidneys, and we beg, we and our families". The way Arab uprising has been communicated by social networking websites and then by electronic and print media in the region has brought commonalities of Arab Public Sphere and has caused immediate domino effects in entire region.

It is worth remembering than Egypt's most important opposition Islamic group Muslim Brotherhood didn't come on the stage of uprising until it had an idea that Mubarak's departure is almost final. The Post uprising Arab Public Sphere is set for more diversity where Islamist political parties, marginalized tribal leaders and other political players are to be part of process. Another important development remain unnoticed in the entire process which powerfully challenge the idea that Islamist discourse is dominant discourse of the Arab public sphere.[45] A survey of Facebook groups statuses, tweets, notes, discussions and notes suggests that among hundreds of thousands tweets, statuses and notes and discussions, there came hardly any voice to establish an Islamic state, Sharia based state or implementation of Sharia law. Mobilization of masses didn't take place on emotional Islamic and other religious sensitivities which is said to be parameter of increasing Islamic extremism in the Arab States.

Conclusion

State media interaction in the Arab world has crossed its worst period of censorship, repression and forced shutdown etc. The very nature of satellite channels, social networking and new media have reshaped state-media equations and have certainly empowered media institute. As a result issues in Arab Public Sphere are not dictated by Arab rulers rather they are coming from each direction of stakeholders; media, audiences, investors, civil society, ruling class as well as international and diaspora community. It is also established that media laws and regulations have also changed it entails more transparency and standardization. With above discussion on Arab media laws, their efficacy in transforming Arab society in general and Arab public spehere in particular following conclusion can be drawn.

Arab media organizations, journalists and writers have played crucial role towards defying arbitrary press laws and have borne much brunt of state repression. This in turn has created a different set of state-media relation in the Arab world. Current changes on Arab streets, protests and uprisings are results of these changed situations in which Arab media has produced diverse range of critical contents through conventional press and virtual media of social networking sites. Arab media have developed new languages for oppositions which may not be direct. Coverage of very small issues are evidence of this language which has developed into a revoloutionary campaign without attracting much attention.

Public Sphere in the Arab world constitutes around religious, cultural and tribal sensitivities which are largely absent from its western theoretical conception. Islam is integral part of Arab public sphere and it will remain as predominant element. That the public sphere's rational deliberation must come from marginalzing religion has not happened in the Arab world and thus secularism and democratic discourses have evolved around a language consistent with Islam or compromised with Islam. After the successful Egyptian revoloution, the eveoloution of Arab Public Sphere will be subject to further transformation once immediate political course is settled.

Over the last some decades, Arab masses have lived under extreme censorship but this didn't restrict them from critical discourses. This has resulted in emergence of regional understanding of modern politics. Niether western model of democracy nor tribal forms of governanace have attracted the region. Their critical approach towards both western politics as well as extremist religious discourses were clearly defeated in current Arab uprising in which religious movements themselves appeared as moderate and committed to democratic society where Islam And modernity lives side by side.

Modern technologies particularly transnational staellites, social media networks have defined much part of the state media relations. States's unilateral mechanism to restrict flow of information have failed and they are forced to create transnational legal frameworks which have resulted in a increased diversity of contents, formats, mediums and messages. Since entire debate is taking place through media, it is called as mediated public sphere however, the message is delivered right in the society and the messages are read and interpreted within society, the public sphere under transformation is not mediated rather a real one.

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Citizenship Practices in Turkey: Civil Society's Involvement in Constitutional Process

Yasin Aktay

A Society Making its Constitution

A discussion of constitution, which has been the topical issue of Turkey for the last 6 years, deserves a quite different sociologic investigation. Within this process, the discussion including many segments of society such as associations, non-governmental organization, literate people, opinion leaders, political parties or media representatives literally draw the soul of the constitution towards a contract. In this respect, the most significant sociologic reality specified by these discussion and negotiation processes is the reality of "a society that draws up its contract". For the first time, constitution is issued with the accompaniment of a negotiation process instead of a violence /force that was regarded almost as a precedent or an obligation. As the phrase goes, there is no word to say and nothing to be done; and, both number and power of the people who find it strange that there is no word to say and nothing to be done has decreased quite a lot.

There is nothing to find odd with the intense arguments accompanying the preparation of the new and civil constitution . Turkish society attempts to issue a constitution "as a society" for the first time in its history. The Constitution that will emerge will be a text that will enable the people living in Turkey to make a contract with each other and taste the delight of living together. In accordance with their nature or definitions, constitutions are contract texts that have been formed as a result of the negotiations of the societies' constituents and members with each other. Since 1876, Turkey is acquainted with the culture of Constitution; however, in this period, Constitutions have never been realized with the participation of the society as its definition requires. Texts, which are "social contracts" have been served out by some people

from the top “on behalf of the society”, they are imposed upon the society as the expressions signed in the police station in extraordinary circumstances and under pressure. Thus, we should be ready for the possibility of new constitution’s getting the vote of fewer segments in a possible referendum; but, this shouldn’t deter and surprise anyone. Since those who are to speak or vote will find the opportunity to behave on their own will, there should be no doubt that the contributionsof all constituents of the society as parties of the constitution contract to the discussions with their free wills are of great significance in terms of this aspect. As this is an act with which we have not been familiar with or which is at least rarely applied, the events that will break out may be odd and alarming to some extent.

In preparation of the new Constitution this is a significant point at which significant attention should be paid . Unless a powerful political command is displayed, it is highly possible that each event that is triggered in a tiny situation by the ones who have disproportional powers with their rights shall take us back again to the status of the current constitution. For instance, in the “beginning part”, if a will is to be displayed to maintain the one in the current constitution, we can be concerned that new Constitution shall increase the current one in a short time. While Turkey had this opportunity that may be rarely vouchsafed throughout its history, it shall be a pity to miss it with tiny redactions.

There has been no satisfactory reference, which people can give to each other in a relived way, about the fact that to which base, to which law the cooperation till now is based upon. As the contract imposed upon people is lacking in the most basic term, term of morality; people had a problem in obeying their ethic liability towards it. Therefore, at which point the constitution is broken down, it has been an atmosphere of opportunity in which the ones breaking down shall get away with profit.

It has been stated that the Constitution, which shall be prepared in accordance with its description and nature, will have a role in reconciling the nation and the state; to be honest, such a constitution process shall foster the state to be the state of the society or the nation directly. It is very strange that in many constitution proposals prepared till now, the government is rendered as the party to be supervised all the time and be required to reimburse as abdication from rights, liberties. Indeed, this is an indicator of the fact that government- centered sense has relieved us in a very strange manner. However, Constitution is a contract between the society and the state; indeed it is a contract between the constituents of the society, which provides the state with reason and which makes it official. In its real sense,

in the constitution; namely, in a constitution which has been realized as the social contract, the state is not a party, the government, itself, is rendered possible and made official only with this contract. The government is a not anything prior to over this contract. However, without any doubt, such a "contract process" is a sophisticated and in the same way an exciting concept in terms of the composition history of the modern state. Modern nation-states towing the legal acquis of the well-known contract Arian philosophers (Rousseau, Hobbes and Locke) of the Enlightenment did not anything apart from imposing the texts served out with the support of violence to the public as a contract. With the constitutions composed with the conciliation of only the dominant constituents of the society, not all the constituents of the society and constitutions adopted by the society with similar democratic illusions… However, the world is not any longer a world of the times when the nation- states were established for the first time. Constitutions' becoming social contracts true to its name any longer is the criterion of contemporary and major societies.

Issuing its own constitution is the basic conditions of one society in proving its majority.Therefore, constitution process' being tumultuous is the indicator of the sound running. The tumult is caused by the nature of the work and it doesn't provide any one with an excuse for "stopping" and "missing" this process.

Constitution as a social contract

As its definition and philosophy requires, the Constitution is a social contract. As a contract, its parties are all the constituents composing the unity, which we named as a society. It spontaneously reflects the will of these constituents to live together. Despite excellent texts of constitution, it is seen that the constituents composing the society have serious problems in living together. Furthermore these problems sometimes can be experienced with the accompaniment of manners that never recognize the contract text beyond the controversy experienced upon the contract articles.

This situation necessarily requires the questioning of the quality of constitutionas a social contract. Because, objections don't stem from the fact that contract articles, below which people put their signatures, don't serve the purpose of people any more and it is therefore violated. The problem is that the constitutions have not been appropriate in accordance with the definition of a "social contract". Is it possible to expect more from the constitutions each of which is written by the armed force following a coup according

to their own wish and which are not anything apart from the texts imposed upon the society to be signed by force of arms?

It can be said that, during the era of nation-states, all the constitutions are the texts that the states imposed upon their societies as a power of having the monopoly of using fıorce. In which one was agreement made regarding the constitution first and then was state established? In the book[1] titled "*Nation-State and Violence* by famous British Sociologic Anthonny Giddens, leading role of the violence is dealt with as a basic moment in the foundations of the states. In the analysis in which all the historical data is taken into consideration, nations and laws accompanying these nations are told to be provided by the ones with the monopoly of using violence. Namely, all the examples indicate that the constitution that makes the state official; more truly, that renders the state possible didn't exist before the state historically. This is of course a situation that may create disappointments about the constitution and meaning of the constitution today. In fact similar disappointment may be created by the data about the history of the nations. In contrast to the thing assumed in the books titled "*Nations and Nationalities* by both Ernest Gellner and Eric Hobsbawm separately, states are demolished by their general conviction that they are founded by the nations. In contrast to this, nations found the states. First, state or armed organization is composed and this organization organizes those masses and makes them a nation over the power it has on the sufficient number of masses[2] . Identification of that society on an ethnic or cultural basis is basically related with the sociologic characteristics of the mass on which a transaction is performed. Specific culture's being a society or nation becomes possible with the contract that organized, armed force puts forward. Constitution of those nations doesn't display an arrangement different than this.

In fact, according to an optimistic approach that has been composed regarding the constitution, that can be regarded as naive comparatively, the historical relation with the state and law or violence and constitutions is too far to be taken as a reference currently for a constitutionally democratic society. To be honest, all the constitutions in Turkey till now have been realized with the order that Giddens, Gellner and Hobsbawn and many historical sociologists; namely, initiative of the military powers. Juntas that came into power through coups were able to impose the most nonsense rules to the society, defined the society in a certain course and designed the institutions in a way they desired. Again the fact that this situation has been experienced like this doesn't mean that normal condition shall never be searched for and found out. Thusly, due to the citizenship politics and changing nature of the state, nobody can put forward the founding will of the armed force

firstly for the constitution through considering these historical examples any longer. Democracy resumed its own sociologic grounds and had a serious axis shift from the armed force to the social powers for a social contract. Currently, basing a constitution upon a founding will of an armed power can be emphasized to be a general crime against humanity and many steps have been taken to block the ways eternally to issue a constitution.

Constituent assembly of constitution and Oil of Compote

Societies don't issue a constitution every day. Issuing a constitution is even one of the things a country makes least. Therefore, mentioning about composition of a custom or practice may mean fooling around. However, it is understood that experience of issuing a constitution composed with the examples of Turkey in 1924, 1961 and 1982 has created a sense of practice in some people. The most significant characteristic of this practice is as we have said, all of them occurred following a coup or all of them undertook the authority that an armed force would end all the discussions in a short time and be able to make a "decision" on behalf of the society. It is obvious that this characteristic is not appropriate to the constitution's quality of being a social contract; however this is a situation that may perhaps create a disappointment about the idea of constitution.

As of its issue date, 1982 constitution has been all the time a subject of discussion and it awakes a pressure regarding a change as an external coercive power following every election or in the course of Europeanization. However, at no time, there was no atmosphere for issuing constitution from the beginning for any civil power. Generally, the discussions of constitution were in the level of some modifications that would be done upon the current constitution. Till the great success experienced after 367 crisis in 2007 and AK Party (Justice and Development Party) had in the second general elections it participated. As soon as AK Party got the opportunity to implement a new and civil constitution idea, it attempted to carry out activities for the new constitution it promised to the society. However, the most significant dimension of the attempt was that it would be realized through using the authority to the full extent in a way that was in contrast with the constitution practices composed till now. Strange obstacles were set up in this way that had been recently tried and they were interrupted with the closure case opened against AK Party. However, this experience put forward some guideposts that need to be emphasized. This constitution attempt was based upon the fact that a text prepared by six-person committee under the management of

AK Party shall be used as a basis and with opening this text to the discussion, it shall be amended through a common reason of large participation and therefore perfection shall be reached.

Carrying out a constitution study has naturally been the subject of criticism. The most emphasized thing in the criticism was that these activities were to be carried out in the public sphere and in a way open to discussion. It is possible to regard this desire tolerantly. It is obviously seen that the ones making a claim don't have any experience in how this shall be possible in practice. This is a simple thing that everybody knowing more or less about the nature of these activities is familiar with. There shall be nothing that can be discussed before a draft is prepared. As for preparing a draft, the more the number of the people contributing to the preparation, the more impossible it becomes. Very long commission activities stem from the essence that these activities are subject to " Parkinson law. "A. One person carries out a work easily that three people can do. B. If you want a work to be finished in the less time than the required, most of the time it is a more reasonable way to decrease the number of the personnel, not to increase the number of the personnel.[3]

Phase of composing a constitution draft is prepared well with the participation of people in possible minimum number. The following work is of course the discussions about this draft; and, realization of this with the possible maximum number of people and influence of the discussions on the draft texts as much as possible are really significant in terms of Constitution's converting into a sound social contract.

Constitution is not made every day of course. The less rare a work is carried out, the harder reference is given to some practices. However, the constituent assembly is not required to be put forward as a condition by some people; for example, to issue constitution, as there has been settled practice regarding this issue. Stating that Constitution will not be able to issue without Constituent Assembly means disregarding the Assembly that has been recently refreshed and that has representative power in the rate of 85%[4] , this shouldn't have been a cruelty that would be deemed proper.

The fact that the ones thinking that issuing constitution is not possible without Constituent Assembly has adopted such a factor as a prerequisite through their experience they have had till now is not an incomprehensible thing. Both Constitution 61 and Constitution 82 were really issued by the constituent assemblies that are assigned by the ones staging a coup. The society was rendered only as an audience to the constituent activities; they were not given the right to interfere with. Even while every kind of positive

propaganda was promoted in voting Constituent 82, every kind of negative criticism was subject to a prohibition that required someone to end in a court.

When we consider the Constitution as the social contract with the individuals, it cannot be said that such activities of the Constituent Assemblies are appropriate to the soul of the Constitution activities. How could it be told? It is such a thing as forcing the individuals of the society to get married and if they don't sign on their own, signing instead of them. The society was forced to watch their own marriage from outside with the activities of these kinds of constituent assemblies. Perhaps, for the first time in Turkey, the society is progressing towards discussing about their own contracts with their free will, coming to agreements or making agreements on some subjects, but knowing well about they don't agree and signing. This is of course normal. The situation of the ones who don't recognize the Constitution without constituent assembly or coup resembles to that of the Janissaries who are revolting as they don't know the normal circumstances.

It is told that in the Guild of Janissaries, in the kitchen, the responsible kitchen worker who was distributing food around firstly distributed the oily food and rice with the ladle he had put the meal and then he used the same ladle in the compote. Therefore, the compote which was served them was oily. One of the Janissarie agha commanded the responsible kitchen worker and enabled the meal and compote to be put with the separate spoons. However, this time, the Janissaries who couldn't see the layer of oil on their compote which they were accustomed to see said that "They are getting our right, they are stealing from our share, they stopped giving oil for our compote, and we want the oil of our compote back." and they revolted. The situation of the ones regarding the constituent assembly as the prerequisite of issuing constitution, as it has existed in all the Constitution activities till now, most probably resembles to the situation of the ones who don't recognize the compote without its oil if they don't have an intentional hostile manner towards the civil constitution

To be honest, a constitution appropriate for its procedure and essence has not been able to be issued in Turkey till now. Therefore, it is significant to some extent that the Constitution which shall be made is better or worse than the current one. However, what is significant is that Turkey will experience the process of issuing constitution. A constitution shall be a contract that the individuals made with each other in the society with free will and even the discussions that will be experienced during the realization of this contract will teach the society many things and will educate the society in terms of many aspects. Significant segment of the problems in Turkey is the

fact that the constituents which constitute the society are deactivated in the composition of the thing currently called as constitutional order. Most probably, after this text was given its final form, the approval of the society was taken with a threat. The only reference of the objections to issuing constitution which includes the society in the possible highest rate in accordance with the procedures is nothing apart from the oily compote.

New Constitution's being issued in terms and ways in accordance with its essence, its content's being in accordance with the essence of a constitution is a thing that is really longed for. As the references of many objections are not a normal constitution, this may cause a difficulty. In this issue, it is a big advantage to insist on seeking for the normal activity. However, it shouldn't be forgotten that society has to be a normal society for a normal constitution. Despite being outside of the Constitution routine, there needs to be a caution against the specification of the ones who aren't attempting to regard the Constitution as a contract in which all the individuals of the society participate; in contrast to this, who regard it as a doctrine basing upon the right of specific segment to impose on all the society.

Should the Constitution text be long or short?

The issue that current constitution is "longer and more detailed than the required" is a reality subject to criticism. However no body is aware of how different and arbitrary comments shall be tackled with, if the Constitution is abbreviated as it is even open to various comments with such long and detailed form, but this is the most significant puzzle for us. According to me, today, associating many such crises such as 367 crises, headscarf crisis and many other crises in the other subjects which lead to the controversies basing upon the constitution, with the fact that the relevant provisions of the Constitution are not sufficiently clear means moving away from the essence of the matter. The problem is never the ambiguity of the texts, but the absence of any protective mechanism against the arbitrary interpreting of these texts; namely, the actual sovereignty. The problem is the actual sovereignty.For example, when the genealogy of the headscarf ban imposed as an irrational application is considered, it is seen that no law exists upon which this ban can be based in deed. In contrast, laws state that the bans are imposed by a law. The headscarf ban never had such a legal basis. The ban, which became the hot topic of the actual reality of the country, was based upon the repeal of legislation stating clearly that clothes and dresses cannot be restricted and a justification written by a Supreme Court. Addition-

ally despite the fact that cancellation decisions of the Supreme Court are clearly written not to lead to a new application, which is not available in the law, in the Constitution. On the other hand, there was no need to impose a new law in order to remove the headscarf ban. Taking over the actual sovereignty was the only way to solve out this. Hence actual situation was composed and that ban was removed from application in various fields.

It was thought that there was no other solution other than placing a tremendously clear expression that would make headscarf ban impossible into the text of Constitution while concept of writing such a short constitution was given credit even though it was not within the scope of the routine of Constitution texts. Because, the ban itself was applied in an extraordinary way and all the ordinary ways were closed in order to remove that.

It is seen as predestined that the new Constitution, which we expect to settle down in routine in all aspects, seems to be void in such an oil (oil is used in its metaphorical meaning. Essentially, "the oil of the compote" is meant. That " specific oil" refers to the oil layer in the compote of the Janissaries) Perhaps, such amount of oil shall not contribute to the compote in terms of taste but perhaps it shall prevent it to become something uneatable owing to its taste.

Agreement Base in the Social Contract

The Constitutions imposed with armed force cannot have the quality of being a social contract. Therefore; even though it seems as if it has solved out all the problems temporarily basing upon the power it trusts and has made all the sharing, the developing powers of the society seek for its own balance and finally find out and put forward a text in which the participatory constituents shall be able to find themselves. Meanwhile, the fact that the constituents who were favored unjustly in the previous texts are glad with the situation and they resist against the new and normal constitutional process is tremendously appropriate to the nature of the work; however it is not just ever.

What is ideal in a constitution more appropriate to the nature of new work is to make unruffled negotiations and reach a common text. However, as the society has never been founded from the zero point and has a political distribution with specific advantage differences, we don't need to expect such a base of agreement. Even if a text that may be beneficial for everybody in the society is put forward, the people in the society don't have the tendency to treat each other through such charitable attitudes as negotiation, agree-

ments. Approaches of at least some constituents of the society are never in an amicable level. Therefore, many philosophers of the society enabled people such as Thomas Hobbes to think that it was a world in which man was a wolf to man (We can use the latin version “Homohomini lupus” to enhance the metaphorical meaning, either) or having been influenced from this impression in the full sense, fostered the ones such as CarlSchmitt[5] that nature of the politics was not a reconciliation but a hostile conflict.

Hence, it could be said that the constitutional amendment package (the package brought to the referendum in September 12), which is currently known not be objected to by most of the people who are rational, shouldn’t have been rejected just because it has been issued by AK Party. It has been told that the ruling party shall not issue constitution due to such reason or other. However, the ones stating this did not refrain themselves from saying that they would perhaps make the same constitution amendment or more than this when they come into power. While this constitution, in reality, indicates the incorrigible nuisance of our social contract practice, it is warning us about the incompatibility reality of the nature of the politics. When everybody regards himself/herself as a determiner in the matter of issuing the constitution, even as only determiner by means of excluding the others, the question of “ Put the maximum aside, who will make the minimum agreement with whom to issue the constitution?”

Despite everything, writing a constitution is a process of negotiation and contract which needs to be carried out with the participation of everybody as much as possible. Nobody has the right and luxury to exclude the other from this process. Stating that “I don’t issue a constitution with this or that segment” means that you are nurturing enmity that will result in destroying those people at the first opportunity. It means that you don’t have the intention both to live with these segments and do politics. When examined more, this is a manner which has the intention of a secret “genocide” within itself.

However, when the constitution is achieved as a contract for the first time, results of the text shall be a text that interests every one. Especially the referendum process and phase of writing the text which prioritizes it, is a process to which everybody is invited and open to the contribution of every one. The ones who did not participate even though they were invited and their participation was fully enabled don’t have the right to be a spoilsport person. The thing that the ones refusing to participate in the contract process due to some reason or other seek for is out of the politics. When it is out of the politics, it loses reason, it remains as a meaningless nuisance that doesn’t have any relation with the context they are stating.

Constitution as a Decision

To what extent can all of the society be enabled to participate in the process of issuing constitution? This is a tremendous problem that directs the criticisms in terms of method in such situations as when the constitution is defined as a social contract. This question has become the starting point of the criticism that a text which had been prepared by a science committee in 2007 under the management of AK Party violated the conditions of enabling the social participation.

Also, with which way is the society enabled to participate in the process of issuing constitution that is considered as a social contract in the most efficient and effective way? Does the participation of great number of people lead the discussion to the infinite ambiguity? In an atmosphere in which the words vary and increase, making a "decision" is very significant; however, it becomes such difficult, as well. Even if it is significant that different persons participate in the discussions as much as possible, it should be stated that this participation makes the moment of decision harder and delays it. Therefore, an initiative that shall interrupt the discussion at one point and convert the emerged reason into decision is required. It is unquestionable that liberalism or pluralistic democracy has the tendency to complicate the discussions by means of creating uncertainty, undecidability. However, this "undecidability" is recorded to be a difficulty in issuing constitution, it shouldn't create an obstacle[7].

Experience of constitution that has come to the fore of Turkey since 2007 created a "discussion" and "decision" experience which has never occurred in the processes of constitution till now, at the point of participating in the discussion Great number of non- governmental organization, opinion leaders, institutions and organizations took part in the discussion. Many numbers of opinions have been propounded. An absolute constitutional text has not been reached yet; however, at one point of the discussions, at least in a text composed of 27 articles in which urgency of the constitution is mentioned, decision has been settled down in the Grand National Assembly of Turkey. This decision got the approval of the nation in September 12, 2012 and decision has been made. Within this time period, meetings, which were held out by various non-governmental organizations and enabled the inclusion of many scientists and opinion leaders, took place and they had constitution proposals according to themselves. Each of these experiences represented the experience of "decision" within itself. Without any doubt, participation of the civil constituents within the text through holding out these kind of

meetings enabled the content of the Constitution to be more inclusive, surrounding and representative and it promised to provide for the following experiences. The text that will emerge as a result will not be the text of any segment on its own; however, this is not an obstacle for the text to be issued in a way that shall not disturb any segment. At least provision of this can be sought for in the constitution text.

Issuing the Constitution with the maximum participation of the society is undoubtedly the most ideal one; however, here a reality about the nature of these kinds of discussions should be noted. As in the result notifications published as a result of Abant and similar meetings and shaped as a result of the discussions of the participants, a "decision" is needed to be made from the on-going discussions. Determinant dynamics of the decision is the initiative; as long as no decision is made, discussions turn into an infinite vicious circle. This decision is not made with all the society together, with equal participation throughout human history. As a result, the participation of the society is realized over a relative "decision" text, which is most probably proposed.

As a result, constitution text is a decision and in order to make this decision, an initiative that will be determined; tamely, a leadership is required.

Abant Platform representing significant accumulation in the field of discussion and decision regarding specific matters of Turkey as of 1998, as far as I can know, held out meetings, one of which took place in Kartepe in 2007; subsequently in Abant and some other places. In each of them, a kind of notification that I mentioned was "decided" upon. This is not the place of summarizing these meetings or tackling with the discussed subjects; however, especially, I would like to mention about the discussion initiated by Ali Bulanc following the speech of Prof. Yavuz Atar in Kartepe in 2007. Bulac at that time criticized that a liberal paradigm was dominant in the constitution draft which was prepared and opened to discussion by AK Party and as a result of this paradigm while it gave priority to the individual, it did not bring any initiative about the group rights and status. This is a point that seriously needs to be taken into consideration. The text that expresses the differences as richness in the real sense doesn't have a statement that regards Kurdish People or Alevi or religionist segments as a group or congregation. This discussion could have enabled us to give more attention to how the problem which was one of the hot topics of the constitution could be dealt with. Will the Constitution full of special emphasis for the Kurdish People, Alevi or Sunni be more liberal than the Constitution that guarantees the expanded rights of the individuals without emphasizing none of them in terms of composing the group rights?

Firstly, I have to record that the idea of the fact that the things mentioned regarding this issue in the constitution are like this due to the influence of the liberal paradigm is a claim which is required to be considered with great attention. Even if I have no sympathy towards liberalism, as I know that liberal paradigm has no fixed decision regarding the communitarianism and individualism, I think that imposing all the responsibility and or position of subject to such an ideological hegemony is not just. Any defect that may be attributed to the constitution draft can be associated with the on-going influence of the nation-state paradigm, which currently affects Turkey and perhaps, the auto-control reflex that pursues this influence in an exaggerated way from time to time.

On the other hand, we don't have sufficent knowledge (foresight) about the objections (inconvenience) caused by reffering to the rights of the cited group in a constitution. Regarding this issue, it shall be beneficial to remove the possibility of a paradox between the loyalty of the individual or person to the congregation and their constitutional rights and responsibilities. Within this context, models of Canada, which made the multi-nationality a constitutional institution and USA, which has settled down the individual rights and freedom, secularism and liberty of religious life with powerful formulas can be taken into consideration as formulas in which both the individual ad congregations can be supervised at the same time

What is more, a struggle for keeping the constitution from being a possible symbolic conflict atmosphere is truer than propounding the Muslim philosophers against the Western philosophers as a reference in the Constitution on behalf of Muslim sensitivity. It is possible to make preferences among different texts to seek for the beneficial and functional one. As long as the approach of the Islam in this sense doesn't contradict with the basic principles and values, it tells that the essential things are permissible in the search for system regarding the issue. Islam, which is not a detailed list of indispensables especially in the issue of management, notified the limitations that shall not be violated and it called them as "hududallah (limitations put by Allah)". It should be noted that Muslims are given extensive initiative or field of judicial opinion behind this limitation put by Allah. Above all, if Muslims don't issue constitution on their own but issue it through conciliation with the others, they have more field of preference behind these limitations put by Allah. It is not required to be thought for this that patent of the way they have chosen belongs to some systems or ideologies. At least we have to remove the blockage of these kind of patents over beneficial and right ways. It doesn't matter whoever stated the thing that is beneficial and right, this is the common commodity of the humanity.

Experience of Social Contract of the Muslims and Citizenship Politics[8]

Also, it will be useful to note the fact that such Islamic political philosophers were not so far away from the Greek Philosophy and the philosophy they had done against this didn't lose the Islamic quality and to make the evaluations according to this. With the amendment that he made later, Bulaç stated that he did not make attribution especially to Al-Farab, because he stated that the influence he got from the Greek philosophy and the model of Ideal City (state) he proposed did not comply with his own Islamic envisagement.[9] Basing upon the emphasis which, I made regarding the human reality of the Muslims, Muslims are not people fully close the influence, they don't need to be either, the came to the conclusion through the influence of Kant and John Locke that I had proposed a constitution for the Muslims. In contrast, it doesn't matter whoever this is, Locke, Kant or Marx, the fact that basic paradigms are wrong doesn't require the fact that all they say shall be wrong. Within the context of constitution, I don't say with an attribution to anything they have stated; in contrast, I am discussing about a possibility in the primitive level. I cannot propose that a constitution shall be issued basing upon these names during the process of issuing constitution; however, the fact that some ideas resemble to that of theirs or can be likened to that of theirs don't require us to regard an idea wrong in terms of its basis. When we come to this point regarding the issue, there shall not be no thought or proposal we can eliminate and this shall not enable us to reach a conclusion. As a result, it is possible for people to take part in the process of issuing a constitution with the others through Islamic incentives and it is normal that this kind of constitution shall be different than the constitution that will be issued only by the Muslims. In the history, Muslims experienced very different contract or citizenship process. In some of these experiences, Muslims took part as the founder- essential constituent of the society; the rest of the people were defined in a frame in the center of which Muslims are located. In some other experiences, Muslims acted in the procurement of a society and an order as the equal parties with the other constituents. Indeed, constitutions are comprised of the contracts which regulate the relations of these constituents with their powers, rights, and assets in a symmetric way. Thinking that the same rules shall be valid in all these contracts and accepting the demand for the same package application in all of them as a religious necessity don't comply with the dynamic fiqh sense of the Islam, jurisprudence experience.

Muslims had the experience of being minority in Non- Muslim society. In every period of the history, examples of Muslim society or congregation having experienced these kinds of situations can be encountered. Furthermore,

even if these kind of places are generally named as daru'l harp (region of conflict) or darü'l küfr (The land of shirk) in the Islamic body politics (conceptualization of the country), it became possible for the Muslims to live as a citizen and for a long term in these lands. There were Muslim congregations in such regions as African societies, Far Asia, India, Caucasia and Russia even if they didn't have their own states and even if they sometimes had problems, tensions or conflicts with the regime, they continued to live as a citizen for centuries. In the event that they were identified as a congregation in principle, in such situations as when no interference was made to their beliefs, to their life as part of their beliefs, no theological –political obligation, which prevented the Muslims to live as a vassal of other countries occurred. As for such situations as when the regime was oppressive, persecutor, interventionist, Muslim theology- politics can be easily articulated through conflicting, insurgent or revolting discourse.

Today it can be emphasized that Islam is progressively joined to the political institutions that are in force or movements more but with less authentic project proposals and it seems as if it was withdrawing. To great extent, this is stemmed from the fact that generally political participation channels in the world varied and the relation between the state and citizen put forward a different and a new citizenship standard. New definitions, profiles or law of citizenship enable the politics to be founded as an open field that can be given shape with the others through negotiations. The concept of citizenship or the arrangement of the relations has a long history[10]. Of course we are not disregarding this history, but, if we are supposed to state it roughly, in the current time we are experiencing, the citizenship is under pressure of development from the level in which the state distributes rights and obligations towards its vassal to the level in which the state itself is founded by the contract of the citizens through a constitutional process. It cannot be of course told that this pressure creates a relationship of state- citizen that is in the same kind everywhere and without any problem. However, in the period of nation-states, a model of state, which is imposing ideological, cultural and political positions through force with the sense of colonialism/ post-colonialism or on its own but one-sidedly, is progressively losing its legitimacy. In deed as a project that has been shaped within the terms of this period, the political horizon of the Islam included producing the same state system symmetrically and in this sense, its own citizenship model included assignment of the identities given to its own fancied vassal (Muslim or Non- Muslim) , cultural and economic sources. Perhaps the political order in which it was located did not enhance any other political participation and therefore this kind of politics was obviously too far from the more functional

meaning of the politics we currently know. As we have previously stated, this is not a politics; in contrast, it states the obvious objection of the politics. Political cynicism that composes the typical terms of the post-caliph situation has been fed from the literature of "abandoned in the homeland". However, this literature is currently regarded as more banal than the required by the Muslim people in many parts of the world and it has less sense of value that will at least feed Islamic politics. In a more clear expression, mood of "diasporic in the homeland" fed by this literature has been overcome to a great extent. Even if they still experience problems in such subjects as headscarf, religious education, the objective conditions that require the fact that religionist people regard themselves as victim categorically in Turkey is weakened by their active participation in the field of politics and their relative achievements. One reason of this development is the fact that political understanding of the government, which supposes that ideology and citizen of the nation-state is comprised of vassal, has evolved into the concept of citizenship. The second reason is that the increasing globalizing has quite weakened the sense of incapability and shortage; the third is that consistency of the post-caliph conditions have any longer been taken for granted by the Muslims and the condition of caliph has been rendered possible for Muslim existence. Lastly, of course, as total of all these processes, with the opportunities procured by the state-society relations, compatibility codes of new politics channels with the Islamic politic-theology are easily founded.

The most significant constituent of this compatibility code is the social contract. Islamic politics is historically not strange to the culture of contract. Level of politics in which the citizenship, even constitutional citizenship is discussed upon , state means the contract of all citizens is very significant as a discourse rendering the legitimacy for an Islamic politics even if it is unrealistic.

Muslims made many agreements with many parties including their enemies throughout history. The historical contract that has been recently known as Medina Document and that constitutes a basis for a thesis claiming for the compatibility of the Muslims for a constitutional citizenship to the agenda of Turkey is a contract of living- together made between the members of different religions and Muslims. As for the one known as a Treaty of Hudaybiyyah, undoubtedly it has more strange political implications. The terms that the Prophet accepted in this contract are the terms against the Muslims apparently and it satisfied the friends of the Prophet with difficulty. Even in signing the Contract, with the imposition of the polytheists from Mecca. Mohammad accepted that the part "Allah Resulu" would be removed from the phrase "Allah Resulu Hz. Muhammaed" and this was regarded by Muslims

as a concessive manner. However, Muslims obeyed to this contract to a full extent and again the termination of the contract occurred due to the acts of the polytheists as the developments resulting from the contract disturbed the polytheists. But, Muslims obeyed to this contract, which had been regarded as an action against them in the beginning, till its termination by the polytheists and at the end of the process they got rid of difficulties and took easy breath. Terms of these are undoubtedly evaluated; when the result of this contract is considered, it is not possible to infer that Muslims would not obey if the polytheists had not terminated. In contrast, the slightest implication, which may legitimate the matter of regarding the contract as a strategic ignorance and deception, for the contract doesn't exist in the culture of this contract.

Contract culture requires the presence of two or more parties and in a contract text, all the terms cannot be against one party or in favor of one party. As the texts that look after the rights of each party and respond to the partial expectations of everybody is the result of some negotiation (dialogue) processes. As currently Muslims (or nobody ever) aren't given a society, which is at the zero point, to be founded from the beginning, foundation of a society in which Muslims are included with other participants basing upon a contract sense is appropriate for the purpose of the righteousness of the Islam. As it is not possible to close the organization founded through dialogues with a specific form, a fixed Islamic political model cannot be envisaged for today. In the clearest expression, Islamic political model is a kind of dialogical model and it is all the time founded basing upon the negotiations of the open-ended, political actors. Sense of jurisprudence that the tradition of interpretation has, a search for an affair (advantage of the society) which is appearing as a kind of pragmatism in the political field render the Islamist actors as a party who can easily negotiate in any political discussion and can recognize the demands of the others through taking them to the acceptable limits. When they consider the politics as a way of finding a solution, they find out the most appropriate one for each participant among the possible alternatives and this is not an alternative that can be dropped from sky. It is a path that shall be found out among the possible ones or that shall be approved. The possible alternative can be simple, can be charmless, be a known path, but what is the most significant thing is that it has to solve out the problem at that moment.

The most significant term that undoubtedly renders the model Islamic is that Muslims participated as actors representing their own sensitivity, sensitivity regarding their "good" ideals for the given terms and interests of the community. However, Islamite of the model doesn't mean that such experi-

ence as divine inspiration that can be taken as a reference in terms of every aspect shall emerge. As a result, this is a human experience of politics with its lacks and surplus. It is invalid with all the lacks of human.

The approach of Rousseau who accepts the citizenship as a political participation code that renders the social contract possible rather than the approach of Marshall[11] who regards the concept of citizenship as channel in which there will be equal participation in the sole economic sources and therefore inequality problems among the classes in the capitalist society are solved out to a great extent seems more functional. Especially under the shadows of the constitution discussions, the fact that a discourse which associates the presence and legitimacy of the society with the condition of all the citizens' participation becomes widespread is apparently appropriate to the politic theology of the Islamic politics. Even if the belief in the actual validity and reality of this contract is very naive.

Civil Society Movement and Issuing Constitution

What should be the basic or dominant feature of the constitution? Let's move forward considering some interesting data related to this point. Even the countries that accepted democracy long after Turkey did have covered a huge distance in such a short time and overcome Turkey in terms of democracy. Moreover, Turkey has lost the quality of being the only country which is governed by democracy in the Islam world while it is expected to be the model in this sense.

Turkey is ranked as the 89th in "democratic development index" which covers 110 countries ruled with democracy. According to this index, the democracies of Indonesia and Malaysia, as well as the ones of ancient Eastern Bloc countries are ahead of our democracy. Not long time ago, scenarios used to be fictionalized with the nightmare of "Turkey will be like Malaysia" only 3-4 years ago.

Considering a road map for democratization of Egypt or other Arab countries looking from the angle of Turkey, it can even be said that Egypt will not be democratized for a long while. Yet, at the point it has reached today even Egypt can be regarded as more advantageous than Turkey in terms of a more democratic constitution provision. Because after Egypt abandoned the previous regime which was identified with the name of Mobarek, all parts of society have become ready for speaking about issuing a new constitution which is renewed and does not have a red line12[11]. It means that you do not need to cook full democracy with low heat. If the heat is that low, democracy

can be rotten even before cooked…

For nongovernmental organizations and social parties that prioritize democratization as their primary concern, a new constitution is the most important agenda of the new period and a trial point regarding the parties going for the election. Therefore, as we have mentioned above, some non-governmental organizations are joining in the process of issuing constitution one after another. Even the new Council to be elected will issue the new constitution; it does not mean that all parts of society will be excluded from this process. On the contrary, the new constitution should be issued with the provision of the widest agreement possible by enabling the most participation ever. The most acceptable way for this, every single individual who says "I am in" should be included in the process with the sense of responsibility.

The draft suggestions for the new constitution prepared by TUSIAD, HAK_İŞ, MEMUR-SEN and TESEV are declared to the public. At the same time, some platforms which are only designed for the constitution such as YAP and Abant; and some organizations, institutions and gatherings have shared their own suggestions with the public as a result of long studies.

Questioning which party is willing for a constitution which is free from military or bureaucratic custody, it can be observed that no other party than AK Party is willing for that considering what has happened in a few yearlong constitution processes. The time of 12th September referendum has become a very important process which dramatically downgrades the military and bureaucratic custody. Nevertheless, everyone knows that it is not possible to take a related step within this process unless AK Parti has achieved a majority which can take the constitution to referendum in the Council.

As a matter of fact, it is almost impossible to reach an agreement with which everyone will be pleased. Yet at least it can be agreed upon a democracy which is free from custody. Every citizen has the right to expect this fact. But while it is expected to be agreed upon first of all such a foundation for a totally democratic constitution which is free from custody in today's parliament arithmetic, it is realized that CHP is rather far from this goal. It is realized that CHP—which placed Silivri convicts in electable places and made them elected within the last elections—is even far from an agreement base against coups. Therefore, should we understand that with the agreement conditions which CHP will offer for a new constitution; it has demands for regaining the custody position which it has lost instead of democratization of the country?

Within this process, Turkey has to get rid of every kind of custody and to issue a new constitution which is totally democratic and free from taboos. The constitution should be saved from the blockages of irrational articles such as "cannot be offered to be changed" which is oppressed by some junta existences which direct their guns to the people. Although the mentioned articles do not have troubles in terms of their contents, the constitution should be free from such clauses.

Suggestion of SDE for Constitution :
Constitution Free From Custody and Based on Human Honor

The constitution will be issued by TBMM (Grand National Assembly of Turkey) yet, it is principle to enable it to be performed on a "communal agreement" base. Accordingly, important draft suggestion which occurs within the society preparing its own constitution has been made by Strategic Thought Institution (SDE)… With this approach, SDE shared its "New Constitution" draft for the new period with the public. It is remarkable that there is no red line within the new Constitution suggestion which is offered under the title "a constitution which is based on human honor, totally democratic and free from custody." The draft has been prepared as a thematic report as a consequence of six month workshops in which nearly 150 lawyers and intellectuals participated.

The Constitution Report of SDE acts with the reference to the necessity for 12th June election agenda to be a new constitution. Prepared by focusing on the problematic parts of the current constitution, the draft anticipates that "human honor" should be centered in return for the centralization of the state by the previous constitutions: "The most important priority of the new constitution is to guarantee the human rights basing on human against the will of state. It should have the focuses such as individual, freedom, public will, the superiority of law etc. not the ideological preferences which narrow democracy and human rights. The basic principle should be "freedom is the rule, limitation is the expectation."

Establishing a social, legal and politic frame in which the citizens can perform their religious beliefs and practices without violating the rights of others is accepted as the basic requirement of respect for human honor. Within this scope, it is offered to guarantee the "the right of mother tongue education", to eliminate the obligation of a religious education basing on a single belief and in return for this to get rid of all obstacles before the religious education on demand. Moreover, it is suggested that employment and service provision without any discrimination and limitations in terms of religious beliefs, expressions and practices be guaranteed under the constitution.

While it is supported that no individual or institution is accredited with holiness, it is remarkable that National Security Council (MGK), Higher Education Board (YOK), Directorate of Religious Affairs do not take place in the constitution and the text does not include any kind of ethnical hierarchy. One suggestion for the preface of the constitution:

"We the Turkish public;

We have the belief that all people have the universal rights and freedoms. We accept that all individuals are equal without facing any kind of discrimination and regard all differences as cultural wealth. We share the ideal of universal peace and accept the protection of natural balance as a human responsibility.

We would like establish a democratic order which aims at that everyone basing on human rights, the superiority of law, pluralism, freedom and equality live in a way which is suitable for human honor. We accept and confirm the constitution herein as a warrant of our will for living together."

With such a constitution, will there be still the problems related to Kurdish, Alevi, secularity and human rights which we have been living for centuries in Turkey? Debate process for the new constitution; "is not a negotiation process but a democratic awareness, education and maturation process."

The constitution studies are continuing at full steam. There are some troubles and hardships of these studies but there has emerged a compelling atmosphere. Therefore, we have been close to a new constitution possibility more than ever. Still, although it is not possible to say something for sure about whether a new constitution is possible within this period, it is obvious that the debates related to the constitution enable the citizenship awareness to develop more. At least, these debates and studies strengthen the fact that state is not a ruler over the citizens but it is a collaboration which occurs with the participations of citizens.

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3 Parkinson, *Parkinson Law*, trans. Saban Stembolukbası, Ankara, Vadi Publications
4 It is required to be recorded that currently Grand National Assembly of Turkey has a more representation capacity. A situation in which the parties with a group in the Assembly have received almost 97% of the total votes is a very rare condition that can be encountered in the history of Turkish Republic.
5 Carl Schmitt, *Concept of Politics*, Trans. Ece Goztepe, Istanbul: Metis Publications, 2012
6 While "undecidability" is underlined as the characteristic of postmodern political situation shaped under the hegemony of the liberalism, it derives its philosophical roots from French

poststructuralist Jacques Derrida. Real character of the actual meaning of Derrida's texts or discussions is that they don't have decidable qualities or meanings. Therefore, the decision made during the discussions states that this decision doesn't stem from the superiority of the truth, but the authority making the decision. For these ideas, see. J. Derrida, 1981, *Positions*,translation from French to English trans. Alan Bass, The University of Chickago Press; Writing and Difference, translation from French to English transl. Alan Bass. Chickago: University of Chickago Press, 1978.

7 Part of the article under this title has been previously studied from my article published under the title of Rise and Fall of Islamic Politicality: Journey Notes of the Islamic political theology from the Post- Caliph Situation to Citizenship Politics in the book titled *Political Thought in Modern Turkey: Periods and Characteristics*, 9th Volume, (Ed. Omer Laciner, Istanbul: Iletisim Publications, 2009) and taken here.)

8 Part of the article under this title has been previously studied from my article published under the title of Rise and Fall of Islamic Politicality: Journey Notes of the Islamic political theology from the Post- Caliph Situation to Citizenship Politics in the book titled *Political Thought in Modern Turkey: Periods and Characteristics*, 9th Volume, (Ed. Omer Laciner, Istanbul: Iletisim Publications, 2009) and taken here.)

9 For a few studies that state the development of the citizenship concept occurring in parallel with the development of the state and society relation and also state that the phases it has experienced in the phases of capitalism, welfare state and globalizing determine the nature of the politics, see. Marshall, T. H.(1981) *Citizenship and Social Class and Other Essays*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Marshall, T. H. (1981) *The Right to Welfare and Other Essays.* London: Heinemann; Roche, M (1992) *Rethinking Citizenship. Welfare, Ideology and Change in Modern Society.* Cambrige: Polity Press; Turner, B.S. (1986) *Citizenship and Capitalism. The Debate over Reformism*. London: Allen & Unwin.

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11 Yet, Egypt has approved its constitution after getting it through a process of referendum as a consequence of a rather painless process in December of the last year. While doing this, it could not eliminate all the dissatisfactions of parts of society and it canceled the expectation of a more comprehensive, more surrounding constitution in the society as a politic demand until the next elections.)

Transformation of Arab Identity during the Arab Spring

Hüsamettin İnaç

Introduction

Almost all countries in the world suffer from the identity problems within 21st century political atmosphere. In this turning point, the "nation-state" as a political entity is eroded and homogeneous national identities faded away, thus, different cultures and varying civilizations are supposed to come together and form different blocks for economical, political and cultural unification with the effect of the philosophy of globalization. In this context, we will try to elaborate the nationalization, globalization and democratization process of Middle Eastern countries as a result of 'Arab Spring' social movements as well as identity transformation in accompanying with these uprisings.

Definition and Construction of an Identity: Self, Other and Altered: The Emergence of Arabic Identity

Recent political arena suffers under hesitation and contradictory trends between globalisation and multiculturalism and between localisation and ethnic identities, and seeks monoculturalism in respect of countries and people with similar culture coming together in cultural, social, economic co-operations and strategic alliances with those of different cultures and various civilizations that tend to be left outside of these co-operations because of their 'differences'. In this context, identity question is at the agenda for the people who have a fear to lose their own identities. Identity is a social phenomenon which starts with the identity formation process by means of interac-

tion with the 'other' or against the 'other'. The individual tends to internalise and practice the behaviours, values and norms of the society where he or she has lived in, in order to provide his or her psychological and physical security. In this way, to get an identity one must either identify oneself with someone and/or be perceived as identical to someone else. The continuous and permanent internalisation processes of social setting are resulted in the construction of an individual identity within a social dimension.

It is a description or, in other words, the definition of the existence and belongingness. The identity consists of two pillars: identifier and identified. (Eralp 1997:19) In our concern, the individual is subjected identified as a 'self' and the society is main identifier as an 'other'.

It is an alternate, otherness and an ambiguous notion which gets its meaning from what it is not, from the 'other' as Derrida argued: " All identities can possibly exist with their 'differance' (with an "a") There is no culture or cultural identity which does not have its 'other' of the 'self' " (Derrida 1992: 129). Because the identity means to the 'other', it is defined, determined and nominated by the 'other'. Nevertheless, Derrida distinguishes the word "difference" and "differance" as 'the identity as sameness' from 'the identity as equivalence' respectively, which is indicated in his text "'Diffferance' in Speech and Phenomena" written for the counter-argumentation to Heidegger's essay "Identity and Difference". On the one hand, differance indicates 'difference' as distinction, inequality, or discernibility; on the other, it expresses the interposition of 'delay', the interval of a spacing and temporalising that puts off until 'later' what is presently denied, the possible that is presently impossible" (Ibid.:130).

It is a very vulnerable point to bear in mind that if the identity is solely defined by the 'other', the distinctive features and otherness dimension of the identified is emphasized and the common points are disregarded. This kind of over-emphasizing leads to hostility, contradiction and discrepancy as well as denying, humiliating and negating the 'other'. However, the construction of any certain identity is an inclusive process with the internalization of the same values of identifier, but it is also an exclusive process with the elimination of other identities. The main problem here is hidden at the response to the question of "how to realize this exclusion?"

In this context, there are several identity narratives that are presented to the preference of the people in political worries gaining very critical significance. Although it is a fact that identity implies both uniqueness and sameness, according to Martin, one identity cannot be defined in isolation: the only way to circumscribe an identity is by contrasting it against other identi-

ties (Martin 1995: 6). On the other hand, the 'other' may bare both pejorative implications such as "marginality", "lack", and "backwardness" and positive connotations such as "privileged" and "the preferred one" (Kuran-Burçoğlu 2002: 1). However the comprehension of oneself as an 'other', with the others, is always an interpretation. At the same time, the identity narrative borrows from history as well as from fiction and treats the person as a character in a plot (op. cit.: 7). In fact, the person as a character is not separable from its life experience.

As Taylor argues identity is partly shaped by recognition or its absence, often by the misrecognition of the others, and so a person or group of people can suffer real damage, real distortion, if the people or society around them mirror back to them a confining or demeaning or compatible picture of themselves (Taylor 1995: 25).

The phenomena of authenticity, which was defined by Taylor as "the right of people to be acknowledged publicly as what they really are" (Ibid.:149) and the process of identification has a multi-dimensional, dynamic and permanent character. At first, neither individualistic life nor the social / societal stratification can be reduced into the constrained dimension. Thus, the identity is supposed to be multi-dimensional. The multicultural and multi-societal character of the identity requires the necessity of a plurality of people, groups, social confrontations, mutual challenges and profound interactions and, finally, a strong possession is needed for the gained identities and these identities may be redefined in accordance with the conjuncture. However, this socialization process may lead to the creation of the newly constructed identities. The continuity of the process will lead to a permanent character in the identity values as well.

Perceptivity, continuity and dynamism reflect the pluralistic character of the identity, and individuals usually possess more than one identity units and exemplify a variety of identities. As Kymlicka claims, plurality is based on three pillars: One of them is history; human beings have lived as plural and multicultural social units have thus created multicultural identity units throughout the history. Second one is social structure; society has profound, inter-weaved and complicated identities. Third one is identity constructive capacity of the human beings; the identity is profoundly constructed by the thoughtful, planning and conscious people in plural character (Kymlicka, 1998:193-194). The acquisition of the plural identities, such as -popularly known- family, tribe, ethnic group, community, country, *patrie* ('national terrain' in Smith's writings), nation, gender, class and civilization, are constructed within the process of socialization. It could be said that different

sorts of identities fall into three categories. First one of these categories is the universal identity as some traits which distinguish the people from the non-people and be shared by all people without any discrimination. Second one is the group identity that is shared identity by some people. Third is the individual identity that is distinctive and *sui generis* traits of a sole individual (Ibid.:202).

Identity is constructed in accordance with the special condition of the time process and dependent on time and space. The concept of identity is introduced both, the notion of continuity and that of change without making them contradictory; on the contrary, continuity, in so far as it concerns the 'self' in its relation with the 'other', is meaningless without transformation. This transformation is referred to within two factors. First; the authenticities are not natural and given by birth, but constructed within the social and historical framework. Second; the history sense of identity means not only the positioning of identity units within the historical process, but also changing the comprehensive and holistic character of any given common identity unit within the historical perspective. In any certain period of history, a kind of identity might be comparatively more influential over the people. For instance, while the religious identity was more influential and determinant in pre-modern Europe, with the modernization process the national identity gained very critical significance and evenly universal character spreading over almost all countries. Moreover in today's perspective, the deprivation of national identity for any community is perceived as "unidentified" in many respects. The historical character of identity makes it changeable and temporal, while its sociality enhances its continuity (Martin 1995: 8-11).

What are the affects or influences of the identity which has a social, historical, dynamic, changeable, multi-dimensional, permanent and dependent character? The content of variable and plural identities varies depending on both densities and diversities and their influences over the individuals, and the degrees of necessities and initiative within the conditionality of time and space. For instance, Smith contends that "the universal character of the gender identity lessens its initiative of orienting the common action" (Smith 1990: 5). In this point, it can be claimed that if the unit of identity broadens, its strength of creating pressure over the individual, the coherent process of constructing the identity and the dynamic for common action weakens. As a prolongation of this logic, while the "family" and "community" groups have higher capacity to direct the common action than the "nation", the "civilization" and "empire" are weaker than the "nation" in this respect. Lastly, "the criteria of the strength for the identity preponderance are necessity, urgency, external threat and relative capability as well as its internalization by the given society (Eralp 1997:26).

The formation and the definition of a social identity is based on "objective" and "subjective" elements (Smith 1990: 27). Objective elements are depicted as the properties shared by all members of the social identity unit such as symbols, myths, language, religion, ethnicity, geography, the mode of life, common history, values, traditions, etc. Social identity is shaped by the internalization of these elements by the members of the implied unit, and at the second stage, the preponderant character of the social identity is determined by emphasizing and singling out the priority of one of them (Ibid.:28). For instance, as Smith asserts in his book *The Origins of Nations*, on the one hand, the country and mutual rights and duties are the main priorities in territorial model on the other hand in the ethnic model of nation building; they are the ethnic origin and language. Subjective elements of social identity are defined as the relative indication of to what extent the internalization process of the objective ones is carried out (Smith 1989: 349). A strong and prudent perception of the subjective consciousness is very important for the common features in constructing the national identity.

The social and cultural identities can be grouped in two categories, as "granted" and "gained" identities (Yurdusev 1997: 27). Family, ethnic group, society, community, nation and civilization are 'granted' identities and are created within the socialization process. They are exclusive because of their inborn character. However, the identities chosen by the free will of the individual are 'gained' identities. Nevertheless, the dynamism, continuity and plurality of the identity prevents any certain gained identity to have the power of creating monopoly and absolute authority over the individuals such as the case of conversion, since the voluntary factor and humanitarian interference can be mentioned even in granted identities in some extent. For instance, the national identity as a 'granted' identity is not a natural and spontaneous identifier that emerged in any certain period of the history. Contrarily, the intervention of the modern state shapes the construction of the national identity as Massimo d'Azeglio claims: "We established Italy and now it is time to create the Italians" (Hobsbawm 1991:44).

Belonging to a country has a great influence in adopting, reinforcing or weakening of other identities, such as the social identity. That is, country identity determines the social identity, the same way, and national, religious, ethnic and class – based have a great impact in shaping other identities.

The perception of different identities is based on the reciprocity and mutual understanding as well as interaction positioning. A social identity unit generally separates and differentiates the other. Here there is a reciprocal interaction working to find out negative and positive differences of each

identity (op. cit.: 29). If the identities are rival and threat each other, the negative emphasis is pointed out. In order to elaborate this fact, the study of the interaction within the history is required.

In psychological respect, the definition of identity depends upon the notions of I, ego, self or personality, identity that are used like synonymous terms in social sciences, such as psychology, sociology and cultural anthropology. Erickson defines it both as "the permanent self-identification within the inside of the person and the reciprocal relationship of a principal character which always share with the others" (Ercikson 1967: 17). For Wheelis it is "the feeling of the unity and wholeness which is based on the harmonization of the behaviour / actions and the value judgements of the people" (Wheelis 1958: 27). For Fromm it is "the feeling which is required to be an individual and obtained by having the identification with the other groups and persons" (Fromm 1955: 134). For Lichtenstein, there are two kinds of identities. These are "psycho – social identity" and "socio – cultural identity". "Psycho – social identity" has the following three dimensions: objectivity and subjectivity, individuality and sociability, and sameness, otherness and alterity (Ibid.: 134).

According to Smith, individual 'self' is originated from four categories. First, "gender" which is the most obvious and constant category that is universal and the origin of the other differences and dependencies. Nevertheless, the gender distinction is relatively weak in creating the collective identification and not enough dynamic because everybody has a distinct gender. Second category is the "terrain or *patrie* or country" category: Local and regional identity is widespread in pre-modern times. Nevertheless, it is weak because the geographical definition is very difficult and the regions can be broken into local units or they can be varied depending on time and space. Third category is the "socio-economical social class". The class is the unique collective identity and the unique transformer of the history in Marxist theory. In fact, the class-based identity can not constitute a separate category since its organization and awareness of it is a very complicated issue; the criteria and conjuncture is too different to combine, and it is deprived of cultural deepness and sentimental attractivity. Furthermore it is easily seized by the religious and ethnic identities as wider collectivities. Fourth category is the "ethno – religious" identity (Smith 1996: 16-28). Religious identity is originated from the social and communicational scopes and based on the alignment between the culture and cultural elements, such as customs, traditions, symbols, myths and values codified within the social rituals. Religious communities are very involved in the ethnic identities.

In this context, ethno-religious identity is the transformation of any society from religious community into the completely ethnic one. These two identities should be separated analytically despite of the fact that both are capable enough to constitute a community, both have originated from similar criteria of cultural classification and mostly coincides and strengthen each other. Nevertheless the religious diversity leads to delay the emergence of an ethnic unity (Smith 1991: 67-73).

Collective social identities can be conceptualized as religion, gender, ethnicity, race, and sexuality. The list is somewhat heterogeneous; such collective identities matter to their bearers and to others in very different ways. Religion, for example, unlike all the others, entails attachments to creeds or commitment to practices. Gender and sexuality, unlike the rest, are both grounded in the sexual body; both are differently experienced at different places and times (Taylor 1994: 150).

Taylor explains the connection between individual identity and collective identity as follows: Each person's individual identity has two major dimensions. There is a collective dimension pertaining to the interaction of their collective identities, and there is a personal dimension, consisting of other socially and morally important features, that are intelligence, charm, wit, cupidity, etc. that are not themselves the basis of forms of collective identity (ibid.: 152).

The Nation Building in Modern Era:
Nation, Nation State and Nationalism in Middle Eastern Countries

Nation and nationalism are two concepts bearing the controversial ideas about the preceding of their tangibility and conceptualization (Ersanlı-Özdoğan 1985:175). Fortunately some data helps us to comprehend the matter. First data is the reality that today's ongoing political unit is nation-state (Bottomore 1987: 59). At the same time, "nationalism is a doctrine accepting the necessity of organizing the people within the realm of nation-states" (Kedourie 1970: 29). Second data is pertaining with the synchronization of the nationalism with the industrialization as well as with the modernization (Gellner 1983: 55). Thus, the nature of the nation-state is related to the answer given to the question of the beginning period of the nationalization process and its persistence.

The starting point of this process is Western Europe. The process fell into two categories. One of them is the unit of nation emerging with the spontaneous products of newly emerged formations and discrepancies brought about by the industrialization and capitalism. Second one is the unit of nation which is formed as a defensive element against the menacing factors coming from the West with the contribution of the imposition of ideas of French Revolution and, thus, which oriented to the unity surrounding with the pre-modern motto of "one language, one culture and one history".

French Revolution, as a distinctive feature, brings a new understanding of legitimacy and this legitimacy threatens other absolutist monarchies of the Europe. The Revolution imposes the idea that the sovereignty belongs to the nation and approves the "self-determination" and the "right of resistance" or changing the regime in case of the violation of the social contract acted between the state and citizen as vested interests (Kedourie 1971: 4). Naturally, the key word in new understanding is "nation". The nation emerges as an actual entity as the first time in history in France and England. Since 10th century, when the cities and regional organizations became leading factors before the churches and feudal relations depending on the flourishing of the trade, feudal frontiers rapidly fuses and natural national borders are established. The constitution of absolutist national monarchies displays their luminous patterns in France, Britain and Spain.

Taking precedence, England and France played a very prominent role at emergence of the absolutist state in 16th century as a result of rapid centralization process as well as the nationalization of the churches with the Reformation movement. Aforementioned absolutist establishment expresses the consensus and balance between the feudal nobility and newly established bourgeois (Anderson 1974: 15-16). For this reason, absolutist state should be understood as a transitory form. As a result of the working money economy (mercantilism), bourgeois comes to power. Nevertheless, this socio-economic power turns as a political strata in 17th and 18th centuries with the transformation of the states to the constitutional monarchies. This is the brilliant victory of the "tiers etat" (Third Estate). In 17th century England achieves to create the nation and settle and establish her state over the basis of nationality by means of suppressing the ongoing disputes with the governing monarchs and unifying the people who are exposed to be categorized within the castic divisions (Rustow: 1968: 8). Thus, this definition means the comprehension of transferring the sovereignty to the nation, as socially, culturally, economically and politically integrated people.

The state in England, removing the feudal partition with the Norman occupation, ends the power of the church positioning as a non-centralized rival against the absolute sovereignty of state and provides its ultimate submission and acceptance of national obedience. England witnesses the rapid increasing of the capital accumulation, making widespread the manufacture production and settlement of a new understanding of proprietorship over the land within the first half of the 17th century. These developments originate from capital accumulation by the mercantilist expansion of England. This acceleration of social change forces to destroy the political structure of the previous social relations system as expected. The widening of the market turns the whole nation to the one economic unit and, eventually, the monopoly of competition is demolished (Ibid.: 12-22).

Consequently, the absolutist state mechanism establishing the stability between the feudal elements and bourgeois holding the economic dominance with its hand loses its historical function. In this case, the first half of the 17th century is the years of the struggle between two social institutions; on one hand, English patriotism, English Protestantism (Puritanism) as a national sect of the Christianity and economic power of the bourgeois; feudal aristocracy tied with the land possession and resisting against the monetary economy (mercantilism) and England Catholicism (Anglicanism) as official interpretation of the religion, on the other hand. This strife results in the victory of the liberal on the leadership of Oliver Cromwell. The period of 1640 - 1660 when these episodes realize implies the transition to the new political arena and free ground giving chance to flourish the capitalism as a necessity and essential factor for competitive national economy (Hill 1983: 35-88).

These developments came true at the end of the 18th century in France. Apart from England, French political thought developed the philosophic and ideological basis of transition from absolutism to constitutionalism and republic. As Tocqueville, who is a very prominent political sociologist known by his book *Democracy in America*, claims that French Revolution is not a social but political revolution, he means by social revolution the changing in the production, possession and distribution systems (Mardin 1971: 197). Subsequently, French thinkers achieved to get rid of the ancient dynamics of the established social structure with the motto of *"egalité, fraternité, liberté*" (equality, brotherhood and liberty). Because the main target of these principles is to overthrow the monarchs of the Europe, French thinkers envisage the emancipation of the people who bound to be subjected of monarchs by the idea that "the sovereignty belongs to the nation". Under these circumstances, the French nationalism, having the "internal" nature tackles

to the matter of settling their own nation-states to the last ladder of the modernization, by having the "external" nature it becomes the producer of the ideology that will separate their national hostiles from the inside.

Thus, the most important historical steps to universalize the nationalism are the Napoleonic wars and French Revolution which extends the influence of these ideas towards along with the Germany, Italy, Spain and Russia.

Nationalism is a kind of ideology mainly oriented towards these aims (Ergil 1983: 73);

1 . To create a national economy

2 . To constitute autonomous national legislative and executive organs and to collect all separatist relations such as regional loyalties and community ties under the control and integration of this organ

3 . To create a national culture (the system of common values and expectations) and define an identification depending on the newly created culture.

The distinctive features of the French and English are their possession of spontaneously established national economies and internal market integrities parallel to the rise of capitalism and the shaping of the world economy without needing to direct to the first principle. The weakening of the feudal sovereignty and increasing centralist influence of the absolutist state provides the integrity and unification of the country within the frontiers of the national economy. In this process, the national identity is formed and enhanced the volunteer obedience for the national power represented by the absolutist state. The reached relative welfare in 17th century and the mercantile development to supply this welfare and necessities of the increasing population and the bourgeois turning to the preponderant economic element by empowering with these developments removes the need of absolutist state which functions as a stability/consensus component between previous social relation system and newly established order. In this framework, the real social power replaces its own political strength with the support of wide popular strata and their original ideology. Thus, the second aim of nationalism, autonomous national body, is constituted as inclusive of "new middle class" and exclusive of all regional power components. The most perfect form of the nation-state, which covers the content of the power, posses the pluralistic structure. For this reason, as Hayes argues, the understanding of "nation" is rather different from the approach of the nationalistic or cultural nation (Hayes 1937: 231). It is based on the assumption that the citizens who share the equal rights and duties have the consciousness of being the part of the same "civilization". Therefore, some elements such as language, sect, religious order and ethnic origin are reduced to secondary rank.

The relationship between Turkey and Middle Eastern countries, one of the most important priorities is history, identity and security matters and dimensions. These three factors became much more influential over the impact of Turkey's relations with these regions in 1990s years. Primarily 'the burden of the history' prevailed n these relations. The Ottoman heritage affected the nation building processes in ideological respects over two sides negatively. If we consider the relations with Iran, it can be understood that these relations were the history of frequent conflict and fighting of two empires. The relations in post-independence period became under the influence of disputes between bi-polar international structure. Nevertheless, Iran, Jordan and Iraq perceived the Soviet expansion as the threating parameters and preferred to get closed to Turkey even thought these relations remained very distant and insincere. The positioning of Ankara within the Baghdad Pact (1955) and her being the first Moslem country which recognizes the Israel as the official state has been perceived as hostility and enmity. Ankara had initiated to change her policies drastically at the midst of 1960s and Turkey tried to stay in equal status about Arab-Israeli conflict against two sides. Progressively she adopted a balance policy' which is very close to Arab thesis about Palestinian question

In Westphalian, model that European expansion ostensibly globalized, a relative congruence between identity and sovereignty, between nation and state, endows states and the states system with legitimacy. Social mobilization creates, in modernizing societies, receptively to identification with larger communities – nations- potentially coterminous with a state; in an age of nationalism, such common identity communities seek a state and state leaders seek to forge a common national identity among their populations. Where the drive to bring state and nation into correspondence is obstructed, irredentist conflicts tend to destabilize regimes and foster inter-state conflict. Nowhere is the divergence of identity and state sharper than in the Middle East. There popular identification with many individual states has been contested by strong sub- and supra-state identities, diluting and limiting the mass loyalty to the state typical where it corresponds to a recognized nation (Ayoob 1995; 47-70, Hudson 1977; 33-55=.

Historically, identification with the territorial state has been weak, with popular identity tending to focus on the sub-state unit - the city, the tribe, the religious sect – or on the ıslamic umma (Weulersse 1946; 79-83). This is because states, the product of outside conquerors, imported slave soldiers without local roots, or religio-tribal movements, typically disintegrated after a few generations and when a new wave of state building came along the states' boundaries were often radically different. Moreover, in an arid en-

vironment of trading cities and nomadic tribes, peoples, notably the Arabs lacked the defined sense of territorial identity and attachment to the land associated with peasant societies. The important exceptions, those societies with substantial peasantries- Turkey, Iran and Egypt – are those where contemporary states most closely approximate national states.

Aggravating the situation was the way the contemporary states system was imposed at te expense of a pre-existing cultural unity deriving from centuries of rule by extensive empires ruling in the name of Islamic umma. Where, historically, a common supra-state identity had embraced local communities and a mosaic of identity groups around an imperial center, Western imperialism's creation of artificially bounded states divided the region into a multitude of competing state units. Instead of the natural processes of sorting out boundaries through war and dynastic marriage which took place in the northern world, the boundaries of the modern Middle East state system were arbitrarily imposed and frozen by the western powers according to their own needs, not indigenous wishes (Ayoob 1995: 33). This process disrupted a multiplicity of regional ties while reorienting many economic and communication links to the western 'core'. In reaction, new supra-state ideologies, expressive of the lost cultural unity, were increasingly embraced: Pan-Arabism by the Arabic-speaking middle class and political Islam among the lower middle classes. Both, at various times, challenged the legitimacy of the individual states and spawned movements promoting the unification of states as a cure for the fragmentation of the recognized community. The result has been that the Arab world constitutes a system of territorial states, but not, so far nation states (Hudson 1977: 33-55; Kienle 1990: 1-30).

At the same time, all the states of the region suffered competition from the mosaic of sub-state identities on which the state boundaries were haphazardly imposed. There are ethnic minorities in all Middle East countries, notably the Kurds, spread between Iraq, Iran, Turkey and Syria, and the Berbers, who spill across North African boundaries. Iran is the premier multiethnic society, its Persian core flanked by Azerbaijanis, Kurds, Turkomans, Arabs and Baluchis. Religious pluralism is even more striking: Sunni Muslims are the majority community in the Arab world, but not in particular states (Lebanon, Iraq) while Shi'a muslims, the majority in Iran, spill across the Arap region where they are pivotal minorities in Bahrain, Kuwait, Iraq and Lebanon. Several Shi'a offshoots notably Druze, Ismailis and Alawis are historically important in Syria and Lebanon, while Zaydis dominate Yemen. Offshoots of the Purist Kharijities are to be found in Oman (Ibadies).

Where, as is frequent, such identity groups spill across borders – becoming 'trans-state' the lack of correspondence between borders and identity

may foster irredentism. This, in turn, generates inter-state conflicts as states contest each other's borders or 'interfere' in each others' 'domestic' affairs by supporting irredentist groups, a practice which may escalate into actual military confrontation between states. The best example of this is the case of Kurds who have been regularly used by their host states in their rivalries with each other and who have attempted to exploit these state rivalries in their struggle for national rights; this has regularly led to inter-state conflict, notably between Syria and Turkey and between Iraq and Iran. In Lebanon where a multitude of sects, never effectively subsumed by a common Lebanese identity, led to civil war, each warring sect sought outside patrons, thereby making Lebanon a battlefield between other states, notably Israel and Syria (Ayoob 1995:7).

Against this reality must be set a century of ongoing state formation. The consolidation of regimes in individual states created vested interests in the new fragmentation. State builders struggled to contain the penetration of their territory by trans-state forces and tenaciously defended their sovereignty against either a redrawing of boundaries or the sub-state autonomy that might satisfy minority demands. The individual Arab states have outlasted the Pan-Arab movements that sought a solution to the 'one nation-many states' dilemma by merging them in Arab unionist project such as the abortive UAR between Egypt and Syria. States effectively balanced against the efforts to export Pan-Arab or Pan-Islamic revolution. The insecurity of the states system spurred state formation and a greater acceptance at elite levels of mutual respect for sovereignty.

Transformation of Arabic Identity during the Arab Spring

The wave of political activism that started in southern Tunisia in December 2010 has now reached all parts of the Arab world, from Morocco in the west to Oman in the east. The fate of these popular uprisings remains in the balance, but it is already clear that they have produced the most dramatic changes in the region since the end of the colonial era in the middle of the 20th century.

The "Arab Spring", however, is a seasonal misnomer. Since the removal of the Tunisian and Egyptian dictators in January and February 2011, protest movements have stirred but have not flowered. Uprisings in Libya, Bahrain, Yemen and Syria have all led to military confrontations of varying intensity, but the regimes are still in place (although the grip of the rulers in Libya and Yemen is tenuous). In Libya, only NATO intervention has prevented Colonel Muammar Qadhafi's regime from re-imposing its writ over the entire country

following a rebellion in February in the eastern city of Benghazi. Bahrain's uprising has been stamped out with Saudi assistance, and the efforts of a more liberal wing of the royal family to foster a constitutional monarchy disowned. The Syrian regime is mercilessly crushing a popular uprising, and digging in for prolonged resistance to Western diplomatic and economic pressure.

Several governments have responded to more limited protest movements with promises of political and constitutional reform. Such processes are under way in Morocco, Algeria, Jordan and Oman. A group of economically powerful Gulf states—Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar remain resolutely opposed to fundamental reform, including the introduction of representative democracy. Saudi Arabia has sought to pre-empt pro-democracy protests by announcing a massive programme of state investment, in an attempt to address grievances about high rates of unemployment and the lack of affordable housing. It is also playing an important role in countering the pro-democracy trend, most conspicuously through its military intervention in Bahrain.

Finally, there are four Arab polities—Iraq, Kuwait, Lebanon and the Palestinian

Territories—that have more experience of democratic politics (albeit very imperfect) than has been the case elsewhere in the Arab world. All four offer salutary examples of the pitfalls of flawed democracy, as factional in-fighting (often involving heavily armed groups) has tended to result in prolonged periods of political gridlock.

The popular uprisings were sudden and unexpected, occurring in seemingly infertile territory. The Arab region is one of the world's least democratic. The Economist

Intelligence Unit's 2010 Democracy index scored all the Arab states as "authoritarian regimes", except for Lebanon, the Palestinian Territories and Iraq, which are classified as "hybrids". The Arab world notably avoided the waves of democratisation that took placein Latin America, southern and eastern Europe, and parts of Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia, in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s.

The recent upheaval therefore caught the outside world unawares, and has overturned a host of stereotypes about the Arab region. In a part of the world characterised as prone to religious fundamentalism, the revolts have been home-grown affairs led by secular forces. The progenitors of the 21st century Arab Awakening have largely eschewed ideology in favour of simple demands for civil rights, democratic accountability, checks on the power of leaders, and the establishment of an equitable economic system. In Egypt,

the head of a regime with one of the largest repressive apparatuses in the world was toppled within a few weeks.

This raises the question of whether the region might experience a wave of democratisation, as in Eastern Europe after 1989. Will popular unrest of the sort seen in Egypt lead not only to the overthrow of autocratic leaders in other countries, but also to the emergence of democracy? Certainly, the political inertia of the Arab world—which has often been equated in the West with political stability—is no more. In some countries, the transformation is likely to be radical. In others, the odds are that change will prove to be minimal or cosmetic, as established interest groups manage to cling on to their privileges. There is also the risk that in some countries the pressure for change will result in bitter civil conflicts, or in the advent of new and possibly even more oppressive dictatorships.

There is no other force, yet, in Egyptian politics with the organisational depth and popular appeal of the Muslim Brotherhood. The Mubarak-era opposition parties have found it hard to shake off the stigma of having cooperated with the former regime, and of having played a largely peripheral role in the revolution. However, the revolutionary activists have been unable to coalesce into a political organisation capable of conducting an effective election campaign. This comes as no surprise, as a striking attribute of the revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt was their spontaneity and lack of ideology. This gave them a powerful unifying force, but also meant that new political organisations would have to be built from scratch. Mr Mubarak's National Democratic Party (NDP) has been dissolved by court order and its assets transferred to the state. Many of its top officials face the prospect of prosecution. Nevertheless, some former NDP officials have said that they will appeal against the court order and, pending the outcome, seek to resume active politics through a new party. The ex-NDP would appear to face a hopeless task, but some former members of parliament (MPs) may be able to gain election through reactivating patronage networks in rural constituencies.

The amended Egyptian constitution has introduced some curbs on the president's powers—in particular, through cutting the term to four years from six, and limiting the number of terms to two. However, many crucial questions about the relationship between the head of state, parliament and the government have been left undefined. There is an implicit consensus among the presidential candidates who have emerged so far that the powers of parliament must be enhanced and that there should be no return to the models of Nasser, Sadat and Mubarak. However, much will depend on whether the first post-revolution parliament can sustain this consensus and work constructively on the details of the new system. The new government

and constituent assembly will probably have to be based on a coalition between the Muslim Brotherhood and the other political formations.

As the euphoria of Tahrir Square has started to fade, the mood in Egypt about the chances of a successful transition to democracy has grown more sombre. In our main scenario, we expect that Egypt will return to civilian rule and that a government will take shape based broadly on the preferences expressed at the ballot box. However, the evolution of a system of stable yet adversarial politics is by no means guaranteed. More likely, the result will be a politics of permanent squabbles with no party exerting overall control.

As in Egypt, the revolution in Tunisia has spawned dozens of new political groupings that have yet to coalesce into the broad formations needed to form the basis of a new government. Islamism will also be part of the new politics, but the Tunisian version lacks the organisational depth of Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood. The most likely outcome of the election to the national constituent assembly scheduled for July 24th will be the establishment of a representative democracy, probably based on a highly prescriptive constitution. However, a postponement of the contest seems likely, given the size of the task and the difficulty in reaching agreement over the electoral rules. Although the main Islamist party, Hizb al-Nahda, has been legalised, the role of Islamic parties inthe election remains ambiguous. Al-Nahda has some support, especially in the impoverished south, but it is unlikely to emerge as the dominant party. In fact, we do not expect any political party to emerge as the leader, with a large coalition of various societal groups the most likely outcome.

Progress toward democracy in Tunisia has accelerated in the past two months, but vital questions remain unsolved. Members of the old regime continue to pose a threat—police forces loyal to the regime of Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali have clashed with protesters and the security situation remains unstable. It is unclear how far the interim government will go to remove members of the former ruling party, the Rassemblement constitutionnel démocratique (RCD), from the middle and lower echelons of the civil service, regional and local administrations, as well as state companies, where they are deeply entrenched. The removal of senior members of the RCD from the main institutions (no matter how desirable) and the dispute over who will replace them is likely to disrupt decision-making. The interim government's commitment to the democratic process is often questioned. Perhaps the most difficult issue to evaluate is the likely role of the army. The Tunisian army has usually taken a back seat in politics. It is widely trusted and admired, unlike the police, and has been credited with triggering Mr

Ben Ali's flight into exile by refusing to help the police suppress the demonstrations by force. The head of the army, General Rachid Ben Ammar, has publicly declared the army to be the ''guarantor of the revolution''. If the interim government fails to hold elections on July 24th, however, and protests escalate as a result, there is a chance that the army will be tempted to step in and take power on the pretext of ''saving the revolution''.

Conclusion

The pioneers of the Arab Spring—Tunisia and Egypt—will be the test cases of how much popular movements for democratic change can achieve. They have a number of advantages. In particular, these include the relatively quick dispatch of the heads of the former regimes; the integrity of state institutions such as the armed forces, the judiciary, the central bank and the civil service; and the media's generally positive role. Set against that are the debt that campaigners for democracy owe to the army (particularly in Egypt); uncertainty about the role of Islamists in the new politics; and the heavy short-term economic costs of the revolutions.

The new political leaders in Tunisia and Egypt have adopted different approaches in their plans for constitutional reform. In Tunisia, interim powers have been vested in the speaker of parliament, Foued Mebazaa, who will preside over the election of a national constituent assembly. The assembly will be responsible for rewriting the constitution, which will pave the way for parliamentary and presidential elections at a later, as yet unspecified, date. In Egypt, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) has assumed the powers of the presidency since it forced Hosni Mubarak to step down, and is fast-tracking the election of a new parliament and president. Amendments to the constitution were put to a referendum on March 19th, only five weeks after Mr Mubarak was forced out. A comprehensive review of the constitution would be left until after the parliamentary election, and entrusted to a constituent assembly. Activists involved in the mass movement that became the January 25th revolution campaigned for a "no" vote in the referendum, on the grounds that more time was needed to conduct a thorough review of the constitution and to allow new political forces to organise. However, a large majority favoured the changes proposed in the referendum, and Egypt's first elected post-revolution government is likely to be in place before that of Tunisia. likely outcomes for the region, ranging from far-reaching transformation to authoritarian regression. Caution over the chances of democracy taking root across the region seems warranted.

Even where entrenched authoritarian regimes are toppled, immediate transition to fully fledged, consolidated democracies is implausible, since democracy means more than holding elections, and requires the development of a range of supportive institutions and attitudes. Such a transformation takes a long time, and is susceptible to reversal, even in consolidated democracies. Egypt and Tunisia will be crucial test-cases for democratisation. The more successful they are in creating effective democratic systems, the greater the chance for movement elsewhere in the region. Even then, however, the challenges to political change elsewhere will remain formidable.

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Part II

Civil Society, Culture and Agency in Transformation

The Concept of Reform of the Political Islam Movements

Rihab Abdul Rahman Alsharif

Introduction

The number of writers who dealt with the concept of political reform and the necessity of its application has increased recently. The views varied on its content and its mechanisms, especially after the end of the Cold War and the growing phenomenon of globalization, democratization and the spread of so-called terrorism despite, the rationale that is led by those who advocate political reform, the concept remains controversial to many, moreover reform and change became concepts with cultural connotations. This may be an area of intellectual conflict for the differences between presentations Which call for reform according to western visions and models and others calling for the reform according to religions (Islamic). Often the great countries and their organizations represent the first type while the second type is represented by institutions and bodies that belong to the Islamic world. The call for reform was not a new issue in the Arab and Muslim worlds. There are numerous voices calling for reform resulted in various reform schools and patterns such as the reformist schools during the Crusades and then other reform schools adopted by the nation's scholars and thinkers including Ibn Taimiyyah, Sheikh Muhammed Abdelwahab, AbdelGadir Al-jazairi, Mahadi Movement, Al-Afaghani and Sheikh Mohammed Abdu and school of Islamization of knowledge[1].

The movements of political Islam[2] come out as one of the multi pattern international nets that are capable of dominating the situation. After they have been well-established to provide by their programmes and objectives many various visions about the political reform. But they do not agree on the tools of reform. This makes them unable to provide an agreed upon pattern for political reform and to agree on its mechanisms and tools.

It is worth mentioning that there are differences about the term movements of political Islam. One team believes that the concept and the term "political Islam" has emerged in contemporary studies as a symbol of movements that raised slogans such as: (Islam is the solution and governance to Allah) which means (exploitation of religion in politics). Therefore, the intended meaning of political Islam in the views of these groups is that Salafi movements which are derived from Islam are an ideological cover. The opponents of Islam movements accuse them of trying in one way or another to rise to power and build a religious theocratic state and implement its visions of Islamic law Shariaa). This idea has received an absolute refusal of trends, Liberal or Secular movements; they want to build secular religiously neutral countries. The question of following up Islamic law or other laws will be a private affair for each individual in the community where the state does not interfere.

The other team thinks that the term Political Islam is a political, informative and academic term used to describe movements of political change and believe in Islam as policy of rule. Those who adopt this trend believe that Islam is not only a religion, but it is a political, social, legal, economic system, suitable for building state institutions or directing its policies, noting that they refuse the term political Islam, instead they use judgment by shariaa or divine judgment which means that political Islam is the one that calls

for mixing religion and politics in local and international affairs, they do not believe in the separation of religion from state. And they seek in their strategy and programs to establish an Islamic state that applies Islam as a religion state and system of life. Thus, we conclude that political Islam is an understanding of Islam as a comprehensive integrated religion that contains a base for establishing an Islamic society, distinct with its Islamic identity, where religious and doctrinal standards are applied in all walks of life. To sum up, political Islam movements are the ones that state a clear aim which is to seek by all means to establish an Islamic state that possess an overt or covert organizational structure and enjoy public support that varies from one country to another. On the other hand, they vary in terms of size and efficiency but agree on the desired end.

Therefore, this paper aims not only to explore deeply the theoretical part of the concept in the various civilized models and reformist trends[3], but also to find out the patterns provided by the political Islam movements thus, this study attempts to record and analyzed the attitudes of political Islam movements in particular with special focus on the movements which have the greatest social effect to find out the points of strengths and weaknesses

between the reform imposed by the states and the one called for by non-state actors which is more useful? Then to discover the points agreed upon and the ones disagreed on inside the political Islam movements concerning its concept on reform and considering the tools of measuring its achievement and effectiveness, taking into account the different circumstances of each of these movements. But the paper concentrates on Muslim brothers Movement in Egypt. The development and Justice party in Turkey, Taliban movement and Al-Qaeda party in Afghanistan. This interest has an objective Justification whereas these movements have great effect on their environments. Moreover, their effect extended outside their countries. The phenomena of Islamic revival, Islamic expansion and return to religion have been of great interest to decision makers, research institutions in the west and the Arab governments especially after the eleventh of September events that required giving more attention to Islam and political Islam movements in particular[4].

The recent events which are experienced by the Arab world as revolutions has revealed that Islamic groups were active participants, significantly either through coordination with political entities and elites in the Arab countries, or as a parameter to the attitude of international forces towards the deposed governments or the alternative ones. This explains many of the attitudes of the international community towards the Libyan and Syrian systems as examples.

As for the Muslim brothers' movement in Egypt, it is the greatest of Islamic movements in the Arab area. It was and still has great effect on the various intellectual, Social and political levels in most Arab countries and beyond, it is the principal group that laid the foundation stone for the construction of political Islam in contemporary Egypt from which a number of religious groups branched off. As for Taliban movement, it kept the world busy with its hard-line attitudes towards Islam and introduced an extremist model according to which and the behavior of Al-Qaeda party, a mental mage about Islam and Muslims has been formed regardless of the justifications and motives of those groups. While the Turkish model represented by the Justice and Development party provided a moderate model of Islam. Despite the different experiences and visions for providing a model of the Islamic State, It can be said that there are many communalities and points of convergence between these models. Thus, the research focuses on the following points:

a. The concept of reform and change in the thought and practice of the above mentioned movements.

b. The most important motives that drove movements of political Islam to adopt methods of change that sometimes conform, but very often vary.
c. The methodology and tools of reform of some models of political Islam movements to find out which ones are more effective and capable to change the reality of communities. Is it the recognition of the other, freedom, pluralism and peaceful free competition or oppression and imposition of opinion?
d. The relationship of the Islamic movements under study with the ruling authorities and the forms which characterize those relationships (Dialogue or conflict) (agreement or differences). The study addresses those dimensions using the historical method to deduct the intellectual components and the contexts in which those movements are formed and the descriptive and analytical approach to determine the dimensions and roles of those movements for analysis and comparison between the tools of reform they have and to find out which one is more effective and capable of creating the required change towards the best or is that in the opposite direction?.

This will be through the following sections: The First section: Reform: the concept and implications, reasons and necessities. The second section: Movements of political Islam: upbringing and objectives. The third section: The concept of reform and its tools that the movements of political Islam have (application on selected models) The Forth section: Reform tools and condition of efficiency and empowerment.

(I)

Reform: The Concept and Implications Reasons and Necessities

1 . Reform: The concept and implications

The concept of reform is one of the most heavily traded concepts in recent times. Many voices called loudly for reform. But the question that rises here: does this concept give all those who call for it one indication in a sense that every one agrees on its significance? it is proved that there is no agreement between individual users of the word, but the difference has reached the point of contradiction. The reason is fundamentally due to the fact that, the concept of reform is a philosophical one; it has special significance for each category of the society. What some call a reform is considered to others corrupting, it all depends on the philosophical visions[5] of each society. Thus, reform differs according to its different concepts, perceptions, goals, fields, motives. So, reform has its own goals, laws ways, means and mechanisms.[6]

The reform meaning in language is the opposite of corruption[7] or it is removing enemity between two sides, or making the thing useful and appropriate to its context. And idiomatically means the will that search for goodness and rectify deviation. It can also be defined as changing the rules of the communal system and addressing the deficiencies and unbalance that impedes development of the society in its social, economical and political aspects, which means that reform, has intellectual and dogmatic significance. Reform is not only a political act, but it is a civilized comprehensive act that addresses concepts, values and ideas, customs and traditions and individuals, communities and institutions. For it affects all aspects of life the materialistic, intellectual, spiritual and moral. In addition to that, reform is an ongoing process of many levels, ranging from, self-reform with strifing it, and fighting lusts then reform of the family to be the nucleus of the nation reform and reforming the society in all its aspects. It has been stated in the Holy Quran in several places as opposed to spoiling. The concept of reform acquired many and new meanings in the nineteenth century. It is a call to change or repair a system of an existent state or it may be a reform adapted from imitating a particular model. It seems that reform has two trends: one thinks reform will be in imitating the western pattern and western societies, the other thinks that reform will occur by returning to Islamic civilization and identity[8].

2 . Reform: Reasons and Justifications

The most important reasons for reform is the fact that it is a command, an order and it is an essential part in the system of Islamic concepts and values because the Islamic civilized perspective calls for reform as Allah stated by the tongue of his Prophet Shueib “I only want to fix what I can and compromise. Only in God I trust, and to Him I return”

It is a necessity required by self-awareness, and not only in response to external demands. It is also a necessity imposed by the transformations experienced by the Islamic nation to reclaim identity away from dependency and alienation. Moreover, it is a necessity imposed by the human nature, which is disposed to love lusts and maximize personal benefits.

As the universe sunnah required that Allah substitutes us if we are driven by lusts and corruption. Therefore, reform is a necessity dictated by religion and approved by ethics. It is essential whenever a deviation from the right path occurred at the level of individual and collective behavior. It is also necessary to defend their homelands and protect them from enemies.

The deviation of many Arab regimes from democracy and confiscation of freedoms makes the call for reform a legitimate issue since it is associated with satisfying legal demands[9]. Among the main reasons for the call for reform are the absence of cultural righteousness and intellectual independence and the mobility of the nation and its failure to fulfill the functions assigned to it according to sharee'ah.

All the above-mentioned reasons, besides the circumstances concerned with the environments in which the Islamic movements grown, drove the political Islam movements to adopt the call for reform according to its theorists' visions. The term reform was commonly used by reformist social movements that appeared in the Islamic world during the nineteenth century except Wahabi movement, which started before this date. These attitudes extended to the first half of the twentieth century. These calls differ according to the difference in their motives and the effects created by them, and then grown up again since the beginning of the twenty first century.

A number of Arab documents that call for reform were issued. The movements [10]of political Islam can be classified according to its tools for reform into: mobilizing movements such as the Muslim Brothers Movement and Ut-Tahrir party and the Islamic groups such as the Salvation Front of Algeria and the Justice and Developments party of Turkey and Hamas in Palestine and Hisbollah in Lebanon, the Iranian revolution[11]. And other Jihadist movements reject the existing Muslim communities systems for non-application of Islamic laws (Shariaa).[12]

3 . Political Islam Movements (the growth and Objectives)

The Islamic movements are an intellectual trend that adheres to Islam and device from it its theory and thought of life. This trend appeared in response to the accumulation of internal, external and self factors. It sought to establish a pattern of reform that derives its origin from the Islamic civilization and it's completely independent of any other prevailing patterns.

Identification of the content of reform of the political Islam movements required inquiring first the historical context and the climate in which these entities emerged. Initially, and it can be said that the phenomenon of political Islam invaded the Arab World since early seventies. And it is classified by some as one of the most dangerous political phenomena faced by Arab countries in the nineties. It aims at re-shaping the Arab societies according to the Islamic model. The risk is that some of these groups taken the armed violence as a war to eliminate the existing systems and get power forcibly as a means to implement the visions of those groups.

4 . Historical Context and Circumstances

The religious phenomenon from which the Islamic movements were emerged in many parts of the world was not the product of pure chance. And it did not come to fill a gap, or an expression of more political luxury. But it is one of the multiple -patterns movements and international networks[13] that have managed to impose themselves strongly in both Arab and western worlds. This does not mean that the Islamic movements in its various places in Egypt, Turkey, Afghanistan and Al-Qaeda organization does not reflect the issues of reality and not consider it in its intellectual and political career. In any case, there are many justifications supplied by the study as entry points to explain the context in which the phenomenon of religious revival movement arose. And those approaches centers in explanations and factors of internal nature concerning the local environments in which the leaders who formed such organizations are found. And other factors of external nature reflect the impact of the external context and its reflections on the inside.

5 . The Internal context:

a. Such as biodegradable of Muslim community and giving up its values by responding to the changes resulting from the domestic disintegration and degeneration of Muslim community since the late twelfth century, and the stop of the scientific motion when the community entered the imitation stage in the period after the Crusades.

b. The same thing is the historical background to the case of weakness that hit the Muslim communities and that has found the clearest expression to it in the collapse of the institution of the caliphate in 1924[14]. It was a major incident that shook the Islamic world by Kamal Ataturk.

c. There are multiple manifestations of the corruption of some political regimes loyal to the colonial (the rightful heir to the colonizer) who resulted in conflict over resources, wealth and freedom in the Islamic countries and its inability to achieve development and prosperity for its citizens and this made those elites lose their legitimacy.

d. Shaping secular elite at the time that expressed itself in approaching the values of European civilization that represented the developed world at that time.[15]

e. The emergence of religious leaders (fundamentalist) who enjoy high intellectual, political and organizational capabilities, this made them charismatic characters. This helped in the emergence of reform calls of a number of pioneer reformers such as (Jamal Addin Al-Afghani and Mo-

hammed Abdu) that appeals to Muslims and ask them to return to the origins and remind them with their glories and history and ask them to bear their responsibility for the cultural degradation of the Islamic nation.

f. The Arab setback in 1967, the retreat of the Arab national extension and the collapse of the Arab national movement formed a big disappointment to many towards the socialist and semi-socialist regimes in the Middle East and North Africa. The leftist secular movements in the region failed to achieve its slogans, this disappointment paved the way to all kinds of necessary solutions and prepared to the emergence of Baath religious movements.

6 . The external contexts

The compilation of great powers helped in the emergence of political Islam in general, especially during the Afghan war. The Islamic groups continued to receive support from Western countries and the United States in order to neutralize the Nasiriyah and communism during the sixties and early seventieth of the twentieth century whereas anticommunism and Nasiriyah became a target of the political Islam movement in the region. The conflict of interest in the period of cold war made the United States provide the political Middle Eastern Islam trends with economic and military supports that enabled them to expand outside the Arab region. The military and its intellectual colonization deepen the feeling of injustice towards the colonial polices that targeted the identity blur and practiced economic and cultural domination[16].

The secularism and its intellectual climate and polices that established for cultural invasion such as the Ottoman Empire the symbol of Islamic sovereignty and for the national state in the Muslim World later and the explicit call for intellectual liberation and keeping religion away from the course of life. This created multi-dictate within a single country and among the members of the same ethnic group and the different religious and cultural ones.[17]

In the context of those consequences, movements of political Islam have emerged as one of the images of response[18] to call that appeal to Muslims to return to origins. Patterns of response have varied according to the various environments, cultures and classes of respondents to that call which aims to preserve the Islamic identity of the nation and protect it from vulnerability, weakness and dying as a result of the violent attack to which it is exposed at all levels: cultural, political, social and economic and to the strong feeling of the effect of the external contexts of the phenomenon of re-religious consciousness because dear as an introduction to understanding the move-

ments of political Islam. Therefore, the Islamic movements are religious and cultural ones for defending the Islamic privacy and identity.

Others argue that the trends of political Islam are only modern resistance movements that respond to challenges of the time and they are also conservative ones that seek to impose its control on the society through its puritanical understanding of Shariaa and heritage. They are also movements of orientation and geographical expansion towards the Islamic Arab world. They are also criticized as being movements whose owners are concerned with controversial issues of an ideological nature not dogmatic one such as the system of government in Islam, the contradiction between the national state and the state of the caliphate, and the problem of the bureaucratic state and the Qatari state and the trend of blasphemous Jihad..Etc[19]

Considering the situation of the Islamic movements, according to the previously mentioned, they are either power-sharing (Sudan, Algeria, Turkey) or exposed to repression (Egypt. Saudi Arabia). At the official Arab and Western level, this phenomenon attracted the attention of many research centers and political regimes, based on the fact that it is a phenomenon which threatens the Western interests and some interests of the Arab regimes that do not agree with the philosophy of these trends as in the case of the Iranian revolution, where the masses come out and ousted the Shah's regime (who is closely related to American interests). It is also involved in a collision with the largest conventional military force in the world, in Afghanistan, and managed to release it and defeat the Russian Army. The most important issue is that, from the cultural perspective, it proved wrong the western theory that prevailed before the seventieth as a negative force that cannot be a source of protest, revolution or social change according to the western analyses which prevailed at that time.[20] The political Islam movement (The Subject of this Study) came out from this Islamic extension[21]

The growing of the Islamic extension satisfied the longings of many Muslims whose social and psychological nature corresponds with the Islamic Baath movement, thus satisfied the desires of many for the enthronement of Islam, therefore it is noticed that the various manifestations of religiosity and Islamic trends whether in its traditional form (Sufi and sectarianism) or in its modern form and the religious political parties, organizations and the bodies of Islamic orientation. So the rise of political Islam movements is not product of the influences in the external surrounding only though it is not separate from it, but at least, the internal factors were reflection of the Arab and Muslims calamity during the fall of the Islamic Caliphate and the cultural, intellectual and military dominance of the colonizer.

(II)

Reform objectives of the political Islam movement:

The goals of political Islam movements emerged from the factors and reasons in which those entities arose[22]. The most important objective that the Islamic groups would like to achieve is the establishment of an Islamic government who maintain religion and care for the nation affairs, and to be the way to revive the caliphate state in the whole Muslim world, in a deletion to resisting imperialism. This derived the west to be cautious of the so-called fundamentalist extension and the political revolutionary Islam (New Islamism). Especially after the success of the Iranian revolution and its aspiration to be exported to the Arab and Muslim Words, but this does not negate the fact that each organization has its own objectives derived from the reality of the communities and the circumstances in which they live.

1 . Reform Objectives of the Muslim Brothers group in Egypt

It is a social movement of a political nature. There are several figures who contributed to the formulation of the thought of the Muslim brothers movement in Egypt and played an active role in the life of the group including: Hassan Al Banna, who played the role of the originator of the group and specified the content of its call as well as being the general supervisor of guidance and implementation. And Abde Gadir Awada – the thinker – who performs the origination (Taaseel) process adopted by the group. And Sayed Qutb, who played an important role not only in the life of the group, but also in the lives of the groups working in this field outside Egypt.

The Imam Al-Banna was influenced by the atmosphere where he was found whereas he used to sit on the boards of men of religious thought and some religious associations. He witnessed the cancellation of the Ottoman caliphate by Kamal Ataturk and the controversy over it, his main goal was the call to Allah and resisting missionary. The group was originated in 1928 when Hassan Al-Banna was a teacher in a primary school[23].

As for the objectives formulated by the Muslim brothers movement in Egypt, they emerge from the concept of Islam as defined by the General Guide Sheikh Hassan Al Banna is: worship and leadership - religion and state – spirituality and work – prayer and Jihad – Holy Quran book and sword – none of the two shall separate from the other. The imam Hassan Al Bana called for paying attention to the nation political affairs[24]

The objectives of the Muslim Brothers movement in Egypt can be summarized as follows:[25]

a) Give priority to the recovers of caliphate.

b) Prevent proselytizing within the Egyptian society.

c) Fighting colonization as being supportive to the evangelization movement.

d) Urging Muslims to follow religious values and keep away judging from misguidance.

e) Ruling by Allah's Holy Book and the Sunnah of his messenger in all matters.

f) Strengthening the links among the Islamic countries especially the Arab ones[26].

g) Then their goals evolved, so that the power will be the effective tool for the call to Allah. Then the whole Muslim World becomes a field for preaching. They do not consider that their adherences. If Islamic thought will decrease their love and belonging to their country.

2 . The Reform Objectives :
(Justice and Development) Turkish model

The historical legacy made the establishment and rapid spread of Islamic movements in Turkey more portable than any where else. The return of religion to public life was not a philosophical problem for the Turks, but helped the survival of the effects of historical legacy such as: - Mosques, Schools, Palaces and Museums which stand as a testament to the greatness of a civilization that disappeared after defeat and victory. Then being eliminated by the Sultan who can destroy only the public affairs. Islam in Turkey is linked to Turkish nationalism in a unique pattern which is a product of the Turkish history and identity. Islam has been the basis of identity, legitimacy and individual spiritual satisfaction.[27] Among those decisions prevent calls the pro-Islamic law and the headscarf ban and Islamist militancy in the practice and they receive the authority to censor them and shutting down [28] Despite the westernized and modernized reforms at the end of the third decade of the nineteenth century, the social structure is the Islamic one that deplores elements of secularization and westernization. Islam has been the tool for social cohesion and solidarity, sometimes, challenging the existing system. The religious methods were one of the institutions of connection between the society and Islam which represented one of the manifestations of social life. In the Ottoman state, it had a historical role in the defense of Islam;

it also had a role in the Ottoman army. To identify the Islamic roots of the justice and development party, it is better to begin by reviewing the history of Islamic trend and its role in the Turkish political arena. Mustafa Kamal Ataturk has led a campaign to the community of the Ottoman Empire in Turkey, represented in his fight to the community practices and suppression of its symbols. He Started by declaring the secular republic on 29 October 1923 then abolished the Islamic caliphate in the following years and began to westernize Turkey. Moreover, he has developed the role of the military as guardian of the new system, and has issued several ceremonies which included abolition of manifestations and laws derived from Islamic shariaa and introduced imprisonment for those who violate these orders and completed the blur of the traditional Turkish society and state secularization by abolishing the article which states that Islam is the religion of the state in the belief that Islam is responsible for the weakness of Turkey. He believes that the National League is the essential link between the Turkish people and not Islam. These polices continued to be implemented in various ways even after the Ataturk being succeeded by the president Ismat Inonu who conducted political reform and allowed the establishment of an opposition party to the government according to that détente, the democratic party was established in 1946 where the Islamic trend found an outlet, and in this period, the Islamic trend witnessed an expansion of the role of Islam in the Turkish life. This derived the Islamists to infiltrate into other political parties such as the Justice party and the National Order party in 1975 which was spearheaded by Najm Adin Erbakan who was considered the first to redefine the Turkish nationalism in an Islamic vision (arguing that Islam brings the Turks together, neither geography nor race or state) representing the traditional trend of Islam. But the trend of reformist Islam has been expressed by the Justice and Development party. Then the Turkish arena witnessed several coups, then the National Safety party was formed in 1973, a party in which the political Islam movement grew clearly. In 1983, Erbakan established Al Rafa party which aims to achieve social justice to form the social welfare state believing that Islam is the first link between the Turks.

Erbakan home philosophy was centered on the national idea mentioned above, while at the external level, the Just system identifies Turkey's political targets in establishing Islamic United Nation Organization and the defense cultural, joint co-operation organization and the transition to joint economic market, and monetary joint unity and an Islamic monetary fund. This theory has represented the basic slogans of Al- Rafa party, but the army had turned against him in 1997 and conducted many decisions on national security council which aims to prevent all Islamic manifestations,

then Ataturk fell from power, the constitutional court Issued a ruling to close the Rafa party and preventing some of its leaders from practicing political work. Erbakan returned and formed the Virtue party in 1997, which was also closed in 2001.

When AlRafa was dissolved, the conservatives where under the leadership of Erbakan and the reformers were led by Abd Allah Jul. Erbakan supporters formed the Happiness party, while the reformers found the Justice and Development party which determined its objectives according to the needs of the Turkish people. It is observed that there are several determinants that made the objectives pattern of the Justice and Development party different and distinct from the other political Islam movements, including the party's urgent desire to join the European Union. This led the party to devote its project to development to keep pace with European standard; this desire imposes it to be committed to the principles of democracy and deals with a conciliatory policy rather than confrontational. Moreover, Turkey's geographical position imposes this kind of trend on it so as not to be less renaissance than its counterparts. Therefore its objectives are summarized as follows:- achieving sovereignty to the Turkish people without any condition, to maintain the Turkish unity, preserving the values and ethics (heritage of the Turkish people), to provide security and welfare to the people, to achieve social justice and equitable distribution of national income to achieve civilization according to the way devised by Kamal Ataturk. The party's program is:- To achieve development and rise above the level of civilization and democracy – to strengthen the Turkish economy – redistribute the country's resources fairly among the people. Finally Jul announced that the new government will impress the European leaders by taking serious decisions to show that Turkey is a Muslim, temporary democratic state so as to be model for the rest of the Islamic countries.

3 . Reform Goals of Al-Qaeda organization

Al-Qaeda organization formed a complex network as it contains small cells in different regions in the world run by decentralized leaders. It acts as it deems without referring to the central command. But Al-Qaeda was not like any other organization because of several qualities that distinguished it from others. First, the geographical spread of its members, as it is rumored that they are deployed in all of Asia, Africa, and Europe besides, America. Creed also played a crucial role in mobilizing its members by making them believe that surrender to the enemy is rejected, in addition to the fact that members of the organization are characterized by high capacity to continue fighting, patience and embarking on self sacrifice.

Jihad cadres were formed as a base for establishing and managing Al-Qaeda. Its objectives are summarized in: fighting the United States and its allies by hitting their interests everywhere in order to weaken its influence in the region and prevent them from supporting unjust systems in the Arab and Muslim worlds. By conducting these operations Al-Qaeda aims to win the support of the masses in the Islamic world. They think it is necessary to go beyond the ethnic groups in order to achieve the Islamic caliphate.

Al-Qaeda was established in 1988, and then Jihad organization joined it. But Jihad has no intention to move outside the borders to form an international organization. Its aims were limited to local issues: to change the existing regimes by force as they consider them infidel and unjust because they do not apply Islamic law. Then political circumstances emerged from the international conflict during the Cold War between the Soviet Union and United States. This made the jihad organization expands outside the Egyptian border. Many reasons accumulated that prompted the members of the organization for migration and alliance with Osama bin Ladin where the aim changes from changing the regime in Egypt to fighting the United States and its allies. Hence, they thought of migration outside Egypt to achieve empowerment which was not accessible because of the stringent power and security systems that deal with Islamic groups as being considered outlaws. Thus, the first goal of Islamic Radical groups is to create Islamic internationalism that goes beyond the national borders but not by *Daawaa* as it used to be done by many Islamic groups but by a violent forceful way that does not recognize the slow peaceful move. Thus the Jihad organization plan has been concentrated on three main issues: the caliphate, Jihad and the relationship with the west

4 . The Reformation Targets of Talipan Movement:-

Taliban has occupied the attention many sections because of their stiffed situation related to Islam either in politics, cultures or in the manner of life. That party which constituted its roots from classrooms students who responded to the direction of Mulla Omar. Two years after the downfall of Kabul at the Afghani's students, pledged Mulla Omer as their prince. He chose carefully his consolers council, qualified and experienced and graduated from theological schools some of them from the Science Home "Dar Alolum". In 1994 Taliban seized Gandahar, the second biggest city, who met military support from Pakistan and in 1996 they captured Kabul the capital city.

Taliban did not have any political goal, but their desperateness and frustration was because of the fierced that was between different Jihad sections who beat the sovets and then turned over against themselves in 1992. The real motive of Taliban which can be said the real goal is to fight corruption, killings and robbery and to free the capital from the strong hands of the Jihad gangs, beside the main target, transforming Afghanistan to a purely Muslim state.

The opinion of the movement about the attacks of the English, Russians and the Americans is not because the offense of the11th Sep, but due to their cling to Islam. That is why they instigate the people to grip on Islam and call them to defend Islam; moreover, they pushed the people to fight and not handing Osama Bin Laden because it is the central concern of the American demands. That was the vision of Mulla Omer about the role of religion in life in Afghanistan that conflict the west in the ground of religion in rejecting any regression to kills by any means to catch Osman Bin Laden.

Part III

Reformation Tools of the Islamic Political Movement:

The reformation tools varied in the Islamic political movements, in Algeria, the Rescue Front accepted the democratic competition way and could achieve tremendous victory, though it was not allowed to takeover by the Army which forced the front to seek violence. In some other countries, the authorities banned the Islamic from any political activities; moreover, they packed them in prisons, which created a sort of conflicts between these movements and the ruling regimes. In the Sudan, the Islamic movement took over the power through a military coup and rejected the democratic trend, but recently moved towards democracy and allowed marginal freedom by permitted partially journalism freedom and political a parties and finally lifted up the curfew.

Other movements adopted the educational reformation methods and its tools like (voluntary, fasting, mass lftar, worships purity meeting, beside visiting programs and social integration) as a tool of reformation and a way to change the societies, the objective behind that was to find out the individual Muslim, the Muslims community that are committed by their religion rules and lessons without neglecting to qualify their cadres politically and to improve their administration abilities. What are the most dominate features of reformation of these movements as the subject of the study?

Muslim Brotherhood Movement Tools in Egypt

The movement discarded violence and chose peaceful activities and was concerned with education in particular in its first phase where the situations were not designed to that especially the group o wasn't strong enough and the situation in Egypt was controlled colonizers and the people were fighting to get back their freedom, while the situation in Egypt was not free from the political parties conflicts. One of the ways of the movement was the call to Islam through mass gathering in the mosques, cafés, and also through writing notes and pamphlets, lectures, speeches and standing against the preaches and missioners.

After that, the ideology of the movement turned from guidance and organized activities. They believed that getting over the government offices and its institution is an effective way to reach its goals and supply it with greater resources to achieve what they look after and that establishing a nation and community with an Islamic foundation.

Departing from this ideology, the goals and means have changed that is possessing power became their target, that is why Jihad has become a substitute to wisdom and guidance but Jihad was left to those only able . Then the matter developed to battalions directed to work among charities to guide and teach and to found institutions, in that step good elements were chosen to take up the responsibility of jihad, the third stage was jihad. One of the battalion was assigned to assassinate the councilor khazindar, the Nigrashi the Prime Minister and tried to assassinate Jamal Abdulnasir.

The movement also refugee to assess their tools especially they could not reach to its objectives, where it thought some of the tools have become useless to reach at their goals. The first tool that has been reviewed is the guidance and exhortation, which were implemented by Hassan Albanna. The group thought that they are not enough and have limited effects in the mosques platforms because the exhortation platforms are seized under the dictator regimes, moreover, having access to the charity organizations and social reform activities are not enough to establish Muslims society and that is the success of counseling the rulers is related to their willing, desire and their ability to set up an Islamic community.

This tool was not used at Hassan Albanna's time, but after his death and the revolution. This view has changed because the change through a military coup is apt to change the same way, beside if they did so, their way of dealing will be the same as with others and that may lead to change the army to be a protective force to the regime instead of the country, as well as taking over the power by a military coup means imposing certain ideology or persons through force.

1 . Reformation Tools of Justice and Development Movement in Turkey:

Justice and Development Movement arrived and has found that Erbakan has used Islamism as an official ideology to dominate the society which led to a conflict between Islam and the state ended by the victory of Erbakan's society by gaining the first position in the parliament election in 1995, then followed by coups and then dissolving the Islamic parties several times. Erbakan refused any usury dealing and called for Islamic economy against liberalism with maintaining the religious values and discarding westernization and pulling back Turkey to its Islamic roots and moving towards the Islamic world and rejecting its membership to the European Union.

Erbakan and his follower represented the conservative wing, but the reformative wing was led by Rajab Tayib Erdogan and Abdullah Gul. Keeping off from Erbakan's policies has influenced the idea of Islamic nationalism and conflicting with the army, they realized that the surrounding environment has got different facts must be taken care of:

The divergence between secularism and Islam doesn't allow any common ground and threaten Turkish identify that is why they have to compromise and the party shouldn't abrogate the other because it leads to violence. The army shouldn't be enemies and its force should be recognized.

The Justice and Development party made use of Erbakan's experiences and put into account Turkey's territorial and international relationship and also realized that the religious conscience cannot be uprooted from the citizens and that the religion inflexibility will lead to smash the people that make them to twin between secular democracy and Islamic intentions. Before presenting their tools of reformation, the reformers performed a public opinion poll to survey the nature of the party that can be accepted by the people and the nature of the priorities that they would like to achieve. From here, the party started its success because it touched the peoples' needs.

One of its tools is to maintain flexibility and open relationship with the outer circle including the U.S.A and with the Turkish elites including Fethullah Gulen the leader of Nur Movement, also the army leaders as well as responded to the invitations from one of the Jewish organizations, the Israel ambassador and the British council, which was approved by Aordogan's personality that he enjoys. The awareness and understanding with these given findings derived the chief of the Justice and Development Party to choose his reformation tools carefully without paying any concession from Islam, which enabled him to apply the essence of Islam and his tools at the internal level.

Law command ship, transparency and complete accountability.

a. Separate the awareness of rights and freedom and participate the people in taking the decisions.
b. Decreasing the rate of unemployment and pursuing policies to achieve high efficiency in public administration.
c. Complying with modern, wise and realistic policies in education politics, law, culture, economics, arts, health and agriculture.
d. Indiscriminating between the people on the basis of religion, race or doctorine and rejecting all the conflicts departing from these grounds.
e. Granting women all their democratic rights.
f. Bestowing upon following wise economic policies to eradicate every imbalance in distributing the national income.

And they deny that secularism is an enemy to Islam and that the political parties are means to serve the society and their ultimate objectives is to reinforce sharing democracy. At the social level, they believe that social security is the responsibility of the state, so they have to look after weak sectors in the society. As far as their external policies, they adopt policies, which stand by their geographical location, departing from mutual interest according to the priorities of their foreign policies. This program, which was adopted by the party, gained the confidence of the Turkish people beside other factors and wins the elections. But the reasons of success of the party can be summarized in to two factors, the failure of the electors and the rejection of the people to most of the political and traditional figures and the second the diligence of the party and its good management to the election especially in persuading the voters to choose it. Also, the party convinced the electors by its honest slogans and its interest in true changing Turkey. Also the background of Rajab Tayab Ordogan which sprung from modest roots defending the culture and the traditional values in addition to the party's moderateness of Islam away from fundamentalism that was invented by Erbakan, and the party's concentration to fight corruption and accomplishing justice among Turkish people and also avoiding being pulled to side conflicts and its declaration of joining the E U, all these helped the party to reflect positive image to the west. One very important factor is that freeing the reformation concept in its Islamic context from fundamentalism which drives it to abolish the other. After winning the election, Ardogan adopted many procedures that led to increase his popularity inside and outside Turkey; one of them that his party is sticking on the constitution that announces Turkey is a democratic and secular country. At the internal level, the U.S.A welcomed this leadership.

Here only the policies of the party has won the enemies before friends and was able by getting over the crisis and the historical reality that reflects the sever conflict between the secular and Islamic institutions that diverted to be a model to be sought by many countries and followed in different political, social and economic aspects. Many institutions all over the world tried their best efforts to stand at this trial that applied the essence of Islam and kept away from the formalities in this way, the party has changed its methodology that represents the Islamic movement in Turkey, where the party accepted to work under the secular constitutional umbrella and ran after joining the European market without giving up its Islamic project.

2 . Reformation Tools of Taliban Movement

The most outstanding tools of Talipan movement are represented in their rigorous procedures that were compelled on the Afghani's people, some are as follow:

a. Banning women education and forbidden them sedition and punishing their husbands if their wives disobeyed them.
b. Prohibiting music, satellites any entertainments ways.
c. Forcing men to free their beard those shaved are denied jobs and praying in the mosques.
d. Banning drugs use and disallowing statues in the shops.
e. Rejecting dealing with any financial interest.
f. The Afghans' move from a very restricted vision, They instigated tens of Pakistan's students to participate in wars, they really formed an unneglected force, they reached in two years to about 50 thousand fighters.
g. Some of Their Eminent Tools:-
h. Relying on the military forces and Jihad as a suitable way to rescue the people from the civil war between the chiefs of Jihad fighting for power.
i. Depending on the cultural tools in the form of magazines issued by the name of the movement in many languages.

But there are many Afghan's who do not agree with the restricted policies, those were committed by Mulla Omar and other movement leaders through the ministry of commanding kindness Manner and Denying Evilness which drove them to deny the leadership. Some people see that the reason behind the international community enmity to Taliban is their restricted system and their guarding and protection to Osama Bin Ladin.

The Reformation Tool of Al-Qaida Organization

The vision of Al-Qaida moves from that the non-Islamic world has run a war compels them to establish Jihad as an obligation deed and based for its reformative tools taking off from this convection, some are as follow:

a. Cooperation and collaboration with the Islamic movement in other Arab countries to denounce and the ruling secular governments and support the Muslim minorities in different countries.
b. Communicating and dealing with the west on the equal basis and with the language backup by a military.
c. Money hiperdoration and necessary logistics support to the Jihad movements.
d. Suicidal attacks as highly effective means.
e. Using technology in its war against the international forces through supplying the newspapers with the messages and data that published in Jihad's website movements.
f. Founding service affects and military camps to collect and train the youth muslims from different parts of the world and convincing them fighting against the soviets in Afghanistan, and intended to coordinate with the chief of jihad organization Ayman Alzwahri who was welcomed in Afghanistan for his position and their expectation to receive aids and supports possible to be handed to the movement in addition to the consideration that the fighting experience can be employed and used to the Arabs Afghanis.
g. Formed the international Islamic front to fight and jihad the Jewish and the Christians in the mid of fep1998 and that was a great turning point to Alquaida which was formed and signed by Osama Bin Ladin, Ayman Azwahri and number of the Islamic leaders. The front named and specified fighting the Americans and the Jewish all over the world.
h. Establishing a fundamentalistic party in different muslim countries.
i. Political assassinetiaus to some of the political symbols and attacking tourism.
j. Blessing the military operations performed by the organization to adopt distributing these operation roles, some of them, the attack against the American Embassies in Nirobi and Dar Alsalm, exploding the koal in Yemen's port Adan in october2000.
k. Attacking the international trade and the pentagon towers.

(IV)

Reformation tools and the conditions of efficiency and commandship:

Because the reformation, this study focuses on the concept and the tools of the movement be long to Islam, that is why it should departs from the overall vision of the realization and its goals and intents, which requires true understanding to the essence of Islam and not obligating the guardianship on the worshippers on the name of religion, as well, it dose not mean confining in the past and not to be reoccupied from the present and the future and also not discriminating between the means and the goals.

From this departure point, the study tries to standardize number of parameters through them the effectiveness of these movements can be measured that can be narrowed in the following: Reformation requires construction not destruction and diagnosing the illness to fit the drug and releasing the concept shariaa and to look at it as an aim to protect human being at the first rate and then connecting it with the reality of the people and visioning its future, also, freeing the self from believing in its identity from absolute wrongness to all who stand against it.

The operation of reformation is sized according to its nearness or farness from reality and the ability to employ the lessons of the past and benefiting from the experiences and the existing notches.These operation are connected primarily with self purity and which the correct origin which starts from within (God does not change any people unless they change themselves).

Reformation is set of being far from immaturity or roughness in the speech or exercise and working lord in studying the fundamentals of Islam. Reformation needs taking lessons and gaining experiences fro the past to avoid any reversal results. Reformation needs solidity and strengthening the inner parts because it's the ultimate way to build and immure the nation from any external greediness.

So, the question is, to what extent do these standards identify with the reformation tools in the Islamic political movements? Do they practice into lerancy with all the available easy measures? Do they choose their reformation tools for calling from being kind or rough? Dose the concept they call at touch the needs of their societies and nations or kept away in conflicting in secondary issues? The above are the standards from which one can measure or consider the performance of the Islamic movements.

According to the mentioned measures, the study counts the following observations:

The Islamic movements present themselves as an alternative or a substitution to the ruling regimes as well, they assume that they possess general principles to regulate all life aspects; they do not accept Islam to be only as a worshiping but also a religion and a state. This concept of religion makes the movement believe on it as an important and decisive too for the change and reformation.

The use of violence from some Islamic movements resulted from it gaining some hostility and reflecting negative image as (Alqaida and Talipan) which compelled the world to form alliance against them, which outcome a confine them and regularly targeting the Islamic symbols especially after 11th September, and other reflections that touched the Arabic and Islamic identity that drove to many political and strategic changes that enable the U.S.A to penetrate strongly in different parts of the world under many incentives aimed of dismantling the financial ability of the international Islamic front and Taliban's government. The U.S.A has succeeded in distorting Islam and Muslims image, which means selecting the improper method will lead to an ineffective and disable result and rather may guide to negative outcome. Al-Qaida organization and Islamic Brotherhood Movement in Egypt have some common features, one of them that they are both internationally stamped and overseased to different countries. These Islamic movement challenge the greatest economic and military power, that is the U.S.A, moreover, Taliban and Al-Qaida biased to jihad as a reformation tool either by direct fighting, or social operation or through speeches and addresses those published in the websites.

All the Islamic movement in their efforts agrees, except the Justice and Development party who announces to establish a secular constitution, on establishing an Islamic state. The Justice and Development party proved its ability to match between secularism and Islam in Turkey and founded the principles of the Islamic state as provided during Alma Dinah state at the time of the prophet Mohammed (pbuh) concerning the citizenship and good neighborhood. But the first model resulted to the conflict within them and between their national governments, and some of them started fatal struggles even with their national state, but for Bin Ladin, changing the Sandi regime wasn't a goal that is why some of them were sanctioned and narrowed down their paths.The strong attacks that faced Agaida's camps in Afghanistan led to distract their bases, but he could maintain them with the appearance of some signs of its continuity and efficiency in spite of the assassination of

their spiritual leader and their financer Osama Bin Ladin. Also squeezing the brotherhood in Egypt and the inefficiency of their tools forced them to review their methodology and tools.

The changing of the Islamic movements from the educational reformation programs to the organized political activities created a problem these movements and the ruling regimes, as the ruling regimes are featured for suppressing public freedoms and the unavailability of any constitutional mechanism allows the participation or the circulation of power, and consequently, Islamists power conflict appeared recently as an urgent problem on the was of the hiking in the late of the 20th century in most of the Arabian counties like Egypt, Algeria, Tunnis, Bahrain and others, the revolutions those wittnessed in the Arabian regions recently were the results of these polices.

Conclusion

It is here by that we can conclude to the facts that led the politicians of the Islamic movements to concentrate on the oriented political activities is to reach to power, which is considered as a pass way to achieve the Islamic state and a passage retain the Islamic Khilafa, as well that refers to the native of the regimes and their trend of dealing and the international situation. Even to say, these movements have what to be justified to shift from the educational reformation method and focusing on the regular oriented works, especially with the multiplicity of the reformation tools and their graduation in the Islamic vision, where it begins with the individual responsibility until it reaches to the (call) Dave methodology until the states of forgiveness and giving ness and that up to the human demands to be treated equally. Here the offensiveness and hostility becomes legal unless becomes over passed and unfair offense, in same cases, reaches to the order to fight. But in all cases and circumstances, hostility or offense in forbidden becomes was in Islamic has its conditions but if Muslims are obliged, they must be unwilling or have to undergo it.

The political Islamic movement have to have a comprehensive view of the Islamic value and shouldn't compromises from the Islam's principles by means that are detested by Islam. With all considerations, local or international, that pushed and contributed many movements to adopt violence, but the future of these movements is conditioned by restoring the concept of Jihad and not confined to fight but should concern to amend the real issues and constrains because it is the way to maintain power it reached

with respecting the people's interest and then grading up in the reformation tools and selecting more effecient and effective tools matching the age of the religion.

In spite of the distinguished role that is played by the leaders in reformation process generally and in political especially, but the reformation operation is social operation requires the society to take an active part in it. In the formula of review that is taken by the Islamic movements, they should benefit from the most successful modules to present a perfect and ideal image about Islam and Islamic symbols.

Re-evaluating property the realistic doctrine and understanding the essence of Islam where Almadinah constitution represented the best modules to deal with the others.

It is proved that the did not fruit the required reformation results, they should make use of the Turkish trail offered by the Justice and Development party which deeply belongs to Islamic and succeeds in achieving the supreme essence and directions of Islam without driving away from the disputable and controversial issues and touches the people's needs to make politics practically and really guardian to the interest of the people.

The effectiveness of the tools in connected with the revisions and over taking the obstacles like the ignorance of Islamic; the calls against Islam, not giving up and searching getting desperate from the repeated suggestion by ignoring the international barriers as the strong foreign influence, secular regimes and the negative international situation through developing new tools and methodologies to deal with them. Then overtaking internal constraints like disuniting and conflicting within which loses the movements its harmony which is considered as the greatest danger that should be over passed. Through regulation and planning they can provide and arrange public base with confirmation of the religion humanitarian dimension which is one of the dimension that is absent from the thought and practicing of the Islamic movements.

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Sufism and Modernity: A Comparitive Study of Contemporary Social Movements in Turkey and Egypt

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During the 20th century, a combination of the unprecedented challenges- secularized authoritarian state structures, a Western-inspired rationalist discourse and Islamic fundamentalist critique since the second half of the 19th century- led to a decline in traditional forms of Sufism. Sufi orders needed to adapt their traditions to the new circumstances, otherwise they would become moribund. Some Sufi orders transformed into new forms of collective action such as cultural and educational associations, social movements and political parties. At the same time, they developed strategies to face the challenges of modernity which normally involved collaboration with one of the dominant forces of the age: the nation state and its elitist class, Islamic modernism and fundamentalism, Western culture and globalization. The most prominent social movements today are those which have been able to collaborate with contemporary forces and to adapt to a changing environment. The transformation of Sufism as reflected in the Gülen Movement in Turkey and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt reflects the changes in various aspects of spiritual and activist Sufi tradition in a modern context.

Introduction

Early 20th century scholarship directed towards the study of Sufism, focused mainly on its mystical and non-political aspects. Most Orientalist scholarship treated Sufism as a medieval concept of mystical beliefs or a philosophy that has little to do with the Islamic faith.[1] Orientalist scholarship also ignored Sufism's role in politics as well as its social and economic manifestations as

expressed in Sufi orders.[2] Furthermore, because Sufism is characteristically linked with traditional Islamic societies, many Orientalists assumed that modernity would eliminate Sufism.[3] More recent studies however, have tried to correct the picture and investigate modern forms and manifestations of Sufism. This research is founded on a project that was initiated by Carl Ernst who explains that "while the study of historical Sufism is essential, it needs to be juxtaposed with the exploration of Sufism's current manifestations to reveal its contemporary significance".[4] Today, Sufism is no longer exclusively confined within an organized Sufi order; instead it has become a significant aspect within many modern social movements. Therefore, unlike most of the earlier surveys of Sufism, this research does not primarily treat Sufism as a traditional phenomenon of the past. Instead, we will focus on contemporary manifestations of Sufism. This research will investigate the effect of modernity to illustrate that Sufism in our contemporary world, has not only a spiritual, but a social, economic, and most importantly a political dimension as well.

At the same time, the role of traditional Sufism in several movements and trends within the Islamic world has been commonly underestimated. Traditional Sufism acted as a conservative force to maintain an authentic Islam; it opposed European imperial expansion during the 19th century; and it acted as a moderating force for the foundation of popular support for 20th century political Islam.[5] However, the study of Islamic movements within the socio-political context of the 19th and 20th centuries' reformist movement, has produced scholarship that categorizes Islamic movements as either Sufi of a non-political nature or as socio-political movements of a fundamentalist, non-mystical nature. Hence, social movements in the Islamic world are either Sufi/mystical or socio-political, but never both. This gap in scholarship has created a dichotomy since the overlap of these two categories has been ignored. Therefore, scholarship continues to produce an inaccurate image of Islamic social movements.

The aim of this research is to address this dichotomy by exploring the relationship between mystical Sufism and political social movements. This overlap is exemplified in two social movements: the Gülen Movement in Turkey and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. These two contemporary Islamic social movements have adopted different aspects of Sufism within their organization, practice and their method of interaction with their surrounding social and political contexts. In this research, we will pin down the elements of Sufism in each of the social movements and compare and contrast them to one another. We will also attempt to understand the characteristics of each type of Sufism and the way these characteristics

relate to the traditional expressions of Sufism. Finally, we will illustrate how modern factors influenced and shaped these Sufi elements within the modern context. At the same time, this illustration will reflect the Sufi elements' level of centrality in advancing the social mobility of each social movement.

To carry out this task, it is essential to reference traditional Sufism in order to understand the components of its modern manifestations. Our main references to traditional Sufism are the Naqshbandiyya and the Shadhiliyya Orders. The Naqshbandiyya is among the most influential and widely-based orders in 19th century Turkey. The Shadhiliyya held the same significance in 19th century Egypt.

Before starting the analysis of our historical context, there are a few points concerning terminology which need to be clarified for further reference throughout this research. Firstly, the term social movement within the context of this research refers to "organized contentions structured through mechanisms of mobilization that provide strategic resources for sustained collective action".[6] For the most part, the study of Islamic social and political movements has focused on analyzing the ideology, structure, history and goals of certain Islamic actors without placing them within a framework.[7] Only recently has their study been incorporated within the Social Movement Theory Approach (SMT), which places Islamic movements within a plethora of theoretical and conceptual developments that have emerged on social movements and contentious politics.[8] Placing the three social movements in our study within this approach, they will be considered as rational, organized manifestations of collective action and not as irrational outbursts intended to alleviate psychological strains.[9] Religion, as only one of several dimensions of Islamic movements, will be regarded as an organizational resource and as a source of the mobilizing ideology.

It must also be noted that formal social movements are not the only pattern of organization available for movement mobilization. Recent studies show patterns of informal social networks in sustained collective action. They create what is known as 'social movement communities' comprised of informal networks of politicized participants who promote the goals of a social movement outside the boundaries of a formal organization.[10] Informal social networking is commonly used as a subtler form of activism and collective action in less open political systems where formal organization risks regime reprisal.[11] Since Turkey and Egypt each represent varying degrees of repressive political systems; our analysis will reflect forms of informal networking in each social movement.

The Gülen Movement

In Turkey, the Naqshbandiyya's activity was hampered by the establishment of the Turkish secular state. The ban imposed on Sufi activity by Ataturk's regime in 1925 along with intensified persecution in the aftermath of the Menemen Rebellion of 1930[12], caused the Naqshbandiyya and its o affshoots to go underground. When state inspection relaxed in the 1970s, the Naqshbandiyya resurfaced and developed strategies to face the challenges posed by modernity and a repressive state. These strategies have normally involved collaboration with one of the dominant forces of the age: the nation state and its elitist class, Islamic modernism and fundamentalism, Western culture and globalization.[13] At the same time, the Naqshbandiyya offshoots transformed gradually from being strictly religious associations into various new forms of a religious underpinning.[14] New forms of collective action included competing educational and cultural associations, social movements and political parties.[15] Thus, the Naqshbandiyya's transformation offered a high degree of social mobility both horizontally due to its production of society-centric Islamic movements; and vertically with its state-centric political parties.[16]

Said Nursi (d. 1960), a modernist adept of the Khalidiyya founded the Nurcu movement which gave birth to his successor who links closely to his ideology, Fethullah Gülen (b. 1938). Today, the neo-Nurcu Gülen Movement, founded and lead by Gülen, is the most outstanding of the Nurcu circles. While modern affiliates of the Naqshbandiyya-Mujaddidiyya-Khalidiyya, most notably Gülen himself, continue to successfully voice their vision of Islam in the national and global spheres, they have done so at the price of major modifications to their modes of operation and their commitment to the orthodoxy of the brotherhood.[17]

Gülen's Activist Piety

For modern Naqshbandis, to some extent or other, their mystical path was superseded by the modernist and fundamentalist readings of Islam. Prominent among those who have adapted their Sufi ideals to such readings, is the Gülen Movement.[18] Like his predecessor Nursi, Gülen's message is designed to substitute the Sufi *ṭarīqa* mode of religiosity which he found to be obsolete. He became convinced of the need to enlighten the masses in the various fields of learning and to demonstrate the truths of religion in the face of modernity. Gülen links his understanding of Sufism

to the first centuries, during which influential Sufis such as al-Ghazzali and Rumi[19] practised Sufism without following a *ṭarīqa* or a shaykh. Gülen has written lengthily in the various meanings related to Sufism, on the life of the Prophet Muhammad and on science and modernity. His writings include a collection of books and articles that are widely available in several languages including Turkish, English and Arabic. With an ideology which brings together modern reasoning and 12th century spirituality, Gülen's ideas reflect a unique combination of authenticity and modernity. This trend of thought has attracted a large number of followers not only in Turkey, but around the whole world.

At the same time, Gülen has not taken up modernity without criticism. To Gülen, the spiritual emphasis of Sufism provides a basis for purifying modern scientific study and its ethical inadequacies; and so it provides both a scientific and humane, religious approach to life.[20] Gülen believes that Islam is the middle way which leads to a critical engagement with modernity. His interpretation of Islam is a balance between materialism and spiritualism, rationalism and mysticism, worldliness and excessive asceticism and between this world and the hereafter.[21] He does so through enriching his followers with Sufi ideals and meanings to guide their morals. At the same time, he encourages them to engage with the modern world.

Gülen shares with the Naqshbandi tradition its commitment to orthodoxy, adherence to the shari'a and sunna and an emphasis on the afterlife which makes his followers' outlooks on life serious and active.[22] To him *taṣawwuf* and shari'a are two aspects of the same truth and so they cannot be separated. He believes that the sole performance of the external dimension related to the shari'a would result in a dry ritualistic practise whereas concentration on the inner Sufi dimension and rejecting the prescribed rituals would lead the individual to follow his own whims and proclivities.[23] Gülen's preservation of this fundamental principle is not only a continuation of the Naqshbandi tradition; it is also a form of adherence to the contemporary fundamentalist interpretation of Islam. Although the Salafi ideology is not entrenched within the Turkish community, it has become a widespread inclination in the Muslim world. Therefore, Gülen's ideas not only avoid confrontation with the Salafiyya, but they also have the potential to spread in the Arab world where the Salafiyya is much more influential. Indeed, Gülen's books are now translated into Arabic and are readily available at a bookstore established by the movement in Cairo.[24]

Since the Naqshbandi tradition is characterized by *ijtihād*, Gülen considers his new and adapted practices and ideas, a renewal of the Islamic tradition within its contemporary context. Indeed, Gülen's ideas are

specifically inspired by Ahmad Sirhindi[25] whose writings were concerned with the renewal of the spiritual teaching of the Naqshbandi tradition by focusing on the way of the Prophet instead of early Naqshbandi teachers.[26] Although his followers refer to him as *Hoca or Hocaefendi* (literally meaning teacher and traditionally used by Sufis to refer to their master), Gülen denies that he has this place among his followers and insists that it is out of respect that they refer to him using this term.[27] Instead of the traditional *ṭarīqa* system based on a close relationship between the shaykh and his disciples, Gülen's movement gathers around the study of his books, writings, and video-taped *vaaz* (sermons). He has appropriated the reading and debating of his writings to replace the guidance of Sufi masters; reminiscent of a devotional formula, his writings explain to his followers how they can incorporate Sufi ideals into their daily lives.[28] Gülen has dedicated a series of sermons to the discussion of the Prophet Muhammad which are compiled in a series of books under the title of, *Sonsuz Nur* (*The Eternal Light*). This series focuses on the Prophet as a role model to aid his followers to internalize spiritual meanings by following the example of the Prophet. At the same time however, his discussion of the life of the Prophet as a leader and a teacher in his sermons, sets the stage for the outward, activist aspect of Gülen's ideology.

The traditional *ṭarīqa's* defined path towards salvation does not exist for Gülen's followers. Rather than practising prescribed exercises and prayers, Gülen's followers see salvation as a result of good deeds and service to God which must be combined with an internal purification of oneself.[29] The discussion of internal purification is a Sufi aspect in Gülen's thought which is best reflected in his book, *Kalbin Zümrüt Tepeleri* (*Emerald Hills of the Heart*). This book explains key concepts in the practice of Sufism, by introducing and describing various stages of the Sufi path. Gülen describes Sufism as the moral dimension to one's existence which one must purify through practicing concepts intrinsic to the Sufi tradition such as *tawba* (repentance), *tafakkur* (reflection), *khawf* (fear) and *zuhd* (asceticism).[30] While *dhikr* in its congregational form as practised by Sufi orders has been abandoned in the Gülen Movement altogether, Gülen still emphasizes the importance of *dhikr* for his followers and they are committed to reading *zikirler* (a compilation of *dhikr*) on a daily basis.[31] Thus, a member of the Gülen Movement is meant to lead a serious life of high ethical and moral standards and work as hard as he/she can since other paths towards salvation are uncertain.

Gülen propagates a subtle religiosity described as active pietism by Özdalga. He calls for individual responsibility not only related to one's

inner life as a pious person, but also directed towards the outside.[32] This philosophy creates greater emphasis on action rather than traditional Sufi emphasis on contemplation and spirituality which are 'inactive'. His pietistic activist philosophy also encourages a critical 'rejection of the world' and not a 'flight from the world' characteristic of mystic Sufism.[33] With this rejection of the world however, Gülen advocates the organization of the society through rational, structured activities. Although the Naqshbandi tradition may not have directly articulated an activist dimension within its ideology, it has clearly practised this concept through continuous engagement in the developments of its surroundings. Hence, Gülen's articulation of this dimension seems to be an extension of a deeply rooted concept within Naqshbandi tradition.

An essential element appropriating the success of his movement is the collaboration of Gülen's ideas with modernity and Western-inspired rationalist culture. He propagates an ideology which engages critically with modernity and tradition, with science and religion and with Westernization and Islamic values.[34] Instead of opposing modernity, Gülen incorporates an emphasis on science and reason as fundamental aspects of his ideology. Just like his predecessor Nursi, Gülen's message which combines faith with science provides his followers with a doctrine that allows them to be good Muslims as well as followers of the secular sciences.[35] Several of Gülen's writings reflect an emphasis on the significance of knowledge and learning in all of its fields. In his book, *Ölçü veya Yoldaki Işıklar* (Pillars or Lights on the Road), a compilation of his reflections on various concepts, life and society; Gülen begins with the discussion of the purpose of knowledge and learning.[36] For Gülen, true knowledge is that which is in coordination with scientific proofs and information.[37]

Society-Centric Projects

Sufi networks in the contemporary world are no longer confined to a spiritual practice but they also constitute powerful transnational economic, political and social entities.[38] While most Naqshbandi-related groupings transformed themselves from purely religious networks to informal educational and cultural associations they still remained within the Naqshbandi tradition. On the other hand, the Nurcu Movement and its offshoots, most notably the Gülen Movement, transcended it. The movement has been responsible

for investing in secular instead of religious education, for building secular schools instead of mosques, for encouraging economic enterprises and requiring them to invest in education and for supporting collective self-criticism and planning for the future.[39] Thus, Gülen and his followers come across as social activists seeking salvation through good deeds and ethical conduct.[40] Gülen's approach and activities reflect an understanding of Sufism which is capable of assimilating modern tools and acculturating to differing social, economic and political environments.

Gülen's philosophy is congregational and encourages collective activism through group projects in the community.[41] At the same time, the Gülen Movement has adopted a gradualist, accommodative approach to establish itself and expand; it has shifted from the state-centric Naqshbandi tradition to a society-oriented one. An expanding private economy in Turkey has given the Gülen Movement the opportunity to practise its philosophy. The Gülen Movement incorporates an intricate network of businesses which helps it build a strong educational enterprise with several universities and colleges and a vast communication empire.[42] The Gülen Movement also operates private high schools, hospitals and an Islamic banking chain (Bank Asya) which together creates a strong, reliable social and economic network for the movement. The movement also provides for its members, opportunities of upward social mobility; Nurcu/Gülen connections are useful in establishing businesses, obtaining credit and scholarships from education and political positions.[43] Thus, the incorporation of powerful businessmen in the movement satisfies different needs of its members.

Gülen projects great keenness on scientific and educational advancement of his followers. By the year 2000, the Gülen Movement had actively established 300 hundred schools and seven universities in over 50 countries.[44] The application of Gülen's approach is reflected in the schools built by his movement which provide a modern, scientific education. Such schools adopt teach Sufi values and ethics by example of role models, without brainwashing students into following a specific ideology.[45] Such a practise is closely related to the Khalidi tradition which focused on the example Prophet to teach values. At the same time however, these school as well as summer camps which are regularly set up by the movement, play a vital role in spreading Gülen's message and ideas among the youth.

Gülen's realization of the importance of print culture and the media is a reflection of his engagement with a globalizing world. Such engagement has had a vital role in making his group into a mass religious social movement.[46] Today, Gülen's followers have founded a media network; they are the

proprietors of the daily newspaper, Zaman, several magazines such as Sızıntı and Yeni Ümit, a radio channel called Radyo Nur and the television channel Samanyolu Televizyonu as well as printing houses and publication companies (eg. Nil Publication).[47] The Gülen Movement also established the Turkish Teachers' Foundation which publishes a monthly journal and two academic journals and organises symposia, panel discussions and conferences.[48] Such media outlets and academic activities have been used to spread Gülen's ideas on subjects such as academia, the relationship between religion and science and the importance of interfaith dialogue.[49]

Among the most central of these ideas are love, compassion and tolerance to peoples of other religions and the importance of interfaith dialogue. The Gülen-established Journalists' and Writers' Foundation specifically promotes and acts in accordance to this message.[50] Although Gülen links the importance of interfaith dialogue to Sufism, the Naqshbandi tradition has not reflected such a tendency. Gülen's emphasis on interfaith dialogue could be considered his *ijtihād* and renewal of the spiritual teachings of the faith. Gülen's engagement with globalization is also apparent in his substitution of personal contact between master and disciple with advanced mass means of communication such as the internet. The number of internet websites that are dedicated to his ideas and writings are extremely abundant and available in several languages.[51] This has lead to a transformation in the character of the Gülen Movement from a traditional Naqshbandi lodge-based, small-sized community, to a textual-based, global community which has expanded all the way from the Turkic states, to Europe, America and even the Arab world.

Relationship with the State

Gülen's relationship with the state is different to the relationship of the Naqshbandi tradition. Although the Naqshbandi tradition was founded on cooperation with the state as exemplified in the previous chapter, many historical occasions of confrontation with the state, show that the Naqshbandiyya's cooperation and appropriation of government support was only to a limit. For example, while the Naqshbandiyya fully supported the Turkish War of Independence, it protested against the secular transformation of the system by Mustafa Kemal.[52] Furthermore, the Naqshbandi leaders led popular anti-reform movements against Westernization including: the Shaykh Said Rebellion (1925), the Menemen Rebellion (1930), and the Iskilip Rebellion (1936).[53] Hence, the Naqshbandiyya-Khalidiyya, actively

modernized and revived their political ideology, but they were not ready to forgo fundamental principles in order to receive the support of the state.

Gülen is critical of this confrontational approach and does not believe that politics is a vital principle of religion which makes him opposed to most political Islamic parties.[54] Gülen propagates an ethic of co-operation and peaceful activism.[55] He takes a low profile vis-à-vis politics and his approach reflects much greater cooperation with the secular state. Gülen cooperation with a secular state is in the form of avoiding direct engagement with formal politics. His work, as we saw, is centred on social, cultural and economic spheres outside the bounds of state control. Gülen's seems to be a pragmatic choice within an environment which has been hostile enough to totally eliminate his predecessors. However, Gülen does have influence over politics through his media outlets, businesses and Islamic banking, and his educational empire. His activity in the educational and financial sector brings him into contact with political figures. His schools in Turkic states make him an unofficial part of the government initiative to expand Turkish influence in Turkic states.[56] Furthermore, Gülen's visit to the Vatican in 1998, where he was received by Pope John Paul II who conveyed his satisfaction with Gülen's activism in interfaith dialogue, is an example of Gülen global significance.[57] Therefore, although Gülen is not directly involved in politics through a political party for example, his role in the Turkish society is highly politicized.

The Muslim Brotherhood

Although the Muslim Brotherhood has been more traditionally associated with the Salafiyya and an anti-Sufi inclination, the Muslim Brotherhood as delineated by its founder Hassan al-Banna (d. 1949), shows great affinity towards some forms of traditional Sufism. Al-Banna defined the movement as 'a Salafiyya message, a Sunni way and a Sufi truth, as well as a 'political organization, an athletic group, a cultural-educational union, an economic company, and a social idea'.[58] The politically active and violent history of the brotherhood as well as the criticism of its later members to Sufism may obscure the fact that the Muslim Brotherhood's spiritual ideas and non-political activity were to most members the more important part of their membership.[59] At the same time, the political passivity of most Sufi orders in Egypt during the modern era and their non-adherence to shari'a, sunna and '*ilm* made it less viable for al-Banna to fully associate with the Sufi tradition in Egypt. This social movement is a clear reflection of the intersections

between Islam fundamentalism of a Salafi trend, political activism in its fight against imperialism and an authoritarian state and Sufism in its emphasis of the spiritual devotion and development of its members.

The Sufi Truth

Al-Banna the Sufi

The Muslim Brotherhood is significantly older than the other two social movements under study. While the emphasis on the ideology of Gülen who is still alive and Kuftaru who only passed away recently may seem reflective of the movements' ideologies, a focus on al-Banna's (who died more than sixty years ago) ideas may seem less applicable to the contemporary practices of the movement. It is true that the Muslim Brotherhood has evolved greatly since the time of al-Banna; however, the ideas of al-Banna remain a fundamental reference for the Brotherhood. Al-Banna's ideas and writings form the textual base of the groups which theoretically directs the Muslim Brothers until today.

Since the early part of his life, al-Banna was a member of the Hasafiyya Brothers, a sub-branch of the Shadhiliyya known for its commitment to *'ilm,* shari'a and sunna. Hassanayn al-Hasafi, founder of Al-Hasafiyya al-Shadhiliyya was an Azhari scholar, his teachings were founded upon the principle of *'ilm* and *ta'lim*, *fiqh*, fighting *bida'*(innovations) and adherence to shari'a and sunna.[60] Al-Banna read avidly on the founders of the order and on Sufism, becoming an ardent member the *dhikr* circles and committed to reciting *al-waẓifa al-razukiyya*[61] as a disciple of Shaykh al-Hasafi.[62] Influenced by al-Ghazzali's teachings, al-Banna interpreted Sufism as based on activism and involvement in the world.[63] To him, the path of true Sufism was sincerity and work in the service of humanity rather than asceticism and withdrawal from the world.[64] In his memoirs, he explained that on several occasions his shaykh guided his followers and others to avoid *bida'* and adhere to shari'a.[65] While his Sufi brothers spoke extensively about the miracles (*karamat*) of the shaykh, it was the practical side of the shaykh and not those *karamat* which founded in al-Banna the greatest levels of admiration and appreciation for his shaykh.[66] In his memoirs he also mentioned that: "And if God wills and the power of knowledge of al-Azhar, met with the spiritual power of the *ṭuruq* and with the functional power of the Islamic movements, it would be a nation with no equal".[67] Indeed, al-Banna tried to create an all-encompassing movement with social, economic and political dimensions as well as spiritual and educational ones.

Indoctrination

Al-Banna saw Sufism's purification of the self as a method for spiritual pedagogy and the basis of the Muslim Brotherhood's message.[68] This is particularly the aspect of traditional Sufism which al-Banna incorporated into his social movement. Al-Banna found that the most valuable aspect in Sufism to be *'ilm al-tarbiyya wa-l-suluk* (science of pedagogy and conduct). To him, this knowledge was vital to organize a special way of life that would take the individual through the levels of *dhikr*, *'ibada* (worship) and *ma'rifa* (knowledge of God), which are all stages within a Sufi path.[69] There are many references that reflect a commitment on the part of al-Banna to learn and teach his followers in the Sufi path. For example, Said Hawwa mentions in his book, *Mudhakkarat fi Manazil al-Siddikin wa-l-Rabaniyyin*: *min khilal Nusus wa Hikam Ibn 'Ata' Allah al-Sakandari (Treaties on the Ranks of the Righteous and the Devoted from the Clauses and Wisdoms of Ibn 'Ata' Allah al-Sakandari)*[70] - that one of al-Banna's companions narrated how al-Banna taught *al-ḥikam* to a special group of his students.[71] Today, the books of Said Hawwa, specifically a series of three books including the one mentioned above, in addition to *Tarbiyatuna al-Rawhiyya* (*Our Spiritual Pedagogy*) and *Al-Mustakhlas fi Tazkiyyat al-Anfus (The Essentials for the Purification of the Self),* discuss Sufi spiritual pedagogy. These books are among the important reference books for the members of the Muslim Brotherhood today. At the same time, several of the Muslim Brotherhood's members have been known Sufi scholars such as Shaykh Tantawi al-Jawhari who was a prominent personality inside and outside of Egypt during the early 20th century, a professor at Dar al-'Ulum in Cairo University known for his great knowledge and intellect, a committed member of the Brotherhood and a well known Sufi.[72]

According to al-Banna's teachings, the spiritual development of members takes on the form of an organized instruction through several methods which form the basis of *al-tarbiyya al-rawḥiyya.* Similar to initiation in Sufi orders, the initiation of members into the Brotherhood is carried out by taking the 'oath of the brotherhood' which is the primary expression of loyalty.[73] Initiation takes place after the completion of a preliminary spiritual, functional, and educational process to make the individual ready to enter the brotherhood.[74] The term used to refer to the taking of the oath or pledging allegiance to the Brotherhood is the same as the Sufi term *bay'*, which also denotes a *murid's* initiation into a *ṭarīqa*. After this step, the member participates in extensive instruction and spiritual education which to a great extent resembles the idea

of *khalwa* and *suḥba* where a *murid* receives personal spiritual instruction from the *murshid*. Because the number of members in the Brotherhood is much greater than the number of *murids* in a *ṭarīqa*, spiritual instruction is not carried out through direct personal instruction of the *murshid*.

Spiritual instruction is instead carried out within smaller groups in a system of families (*usar*), which was created as an alternative method of maintaining close relationships among the members despite the growing number of the group. This method is comparable to the innovation of circles in the Kuftariyya order. The family (*usra*) is regarded by the Brotherhood as the most fundamental of its educational (*tarbiyya*) tools.[75] The *usra* which meets weekly, is headed by a *naqib* (head), who is delegated an amount of authority over and responsibility for his members. The member is prescribed personal, social and financial duties which include among others: sincere and industrious practice of the rituals of faith.[76] Even more similar to the *khalwa* tradition, is the *katiba* system which included personal spiritual instruction by al-Banna himself during his lifetime. One night a week or month (frequencies have changed from the time of al-Banna), a group of *usar* meet for training which involves a rigorous and sustained night vigil, with a minimum of sleep and a maximum of common and private prayer and meditation.[77] The *katiba* reflects the exercise of traditional Sufi practices in its emphasis of meditation, vigils and rigorous training. Al-Banna used to dedicate a period during the *katiba* for the explanation of a *wird*[78] which would revolve around a specific meaning that al-Banna wanted his followers to internalize.[79] For example, to convey to his followers the meaning of faith, *wird al-imān* would be explained, recited and later memorized and recited regularly by the attendees of the *katiba*.[80] Likewise, the meanings of loyalty or sincere devotion would be explained through *wird al-wafa'* and *wird al-ikhlas* respectively. Furthermore, one of the treaties in *Rasai'l al-Imam al-Banna*[81] titled, *al-Ma'thurat*, which refers to a compilation of *dhikr*[82], a*wrad* (pl *wird*) and *ad'iya* (supplications) that are thought to have been handed down through the Islamic spiritual heritage, for different occasions and times of the day.[83] Such *awrad* and *dhikr* have been documented and they remain important devotional practices for the members of the Brotherhood. Therefore, just in Sufi orders, *dhikr* is emphasized and taught as a regular ritual which the members should commit to. Through our analysis, it is apparent that the spiritual dimension of the Brotherhood is closely linked to Sufi tradition. The Brotherhood's spirituality however, is less affiliated with popular 19th Shadhili tradition, which like most Sufi orders in Egypt illustrated different inclinations as explained previously.

Social Activism

The Muslim Brotherhood is a mass movement that attracts membership from all socio-economic classes of the Egyptian society. Al-Banna made public health an important part of his social reform program as a means to tackle vast national health problems. The members of the Society were among the first to bring medical care to the countryside.[84] As a grassroots movement, the Brotherhood later established educational and healthcare facilities which act as an alternative to those provided by the state.[85] The Brotherhood's social welfare activities are a reflection of its spiritual activist philosophy. These institutions have enabled the Brotherhood to disperse its ideology among a large sector of the middle and lower classes of Egyptian society. At the same time, the Brotherhood includes wealthier members who own business enterprises help support and fund the organization. In the 1980s, eight of the eighteen families who dominated Egypt's private sector, were affiliated with the Brotherhood.[86] The Brotherhood has also developed a media network which helps spread the Brotherhood's ideas and respond to its criticisms.[87] These roles illustrate that the Muslim Brotherhood has expanded much farther beyond a mere religious movement. In fact, it is this expansion into various facets of the Egyptian society, which has kept the Muslim Brotherhood alive in a modernizing Egyptian context which includes severe state opposition.

The Brotherhood's utilization of modern means of communication to spread its message across a globalizing world reflects the Society's collaboration with globalization. The second general conference[88] held in 1933, was dedicated to the discussion of advertising and instructional propaganda. The conference members authorized a small company for the establishment of a press outlet for the Brotherhood.[89] The Muslim Brotherhood makes extensive use of print and oral means of communication to spread its message among its own members and the whole of the Egyptian community. The Brotherhood began publishing a weekly magazine called *Majallat al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin* (the Newspaper of the Muslim Brothers) in1933.[90] This paper was followed by a political weekly, *al-Nadhir* (the Warner) in 1938 and a daily newspaper called *Jaridat al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin* (the Muslim Brothers) in 1946 which exemplify the Brotherhood's keenness on taking advantage of modern communication means. The Brotherhood's use of modern communication means has also played a vital role in spreading al-Banna's teachings. A committee was responsible for collecting, systemizing and republishing a major part of al-Banna's written

works, especially *al-Rasa'il* which are a vital reference for the members of the Brotherhood.[91] Today, the Brotherhood has official English and Arabic websites which address the global community. These websites continuously update the Brotherhood's members and the general Egyptian public with the organization's news and opinions on a variety of issues including politics and education.[92]

It would be beyond the limitations of this research to expound on each aspect of the Brotherhood's socio-economic activism. It is however clear at this point that unlike traditional Sufi orders which depended on cooperation with the state, it is the Muslim Brotherhood's social activism in all facets of life which has contributed to the expansion of the organization's influence and membership. Indeed, the Brotherhood's educational and socio-economic roles along with its use of modern communication means have allowed it to become a global movement.

Organizational Structure and Political Agenda

In terms of organizational structure and functions, the Muslim Brotherhood illustrates clear departure from the Shadhili tradition. Al-Banna saw that Sufism transgressed what he defined as its pure form – *dhikr*, asceticism, worship, and intuitive and mystical perception of God – and had become mixed with foreign elements such as 'the sciences of philosophy and logic and the heritage and thought of ancient nations'.[93] He felt that divisions, corruption and competitiveness among the organized groups had greatly harmed Sufism in the contemporary world. Thus, al-Banna made no effort to present his own organization as a *ṭarīqa*.[94] Al-Banna created a highly organized movement which is guided by regulations that were drafted since his time and continue to be reviewed by a consultative body and guidance council. The Muslim Brotherhood in no way resembles the organizational model of a *ṭarīqa*, instead it is much closer to a modern company or political party. The Brotherhood is headed by the General/Supreme Guide (*al-murshid al-'ām*), and includes: a consultative assembly, a guidance council, a deputy, secretariat, committees and both technical and field subsections.[95] Unlike a *ṭarīqa*, where the *murshid* takes on an authoritarian-type of role, the Supreme Guide of the Brotherhood shares his authority. The Supreme Guide is directed by three main parts: the Guidance Council, the highest administrative unit within the organization; the Consultative Assembly, the general consultative council; and by the Fundamental Law, a collection of regulations in the form of articles which direct the internal and external

functions of the Brotherhood.[96] The articles within the Fundamental law are updated through amendments which the Guidance Council votes on. Unlike the *murshid* of a *ṭarīqa* who is not elected and remains the head until his death, the Fundamental Law requires the council to hold elections every six years to elect a Supreme Guide. Although this law theoretically distinguishes the Brotherhood from traditional orders, all *murshids* of the Muslim Brotherhood stayed in their position as Supreme Guide until their death except for Muhammad Mahdi Akef who did not renew his term but instead resigned six-month before its termination in 2009.[97] It is apparent from such illustrations in the function of the Brotherhood that its organization is at least in theory, quite similar to a Western-inspired democratically lead organization rather than a traditional Sufi order.

Likewise, although some Shadhili sub-branches have been politically involved during history, the political involvement of the Brotherhood transcends that of traditional Sufi orders. Furthermore, when compared to popular Sufi orders in Egypt who maintained an apolitical or passive approach, the Muslim Brotherhood reflects intense political activism. For example, the Muslim Brotherhood had a significant role during Egypt's fight against imperialism and in the 1947 war on the Palestinian lands.[98] The Brotherhood's violent acts and inclination to oppose instead of cooperate with the state, clearly distinguishes it from traditional Sufism in Egypt. Yet, when compared to the Naqshbandiyya, we may see in such actions some parallels between the political ideology of Brotherhood and traditional Sufism in its fight against imperialism and secular states. Furthermore, recent developments within the Brotherhood's political agenda which include the participation of its members as independent candidates in elections only after its failed attempts to create a political party, clarify that the Muslim Brotherhood does not consider itself a social movement with mere political underpinnings.[99] Instead, the Muslim Brotherhood has increasingly developed into an organization reminiscent of a political movement.

Concluding Remarks

The two contemporary social movements – the Gülen Movement and the Muslim Brotherhood, reflect the way Sufism has transformed during the 20th century. A common feature shared among the social movements is that they have each transformed in form and structure and transcended the social, economic and political functions of a traditional Sufi order during the 19th century. Each of these movements has either abandoned the *ṭarīqa* formation or relegated it to a secondary role. The dominance of social,

economic, political and educational roles, which have been suited to each movement's priorities and national contexts, reflects the transformation of their spheres of influence.

Because the Naqshbandiyya reflected a unique ability to adapt continuously to the changes in its environment, the social movements linked to it, the Gülen Movement reflects more commonalities with traditional Sufism than the similarities we see between the Shadhiliyya branches and the Muslim Brotherhood. In fact, the Muslim Brotherhood reflects closer affiliation with the Naqshbandiyya than it does with the Shadhiliyya for two main reasons. For one, traditional Sufism as exemplified by most Shadhiliyya branches were not as seen as committed to *'ilm*, shari'a and sunna. Secondly, traditional Sufism in 19th century Egypt took on a passive, apolitical role. Because the Naqshbandiyya was generally committed to adhering to shari'a, sunna and approaching *taṣawwuf* through *'ilm*, the mystical aspects of the three social movements are similar to the Naqshbandi tradition in that sense. At the same time, the Naqshbandiyya's activism is also a feature that is fundamental to the contemporary social movements who have translated this principle into more defined social, economic, educational and political roles.

The influence of modern forces – secular, authoritarian states, globalization, a Western-inspired rationalist discourse and the Salafiyya, is the underlying reason for the transformation of traditional Sufism in the directions we found. As exemplified in our two social movements each of them adapted, in varying degrees, to each of these forces. While some aspects of a traditional Sufi order were eliminated during this process of acculturation, other aspects were strengthened and developed. The political role of the Muslim Brotherhood and its relationship with the state is its most distinguishing feature; it places the Brotherhood apart from the other two movements who do not assume a clear political role and choose to either cooperate or create an alliance with the state. This political role also links the Brotherhood more deeply than its contemporaries with the revolutionary character of the Naqshbandiyya.

Another point that became apparent through our research is the convergence between activism and asceticism, politics and spirituality and fundamentalism and mysticism within the traditional context and even more so in the modern context of the Islamic World. Each of our social movements represented an example of the combination of commonly presumed incompatible trends. The Gülen Movement and the Muslim Brotherhood are clear examples of a union between activism and asceticism. They each

have a spiritual and political role. At the same time, each movement is to some extent or other, a reflection of the links between Sufism and the fundamentalist Salafiyya.

The two social movements have illustrated a revolution in their means of communication and methods of expansion. The global context has offered each the social movements modern means of communication and the ability to disperse their ideas globally through media networks, the establishment of educational institutions and the expansion their social, economic and political functions beyond their national borders. Modernity has thus been an opportunity and not just a challenge for these movements. At the same time however, modernity threatens to erase the remaining aspects of traditional Sufism within the contemporary movements. As their non-spiritual roles may potentially become even more central to the movements, the significance of the spiritual dimension is likely to diminish. Furthermore, modernity may continue to transform the very nature of the various faculties and characteristics (spiritual and non-spiritual) of the social movements which

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13 Weismann, 147.
14 Yavuz, 129-146.
15 Weismann, 132.
16 Yavuz, 129.
17 Weismann, 147.
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22 Elisabeth Özdalga, 'Worldly Asceticism in Islamic Casting: Fethullah Gülen's Inspired Piety and Activism', Middle East Critique 9:17 (2000), 92.
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59 Mitchell, 209.
60 Hassan al-Banna, Mudhakkarat al-Da'wa wa-l-Da'iya (Cairo 1951), 20.
61 A waẓifa is a collection of dhikr compiled by the shaykh and given to the followers so that they can recite it during certain times of the day. For example, al-Banna mentions that he recited this dhikr every morning and evening.
62 Al-Banna, *Mudhakkarat al-Da'wa wa-l-Da'iya, 20. Mitchell*, 2
63 Mitchell, 3.
64 Mitchell, 6.
65 Al-Banna, *Mudhakkarat al-Da'wa wa-l-Da'iya*, 20-21.
66 Al-Banna, *Mudhakkarat al-Da'wa wa-l-Da'iya,* 20.
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72 'Abd al-Halim, 184-187.
73 Mitchell, 196.
74 Hassan al-Banna , 'Risalat al-Ta'lim' in Majmu'at Rasa'il al-Imam al-Shahid Hassan al-Banna (Cairo 2002), 372- 385.
75 Mitchell, 195.
76 Mitchell, 198.
77 Mitchell, 196.
78 A wird is a section of the Qur'an which is recited during a specified time of day or night devoted to private worship (in addition the five daily prayers) in J. Milton Cowan (ed) Hans Wehr: A Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic (Beirut 198), 1061. The repitition of this wird is a form of performing dhikr, which is a main Sufi ritual in Paulo Pinto 'Sufism and the Religious Debate in Syria', 195.
79 'Abd al-Halim, 151-159.
80 'Abd al-Halim, 151-159.
81 Majmu'at Rasa'il al-Imam al-Shahid Hassan al-Banna (The Collection of the Treaties of the Martyr, the Imam Hassan al-Banna) is a compilation of al-Banna's 13 treaties (rasa'il) which he wrote as a collection of the fundamentals of the Brotherhood. Also known as al-Rasa'il (The Treaties) includes the discussion of Brotherhood's philosophy, relations with the state, an economic program, women and education. The Treaties are a fundamental reference for the Brotherhood until today.
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Modernization of Turkey and Evolution of the Nur Movement under Single Party and Democrat Party (1925-1960)

Kasım İleri

Introduction

Social revolutions cannot be accomplished without a discourse which legitimizes the ideology behind it. In other words, in order to transform or reform the values of a society two sources of legitimacy are required. The first source is related to the need for revolution and the second source is related to the substituting values. The reformer has to show the factors which require a revolution and also has to show the source where he will import the components of the revolution. In that sense, according to Şerif Mardin Turkish revolution can be accepted as a revolution because it presents certain flaws in the structure of the Ottoman legacy as a source of legitimacy for transformation and directs the public to the western modernity as a source of transformation (Mardin, 2006: 196).

The Turkish revolution in first half of the twentieth century was based on two pillars namely secularism and nationalism (Nereid, 1997; Mardin, 2006; Aktürk, 2010). Shortly after the declaration of the republic in Turkey in 1923 Mustafa Kemal and his fellows began to "modernize" the state and society by adopting a secular and nationalist ideology and transformed all of the institutions and ideologies remained from Ottoman legacy. According to Mardin, "the idea of Islamic community" was one of the "ultimate legitimating symbols of the society" and it was replaced with "the secular ideology of the republic […] and the idea that the future of Turkey consisted in the elaboration of a modern society taking its cues from Western solidarism and positivism" (Mardin, 1989: 157). Such a transformation could not be realized in a fully democratic political arena because Turkish society at that time was

still under the influence Ottoman legacy and Islam. Therefore, this transformation took twenty five years under single party regime (People's Party later Republican People's Party). The authoritative regime closed down the public sphere and prevented the construction of a public opinion criticizing the new regime. In 1950 for the first time multi-party system worked and it persisted till 1960 but it was collapsed by the May 27 coup d'état. The Democrat Party with a liberal world view tried to implement liberalism not only in economy but also in the political arena which would possibly corrode the strict secular structure established by the People Party.

This paper will focus on the *Nur Movement* which evolved into a socio-political power pioneered by Said Nursi during the early times of the Turkish revolution. It will handle the ideologies and discourses that took place in the agenda of the revolutionists and Nursi's responses to them. In terms of the scope this paper will cover the evolution of the movement between 1925 and 1960 in the context of its political standing in single party era and Democrat Party era. In the context defined above the paper will compare the attitudes of Nursi and that of the movement towards politics and modernization in the respective eras. It will question whether there was any change in Nursi's ideas and attitudes towards the political arena.

Methodologically it will be based on the three dimensions of the identity of Said Nursi as the Old Said, the New Said and the Third Said, because the works of Said Nursi which he titled as the *Risale-i Nur Collection* (Treaties of Light) and which are the ideological sources of the *Nur Movement* are the reflection of these three dimensions. What is more, another important reason for this methodology is that many scholars handle these three dimensions as three separate identities which are chronologically shaped by the conjuncture and thus put Nursi into a contradiction. However, as this paper will elaborate on, these three dimensions of Nursi's identity overlaps one another and they are the reflection of the same ideology and objective in different contexts.

A Movement Evolved under a Contrasting Paradigm

Most of the Middle Eastern states such as Egypt, Syria, Tunisia and Morocco are the creation of the colonial or imperial powers; hence their modernization in the twentieth century was based on Orientalist premises and was Western oriented. However, even though Turkey did not experience colonialism, it is quite surprising that the modernization process of Turkey "was an uncritical project very much based on Orientalist premises" (Bilici,

2003: 168). In other words, it was based on the allegations that religion is the source of backwardness. Thus in order to reach the level of contemporary civilization religion and religious identity should be left behind.

What is more, the societies modernized under the colonial order firstly experienced the colonial premises regarding their own social codes and then internalized the codes granted by their colonial lords. Thereof they institutionalized their state apparatuses in accordance with the codes they internalized. In Turkish case, the society did not experience these codes and specifically challenged the invasion by the Western powers as an Ottoman society, but abruptly exposed to a modernization process "with a political will to 'Westernize' cultural codes, lifestyles and gender identities" (Göle, 1996: 11). Therefore, Mucahit Bilici defines the modernization of Turkey as "cultural self colonization" because the state voluntarily internalized the Orientalist ideology (Bilici, 2003: 168).

The *Nur Movement* which evolved after the proclamation of republic under the light of the works of Said Nursi, a twentieth century Islamic scholar, was a civil resistance to a "self colonizing" modernization. The Turkish revolution in 1920s was based on two pillars. The first pillar was secularism and the second pillar was nationalism. These two pillars replaced the religious identity of the society and the sense of *umma* (Islamic community) in Ottoman legacy. In other words, from then on there would not be a Muslim community subjected to the authority of the state but a Turkish society; so the multinational and Islamic identity was replaced by a secular Turkish identity. Ziya Gokalp who was one of the most influential intellectual of that time and who is considered to be the "founder of [modern] Turkish sociology" distinguishes the "umma", "state" and "nation" from one another claiming that the social structure that is subject to a religious authority with "a religious public opinion" is called *umma*; the one "with political public opinion" is called *state* and the one based "on cultural public opinion" is called *nation* (Sağlam, 2008: 13).

What is more, according to Gokalp there are two kinds of societies namely primitive and developed. In the primitive societies there are only "religious ecclesiastics" and there are no "political or specialized organization" (Sağlam, 2008: 13). Moreover, "in primitive societies there is religious public opinion instead of political or cultural public opinion." According to Gokalp moral, religious and scientific revolutions such as Renaissance, reforms, philosophical innovation, industrial revolution and romanticism ended the Middle Ages in the Europe. However, due to the lack of these kinds of movements in Islamic world the society was still in the Middle Ages. Further-

more, according to Gokalp there is just one solution against the religious and territorial dangers. It was to advance in science, industry, military and legal organizations as much as Europeans, that is, to be equal with them in civilizational terms. The only way of accomplishing this is to be a part of European civilization in all respects (Sağlam, 2008: 19).

As clearly inferred from Gokalp's definitions the Ottoman society was a primitive society and needed to be reformed. Therefore, the modernization of Turkey was not only a reformation of state institutions but it was also, by the phrase of Göle, an attempt "to penetrate the lifestyles, public manners… and the daily customs of the people as well as their willingness to change their self conception as Turks" (Göle, 1996: 11-12). This paradigm developed by Gokalp had direct reflection on the revolutionists. For example, Mustafa Kemal, very in line with Gokalp's ideas, claimed that Turkish society had to leave its traditional axioms behind and adopt the tide of modernization and the West as the bearer of modernization. For Mustafa Kemal modernization had an existential importance and thus "in order to live it [was] imperative to follow the path of modernization" (Atatürk, 1959: 181). He defined the path of modernization as to turn towards the Western civilization. In *Atatürk'ün Söylev ve Demeçleri* (Speeches and Statements of Atatürk) he says: "… Is there any nations which has desired to become modernized but has not turned toward the West" (1959: 68).

Mustafa Kemal always referred to Gokalp's implications regarding the axioms of religious societies. In one of his speeches in Inebolu in 1925 he drew the route of modernization and said:

It is useless to attempt to resist the tide of civilization… In the face of civilization which…examines and explains everything from invisible particles to the stars, those nations continue to proceeds with the medieval mentalities and primitive superstitions are condemned to destruction or at least enslavement and contempt (1959: 212).

The phrase "those nations continue to proceed with the medieval mentalities and primitive superstitions" seems to be a reference to Gokalp's definition of primitive societies and specifically Islam which Gokalp claims to left Turkish society in the Middle Ages.

What is more, Mustafa Kemal appreciates Gokalp's understanding of "umma", "nation" and "state" and says: "We have taken our inspiration… directly from our life. Our path has been determined by the country we live in, by Turkish nation which gave birth to us (1959: 199). This is an endeavor to create a cultural public opinion and break the sense of historical accumulation that Turkish society gathered from the Ottoman sense of *umma*. The

sense of *umma* was the "only legitimating symbol of the society" in Ottoman legacy (Mardin, 1989: 157). Mustafa Kemal breaks this symbol and reforms it as Turkish nation by the following statement from the Great Speech:

For centuries our people have been compelled to act in accordance with this absurd point of view. But what came out of it? Millions of them died in every land they went to. Do you know how many Anatolian boys died under the burning sun of the deserts of Yemen? Do you know how many people died in order to keep Syria, to stay in Egypt? And do you see what good it all did? The people of the New Turkey have to think only of their own life and happiness (Atatürk, 1927)

Under the light of aforementioned ideologies the first transformation done after the proclamation of republic (October 29, 1923) was the abolition of caliphate (March 3, 1924), and on the same date the abolition of Ministry of Religious Affairs and Pious Foundations. These were followed by the abolition of religious courts (April, 1924); adoption of hat as headgear (November 25, 1925); dissolution of religious orders (November 30, 1925); the reform of calendar (January 1, 1926); the adoption of new criminal code (July 1, 1926); the adoption of Swiss Civil Code (October 4, 1926); the disestablishment of Islam as the state religion (April 10, 1928); the reform of alphabet (November 1, 1928) and the Turkification of the call to prayer (February 3, 1932) (Mardin, 2006: 234).

In order to focus on the development of the *Nur Movement* this paradigm is to be taken into consideration because the target of the Turkish revolution was not only the institutions of the Ottoman Empire but the social structure and the consciousnesses of the individuals were also among the targets. Therefore, any political movement that tried to resist the revolution could not survive or else had great difficulty both due to the strict oppression from the single party hegemony and the discourse that was developed by the Kemalist ideologues.

Many scholars and thinkers, who were against the secular and single party regime, migrated to Saudi Arabia or Egypt. Few of them remained in the country and one of them was Said Nursi. He was born in Bitlis, a city in the east of Turkey, came to Istanbul in 1907; supported the Declaration of Constitutionalism in 1908 and was a member of Institution of Islamic Doctrines (*Dar-ül Hikmet-il İslamiye*) after he returned from captivity in 1919.

He stayed in Istanbul till 1912. After he acquired fund he returned to Van, another city in the east of Turkey, to establish a university which he thought to include both theology and positive sciences in curriculum. However with eruption of World War I he attended the army as volunteer regiment com-

mander and was captured by Russian army. After two years of captivity he returned to Istanbul and supported the War of Independence of Turkey as a member of the Institute of Islamic Doctrines. Mustafa Kemal called him to the National Assembly after independence in 1923 and offered him to be the representative and General Preacher of Eastern Cities. He warned the deputies and the pioneers of the new regime for their secularist tendencies. When he saw that secularism was inevitable he left Ankara rejecting Mustafa Kemal's offer and went to Van to live a mystic life in a cave in the mount Erek. However with the Sheikh Sait rebellion he was arrested and exiled to southwest of Turkey and there in a small village named Barla he began to write his *Risale-i Nur Collection*. He was tried for nearly six hundred times for his books and ideas and exiled five times chronologically to Burdur (1925), Barla (1926), Isparta (1935), Kastamonu (1936), and Emirdağ (1944). Nursi died in 1960 in Sanli Urfa.

After the proclamation of the republic Nursi's ideas which he collected under the title *Risale-i Nur* as Sykianen also emphasizes, were not "political" but they were theological and philosophical interpretations of Qur'an and Hadidth (Sykianen, 2008: 49). However, they played and still play an important role in social mobilization of Turkish Muslims. The most specific main idea of his preaching was, by the phrase of Züchrer, taking "the Unity of God as the basis of life but also studying modern science and technology and using them in the cause of Islam which in his eyes was the true basis of social cohesion" (Züchrer, 201).

Life and ideas of Nursi are to be analyzed since the movement is based on his ideas and today is torn among the dimensions of his identity. The current position and dimensions of the movement are not in the scope of this paper, thus they will not be discussed here. However, it can be said that the movement was identified with Said Nursi during his lifetime.

The main fact caused a generation of masses around Nursi was undoubtedly the conjuncture or the aforementioned revolution. However, Nursi's ideas and works complicate the issue and make it difficult to put Nursi into a context where he can be seen as an alternative or response to a political movement (Voll, 2005: 61). He strictly warns his followers to refrain from politics and states that refraining from the politics and the policies of the government should be a basic principle for the disciples of *Risale-i Nur* because the "sincere servitude to the Qur'an" should satisfy them. Furthermore there are different powerful movements such as nationalism, communism, rightist or leftist tendencies in political sphere; therefore, it would be difficult to keep one's independence and sincerity. Perhaps one of these movements will

embrace his ideas and exploit it for its political interest thus corrupt the blest and sincerity of his service (*Şualar*, 355). Therefore the adherents of Nursi avoid from political arena; hence it becomes difficult to situate the movement into a context as well.

Nursi defines his route as the servitude to the Qur'an; however he keeps the route so wide that it becomes impossible to draw clear lines of the movement. It has compatibilities with the modernity, republicanism and traditional Islamic teachings but at the same time it is possible to trace criticism to these all. Therefore the *Nur Movement* is an experience instead of a theory. Unlike other political Islamist movements it doesn't have a theoretical program to replace the governing regime; instead, the main source of the movement is Nursi's reinterpretation of Qur'an, Hadidth and certain personal knowledge. Political standing of the movement was identified with Nursi's ideology and attitude towards the political sphere in Turkey. So, it is possible to trace the changes in the attitude of the movement towards the political arena from Nursi's ideas and identity.

Three Pillars of the Movement: Dimensions of Nursi's Identity

Said Nursi's works are multi dimensional. They reflect the different dimensions of Nursi's identity. Therefore the movement that Nursi pioneered is torn between the dimensions of his works. In order to understand his attitude towards political arena and the nature of the movement these dimensions should be analyzed carefully because Nursi says: "My life can be a seed for the *Risale-i Nur.* As a grant of God and with the inspiration of Qur'an, a fruitful and valuable tree came out of that seed. I was a seed and putrefied away" (*Emirdağ II*, 152).

Nursi's identity is generally divided into three as: the Old Said, the New Said and the Third Said. Although the respective divisions seem to be chronological they overlap one another and constitute an integrated multi-dimensional ideology. The period that corresponds with the evolution of the movement was the New Said period. Interestingly, Said Nursi claims that the New Said contrary to the Old Said refrains from politics and the political arena and totally focused on individual salvation (*Münazarat*, 30). The paradox lies here. A political activist refrains from all political actions and meditates on his own salvation but this meditation brings about a socio-political movement. So, it can be said that the recoil from political arena was not a sign of change in ideology but it was a tactic of civil resistance.

The Old Said period corresponds with the pre World War I period and Nursi was a political figure in Ottoman politics. His ideas of that period have the reflection of the conjuncture of that time. On the other hand, the works of the New Said period which covers the post-war period till 1950 are densely philosophical, theological and individual oriented. The third Said period which covers 1950-60 is a combination of the first two periods. Because together with his theological teachings regarding individual salvation it is possible to come across his supports to Democrat Party, certain ideas related to the political sphere and letters to certain political figures in his works. The main reason behind this return is that his ideas had already released from individuality and constituted a movement with a large number of adherents. Hence it can be said that the first period corresponds with the political dimension of Nursi's identity; the second period with the spiritual dimension and the last period with the politico-spiritual dimension of Nursi's identity because in the last period Nursi was not only a spiritual master of his followers but he was also the pioneer of a movement which has gained a political position in Turkish society. The main concern of this paper will be the New Said and the Third Said in order to compare his attitude towards political arena in the single party regime and the Democrat Party era.

The New Said and Politics

Said Nursi puts the beginning of the New Said period at the end of the World War I in 1918 when he was in captivity in Russia. He was "shaken by the rigours of the war and his captivity" (Vahide, 2005: 15). This psyche very in line with modernism which gave a perception of vanity in life and "the reality of death and transience of the things" had already came about "at a number of critical junctions earlier in his life;" however, it always declined in the course of events till his return to Van in order to live an ascetic life in the Mount Erek (Vahide, 2005: 15). Interestingly, this decision corresponds with his dissatisfaction with the secular tendencies of the newly emerged parliament in Ankara. In the *Lemalar* (Flashes) he says:

My old age, […] mankind's old age, the old age of the glorious Ottoman Empire, and the death of the Caliphate's rule, and the world's old age all caused me to look in the most grieved, piteous and melancholy state in that lofty citadel at the valleys of the past and the mountains of the future. As I experienced an utterly black state of mind in Ankara encompassed by four or five layers of the darkness of old age one within the other, I sought a light, a solace, a hope. (*Lemalar*: 228)

As it can clearly be inferred from the statement both the psyche remained from the war and the case in Ankara are combined and pushed Nursi to a radical change because by the phrase "an utterly black state of mind in Ankara" Nursi implies the new political paradigm he encountered in Ankara.

In April 1923 Nursi returned to Van and after two years of devoted semi ascetic life in this city he was arrested and exiled to the southwest of Anatolia in 1925 firstly to Burdur then to a small village of Isparta, Barla, in February 1926. Nursi began to write his *Risale-i Nur* and deliver his teachings regarding the unity of God, the afterlife and Islamic morality in this village. Many scholars and Nursi's followers do not consider this effort as a mere devotion to religion but they claim that Nursi already noticed the upcoming developments and the reforms of the new regime so he developed a discourse which will resist the system in the form of a civil resistance (Vahide, 2005; Mardin, 2006).

The New Said always warned his followers to refrain from active politics because the state was not an Islamic state where an Islamic public opinion could be developed and the traditional Islamic formations or teachings could protect the Islamic social structure. There was a new paradigm which was fed from the secular ideologies of the Enlightenment period in the Europe. Therefore, as Bilici also emphasizes "the challenge was neither political nor military (coercive) but ideological (epistemological)." So the target of Nursi was "a profound transformation in the construction of Muslim identity and in the techniques of Islamic reproduction" (Bilici, 2003: 173). Nursi never wore the hat nor changed his traditional garments which created a peculiarly powerful standing in terms of Muslim identity but at the same time despite of this traditional Islamic identity he developed a new paradigm in order to develop a modern Islamic epistemology against the epistemology of the revolutionist ideology.

Nursi generally uses a metaphorical rhetoric in his works. In his *Mektubat* (Letters) he defines modernity as a "swamp" where "the caravan of mankind is stumbling;

The great majority [of whom] are travelling in darkness in the stinking, filthy, muddy swamp. Twenty per cent suppose the filthy mud to be musk and ambergris because they are drunk, and are smearing it over their faces and eyes... they stumble on till they drown in it. However, eighty percent understands that it is a swamp and realizes that it is stinking and filthy, but they are bewildered and cannot see the safe way (*Mektubat*, 48).

Nursi metaphorizes the modernity as "swamp;" the proponents of modernity as the twenty percent of the majority, while he defines the eighty percent of the majority as "those who detest misguidance, but cannot abstain from

it;" and who "want to be saved, but cannot find the way out; they are confused" (*Mektubat*, 48-49).

Nursi defines his aim as to deal with the eighty percent of people who are confused between their beliefs and the modernity instead of the twenty percent who are aware of their actions. He states that there are two ways to take these people from the respective swamp. One of them is to awake the twenty percent with a club. And the other way is "to point out a safe way to the bewildered by showing a light" (*Mektubat*, 48). He defines the clubs as "the political currents" and the light as "the truth of the Qur'an" (*Mektubat*, 49). However, Nursi states that many people try to mobilize the bewildered masses by political currents referring to the political Islamist groups while few people endeavor to focus on the teachings of Qur'an. Therefore, he adopts the method of mobilizing with the teachings of Qur'an. As a result, as Bilici also emphasizes "a new language outside the reach of Kemalist self colonization was developed, because alongside the Kemalist enterprise of nation building through the state apparatus, there was then a simultaneous community building based on textual imagination." (Bilici, 2003: 74). In other words, Nursi's *Risale-i Nur* was constituted of the teachings regarding the unity of God, the after life, the concept of justice and worship and the prophethood based on interpretation of Qur'an. However, even though these teaching were not political they brought about an individual and indirectly a social transformation, because all the respective teachings were "special emphasis on changing man's inner world as the touch stone of revitalized Islam" (Mardin, 1989: 165)

The Obstacle of the New Said: Modernity

Nursi was able to accomplish the respective transformation to a significant extent but the main obstacle before Nursi was the perception that circulated in public claiming that Islam was the main source of the underdevelopment of Islamic society. So Nursi had to prove the positive reflections of these Quranic teachings on social life as well. For Nursi modernity converts the world in an arena of struggle with the ideologies such as nationalism, communism, liberalism, the idea of the survival of the fittest and war of all against all (*Sözler*, 409; *Mektıubat*, 273; *Lemalar*, 117). Therefore, what people need and what Islam offers is the solidarity, justice and peace among communities or social classes. According to Nursi these cannot be acquired with the aforementioned ideologies because rivalry and struggle which end up in hatred and conflict are inevitable for them. This is not only a critique

of the ultimate consequence of the modernity but it is also a critique of the politics of the long nineteenth century which ended up in two devastating World Wars.

However, this doesn't mean that Nursi considers the Western world to be in primitive conflicts and totally wrongly headed in modernity, Nursi appreciates the idea of deliberation, reasoning, democracy and public opinion which are the foremost products of modernity (*Muhakemat*, 35; *Asar-ı Bediiyye*, 475). Furthermore, he is aware that Islamic society doesn't live in solidarity either. Or else it would be a blindfolding because Islamic society had a long way to reach the Western modernity. However, for Nursi the backwardness of the Islamic society was not Islam itself but it was the Muslims who imitated modernity as a source of development. This was a clear challenge to the modernizers of Turkey through a discourse which created a public opinion and evolved into a movement.

Gokalp's claim basing the backwardness of Islamic society on the lack of moral, religious revolutions such as Renaissance, reforms, philosophical innovation, and romanticism in the Europe is asked to Nursi by one of his followers. Nursi replies this question by comparing Christianity and Islam. According to Nursi religious and moral reformation is not possible in Islam. Because unlike Christianity which took only the main axioms of religion from Jesus while "most of the injunctions concerning social life and the secondary matters of the Law were formulated by the disciples and other spiritual leaders," in Islam not only the fundamentals of the religion but also every other "injunctions" or "secondary matters" concerning the social life were brought by the Prophet Mohammed (*Mektubat*, 435). In other words, the verses of Qur'an were explained, taught and applied by the Prophet and the *mujtahids* under the light of the Hadidth of the Prophet and this created an extensive source of renovation. When it comes to the idea of backwardness, Nursi claims that the source of backwardness is not Islam but misunderstanding Islam. According to Nursi, Islam does not reject science, deliberation and reasoning because each science shows the power and wisdom of God through its peculiar language and the universe is a book carrying message of God addressing to human intellect. But he is against the rejection of existence of God through sciences (*Şualar*: 207).

As a result the New Said era was based on a "personalistic" strategy which considered "Islam as an ideological canopy" to be internalized by the individuals and had the target of changing the "hearts" of individuals instead of the society as a whole (Mardin, 1989: 165). The significance of this method was that it was out of the reach of Kemalists because since Nursi never referred to a social mobilization or any political objectives the courts and

any other judicial bodies could not find a tangible cause to sentence Nursi with. Mardin claims that Nursi was already aware of this opportunity "when he shifted from politics to the conversion of individuals" (1989: 165). Since Nursi was well aware of the unrest of the public against Kemalist ideology and the rule of single party, in his discussions he referred to the source of the respective ideology instead of direct reference to the existing regime. He wrote about God, worship, afterlife and suggested: "If you want the pleasure and enjoyment of life, give life to your life through belief, and adorn it with religious duties" (*Sözler*: 146). This kind of a life style was a civil challenge or resistance against the secular ideology of Kemalism.

The Third Said: A Politico-Spiritual Dimension

The Third Said was more sophisticated than the two aforementioned dimensions of Nursi's identity. Unlike the Old Said or New Said who was either active in politics or totally away from political discourse, the Third Said refrained from active politics but at the same time had specific references to politics, political parties and political figures. Some scholars base the third shift in Nursi regarding his attitude to politics on the victory of Democrat Party in 1950 and claim that since Turkish society experienced "a real multi-party democratic system" Nursi benefited from this newly opened public sphere while some others considers the shift to be "a development of the ideas he had first formulated after the First World War" in the conjuncture of post World War II politics (Turner, 2009: 36; Vahide, 2003: 23). However, in my opinion it may not be an incisive inference to claim that Nursi returned to politics when he perceived a milder atmosphere towards religiosity in Turkey because Nursi's discourse had already gone beyond him and generated a mass around him when Democrat Party won the election of 1950.

From the second half of 1930s on writings of Nursi had already circulated among the masses of all over the Anatolia. People copied thousands of copies of his works by handwriting. Osman Yüksel Serdengeçti illustrates this mobilization saying:

Treaties of light of Master (Nursi) reached and circulated from tongue to tongue, hand to hand and province to province […] each disciple became a machine, a typographer. The faith challenged the technology. The treaties of light were written and duplicated thousands times (Serdengeçti: 632).

There was a group of people who were called *Nurcu* and pushed from court to court to be sentenced for their adherence to Said Nursi. Even during the Democrat Party era the disciples of Nursi and Nursi himself were arrested and tried many times (Mardin, 1989; Vahide, 2003). This doesn't mean

that the Democrat Party policies didn't have any influence on the evolution of the *Nur Movement.* It can be considered that the triumph of the Democrat Party in the 1950 elections brought "consolidation and considerable expansion of the *Nur* Movement" (Vahide, 2003: 23). However, by the late 1940s a large group of people were already adhered to Nursi and considered themselves as *Nurcus*, a term which means people who read and try to live up to the codes of Nursi's teachings. Even Nursi addressed to them as *Nurcu* in mid 1940s (*Emirdağ L. I*: 107).

What is more, Said Nursi, in his works, specifically the letters to his followers, emphasizes the idea of "collective personality" (*şahs-ı manevi*) of the disciples of *Risale-i Nur.* This group of people gathered around Nursi had "the feeling that a key element had been driven out of the social structure in which they were immersed" (Mardin, 1989:14). This key element was the Islamic identity which was removed by the Kemalist secularism and thus this feeling in the mind of his disciples gave another momentum to the movement as a political force (Nereid, 1997: 32). Furthermore, these people were from different social/occupational classes such as "teachers, soldiers, bureaucrats and state officials" so when the *Nur Movement* reached 1940s it had already a large social spectrum which would push Nursi to speak about social or political issues. Nevertheless, three other factors which gave way to the Third Said should not be out casted in this context: the significance of the decade 1950 in the World and Turkey, the Democrat Party and the Cold War politics.

1950 a Decade of Transition from Modernism to Post-Modernism

The decade of 1950 has a peculiar place in terms of reconsideration of modernism. It is considered to be a transition from modernism to post-modernism; therefore, any idea that carries the stamp of this decade reflects the influence of the respective transition. The World experienced two devastating wars in the first half of the 20th century. People under the rigorous influence of the devastation of the wars and the spreading of communist ideology into the world pushed intellectuals to think on religion with a modern mind. Therefore, many scholars label this decade as "a time of religious resurgence" (Voll, 2005: 48). However, as John Obert Voll also stated, this resurgence is not in a classical sense but it was resurgence regarding the "issues of faith and social order that were raised intellectually and morally by the modern experience" (2005: 48).

Islam was also experienced the resurgence defined above. What is significant regarding this resurgence is that in certain countries in the Middle

East "religious developments took a different form." (Voll, 2005: 49). Turkey was one of these countries undoubtedly because it had newly passed to multi-party parliamentary by 1950 and public opinion was based on two main concerns: secularism and religion. The secularism was represented by the People's Party while religiosity was represented by Democrat Party although not a religious party in the sense of Justice Party or National Salvation Party.

Democrat Party, upon its victory in the elections of 1950, adopted the policy of "combating communism" and milder attitude toward religiosity (Vahide, 2005: 115). Since religion was already on the agenda of public Democrat Party took a few bold paces in making some changes regarding religion such as permitting the call to prayer to be recited in Arabic after the ban of 20 years and implementation of course of religion and morality into the curriculum of education. However, John Voll claims that the resurgence of the religious public opinion was not/should not be based on victory of Democrat Party because "there were broader intellectual trends at that time which were not specifically related to the partisan politics" (Voll, 2005: 50). According to Voll the trend of Nursi was of these.

As a result, John Voll approaches the 1950s of Turkey from a very different point of view. Almost all of the discussions related to 1950s in Turkey are about Democrat Party and People's Party conflict. However, quoting Willfred Cantacell Smith, Voll summarizes the experience of Islam in the context of modernism in Turkey as "a contrast between 'the reviving of an ancient reality that has lapsed (renascence)' and 'the modifying of an existing one that has gone wrong (reformation)'"(Voll, 2005:60). In other words, Islamists at that time were either in an endeavor to revive religion as it was in the time of prophet or to modify the Islamic political thought in a way to accord it into secular modern politics. But Nursi's trend was none of these. It was the "middle way"; thus it was "the beginning of the definition of a new, post modern Islamic paradigm" (2005: 61-62).

Democrat Party:
A Pivotal Influence on the Evolution of the Nur Movement

Democrat Party had a pivotal influence on the evolution of the movement because publication of *Risale-i Nur* was permitted by Democrat Party and as mentioned above it brought "cohesiveness" and "consolidation" to the movement (Voll, 2005: 51; Vahide, 2003: 23). However, Nursi's support for Democrat Party goes beyond this fact. Nursi in his works has direct comments on Democrat Party and expresses his support to the party. A couple

of disciples of Nursi asked him the reason for his support, Nursi responded the question through the alternatives of Democrat Party instead of referring to policies of Democrat Party. He says:

If Democrat Party falls, either People's Party or Nation Party will come to power… If the People's Party comes to power, communism will gain power in this country through the power of this Party. However, a Muslim cannot be a communist, he will be anarchist instead. Muslims should not be compared to Europeans. Therefore, in order to prevent this party which constitute a danger to the society and country I support and defend Democrat Party for the sake of Qur'an, country and Islam. (*Emirdağ L. II*: 206-207).

Nursi refrains from active politics and warns his disciple not to activate the movement into a political sphere but he didn't prevent his disciples from attending politics on their own behalf instead of on the behalf of the movement. According to Nursi the *Nur Movement* is not a political establishment. Since it is

Above all political movements and it belongs to all it cannot be a part or subjected to a political pole. But it can help the appropriate party against the atheistic movements. […] However, a disciple who wants to attend politics can attend on his behalf not on behalf of the movement and his goal in politics must be conveying and promulgation of *Risale-i Nur*. (*Emirdağ L.I: 160*)

Nursi was aware of the influence of active politics on the Nur Movement. As Karabaşoğlu also discussed active politics of a religious political party would prevent "the communication of belief to the masses at large" and the opposition would target religion; there is also the possibility of "exploitation of the religion", religious values may be lost due to the political games and so on (Karabaşoğlu, 2003: 279).

Lastly, besides Nursi's support for DP as an alternative to the People's Party appreciated certain policies of Democrat Party as well. For example, the reaffirmation of Arabic call to prayer, the implementation of the course about religious education into the curriculum and the relations developed with Muslim World by the establishment of Baghdad Pact were all appreciated by Nursi. What is more, Nursi demanded a few other things from the Democrat Government these were the "publication of *Risale-i Nur* by the Chair of Religious Affairs" and "opening of Hagia Sophia to worship as a mosque" but these never came about even after the death of Nursi (*Emirdağ L.II: 164*). As a result, Nursi's support for Democrat Party was for the cause of Nur Movement and Islam because Nursi was not alone any more there was a mass around him and they expected advices from him regarding sociopolitical and spiritual issues and thus Nursi had a politico-spiritual position in the last shift of his life.

The Cold War: A Threat of Communism

Besides the dynamism that the decade of 1950 brought and the victory of Democrat Party, the post World War II politics brought a new phase to the teachings of Nursi which contributed to the movement to evolve into a political force in Turkey. The post World War II era was under the influence of the Cold War. The Cold War was between two main power blocs: the USA and the USSR but many countries in the Middle East were also under the influence of this struggle thus each of them adhered to a power bloc. Turkey was on the Western side, due to the communist threat it perceived even before the Cold War.

Nursi defined Communism as an "alarming current" against the religions, particularly Christianity and Islam (*Gençlik R*: 37). Therefore, he not only urges Muslims to consolidate but also even to reconcile with "pious Christian clergy and out cast the issues of conflict since the absolute infidelity attacks" (*Emirdağ L.I*: 206). According to Nursi the communist current in the north is alarming because it uses not only uses "the passions of the youth with immorality" but also it justifies "the vagabond and poor to plunder the property of the rich" with feeling of being exploited. Therefore, not only Muslims according to Nursi "all mankind trembles against this calamity" (*Sözler*: 148; *Şualar*: 392). As a result this idea constitute another important factor behind Nursi's support for Democrat Party's foreign policy regarding allying USA or the West.

Conclusion

The Nur Movement is a prevailing Islamic movement in Turkey today. It has a political resonance in current Turkish politics particularly with its branch evolved under Fethullah Gülen. The source off the Nur Movement goes back to the early years of Turkish revolution under the single party regime (People's Party) and Turkey's early experiences of democracy under Democrat Party. The pioneer of the movement, Said Nursi was a significant political figure during the Ottoman era and the movement developed during the republican era was almost totally identifiable with him. The ideological source of the Nur Movement was Risale-i Nur, a collection of books written by Nursi. Therefore the paper mainly focused on Nursi and his works in order to trace the evolution of the movement.

Said Nursi was well aware of the oppression of the regime on the public sphere; thus, he developed a new language out of the political arena and

criticized the sources of the ideologies of the revolution besides preaching the basic teaching of Qur'an. This strategy was titled as the New Said who, contrary to the political standing of the Old Said during the Ottoman era, focused on personal salvation. However the movement went beyond Nursi because people from different social spheres adhered to him. Therefore, he noticed that a movement that he planned had evolved and gained a standing in public sphere although it intentionally didn't have a formal identity. What is more, the intellectual and political conjuncture of 1950s pushed Nursi to make certain political and social evaluations as advice to his followers. This shift was named as the Third Said who is more political yet still out of active political sphere. As a result, the movement was based on the political spiritual and politico-spiritual pillars of Nursi's identity.

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The Quranic References of Human Rights Organizations in Turkey

Murat Kayacan

Human rights are based on the view that all people are born equal and free from the aspect of rights and respect and also provide human being free choice and facility to improve her/his abilities. These freedoms are balanced with the obligation of being respectful to the other and staying away from trespassing the other's rights. So, the rights cannot be considered free from responsibilities.

It can be said that in Turkey, human rights struggle is available both in harmony with the Western point of view and also with the Quranic references. The topic of our paper is limited with the latter. In this context, two country-wide human rights organizations loom large: Özgür-Der[1] and Mazlum-Der.[2] In this paper, in the context of the questions below, the Quranic references of the ones who were/are the president, executive committee member of both will be discussed: How do both organizations consider their own country and the regime in Turkey when they struggle for human rights? Which Quranic references do they use when they determine their position and stand against human rights violations? Are they open to cooperation with the other human rights organizations which don't prefer Quranic references? What do they think about the heated debate of Turkiye i.e. Kurdish matter? Do both only defend Muslims rights? What is the upper identity envisaged by the Quran according to both?

A . Approaches to the Concept of Human Rights

According to Hamza Türkmen saying that "The first word "La" in "La ilaha illallah" (There is no god but Allah) points Muslims' responsibility of standing

against every kind of jahiliyah (ignorance), oppression, paganism, exploitation and transgression"[3] in Turkey there are –among Muslim circles- four approaches to the human rights:

1) "Human rights" is a Western and secular concept and cannot be used: according to this approach which incorporates anti-West point of view, human rights struggle of the West is nothing but a deceit and initiation of liberalism as well. [4] The theoretical explanation of this approach –yet they differ among each other- has been done by generally Hizb al Tahrir (Party of Liberation),[5] Salafi groups and the circle of Iktibas journal.[6]
2) The concept of human rights points to the universal gains of the people and should not be indifferent to it: this approach, by acknowledging that this concept has Western origin, links it with natural law, tries to show the counterparts of the principles of this concept in the Muslim culture and uses The United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a reference. [7] After the period of founding board of directors, latter Mazlumder councils[8] often have been a bearer of this approach.
3) The rhetoric of human rights is nothing but a claim of the West. The first source of this rhetoric is Islam. This concept should be used as "Human Rights in Islam": this discourse has been brought to agenda with the book named *Islam and Human Rights* published by the Publishing House of Aqaba (in Turkey). That book includes the articles of some leaders of the movements and pioneers of reform in the Muslim world and this rhetoric was used in Turkey with a defensive approach.
4) Despite its insufficiency, the concept of human rights should be considered a facility to bring up the nature of the human being and society, head inclination to the truth and justice. In this context, it should be used as an alternative meaning, a pursuit for the right and just: some and the line of Özgür-Der trying to understand the concept of human rights available in the Western paradigm act in harmony with this alternative approach[9] and the right thing to do is to see the human rights struggle as a facility to use as an intra-system means.[10]

As we understand from Türkmen's categorization and preference, he accepts that this concept is Western but should not be disregarded. On the contrary, it should be perceived from the Quranic point of view. Özgür-Der does the same, too.

B . Democratic Opening Policies and Relations with the System

"Democratic opening process" has been begun by the Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. The purpose is to make a distinct progress in the field of

human rights, democracy and freedoms. The other name of this project is National Unity and Brotherhood. The name of the project can be "democratic opening". Yet, every kind of initiation is an improvement towards human nature if it is in harmony with right and justice. The approach of "Whether the state is Islamic or not… Muslims must support the equality among peoples." is right and it is an attitude to revitalize "*There is no compulsion in religion*."[11] or "T*o you is your religion, and to me my religion*."[12] principles.[13] If an opening is right, whether the aim is religious or not, it is not meaningful to deal with it at arm's length. For example, the concept of "freedom" which is formalized out of a religious content has not been sent to us via Quran but it can be considered in the category of the concepts produced by regarding the Quranic general framework.[14]

There are three approaches among Muslim circles to the democratic opening and Kemalist subversive status quo:

1) The ones saying that "The circles against Kemalist status quo are my comrades." and becoming united with them and keeping away from their independent and consultative identity.
2) In order not to be deceived by the saying "The circles against Kemalist status quo are my comrades." the ones postponing the struggle against the oppressors to the future and trying to stand against both side.
3) The ones standing against Kemalist status quo, encouraging the affirmative sides and criticising the negative sides of the ones/circles (conservative democrats, liberals, Second Republicanists[15] etc.) and maintaining their consultative Islamic identity.[16]

The true way must be the third for the Quran disciples and followers trying to change the human life in an affirmative way. Without hiding their identity or covering the versus of the Quran, these circles supporting the monotheistic awakening process in Turkey regard their struggle which they have been knitting item by item against the system as getting back their usurped rights. They try to be just against the ones not fighting with Muslims because of religious reasons, not banishing Muslims, not helping the people(s) trying to banish Muslims and not banning Muslims.[17] Also, considering the principle "*To you is your religion, and to me, my religion*."[18], we can say that the Quran gives everybody the right to identify her/himself. If it is so, Muslims want to express themselves with their own identity.[19] When determining the matters of the age, it is possible to meet on a common denominator with ideological movements such as feminism, socialism etc. at times. Even in some cases, similar solutions can be offered. This position doesn't harm Muslim iden-

tity. Common action with different ideological movements at times brings no problem for any circle trusting its own principles and perspective.[20] If the human rights are objective, that is to say if they are regarded as legal struggle and realised, the other organisations, which were supported and encouraged before, will be treated in the same way.[21]

As it is clear, Özgür-Der and Mazlum-Der don't disregard just attitudes concerning Muslims or non-Muslims even support them.[22] As a matter of fact, the Quran categorizes the attitudes against tawhid (monotheism) and paganism. For example, the Quran accepts the identities of being infidel, hypocrites, idolater and Ahl al Kitap. Even it tells us about the subcategories of some of them. The Quranic consideration of "Christians' closeness to Muslims"[23] can be mentioned here.[24] The Quran's attitude of categorization of the peoples is related to the reality of human being and society. Differences of the people and the societies they formed, make generalization and standard approaches impossible in society categorizations. We see in the Quran different stages of being Muslim as well.[25]

Özgür-Der is not indifferent to the democratic opening brought forward by the government aiming at progressing in human rights. Even being sensitive to it is an obligation ordered by wahy (the Quran). In this discussion agenda, the verse in the chapter Mumtahina, "*Allah forbids you not, with regard to those who fight you not for* (your) *Faith nor drive you out of your homes, from dealing kindly and justly with them: for Allah loves those who are just*."[26] is one of the main criteria of Muslims leading them to behave careful/moderate and responsible.[27] The Quran shows us that the prophets preach –in the context of their struggle- the leaders of the arrogant party of their society,[28] and they, together with the believers, have a method and a sense of winning nonbelievers' hearts. For example, it tells us that Muhammed (pbuh) may torment himself as they don't believe.[29] Additionally, Allah orders (Moses) to preach Pharaoh in a soft way.[30] It is seen in the Quran that the prophets give advice to their societies with a tone of benevolent "*O my people*!"[31] and want their people to come to the true path in order to save them from God's wrath.[32] The obligation of being sensitive and careful in social relationships is a Quranic order. The verse "*Don't let hatred of any people seduce you that you don't deal justly*."[33] as a Muslim attitude, enlightens the way of Muslims in social relationships.[34]

Özgür-Der globally tries to realise justice by keeping its identity. In this context, the good deeds of the ones who don't regard the Quranic criteria can be rejoicing but it is not enough to "integrate" with them. The conscious of being ummah is to be kept. For example the Quran says, "*The Romans*

have been defeated. In the nearer land, and they, after their defeat will be victorious. Within ten years Allah's is the command in the former case and in the latter and in that day believers will rejoice."[35] The victory of Rums over Sassanids had been considered by Muslims. Yet the mission of today's Muslims is not to join the Rums' army but form a society of God's witnesses against liberal or fascist sieges. For that purpose, Muslims should build their monotheistic identity against global capitalism, make their own ark like Noah against strong storms i.e. the aim of reaching "the level of contemporary civilization"[36] The example of risalah, As it is seen in the case of Muslims who are interested in what happens around them (Rum-Sassanid war) even they are a small group, should widen Muslims' horizons from the aspect of finding out the problems and facilities of Muslims in different regions and cooperating with them. Islamic movements sharing many common truths have proved that the monotheistic awareness cannot be limited with wire meshes. The next one is to surpass the artificial and stumbling blocks.[37]

In the context of saving the identity Özgür-Der, doesn't consider its relations with "the system which doesn't define itself as Islamic" theological matter. The Quranic verse in the paragraph above, which is mentioned in the context of human rights struggle in the borders of the country and on a global scale, has also been mentioned in terms of the relationship with the system. The Quran disciples, who don't consider voting in the elections in a jahili (ignorant) regime basic theological choice related with the life or identity, discuss this matter with the chapter Rum. Why didn't a small group of Muslims who struggled for presence by refusing any kind of oppression and paganism rejoice when the jahili army of Romans were defeated? And again why would they rejoice when Romans defeat their enemy? Do the first verses of the chapter of Rum express an escape from the more oppressive army (Sassanids) or an inclination to Romans considered Ahl al Kitab? Of course it is an escape from the oppression which is much greater. We learn from the chapter Rum that the first nucleus of Muslims in Mecca are on the side of the makeshift when considering the outer conditions. Preferring the makeshift can be regarded as an escape not an inclination. For example, the ones punished legally because of their identity in Turkey haven't taken refuge in despotic regimes (where their subjects are mostly Muslims) named kingdom or republic but democratic states in Europe. Nevertheless, there is another fact we learnt when we examine the period of Mecca: none of the sahabah (comrades of the prophet) tried to join the Roman Army by leaving the struggle including a hard test in Mecca.[38]

In order to witness an authentic Islamic struggle, in approaching intra-system means and in discussions on voting, first of all it is necessary to

have consensus on the basic principles defined by Muslim belief. The most important responsibilities in the framework of faith-based method and principles are not to cover versus of Allah, not postponing the life in harmony with revelation. Also the Quranic parable of "*And a believing man of Pharaoh's family, who hid his faith*"[39] symbolising real hardships should not be taken out of its specific context and generalized.[40] For a revelation-based policy, the struggle done by adopting anti-revelation rules and principles cannot be considered gradualism or stage-centered from the aspect of Islamic method. Bearing this impurity cannot be regarded in the framework of taqıyya. The taqıyya, in terms of the attitude and behavior mentioned in the Quran as permission, is not related to a movement dependent on Islamic method in general but related with some persons' specific cases such as "*Except for those who were forced to engage in infidelity to Allah after believing while their hearts remained firmly convinced of their belief*."[41]

The quantitative weakness of Muslims in the beginning of the Islamic community formation[42] can cause the circles in power to make them inefficient and these people can make the masses behave Muslims' message cold. The process of Islamic struggle is full of hardships and tests. However, Muslims must resist any kind of difficulties and oppression and gain their struggle with the efforts which they will increase in an awareness of servitude.[43] Islamic struggle can be gained in the field of struggle not in the idea clubs, places producing abstract thoughts or in circles far from practical concerns. As long as Muslims embrace Allah and His Book by thinking properly He will enlighten their way.[44]

The basic matter of Turkey is Kurdish issue. It is assumed that this matter has been caused by secular nationalistic thought which is considered one of the heresies of infidels.[45] Additionally, this matter has got historical, political and social dimensions. The war, which continues because it has not been solved yet, not only consumes the country's resources but it also hampers the future economic, political, social, cultural improvement of the country. This is a matter transferred from the Ottoman State to the Turkish Republic. Unfortunately the concept of millah (ملة), which always means "religion" in 15 verses of the Quran as it is in the expression of *milla ibrahim* (ملة إبراهيم) in the process of Ottomanism beginning with Tanzimat Fermanı (1839) (Imperial Edict of Reorganization) and later Turkish nationalization, has been used in the meaning of nation. And because of conceptual deviations and breaks Muslims stayed far away from understanding each other.[46] Namely, deviation of a Quranic concept caused miscommunication between

Turkish and Kurdish people and with this deviation Muslim mind confused and divided.

As in the "Kurdish Initiation", the effort of Turkey to humanize its system is desirable. However, Muslims must spend their time in warning the society and themselves personally and rebuilding themselves in the axis of wahy (the Quran) instead of spending most of their time for such improvements in a jahili (ignorant) system excludes the society and state of the Quran. If the system rolls back down its tyranny in the face of Muslims warnings, they are pleased with it as they admire Ahl al Kitab who don't betray custody.[47] They see all the improvements based on right and justice in the jahili (ignorant) system as benefit.[48] Muslims' emphasis on "No division of umma" in the context of challenging Kurdish nationalism without opposing Turkish nationalism loses its moral basis when the agenda is to obtain Kurdish people's rights. It is sensed that Muslim umma is often mingled with national borderlines. So what Muslim umma is, what its function is and will be in the short, middle and long terms must be explained.[49]

Universal thinking necessitates having a long term strategy. Muslims cannot handle the stumbling blocks made by the Western imperialism without the items of Muslim umma differentiated, transforming radically the societies they live in and again without shaking comprador regimes which Muslims are (forcefully) obliged to obey. So Muslims should concentrate their power on their neighborhood while considering gains of universal Islamic struggle. Warning mission should start from close neighborhood.[50] As the aim of their struggle, they should have an effort to show their testimony primarily to the people around them not to ones who are difficult to reach.[51]

C . The Upper Identity Described in the Quran

The concept of Kurdish people or Kurdish identity should be used in the context of qawm (people) or qabila (tribe) not race or nation. As a matter of fact, Muslims should perceive the concept of "qhalq" (creation), depending on God's wisdom of creating and by pointing to the language and colours of the people, as categorizing social Godly signs[52] such as qawm, qabail and shuub.[53] Such categories cannot determine final social identity of Muslims. The Quran presents Allah's prophet (pbuh) and jihad (show effort) for the path of Allah as a dependency more precious and higher than those in question.[54] The differences of qabila, shu'ba, colour and language were created for people to know each other as signs of Allah but not as a cause to fight or

dominate. These differences are just like the differences of our fingerprints, faces and other features of our creation. These are the features of our identity. The upper identity is for human being to define her/himself with her/his worldly and ethereal life identity.[55]

When establishing the Republic of Turkey the aim was a mono-cultural, monolingual, one-nation and a unitary state. The efforts/projects to make the society by force and imposition one colour, expectedly caused a religion matter as well as an ethnic and tribal one.[56] However, the Quran presents the existence of nations as a facility to increase communication,[57] and their languages as a means for understanding each other and preaching.[58] The important one is not inborn differences but to perceive the aim of the life together with these differences. Nations should create a lifestyle in accordance with God's wish by grasping together Allah's rope.[59] The superiority must be in obeying (taqwa) God. The landing mark among the international relations should be this. To regard his/herself superior to the other because of his/her language, colour, nation is to transgress the limits of Allah. It is the same for the nations.[60] Different social features of people should be perceived a variety considered proper by Allah.[61] There is a parallel between the people's having the same features (fitrah)[62] and basically the sameness of the Books (inspired by Allah).[63] Similarly, social features which we can be described as cultural variety reflect the difference in the features of making the wahy (the Quran) reach the people.[64]

The expression in the verse accepting that the presence of the nations as a reality[65] *you may know one another* (لتعارفوا) means acquaintance. In this context, the Quran doesn't define the differences as a means for a group of people to dominate another one.[66] The expression in question incorporates showing respect each other as well. Within this context, the necessary value should be given to the nations properly, an Islamic system should be established open to the cooperation of the peoples having equal rights, making consultation (shura) principle operational, *rendering back the trusts to those to whom they are due*[67] and justly governing. In such a system of justice; with Allah's grant, all ethnic problems and fights will end with a radical way, when facilities are given to the local initiatives and when Islamic identity (which is common and honourable) is accepted as upper identity of all peoples.[68] As a matter of fact, the only thing to put a difference among each people and making superior is "belief": "*Do not, then, either lose heart or grieve: for you shall surely gain the upper hand if you are true men of faith*."[69] The only superiority criterion among Muslims who are as equal as comb teeth is piousness which cannot be determined but by the Creator.[70] The human being is responsible for her/his intentional preference

and behaviour, not for her/his given features such as colour, mother tongue etc.[71]

To be a member of a family, tribe (ashira), clan (qabilah), nation (qawm), shu'ba (people) individually or collectively cannot be an upper identity for Muslims. Making these identities a means for competition, fight or superiority against each other is called in Islamic culture "asabiyah." Asabiyah is egoism which is not individual. It is a consideration of the interest of a social category against other categories. However, there is no superiority of a group to the others.[72] The basis of modern nationalism is the asabiyah prohibited by Islam. Jahili societies get their enthusiasm, speed and power from a variety of national-tribal asabiyahs. The Quran defines this situation as *hamiya al jahiliya* (fanatical rage of ignorance): "(This is why) *when the unbelievers set in their hearts a fierce bigotry, the bigotry of ignorance Allah bestowed inner peace upon His Messenger and upon the believers and made the word of piety binding on them. They were more deserving and worthier thereof. Allah has knowledge of everything.*"[73] Our affiliation to a variety of social units is natural and legitimate but regarding a fight and a struggle for superiority among these units i.e. the acceptance of them as social/universal/ethereal identity is prohibited.[74]

It is informed (in the Quran) that in this world, Muslims preferring Allah, His prophet and jihad in His path forms an ummah.[75] Almighty God directly prescribes that "*Strive in the cause of Allah in a manner worthy of that striving. He has chosen you* (for His task), *and He has not laid upon you any hardship in religion. Keep to the faith of your father Abraham. Allah named you Muslims earlier and even in this (Book), that the Messenger may be a witness over you, and that you may be witnesses over all mankind. So establish Prayer, and pay Zakah, and hold fast to Allah. He is your Protector. What an excellent Protector; what an excellent Helper!*"[76] So the only valid, legal identity for Muslims is the name of "Muslim."[77]

If the freedom of people is provided and they are invited to the tawhid belief (the uniqueness of God) by Muslims for the sake of Allah and with a struggle which is full of consciousness of worshipping and sincerity and again if the society (in Turkey) formed by Kurds, Turks, Arabs etc. establish monotheistic concepts, criteria, value and moral norms instead of superstitions by accepting the invitation in question i.e. if it shows the will to change what is available in its essence on a right path towards the Light, then Allah will fulfill His promise and realise Islamic justice system. Briefly in the Quran, Allah gives the good news of the revolution of tawhid and justice against the system of paganism and oppression if Muslims believe in and do good

deeds, perform their worshipping obligations through big efforts for example reading, understanding and preaching the Quran and living in harmony with it, and again if they do what they must do in this struggle in cooperation and solidarity and within alliance against the oppressors in order to get their rights and freedoms then[78] "*And soon will the unjust assailants know what vicissitudes their affairs will take*!"[79] Namely, the way of success against the oppressors, it doesn't matter whatever ethnic root is theirs, is the peoples' struggle of tawhid and justice. With the help of Allah, the authority of the ones violating human rights will come to an end.

Conclusion

In Turkey, the human rights organizations, which have the Quranic references, consider their struggle one of the orders of Islam. While acknowledging the Western framework of this concept, they put forward their reservations to it. Although they keep their reservations against the system in Turkey, they have been supporting its right efforts considered by them in the context of removing the oppression. While determining their position and presenting solutions to the ethnic matters, they loom large the Quran albeit at different rates. During their struggle, they don't consider "the other" as a whole group and they keep their doors open to the activist groups who don't accept the Quran as their reference but maintaining their struggle regarding their own criteria. Two country-wide organizations we have discussed are encouraging examples of supporting human rights together with secular human rights organizations. Both have a remarkable struggle in the field of freedom of belief and especially headscarf ban as well. A study on this subject will help to understand the change in Turkey better, too.

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22 One difference is that, the previous one strives to keep its independent identitiy.
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25 "Then (there will be) the Companions of the Right Hand;- What will be the Companions of the Right Hand? And those Foremost (in Faith) will be Foremost (in the Hereafter)." Waqia 56/8, 10.
26 Mumtahina 60/8.
27 Türkmen, Açılım Politikaları Kemalizm ve Müslümanlar, p. 39-40.
28 Araf 7/75.
29 "(O Muhammad), you will perhaps grieve yourself to death because these people do not believe!" Shuara 26/3.
30 "And speak to him (Pharaoh) gently, perhaps he may take heed or fear (Allah)." Taha 20/44.
31 For example see. Maeda 5/20, 21; Anaam 6/78.
32 Toplu Çalışma, ibid, p. 121-122; Maryam 19/41-46; Araf 7/59, 65, 73, 85.
33 "Let not the hatred of others to you make you swerve to wrong and depart from justice. Be just." Maeda 5/8.
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35 Rum 30/2-3.
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39 Mu'min 40/28.
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41 Nahl 16/106.
42 "And recall when you were few in numbers and deemed weak in the land, fearful lest people do away with you. Then He provided you refuge, strengthened you with His help, and provided you sustenance with good things that you may be grateful." Enfal 8/26.
43 "We shall certainly test you until We know those of you who truly strive and remain steadfast, and will ascertain about you." Muhammad 47/31.
44 Toplu Çalışma, ibid, p. 94-95; "Allah will surely admit those who believe in Him and hold fast to Him to His mercy and bounty, and will guide them on to a straight way to Himself." Nisa 4/175.
45 Beyazyüz, Abdulhakim, "Kürt Sorununda İslam Ümmetinin Sorumlulukları", Özgür-Der Kürt Sorunu ve Müslümanlar Forumu, Istanbul, 2006, p. 303.
46 Türkmen, Hamza, "Kürt Halkının Geleceği", Özgür-Der Kürt Sorunu ve Müslümanlar Forumu, Istanbul, 2006, p. 268-269.
47 "And among the People of the Book there are some who would restore you even if you were to entrust a treasure of gold, and of them there are some whom were you to entrust with one gold piece, will not restore it unless you stand over them. That is because they say: 'We will not be taken to task for whatever we may do to non-Jews. Thus they falsely fix a lie upon Allah, and do so wittingly." Al-i Imran 3/75.
48 Türkmen, Ulusçuluk Çıkmazı Kürtler ve Çözüm Arayışı, p. 71.
49 Yılmaz, Serdar Bülent, "Kürt Sorunu Vahyin Şahitliği Temelinde Tartışılmalıdır", Özgür-Der Kürt Sorunu ve Müslümanlar Forumu, Istanbul, 2006, p. 107.
50 "And warn your nearest kinsmen." Shuara 26/214.
51 Toplu Çalışma, ibid, p. 85-86.
52 "Human beings, We created you all from a male and a female, and made you into nations and tribes so that you may know one another. Verily the noblest of you in the sight of Allah is the most God-fearing of you. Surely Allah is All-Knowing, All-Aware." Hujurat 49/13.
53 Türkmen, "Kürt Halkının Geleceği", Özgür-Der Kürt Sorunu ve Müslümanlar Forumu, p. 269.
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57 Hujurat 49/13.
58 " Never have We sent a Messenger but he has addressed his people in their language that he may fully expound his Message to them." Ibrahim 14/4; Rum 30/22
59 "Hold fast together to the cable of Allah and be not divided." Al-i Imran 3/103.
60 Türkmen, Ulusçuluk Çıkmazı Kürtler ve Çözüm Arayışı, p. 124.
61 "And of His Signs is the creation of the heavens and the earth and the diversity of your tongues and colours. Indeed there are Signs in this for the wise." Rum 30/22.
62 "(O Prophet and his followers), turn your face singlemindedly to the true Faith and adhere to the true nature on which Allah has created human beings. The mould fashioned by Allah cannot be altered. That is the True, Straight Faith, although most people do not know." Rum 30/30.
63 "He has prescribed for you the religion which He enjoined upon Noah and which We revealed to you (O Muhammad), and which We enjoined upon Abraham and Moses and Jesus." Shura 42/13.
64 Toplu Çalışma, ibid, p. 113-114; "Then We revealed the Book to you (O Muhammad!) with Truth, confirming whatever of the Book was revealed before,78 and protecting and guarding over it.79 Judge, then, in the affairs of men in accordance with the Law that Allah has revealed, and do not follow their desires in disregard of the Truth which has come to you. For each of you We have appointed a Law and a way of life.80 And had Allah so willed, He

would surely have made you one single community; instead, (He gave each of you a Law and a way of life) in order to test you by what He gave you." Maeda 5/48.

65 Hujurat 49/13.
66 Şekerci, Hülya Kur'an-Hayat Ekseninde Mümin Kadın, p. 192.
67 Nisa 4/58.
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Research Centre for Islamic History, Art and Culture (IRCICA) and Its Role in Preserving the Heritage and Enrich the Intellectual Life in the Muslim World

Sabri Tawfeek Hammam

Introduction

The Research Centre for History, Art and Culture (IRCICA) is a branch of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, an international organization made up of 57 Member States, since 1980, interested in activities related to research, documentation and information about various topics, including what is in the field of civilization and culture and history of Islamic countries, including is in the history of science, architecture, archeology, architecture, fine arts and crafts, including what is in the preservation of cultural heritage and cultural development.

The center aims to promote collaboration and intellectual exchange between cultural institutions, universities and individuals who contribute to the consolidation of scientific and technical links. It also stimulates and closely following the studies, which are within the framework of a cooperative to provide a true picture of Islam and Islamic culture to the world public, as well as the consolidation of ties between the member countries of the Organization and other countries through cultural cooperation, and contribute to the establishment of friendly relations between the Islamic peoples and the peoples of other cultures in Eastern and Western worlds. In addition it is interesting heritage in the old countries around the Muslim world, and endeavor to hold conferences and seminars on sources of thought in the Islamic world, as the attention the arts and monuments, manuscripts, documents, and preparation of literature and encyclopedias country-Islamic world and is famous for its cultural heritage and geographical location, it also The closer the views of the countries of the Islamic peoples, and to heal the rift that may arise with

differences between these countries. It also addresses everything published by the West against the Ottoman Empire and Islamic peoples of the views is inaccurate and unfair statements do not depend on real resources, but are derived from Western hateful look on the Islamic world. And then it is an academic center and the University of the Islamic world, a beacon, as well as culturally, historically and politically. Therefore, the IRCICA Castle is an intellectual in the Middle East at large is not interested in issues and matters relating to Turkey, but also sponsor and undertake all the issues of the Islamic world to its relations with the Organization of the close of World Muslim Congress. It also prepares for a lot of programs developed in various fields of knowledge.

And require the work programs of IRCICA conduct research and organize conferences, exhibitions and competitions in the arts, architecture, and provides services in the areas of library and archive specialists in Islamic studies from around the world under the direction of Mr. professor Doctor Khaled Arne [1*].

IRCICA Center is the most important of think tanks in order to preserve the heritage and culture, and then the activities and events carried out by IRCICA many, and those achievements were in 2009, where it led research programs long-term, and organized three conferences, and coordinated many of the forums in the areas of research and architectural and artistic across the world, and produced nine books in several terms of reference, and enjoyed these events with great interest the Member States of the Organization of Islamic Conference and in the scientific and cultural interest around the world[2]. This increased the number of researchers to IRCICA from various spots as the center has won the attention of politicians and officials of the Turks and the heads of some countries, as well as Arab and foreign ambassadors, and to extend that bridge conceptual cooperation with IRCICA.

IRCICA has in the past years activities and different intensive and continuous, managed to impose itself as a focal point in the field of establishing links between different cultures. At the present time which is characterized by the proliferation of cultural and scientific exchanges on a global scale, it became the role of IRCICA in the promotion of cooperation in the field of research essential, efficient and pivotal attracts many researchers from various parts of the world, it also adopts the selection of points of research serve the heritage and Islamic thought in various fields of intellectual, and especially as it belongs to the Muslim world and to the Organization of the Islamic Conference, and cooperate with international and regional organizations great.

For this objective, the pursuit of the center for the development and diversification of resources and the results of research programs on the one hand, and enhance the technical potential and infrastructure on the other hand, that serve the system of scientific in various areas of rare heritage, such as documentation and font effects and preserve the Quran, as well as the history and civilization of ancient peoples , as well as the history and contemporary civilization of peoples, it also prepared the indexes for the Islamic world is keeping an intellectual heritage of the various branches of science, is marked as IRCICA that made many of the folders in medicine, astronomy, sports, geography, science, history and archeology. Of course this development is reflected in all the recorded programs of the Islamic Conference, and that since the adoption of the Makkah Summit in December 2005 to Year Programme of Action, in IRCICA action plans, and contribute to the center in implementing the program in all aspects of cultural and media.

The aspirations of the IRCICA is to serve the common Islamic issues, and participate in the activities of the Organization of Islamic Conference with an international dimension, such as dialogue between cultures, and indicate the true face of Islam and Islamic cultures, and the preservation of Islamic heritage and so on. The IRCICA activities, aims especially its ongoing entitled «Islamic civilization and the relations between cultures» and «History of the Islamic countries and their cultures» and «Studies Bibliographic about the sources of history and culture» and «Jerusalem 2015» and «database Prince Sultan bin Salman, the Islamic architectural heritage,» activities aimed at achieving those previous activities. The Organization of the Islamic world are supporting IRCICA all the necessary capabilities to carry out what it is the responsibility in various areas of intellectual, so the Secretary of the Muslim World League is always present in IRCICA; because he was the first brick in the center, who built this edifice, It is then aware of everything that needs this edifice of possibilities in order to play its role ascribed to it in the service of the Islamic world, as was the head of that association is always the celebrations, conferences and seminars that will stimulate progress and continue the system of intellectual and their secretions scientific, which appeared to bear fruit appear on the scene world, particularly in the Arab world; Similarly, celebrated the Organization of the Islamic Conference of the fortieth anniversary of its founding, and the dissemination of IRCICA this occasion the finest publications, such as photo album history of the Holy Jerusalem, which is equipped with footnotes, and reflects the critical importance gained by the city of Jerusalem at the Organization of the Islamic world and IRCICA, and the special place it takes in the hearts of all Muslims.

IRCICA have completed many activities such as expansion and development of the library. The opening of the library after that added to it touches thought in all its branches, so she developed the latest technology in computers, and the introduction of such data to a network link between all parts of the library, and allows researchers from various parts of the world access to that library and browse the contents, and then this service is a unique service of its kind in the Islamic world, as they contribute a lot in the definition of the Islamic world including Islamic civilization from the sources of thought and writings rich in various fields, and then we find that this library flock by researchers from various parts of the Muslim world and the West, This library constructed in the building of large, appropriated by the Turkish government in the palace where the center IRCICA is located in Yildiz.

The Emergence of IRCICA[3]

Research Centre for History, Art and Islamic Culture (IRCICA), is a cultural research center was established in 1982 in Istanbul, Turkey. It aims to preserve the human heritage, cultural, and maintain current archive is located in the center, which includes documents rare and pictures of archival rare due to the late nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century, and turn them in addition to other publications rare to electronic copies are available to researchers and those interested in all parts of the world. Was founded by Dr. Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu, Secretary General of the Organization of the Islamic Conference[4]. Also took center exercises its activity according to the goals set by the Organization of Islamic Conference. It can create an Islamic institution through which the nation's scientists to come together to do their research in order to create better understanding between the peoples of the Islamic[5].

Objectives of the Center

One of the main objectives of the center working to provide opportunities for collaboration between historians and Muslim writers and dissemination of research Islamic in various languages, and work to correct the errors contained in some of the curricula of some countries in the Muslim world to unite the Islamic history, along with a plan to exchange studies and manuscripts on art, history and culture of Islamic institutions and the organization of conferences and seminars in one of the Member States of the OIC [6].

The culture and Islamic culture that pass on her century XV may spread through history to the various continents, and broadcast of faith and science in the peoples of these areas and deepened so wherever found the concepts of science, philosophy, writers, architecture, art and sent the spirit of development and upgrading of those concepts, also handled through the ages with the cultures and civilizations different through acquaintance and co-existence and cross-fertilization with it. When it opened its arms this civilization of science and useful knowledge from other civilizations, worked on publishing the treasures of knowledge to all humanity.

If you were not signs of these developments have unfolded to us physically tangible, but the manifestations of the moral will remain still visible through the transfer and diffusion from one generation to another. It also highlights the evidence in the entity of Islamic culture and civilization as well as in productions based on their interaction with other cultures and civilizations, as well as what values of tangible or intangible is not limited and resulted in the legacy of intellectual and material and constructional(7). There is no doubt that the service organizations, academic and intellectual world, the Muslim has a great role in linking heritage and its past heritage as well as other societies, and most of those institutions IRCICA which always seeks to heal the rift between the States as well as to intellectual exchange between the universities of Arab and Western; to the development of system of scientific researches , to the heritage of Islamic civilization and the benefit and the benefit. It is also trying to preserve the Islamic identity, and what are its features distinguish them from others.

Can be defined as the cultural identity of a society as a basic set of values, which wraps around the community and produce gains that distinguish it from other communities, and the core values that make up culture are determined by the pattern at the same time the life of communities. For this reason, the continuation of the identity of communities for future generations depends on the indigenous culture of a society through her live with, and transfer of cultural heritage. And the consequent parameters is vital to know the cultural heritage and to make it and keep it.

It is obvious that there are differences in ethnic and linguistic patterns varied, depending on the geographical distribution among the followers of religion, one within acceptable limits, but the important thing is not to turn those differences between the formation of the features of cultural and civilizational common in the context of «unity and diversity»(8).

Another subject is of importance is the question of reference, as we see the increasing interest of communities in today's cultural heritage and keep

it in a world where there is the concept of "globalization." With the growth of transportation and communication technologies and the expansion of international relations and inter-linkages are difficult to control these mutual influences, including his campaign with the results of positive and negative at the same time. Before indulging in that, it must be noted that the talk about society, culture or civilization in the context of globalization depends on addressing cultural heritage as a reference only constant in the variables already mentioned; as the elements contained in that frame of reference consists of concepts that culture and culture such as religion, language, philosophy, geography and historical events and others. In Islamic civilization, the Quran, the Hadith and Quranic sciences are the elements of reference. As well as case, Mecca, Medina and Jerusalem are also elements of reference(9). From the above, it is clear the interest IRCICA culture of Islamic societies and what happens where the variables in the various fields, not to mention the geographical location of that country, it is also concerned with very areas of archaeological and sacred, as well as the Quran is the maintenance of Islamic identity in all its dimensions, and always tried to keep up with Western civilization is in line with the values of the Islamic civilization and cultural heritage legacy.

The cultural heritage constitute the foundations of the identity of communities at the same time it is considered the main source of which is due to the identification and validation, add to this as a fund for the future, and therefore must remain the primary reference is stable and must be maintained and enriching variables emerging that the subject maintained the heritage itself is accelerating the pace of sophisticated over time.

As a result of the foregoing, the preservation of cultural heritage in international forums and international academic relations are gaining increasing importance. There is a remarkable development in the projects aimed to study the issue of heritage protection of historical perspective. In the context of modernity taken with international institutions to this issue is of particular importance in this context, given the multiplicity of the aspects covered by this term and the promise of the properties can be for international efforts to take them, and deal with the topic by the international institutions involved in the important aspects of the following(10) :

a. secure the cooperation within the framework combines the parties involved in the common heritage.
b. provide technical and financial cooperation through international cooperation.

c. publish the results of efforts made in this way and taken as a model for other protection activities.

d. development of international standards in this area and the possibility of compliance.

It also assists the Center IRCICA in achieving its objectives of UNESCO in the preparation of the World Heritage List, and the monuments and the International Organization of Islamic Capitals and Cities and the Organization of Arab cities.

The issue of Islamic Cultural Heritage in the low status of the international organizations concerned. Have included a list of World Cultural Heritage adopted by UNESCO›s 754 impact, including 582 cultural monument, and 149 normal impact, 23 impact in different forms, they are distributed to all 129 countries. And There are thirty Islamic state with 107 of those effects, does not possess the elements of Islamic culture only 36 effect only, and there are groves of Muslim are also important in other countries not members of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, and these effects are also on the list mentioned (Alhamraa, Granada, Taj Mahal, the city of Kazan obsolete). And Islamic monuments and historic towns that comprise the United Nations list the necessary protection and care are the least number [11].

We have had a IRCICA a major role in the adoption of Islamic world, for they relate to the firm of UNESCO, which has always been in full swing with IRCICA in various issues and topics related to preserving the Islamic heritage, as well as the relentless pursuit to help the poor Muslim in the promotion of the system of research in it. And to assist them in maintaining its identity and its ancient heritage.

States have recognized the Islamic those needs, and has taken the concrete step when it agreed to the establishment of IRCICA for the research and activities in the cultural field, and practiced publishing them, and hold international conferences and seminars, and organizes exhibitions and practiced restoration work and develop training programs to contribute to the preservation of culture and Islamic civilization and the protection of heritage and to make it. However, the interest in the subject and concern by the high level has been shown to form the «International Committee for the preservation of Islamic Cultural Heritage» in 1983 under the chairmanship of Prince Faisal bin Fahd bin Abdul Aziz, to work, in particular the issue of cultural heritage, and are manufactured by the other of the Organization of Islamic Conference , and The Center IRCICA task of maintaining them. The Committee has a number of activities supported by the Organization of the Islamic Conference, and today IRCICA follow-up of those activities and maintain. The Committee was merged with IRCICA in 2000.

Some of the Achievements of the Center IRCICA

Varied achievements IRCICA between cultural heritage and to support the preparation of conferences and seminars of different, and the preservation of the ancient heritage, including contents from the effects of rare manuscripts and unique documents of the utmost importance, as well as maintaining the Quran and ancient manuscripts that were found by the writings of many of the Quran, and it has to adopt thorny issues of the Muslim world, such as the issue of Jerusalem, and many more, also contributes to many seminars and international conferences in various parts of the Muslim countries, and was always longer targeted programs for the advancement of the Islamic world in various fields of intellectual, as well as the highlights ancient heritage for the advancement of the future, as well as the urge to preserve the Islamic identity of sound, and encourages researchers and excel in different arts and intellectual fields. Especially that IRCICA by a group of scientists and researchers in various fields of scientific and intellectual potential, and this is why IRCICA to the rapid progress and great fame. The following is a profile of the most important achievements made by the Center:

Jerusalem and Palestine, the History and heritage [12]:

Projects included IRCICA on Jerusalem and Palestine, the preparation of reports and publications and organizing seminars and workshops on the history of the region and the cultural and architectural heritage.

Islamic Architectural Heritage *[13]*:

IRCICA Prepared several programs and advanced on the study of Islamic architectural heritage and it is registered and maintained, and organized workshops on the preservation of cities and monuments, and led projects reconstructive sites, and developed databases about the sites and monuments of the Member States of the Organization of Islamic Conference, and organized competitions on architectural innovation, research and projects repairs.

Support of Member States and Cooperation [14]:

The many heads of state of the world visit the center IRCICA, so visit of His Highness Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, Emir of Qatar on November

9, 2009 m, to attend the Economic Summit of the Organization of Islamic Conference which was held on the occasion of the fifth anniversary of the establishment of the COMCEC (Standing Committee for Economic Cooperation and trade of the Organization of Islamic Conference), accompanied by His Highness the Prince in his visit to the Center of His Highness Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim bin Jaber Al Thani, Prime Minister of the State of Qatar, Sheikha Hind girl Hamad Al Thani, Director of the Office of His Highness the Emir, and ministers and officials in the government of Qatar.

IRCICA Library [15]:

The activities of IRCICA Characterized in 2009, an event distinguished the opening of the library in its new building Slahkhanh Mahazi its headquarters in the palace of Yildiz, and opened the library on May 17, 2009 AD, Mr. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Prime Minister of Turkey in a ceremony attended by Prof. Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu, Secretary General of the Organization Islamic Conference, the Consuls General of FAO member countries accredited in Istanbul, and His Excellency Mr. Muammar Kohler, and to Istanbul, and His Excellency Dr. Kadeer Brick Bash, the mayor of Istanbul, accompanied by Turkish Prime Minister Mr. Ake of Bagsh, Turkish Minister of State for the affairs of the European Union and chief negotiator, Mr. Bashir Alataa, Turkish Interior Minister, the event was also attended by professors from various universities and the heads of the library in Istanbul.

Conferences Held in 2009 [16]:

IRCICA systems and the Royal Institute for Research in the history of Morocco (Rabat), under the high patronage of His Majesty King Mohammed VI, an international conference entitled “The west and the western Mediterranean in the Ottoman era,” held in Rabat from 12 to 14 November 2009 m.

Also organized IRCICA and National Center for Documentation Sana›a International Symposium on “Yemen during the Ottoman period on 16 and December 17, 2009 m in the capital Sanaa, in which twenty-eight Yemeni researcher and Turkey.

And The Ministry of Culture in the Syrian Arab Republic and the Research Centre for History, Art and Islamic Culture in Istanbul (IRCICA) in Damascus from 22 to 25 June 2009 AD to celebrate Jerusalem as the capital of Arab culture for 2009.

IRCICA also held the Second Forum of the Alliance of Civilizations in IRCICA Istanbul on 6 and April 7, 2009 m, and launched the Alliance of Civilizations initiative in 2005 by the two governments, Spanish and Turkish auspices of the United Nations, which is designed to "promote understanding and cooperation between nations and peoples through the cultures and religions, And the fight against the forces that fuel extremism and intolerance". And the first forum was held in Madrid on 15 and January 16, 2008 A.D.

The Center participated in the Council of Europe seminar about «the Other in post-conflict», in Athens in cooperation with the Ministry of Education in Greece. In cooperation with the Ministry of Education in Greece. This is the third symposium of its kind in a series of annual symposia held in the framework of the Council of Europe, «the image of the other in the teaching of history», and dealing with each seminar aside certain amount of the overall theme, and held the first symposium, entitled «learn history to understand and workout cultural diversity today In Strasbourg in October 2007. The second seminar was on the «Globalization and the Image of the Other: challenges and new perspectives to the teaching of history in Europe», subscribe to organize all of the Council of Europe and IRCICA at the Istanbul Center in November and December 2008.

IRCICA Participated in the organization of events on the occasion of the celebration in Baku «Capital of Islamic Culture for the year 2009» in the Republic of Azerbaijan in cooperation with the University of Architecture, Building from March 15 to 20, where established international festival entitled «Diploma and Occupation» dedicated to students and young architects under the slogan « «Traditional Islamic architecture « On this occasion, IRCICA reviewed its activities relating to the conservation of architectural heritage.

IRCICA also participated in thirty-third session of the World Heritage Committee of UNESCO in June 2009 in Seville, Spain from June 22 to 30, 2009 A.D., represented by Professor Amer Pasig architect, head of architecture at the IRCICA.

IRCICA Center also participated in a seminar on tourism development in the Islamic world was held in the city of Kirna in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. And reflect the studies presented during the symposium the various experiences gained in the field of tourism both Guinean and Bangladesh, Malaysia, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Tunisia and Turkey.

IRCICA Participated in a seminar International Committee of the studies pre-Ottoman and Ottoman CIEPO in the Kyrgyz Turkish Manas University

in Bishkek, entitled «the roots of Asian culture pre-Ottoman and Ottoman «.

The center participated in the International Conference on "Russia and the Islamic World: Partnership for stability", and on topics of meetings to strengthen international cooperation between Russia and Islamic countries and Muslim communities in Europe and America, and the reactions of Muslim groups in different countries of the threats of political and economic imbalances, and Russian cooperation And Russian cooperation in the field of Islamic economy and combat the effects of the financial crisis, and the partnership between Islamic countries and Muslim communities and countries, which is leading the world to find a financial system continues, and the dissemination of Islamic financial model.

Calligraphy Competition[17]

IRCICA have built many of the arts and skills of the Islamic conservative Islamic heritage, and one of his interests contest the art of calligraphy, and then launched in 2009, the international competition eighth calligraphy, which ended in 2010, has organized this competition on behalf of the calligrapher Syrian late Mohamed Badawi al-Dirani 1387-1312 A.H. /1894 - 1967 AD, also organizes IRCICA international competitions in the art of the line every three years, since 1986 under the programs of its effectiveness for the protection of the artistic heritage of Islamic foreign influences, which are incompatible with the concept of original art of Islamic calligraphy, In order to encourage young artists to follow the example of top artists of the calligraphy.

The Center Books

IRCICA characterized as a cell enjoys Boukerha on around them, as it is hard to provide the intellectual and scientific activity, according to successive events and the requirements of the times. The Center has issued many of the books that need to be many indexes to attended and classified according to different themes; Hute for the large number of writings on Islamic culture and Islamic history and Islamic civilization, among the most important of these books[18] .

1. Ottoman archives.
2. Library catalog literature Köpürlü, three parts.

3. Catalogue of Arabic Manuscripts Library, Istanbul 1828 - 1928 AD.
4. World Bibliography of Translations of The Meanings of The Holy Qura'an.
5. International Directory of Islamic Cultural Institutions
6. Ottoman stamps
7. Turkish Turkish manuscripts libraries.
8. World Bibliography of Translation of The Holy Quran in manuscript form
9. The West and Islam (Towards A Dialogue
10. Arab Turkish Relations
11. The Culture of Peaceful Coexistence .
12. Cultural Contacts in Building A Universal Civilization
13. İstanbul (A Glimpse into The Past).
14. Views of The Islamic Heritage.
15. Images and ancient inscriptions to Erzurum.
16. Egypt As Viewed in The 19th Century .
17. IRCICA 1980- 2000.
18. Newsletter IRCICA.
19. Turkish Art And Architecture.
20. Islamic Swords and Swordsmiths.
21. Islamic Art.
22. The Art of Calligraphy.
23. Ottoman Architecture in Albania.
24. The Holy Ka›ba .
25. Masterpieces of Calligraphy in Islam.
26. Islamic Art Terms.
27. Curtains of the Harmein Sharifein.
28. The Thuluth and Naskh Mashqs of Mehmed Sevki Efendi .
29. Islamic Monuments of Cairo in The Ottoman Period
30. Mushrabiyya and Stucco colored Glass in The Muslim World
31. Arabesque in The Crafts of The Muslim World
32. Creativity and Crafts in The Muslim World
33. Catalogue of winners› plates in the second international calligraphy competition (1411/ 1991)
34. History of Ottoman State Society & Civilization

35. The Muslim Pious Foundations and Real States In Palestine
36. Ottoman history and culture.
37. Studies on Ottoman Economic and Social History
38. On The History of Arab Countries during The Ottoman Period
39. Traces of Turkish Culture in Egypt.
40. Social And Economic Structure of the City of Damascus During The XVIITH Century The AVARIZ DEFTER NO. 1977.
41. Turks in Egypt and Their Culture Heritage.
42. Islamic civilization in West Africa.
43. Islamic civilization in East Africa.
44. Islam In South Asia.
45. The Advent of Islam In Korea .
46. Islamic Civilization in The Malay World
47. Islamic Civilization in Caucasia
48. proceedings of the International symposium on Islamic Civilization in The Balkans
49. Catalogue of Islamic Medical Manuscripts.
50. Science in Islamic Civilization
51. Religious Values and The Rise of Science in Europe
52. History of Astronomy Literature during The Ottoman Period
53. History of Mathematical Literature During The Ottoman Period
54. History of Geography Literature During The Ottoman Period
55. History of Music Literature During The Ottoman Period
56. History of Military Art and Science Literature During The Ottoman Period
57. The Ottoman Official Gazette.
58. Egypt during the Ottoman period: This book is one of the finest books written in the right of Egypt to the Ottoman era, especially that he was the outcome of an international collection of geniuses of scientists from various parts of the Muslim world, he is dating to Egypt in several points, including Egypt and the Levant during the Ottoman period from a comparative perspective, Administrative Law of the mandate of Egypt in the Ottoman «Kanun Name Misir» in the light of Islamic law. As well as the features of the Ottoman administration in Egypt in the light of the Ottoman documents. And the French occupation of Egypt. And commercial

treaties between the Ottoman text and the facts and the impact on the community of Alexandria. He also referred to Salah Ismail Pasha in the period from 1695 – 1697 AD. And contained observations about cultural identity and Scientific for the resettlement of as an indicator of the scientific level in Egypt in the sixteenth century. And address the role of endowment in the financing of educational institutions in Egypt in the Ottoman period(19).In addition, the center was instrumental in upgrading the system and the payment of property not only in Turkey but also in the Islamic world as a whole.

Center has completed several studies and research related to important issues of the Islamic Ummah. It is therefore an extremely important document includes the documentation of Awqaf and property belonging to Muslims in Palestine throughout the ages, along with their investigation and the statement at the present time. This document has been published in both Arabic and English as a guide, the Center issued the names and addresses of institutions of Islamic culture in the world. The Centre has also developed a set of documentary films about the art of calligraphy and art of gilding and Islamic ornamentation. Also issued a study on Islamic medicine books in libraries in the world.

Translations of the Meanings of the Quran *(20)*

And make the center a lot of efforts to limit the translations of the Holy Quran in various languages around the world, says Ekmaleddin Ihsanoglu founder of the Center on the subject: The primary objective of the inventory of these translations is to bring together the Islamic heritage in this area and not left scattered Even know the date from which the spread of Islam in all regions of the world, the Islamic peoples and attempts to identify the meanings of the Quran(21).

As mentioned, Dr. Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu: that the center has made an inventory of translations of the Quran in various parts of the world, including interpretations were recorded on cassette tapes.

Encyclopedia of Creativity*(22):*

The Center for Research of the History, Art and Islamic Culture in Istanbul - the Organization of Islamic Conference, the first Islamic encyclopedia of the creations of art in many Muslim countries of the OIC member first and foremost: Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey, Morocco, Tunisia, Bahrain, Syria,

Pakistan, Malaysia, Palestine, Indonesia, Yemen, Bangladesh, Jordan and other parts of the Muslim world.

The encyclopedia includes 464 pages in English and 73 pages in French. It was directed by this book in print luxury, and contains 134 color photographs to cut the craft include the decorative arts of engineering and plant for walls and ceilings and drilling on the wood, punching and cutting mosaics, and paintings coincidences, along with plates stained glass and creations of porcelain, pottery, and the ramifications of beauty in the character skin and crafts textile, precious carpets and the beauty of his mastery, which are all unique pieces with unique features.

The encyclopedia includes many researches and studies related to design and develop the skills and improve the production of these craft products. To discuss the problems of funding and opportunities for marketing as well as to review the policies of each state for consumers and employers character. The book includes papers with the task of research and after a field is characterized by the diversity of experiences in many parts of the world in search of 34 provided by specialists. The book also includes papers submitted by experts of international institutions such as Artisan International Council for Africa, and the institution of the Austrian Design Foundation, the traditional industries in Spain, and the Faculty of Science and Technology in Britain, and others.

The center works to establish a network of links and strengthening the bonds of cooperation with academic institutions, technical and cultural issues of common interest within the Member States and beyond, and encourage participation in events and scientific and carried out technical activities. Center has completed many works that will strengthen the bonds of cooperation between the Islamic peoples, and to establish a dialogue between Muslim peoples and the peoples who belong to other cultures. What has been achieved from a variety of activities in certain areas of the Muslim world was the result of the Centre cooperation with the SCO member states and institutions of cultural and scientific fields.

It is the work of Ajman Elderly Nursing by the Centre in this direction “Award of King Fahd of design and research in Islamic architecture “, an international competition that took place between 1985 1986 A.D, and was an important event bringing together specializations, in research and design alike, and was attended by a number of young researchers from forty countries, and awards were presented to a thirty-business in Islamic architecture, and the second event, which raised the echo internationally is the “International Competition for photography in the Islamic Cultural Heritage”,

and distributed prizes to the contestants from twenty-six countries of the world . The Centre in collaboration with the General Authority for Tourism and Antiquities, Saudi Arabia, organized an international conference on Architectural Heritage in the Islamic world during the month of October in 2010 in Riyadh. The Centre also organized between July 2005 to October 2008 "award Prince Faisal bin Fahd to preserve the architectural heritage of the Islamic" and awarded the prize for the best projects to restore the Islamic architectural heritage, was chosen as the projects by an international jury composed of architects and leading scientists in this field In 21 to 24 January 2011 AD the second international conference in Islamabad, Pakistan for Islamic monuments in the old cooperation with the National Research Institute of Historical and Cultural Rights.

In the area of protection of cultural heritage blogger care center also educational activities and training of specialists in that area. Has been developed in the restoration of two Educational programs, archives and manuscripts and methods of take care of it, and was attended by delegates from various Islamic countries [23].

The Centre is Characterized by work and achievements, whether at the level of the printed book, or was at the level of cultural events as the addresses of all Muslims, the Centre has so far issued more than 120 reference book includes among them research the history, culture, arts and crafts and The indexes for the translations of the Holy Quran printed and manuscript, and groups of Islamic manuscripts in the libraries of different history and literature of Islamic Sciences, and works about the Two Holy Mosques, and Jerusalem, and endowments trapped him, and photo albums of historical city of Jerusalem and others.

It all comes down the center of the belief that the Islamic cultural heritage constitute the foundations of identity in Islamic societies, and it is the reference that is due to him when you need to define that identity, and verifiable. It is thus imperative that this remains the basic reference never protect it still exists and we are working to develop and elevate it[24].

There is no doubt that IRCICA have a significant role in enriching the intellectual system of the Islamic world, because it will limit the areas of traditional and effects and rare manuscripts unique in various parts of the world, is also interested in writings serious about the history of Islamic countries and what keeping of archaeological sites, in order to place interactive and interdependent between the various parts of the Muslim world, also known as the Islamic culture of each other, and then the center is the responsibility of this role because of his achievements that are not available in other spe-

cialized centers and prestigious universities, and on this basis we can say that this center is a monument scientifically and culturally, historically and culturally, intellectually and heritage, that is a full-fledged scientific system in the various dimensions of human thought and culture in the Muslim world.

As for the task of protecting the Islamic architectural heritage it occupies a privileged position within IRCICA programs, participated in the early years and in the framework of the International Committee to preserve the cultural heritage in the restoration of the Islamic Mosque Demaq in Indonesia. And gained experience in this area again when the restoration of three buildings occupied by the Centre within Yildiz Saray in Istanbul. And since 1994, and intensive preparation of plans and projects on the subject of architectural restoration and protection of the Islamic heritage which was demolished in Bosnia and Herzegovina on the theoretical level, the activities of the Center as an actual new architecture there. The other areas of the Balkans as well (such as Bulgaria) the establishment of operations and restoration of mosques and cultural institutions [25].

The center IRCICA did not care to heritage and culture, but also interested in the participation of States, home to Muslims under the yoke of other cultures, and in conflict with the other, and those countries Bosnia and Herzegovina, where there was what happened, not lend a helping hand, convergence is only through this center, which through what ripple by these communities struggle intellectual and blurring of identity, and the challenge of Islam by trying hard, because take into their own hands, and embrace their issues, and is to them what serves their thoughts and their heritage, history and civilization from the writings and studies of thought.

Systems are the center of international architecture workshop since 1994 after the outbreak of war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where he was the destruction of cultural heritage, architectural and historical fundamental objective of the war along ethnic cleansing. Came these workshops for the cultural heritage under the title “Mostar 2004” in the city of Mostar, Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is about: education and training, and planning and to establish institutions, and the protection of buildings, priority, and the reorganization of the city’s buildings, and cultural heritage in the economic and cultural development of any tourism. The willing aggressors during the war in Bosnia to destroy everything that was present before them: in Sarai Bosnia, Mostar and Banja Luka and Foche, Gorazde and Bhej and others. It was the demolition of more than millennial architectural effect, and the attack took place on “the Institute of Oriental Studies” in the Serai in Bosnia May 17, 1992, and was home to the largest number in the inside of the Islamic manuscripts and documents in the Ottoman South East Europe.

The center is the first to publish a list of the devastating effects in Bosnia and Herzegovina after the outbreak of war, and sought to declare that international institutions and urged them to cooperate. In the year 2003 has been the center is the first international institutions, launched the call for remuseum collections and library collections that were looted and squandered in Iraq and the institutions that were acquired by [26].

The center did not forget of Arab States to adopt and support issues on the protection of the intellectual heritage and its unique, most notably in support of Iraq and Palestine, especially Jerusalem and the Aqsa Mosque.

The Center held a new series of workshops for the Islamic architectural heritage in Jerusalem and Palestine in collaboration with the University of Jerusalem and architectural colleges across the world, under the title \ "Jerusalem 2015, \". The consultative meeting was convened for this purpose at the center included experts from various around the world to formulate a program and action plan a series of meetings in February 2006. Later in the fact-finding team included 12 papers and experts from the scientific community and professional visit the holy city during the period from June 15, 2007 m in order to explore the prospects and possibilities of long term cooperation on projects, maintenance architecture within the old city, as well as to search for experts can participate in these projects, was issued a comprehensive report on the visit including details of the conditions of the city and its buildings. The Center held its first workshop in the Academy city of Jerusalem during the period of 1827 January 2008 with the participation of 34 architecturally with their assistants from the University of Istanbul Technical University and Yildiz Technical Institute and Barry technical (Italy), and Temple University in Philadelphia, the University of Sarajevo. The participants focused on some projects, which dealt with the separate sites and landmarks in the city. The Center held a workshop on 12 June 13, 2008 m at its headquarters in Istanbul attended by scientists and specialists from European universities and the University of Jerusalem and the International Centre for Peace and Cooperation in Palestine. And addressed the meetings held and activities performed during 2009, the experiences of the project since its launch. The experts discussed the possibility of participants providing support to the authorities concerned to expand the Museum of the Al Aqsa Mosque. The meeting agreed on the idea of developing a complementary sections of the Museum of Far by IRCICA in collaboration with the Museum Administration [27].

The center works on the period since the implementation of a database on archaeological sites and historical monuments in the Islamic countries,

was for the formation of a team of qualified architects, and proceeded to the center to collect and record information for cities, sites and monuments of Islam. Member States were invited to provide the center with the available information in its possession about the historic sites and monuments there as of January 2008, the system is capable of operation and access to it has become possible on the site, which included more than 500 entrance and to the end of December 2009 has been prepared files for 580 teachers listed on the Internet for the project. These features are located in 49 Member States of the Organization of Islamic Conference, and 4 countries as observers, and 29 State not from the Organization of Islamic Conference. During the research phase, 19 cities were selected for the important Islamic further research (Mecca, Medina, Jerusalem, Cairo, Damascus, Isfahan, Granada, Istanbul, Kairouan, Gazzan, Lahore, Mostar, Samarkand, Sanaa, Zanzibar). As has been studying some cities other Islamic and characterization of architecture, including: Tehran, and the bowl in Iran, and Light Port diabetes, and Allahabad and Ahmedabad and Aligarh in India, Kashgar in China, and Khorezm in Uzbekistan, and Kabul, and Ghazni in Afghanistan, and Edirne, Bursa, and Iznik, and Ankara in Turkey and Shusha in Azerbaijan(28).

On the other hand, the Center organized several training courses to hone talents of Muslim artists in calligraphy and gilding and Alabro (paper Almdza) in collaboration with the University of Mimar Sinan in Istanbul, And joined by several calligraphers of the Member States of the OIC, The Center held a number of decrees to grant leave for the calligraphers from around the world has surpassed the 70 calligrapher. Complementing the role of the center, has published a book great in the art of the line and Krastin of Omhak the first to teach linear one-third and copying by calligrapher Mohamed Shawky, and the second to teach the lines of the patch and customs clearance and customs clearance is evident by the calligrapher Mustafa Halim Ozaasega(29).

From the above is unclear how much attention IRCICA adopt talented youth of the world's Islamic calligraphy, and to preserve the Islamic heritage, as well as to maintain the beauty of the Arabic language and linking past and present in a cooperative framework among Islamic countries among themselves, in order to detect talent submerged in the Muslim world, and so provide valuable prizes urges young people to accelerate the participation, as well as the deep study in this area.

Has emerged the idea of establishing the first international art competition online dedicated to the memory of the late Hamid Aamdi in 1986 during

a scientific symposium on the World 'principles, forms and common themes for the Arts of the Islamic ", held by the Istanbul Center in April 1983. The aim of the competition is to preserve the values and methods of the art of Islamic calligraphy and revived by encouraging calligraphers generation of contemporary and future generations. So decided to set up this competition to open the way for the work of Muslim calligraphers by traditional approaches recognized, And concepts enshrined in the common famous of this art over the centuries, Away from foreign influences, which are incompatible with the original concept art of Islamic calligraphy(30).

We have proved IRCICA famous saying that the Quran came down in Mecca and wrote in Turkey and read in Egypt, through talent big in the art of the calligraphy, and those talents were since ancient times to the present day have their mark in the Islamic heritage, and those talents calligrapher Hamid Aamdi.

It was decided to conduct the first competition in the font name of the late calligrapher Hamid Aamdi (1891 1982) in 1986, then conducted a subsequent competitions of senior creative calligraphers in order to urge the runners on the tracing and perpetuate their memory. Therefore, the second competition organized on behalf of Sapphire Almstasma calligrapher (d. 698) in 1989, The third competition was organized on behalf of the calligrapher Ibn doorman in the thousand year anniversary of his death (413 AH/1022 AD), And the fifth as the late Egyptian calligrapher Sayed Ibrahim (1897 1994 m) in 2000, And sixth in 2003 on behalf of Iranian calligrapher Mir Emad Hassani (961 e 1042/1554 1615) in the fourth centenary of his death, The seventh name of the late calligrapher Hashim Muhammad al-Baghdadi (1335-1393 AH/1917-1973A.D) in 2007, And eighth as the late calligrapher Mohamed Badawi al-Dirani (1312-1387 AH /1894 1967 A.D) in 2010 AD(31).

IRCICA has not ignored the crafts that have had a role in maintaining the ancient heritage in its real, it was the stand out features of ancient culture, and then built IRCICA to deliver a message to the generations contemporary skill and sophistication of their ancestors ancient and putting of rules in the service of culture and thought.

The "program to develop handicrafts " one of the programs IRCICA task in the field of cultural heritage, It serves to protect the manual arts in the forms and principles, and seeks out after about foreign influence, and identification characteristics and advantages of origin, and support development programs. In this context, experts participated from all over the world in seminars and international celebrations of the many held by the center

today in Morocco, Pakistan, Egypt, Syria, Tunisia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the Sultanate of Oman and the other, and the heads of crafts and craftsmen than one hundred countries presented their work, and seminars that have been the subject of its diversity; such as: the possibility of developing craft sector, and promoting the art of carpets (Klim), carpets, arabesque and stained glass and oriels. Research was published in the books took place today in the libraries of the world. This program continues its activities effectively, it recently held a seminar with the General Authority for Tourism and Antiquities in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (Riyadh, November 2006) on the topic of tourism and handicrafts in the Islamic world, Then followed in the Muscat International Symposium on Innovation in Crafts (19 February 20, 2011 A.D). This aspect in Islamic heritage and very widespread, and reflects the social and cultural characteristics as well as the technical side(32).

From the above it is clear that this center has been struggling to keep the old in a dress today, it displays for his veterans of various efforts in various professional fields, introduced to the carpet industry and the line and many of the handicrafts in order to clarify that these industries are emerging culture and Islamic identity form pure away from the falsity of Western civilization.

This has begun to center its activities in 1980 as the first research institution working in the cultural field under the flag of the Organization, that the spin of its activities and research of scientific and different activities related to: history of the Islamic peoples, and the relations between civilizations and cultures in the past, present, and cultural development, arts Muslim countries, and art history, history of science, and Islamic architecture, and the preservation of architectural heritage, and Islamic monuments, and so on. The center seeks to achieve this through the dissemination of research and organizing international conferences and scientific symposia and lectures, exhibitions and live competitions aimed at supporting cultural and artistic activities and promote international cooperation, And then provide it all to serve the universities, institutes and researchers around the world. The Centre aims through these activities to better definition of the Islamic civilization and increasing convergence between the OECD countries on the one hand and between them and the world on the other hand (33).

The Most Important Projects of the Centre for IRCICA
History of the United Islamic

a. History of Islam in South Asia
b. History of Islam in Southeast Asia.

c. History of Islam in West Africa.

d. History of Islam in the Caucasus.

e. History of Turkey

f. Studies in Arab relations – Turkey .

g. Muslim community outside the Member States

h. History and culture of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the activities of the center related to Bosnia and Herzegovina

Exhibitions and Conferences:

a. Workshop on preservation of heritage in Bosnia**.**

b. Audio-visual shows**.**

c. Mostar 2004.

d. Symposium in the History of Science.

The Most Important Conclusion Search Results

The IRCICA of service institutions in preserving the heritage of the Islamic old; is interested in the documents and manuscripts through which derived peoples of the Islamic dates and civilization from Islamic sources far from the fallacies Orientalists that are scattered in their writings, especially in the literature on the relationship of the Ottoman Empire Islamic countries, and then the IRCICA re-writings of these dates through the original sources, manuscripts and documents using the senior professors, scientists, specialists neutral point of view.

IRCICA cares researchers from various parts of the Muslim world, by providing scholarships at all levels and all stages of research, it also contains a library of the most precious and most valuable libraries in the Islamic world and that the content of manuscripts and sources and references are unique from the others in the world.

The Centre IRCICA activities in the areas of research and publication, registration and information on topics dealing with culture and Islamic culture from the date of the Islamic peoples and history of science, archeology, architecture, fine arts and crafts, and the preservation of cultural heritage, and issues of cultural development.

The Center seeks to cooperation between universities and research support and student activities on the arts and studies on Islamic civilization,

and the scientific exchange between the Islamic countries in various areas of research to build a good relationship between Islamic peoples and other cultures and societies in the East and West.

The center held a number of global conferences that combine thinkers and leaders of Islamic scholars in various fields of science, and the holding of exhibitions organized competitions in art, architecture, and provides services relating to the library and archives specialist in the Islamic world.

IRCICA cares religious events in various parts of the Muslim world, had been initiated in the holy month of Ramadan to revive one of the most important events of interest to all mankind, a lapse of fourteen centuries from the Hijra on the descent of the Holy Quran.

IRCICA is the largest castles in the intellectual culture of the Islamic Middle East, especially the ancient heritage of civilization during the Ottoman Empire. here are many of the manuscripts and indexes that contain intellectual reference books from which the modern generation sipping fragrant past of Islamic sources far from the West and distorted to such sources.

IRCICA supports talented in calligraphy, and to preserve the Islamic heritage and Islamic Calligraphy, Arabic language and its glory, and then credited with maintaining the language of the Quran.

IRCICA a good chance that he follows the system of the OIC, headed by Dr. Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu, who spares no effort in supporting the Islamic heritage and to maintain and encourage researchers from all over the Muslim world to provide grants and scientific missions to universities in various parts of the Muslim world. It is also much concerned with issues of the Muslim world, it contains a digital library are running an e-interview through which all the intellectuals and researchers in various parts of the Muslim world to achieve what they dreamed it, and this effort done by Mr. Prof. Dr. Khalid Arran, accompanied by Mr. Prof. Dr. Saleh Al-Saadawi, all based on that status does not save no effort in attention to the dates and the Islamic cultures of the world is pleased to many countries and states to come back in the snow-white dress away from the impurity of Western thought and Orientalist. This is the aspirations of the center IRCICA in the future with the support of many Muslim countries in terms of intellectual, in several types, including grants, including electronic libraries, including the Book of drafting history in and visions of a moderate to stand on the facts that the benefit of the new generations in the future next.

It is one of the most important books that have attracted the attention of the Egyptian Book Readers “Egypt in the Ottoman era”, which is related to cultural and intellectual right of Egypt at that time from the perspective of a

neutral, informed intellectuals in all parts of the Muslim world on Egypt during the Ottoman era.

IRCICA Center is also interested in preserving the rare Islamic monuments in various parts of the Muslim world, and it supports the center in his studies on the Ottoman archives, which abounds in many of the documents on the Arab countries and various parts of the Islamic.

Center also supports the Arab countries such as Palestine, he has a number of seminars and conferences on Jerusalem and the Arab countries in crisis are different.

And then we can say that the center IRCICA is academic and scientific institution thought to serve both the Muslim world, and re-drafting of civilization and history of the Islamic world on track straight. It is also a research center is credited with overseeing and adopting many of the talented people in the Muslim world in various intellectual fields. And work to correct the errors contained in some curricula in some countries of the Muslim world to unite the Islamic history, along with a plan to exchange studies and manuscripts on art, history and Islamic culture among the different institutions.

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http://ar.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=ircica 20/6/2011.

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Endnotes

1 (*) المدير العام لمركز الأبحاث للتاريخ والفنون والثقافة الإسلامية بإستانبول.

2 () منظمة المؤتمر الإسلامي. مركز الأبحاث للتاريخ والفنون والثقافة الإسلامية بإستانبول. IRCICA. إستانبول. مطبعة ماوي أوفسيت. ٢٠٠٩م. ص٢.

3 () وكانت نواة إنشاء هذا المركز خلال انعقاد المؤتمر السابع لوزراء خارجية الدول الإسلامية الذي عقد في اسطنبول عام ١٩٧٦م. وقد تم وضع النظام الأساسي لإنشاء المركز خلال انعقاد المؤتمر التاسع لوزراء خارجية الدول الإسلامية الذي عقد في داكار عاصمة السنغال عام ١٩٧٨. وحتى تم انتخاب مجلس إدارته بانعقاد المؤتمر الإسلامي الثاني عشر في يونيو عام ١٩٨١ م. أما بالنسبة لافتتاح المركز بصفة رسمية فقد تم في ٢٣ مايو عام ١٩٨٢:
- أكمل الدين إحسان أوغلو: الحفاظ على ثقافة الأمة وتراثها الإسلامي ضرورة معاصرة. ينظر:
- http://haras.naseej.com/Detail.asp?InNewsItemID=136371

4 () http://ar.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=ircica 20/6/2011.

5 ()Brief History of The Establishment of The Centre, May 1982, p. 1.

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Part III
Social Movement and Revolution

Spaces of Protest: The 2011 Egyptian Revolution, Non-State Actors, and the 'Coupling' of Social and Virtual Protest Systems

Aristotle Kallis

"*after 2 days of protesting, tear gas is like fresh air, rubber bullets are like rain drops, sticks are like Thai massage"*

Introduction

Information and Communication Technology (ICT) - and, above all, the new, increasingly sophisticated ways in which its tools are used by real people individually and collectively - have transformed fundamentally our perception and experience of both space and time. On the one hand, technological mediation collapses conventional categories and boundaries of space in the sense that the physical distance between the local, the national, and the regional or even global is radically transformed into a matter of access to a single gateway. On the other hand, space also expands through a process of creating a technologically mediated field in which individuals (whether socio-politically organised or not) and non-state collective actors emerge from the shadows (especially where state restrictions make this problematic or impossible in the 'physical' space), break free from their isolation or from the chains of repressive surveillance, create new (virtual) spaces of congregation, and in some cases establish the contours of an alternative public sphere. Crucially, the time dimension of communication flows is also radically altered through instant transmission and archiving, making contact and the exchanged information accessible either in real time or asynchronously. But the two spaces (physical-social and virtual) can be 'coupled' - either the social space (again previously organised or ad hoc mobilised) enters the

internet system and becomes a virtual, decentred/deterritorialised but re-aggregated network; or the virtual space becomes the locus of new social and political channels of mobilisation and self-organisation, in response to new external conditions and stimuli; or usually both. In any case, however, the dynamics of the two systems can - in particular conditions and circumstances - become intertwined and reproduce/reinforce each other in an explosive multiplier effect.

This complex process of 'coupling' between the physical (social and political) and the virtual spaces has become of paramount significance in the case of mass protest. Midan Al-Tahrir in Cairo became a mass protest space that was both very real and symbolic - condensing a local, national, and of transnational or indeed global import. This was the physical location and the moment in time where/when the physical space of mass protest and the constructed, technologically mediated virtual space of communication-mobilisation converged. The dynamic structure and geography of this unfolding mass protest became too complex for the state authorities to follow, fully appreciate, and address. The attempt of the then Egyptian government oscillate between physical repression and an exercise of 'sovereign ban' on virtual networks of communication (by restricting, penalising and eventually banning altogether access to it) proved desperately ineffective. On the one hand, it underlined how the Egyptian state attempted to strategically territorialise and 'nationalise' the internet - as a 'panoptical' space where popular participation is subject to state regulation, supervision, and sanctions for transgression. On the other hand, the virtual space by definition does not lend itself easily to this kind of state appropriation/territorialisation and very often (though not always, as the case of China has demonstrated) generates the tools to bypass it. The last resort of a blanket 'access denied' within Egypt around midnight of Friday 28 January was soon mediated by using new, strategically created and de-centred nodes (e.g. the Google 'Speak to Tweet' service or globally-based dial-up or proxy services) and by re-purposing existing ones (the Noor Data Network that was not shut down immediately as it apparently served big multinational companies in Egypt and the entire region of the Middle East). Thus, ICT offered three highly effective and sophisticated channels of political activism: creating dynamic alternative virtual spaces of mass mobilisation and congregation through pages, online groups, media streams, and hashtags that transcended both state restrictions and the conventional dimensions of physical space; using clandestine techniques to 'jam the jammer' and thus 'liberate' (cyber) spaces previously rendered inaccessible by the state authorities; and finally, facilitating the instant 'coupling' of the physical and virtual spaces of protest.

What do all these changes mean for the capacity of non-state actors (existing and newly mobilised) for mass protest in the 21st century? The highly effective 'coupling' of physical protest and internet systems of mass mobilisation witnessed in Tunisia and particularly Egypt in the winter of 2010/11 underlines the new opportunities for self-organisation of (established but also new) non-state actors, especially in conditions of institutionalised state surveillance and repression. Unlike conventional protest systems, informational ones provide an alternative model of instant, multi-faceted flows ensuring that the system of protest reaches self-organised stability much sooner. Yet, while the 'co-evolution' of social protest and internet (virtual protest) systems was a key component in the success of the Egyptian uprising (particularly during the critical days following the 28 January outage of internet communications), the experience and role of human actors in this process retains an undiminished critical significance. It is precisely the strength and effectiveness of the 'coupling' between human agency and internet-based social-political communication that creates the necessary conditions for the other, even more critical phase of 'coupling' - between cyber-protest and physical social protest. Midan Al-Tahrir in Cairo was the felicitous outcome of this polycentric, effectively converging and combined convergence; yet, the way it happened, the extent that it reached, and the dynamics that it generated cannot be fully appreciated without examining the specific structures and patterns of human behaviour in Egypt during those critical weeks of January-February 2011.

How Information Travels (and Perception Changes):
Of 'Viruses', 'Waves', and 'Dominoes'...

Good, empowering, liberating ideas are infectious. They tend to spread fast (and nowadays much faster) through the dramatic proliferation of, and widening access to, mass media and new information/communication technologies, reach people regardless of their space coordinates, and are adapted in the process of their diffusion to address particular circumstances or promote specific goals. Diffusion and adaptation are twin processes that very often happen at the same time - as ideas spread, they also tend to mutate, 'reframe' perceptions of reality, and incorporate more specific cultural forms or messages. Indeed, the two processes are related in an additional, crucial way: ideas that are adaptable and attract others to adapt them tend to spread faster and definitely more widely.

Nevertheless, ideas do not always spread fast, afar or in an enduring way. Some ideas and practices, however impressive they may seem or however fast they may get initially diffused, are also easily forgotten or soon run out of social 'steam'. Others get diffused very slowly at the beginning but at some stage they truly gain spectacular traction. Only very few ideas 'succeed' instantly and enduringly in the test of diffusion. They are seen as 'successful' because of their influence over, and relevance to, the lives of their audience - and not necessarily because of their intrinsic value or innovative premise. Unfortunately, 'bad' ideas (e.g. divisive, oppressive, hate-infested) may also spread fast and 'succeed'; in fact, all collective prejudices in the past and present have been formed by such 'bad' ideas that 'succeeded' in their diffusion and entrenched themselves in the cognitive model of entire societies and cultures.

When ideas spread fast and provoke mobilisation (whether through existing social movements that become reactivated or through generating new ones), we often talk of a 'contagion' effect. The metaphor is indeed interesting. Contagion attests to both the strength of the infecting element (the idea of precedent) as well as to the vulnerability/weakness of the infected host (the person-s adapting it). But in a globalising world of mass media and near-instant communication, this kind of cognitive contagion requires no immediate physical contact in order to occur. It crosses effortlessly multiple boundaries - not only between social and political spaces but also between countries and entire regions. 'Contagion' in this context refers to three separate indicators: the speed of diffusion; the spatial extent of diffusion; and the strength of the consequent influence on a large number of people and groups. By definition, 'contagion' is spectacularly fast, dramatically extensive, and extreme in its consequences. Here I use the word in neutral terms, i.e. dismissing its connection with the (negative) idea of 'disease' and 'epidemic' but borrowing from the imagery of 'viral' transmission. Viewed from this angle, 'contagion' was at the very heart of most mass protest movements in history, whether within the contours of the same community/society/state or in regional and even global terms. Historically, mass protests originated in one place (usually - though not necessarily - a big city) and then spread, first to other cities, then to the countryside. Sometimes, protest activity in one country provoked similar phenomena in others (e.g. 1848 and 1989 revolutions in Europe) in the course of a few weeks, months, years or decades, depending on how fast (in objective, technological terms) information could be transmitted from one place to the other.

There are other ways to look at, and describe, this process of 'viral' diffusion of ideas and practices. Like 'contagion', the 'wave' metaphor indicates

a seemingly uncontrolled, fast, and strong process of transmission. Then we have the famous 'domino effect' - very much in the headlines today. In addition to all the above features, this particular metaphor conveys the image of a 'fall' - quite literally in the case of the domino tiles but also used in more figurative terms to denote the collapse of an order, whether political or social or both. Unlike either contagion or wave, the 'domino effect' combines speed and extent with a sense of more or less predetermined direction, marked by patterns of relation and interconnectedness. Thus, the domino tiles are expected to fall because they were already standing sequentially next to each other in the first place. But the 'domino' metaphor communicates an exaggerated sense of pre-determination: if the first tile falls, then all or at least most of the others will follow, regardless of either objective (structural) or subjective (psychological and perceptual) conditions in each case and at each particular time-space.

Neither of these otherwise very rich and evocative metaphors explain what happens between the originating moment of diffusion and the 'falling' of a particular tile or the 'contagion' of a particular group, big or small but essentially disparate and made up of independently thinking and acting individuals. They do not explain why the idea or the practice became 'contagious' in the first place - why at that precise moment and not earlier or later, why in a specific direction and not another, why in this particular form and not another. They have an unduly strong structuralist component (tiles will fall because they find themselves close to each other, etc) while paying less attention to subjective elements and influences, whether long-term (e.g. cultural and historical determinants, such as values, attitudes, and behaviours, both individual and collective) or short-term (e.g. specific perceptions - or shifts thereof - at that time). Even when it comes to objective-structural factors, both metaphors suggest a very narrow focus, disregarding for example the significance of factors such as the organisational strength and mobilising capacity of protest movements, the power of their opponents, the attitude of third parties, and so on.

In this paper, I am not really interested in how such 'successful' ideas are produced in the first place; my focus is on the process of 'successful' diffusion itself. I am proposing to begin reflecting on the diffusion of ideas and practices as swift/extensive/perception-altering emulation, adoption, and adaptation of 'successful' and 'opportune' precedents in particular, highly conducive to transmission and profound adoption, socio-political contexts. Put simply: very few people will follow an isolated, seemingly unsuccessful (in terms of either impact or achievement of particular goals) or wildly unrelated to them example set by others; even less so one that they funda-

mentally disagree with. Perception-altering and paradigm-shifting developments, on the other hand, - indicated by their mobilising capacity, their mass social influence, and their attainment of spectacular outcomes - do have what (to stay within the context of figurative speech) resembles a seismic effect that rattles existing relations, perceptions, and cognitive/psychological balances. What happened in Tunisia during last December and January may have subsequently been identified as the beginning of a 'wave' of mass protest known as the 'Arab spring' that spread, first, to Egypt and then to a multitude of Arab countries; but at the time it was a unique event without either reference to something that preceded it or awareness of what could have followed it. Events and outcomes in Egypt in late-January and early-February 2011 were also unique but for rather different reasons: not only because they effected fundamental change in a different political and social context but also because they were seen as a resounding 'confirmation' of an social-political mass emancipatory trend starting with Tunisia and waiting to spill over across the broader region.

This is why the Egyptian revolution of 2011 is the most fascinating and at the same time challenging in analytical terms case study of the protest movement that has recently shaken up or is still convulsing many Arab countries. Midan Al-Tahrir gave tangible and visible expression to two complex developments taking place at the same time: an attitudinal and psychological-perceptual change on both the individual and the collective levels inside Egypt, growing by the day, seizing a gradually expanding window of 'political opportunity' for revolutionary change; and the spontaneous, dramatic formation of a social movement, partly based on existing organisational structures and partly spontaneous and self-organised, that drew inspiration from the recent precedent of Tunisia, adapted it to the specific conditions, challenges, and expectations of the Egyptian context, and 'succeeded' against a powerful, deeply entrenched political system in a way that crucially inspired others beyond the national boundaries of the country. In other words, the success of the Egyptian protest movement not only 'confirmed' the perceived message from Tunisia but transformed it into a trend of trans-national import, unlocked new channels of diffusion, and strengthened its influence regionally. Midan Al-Tahrir was at the same time the central node of a purely Egyptian mass protest and revolution (that was at the same time unfolding in numerous places across the country), the confirmation of the emancipatory forces and processes that were unleashed weeks before in Tunisia (in many ways, Egypt's empowering precedent), and the blinding spark for a new, more powerful wave of protests that spread east and west within the course of a few days or weeks. It was in Egypt that the most sig-

nificant features of this wider, diffuse trend were established - mass popular movement, on the streets but also along the invisible threads of the cyberspace; active opposition to authoritarian, repressive, corrupt and nepotistic rule that is exposed as illegitimate and now socially bankrupt; a sense of newly found empowerment to fundamentally change the situation.

Generally, protest movements function in three dimensions. The first one (micro) involves individuals - how they perceive their surrounding world, how they negotiate dissonant messages, how they respond to changing structures and - particularly - subjective perceptions. The second (macro) dimension relates to movements made up of these mobilised individuals, with a focus on how they respond and act collectively, how they negotiate individual values with the operation of the movement, and how collective action impacts on their individual perceptions and behaviours - and vice versa. Finally, the third dimension - and perhaps the most interesting from the point of view of diffusion of ideas/practices - concerns a transference of those ideas and practices to other contexts, whether political, social or cultural, usually indicating a diffusion that crosses social, political, cultural, and indeed national state boundaries. Classical accounts of mass protest follow different conceptual avenues to highlight the significance of factors that facilitate group mobilisation and point to the exceptional opportunities for radical action. Objective structural factors (such as socio-economic grievances, political repression and corruption, erosion of the government's legitimacy, but also strengthening and increased efficiency of the organisational structures of oppositional forces and in some cases external influence) are indeed highlighted. Yet, so are subjective developments - most importantly, a fundamental change in consciousness as a prerequisite for radically changed behaviour and action. Often, non-state actors are still stuck in the previous diagnosis of powerlessness or lack of political opportunity vis-a-vis an oppressive, corrupt state apparatus. It takes some powerful triggers for either individuals, groups or organisations to revisit their diagnosis of the situation and alter their perception of it and their action repertoire; indeed, this is the case even regardless of objective structural changes. Put in other words, objective structural change and a de facto shift in the balance of power within a system may be crucial in understanding afterwards why mass protest did occur; but it does not explain why it happened at a particular moment or in a particular way and pace. By contrast, radical modifications of individual and collective perception (and an acknowledgement of 'political opportunities' for change that galvanise people into protest action) underpin the outbreak of mass protest there and then, even if the spike in protest activity does not necessarily correspond to concurrent structural shifts that would otherwise

explain it. 'Political opportunity' may be related to structural factors but it exists in real life as a matter of perception and conscious acknowledgement on part of (existing and would-be) actors. Moreover, mass protest may occur in the expectation of generating genuine political opportunities in the course of the protest itself, not as a calculated response to their perceived existence.

In addition, classical theories of mass protest pin down the dynamics of mobilisation to two factors, depending on whether one focuses on the micro- or on the macro-level of protest. With regard to the former, the psychological influence of 'neighbours' (a term that is here used to refer to individuals and groups de facto in close proximity to one's everyday life, be that family, neighbourhood, social and professional environment etc) has been highlighted as a critical incentive (or disincentive in other cases) to mobilisation and participation in protest action. With regard to the latter (macro) level, the operational efficiency of existing organised movements and their capacity to provide inspiration (often through leading by example), cognitive 're-framing', direction, and a new convincing diagnosis-prognosis alternative to the official one during the crucial phase of gaining traction have also been highlighted as significant factors behind the success stories of mass mobilisation and protest in the past. Both these sets of factors are particularly significant in the context of analysing protest movements - not only in the generic scenario of mass mobilisation for radical change against state or global practices but especially in the context of authoritarian, highly restrictive political and social environments, where alternative 'frames' of analysis and prescription are de facto banned and actively persecuted. The example of the Iranian mass protest movement in 1978-79 underlines how a mass protest movement, motivated by a new, fundamentally different 'frame' of diagnosis-prognosis, can begin and gain traction even within a highly repressive political regime through organisational mobilisation (strength of the opposition and especially perception thereof by social and political actors) and 'neighbour' psychological empowerment and pressure (through observing the actions of others, feeling 'liberated' to follow their precedent, and - in some cases at least - jumping on the proverbial bandwagon once the protest movement has gathered visible momentum).

All the above factors assist critically in a process of 'cognitive liberation' of social actors: namely, the subjective - individual and group - perception that the previous balance of the situation has changed dramatically, that favourable change is possible now, and that the chances of this change happening through protest action have significantly increased. The perception of 'success' is not only highly subjective but also relative. For the so-called 'early adopters' of the new 'framing' it relates to the acknowledgement of

changing conditions and balances even if the perception of change itself has not yet become fully tangible or objectively critical. For others who become cognitively 'liberated' in the process by observing the behaviour of others and following their precedent, 'success' relates to the 'confirmation effect' of the protest, the fact that a growing number of 'neighbours' have already joined or are joining in and, in so doing, are actively altering the balance of power through their cumulative (mass) agency. These processes happen usually fast - as fast as information and exchange flows can travel in each case, aided by visibility and mass communication.

For 'cognitive liberation' to occur on a significant mass level, a combination of long- and short-term perceptions must combine into a new 'frame' of diagnosis-prognosis. In all cases of mass protest, the long-term ingredient entails a general acknowledgement that a set of official decisions by the state or indeed the entire political system is illegitimate (the latter far more likely in the case of authoritarian, repressive regimes). This acknowledgement ushers the individual into an enduring state of neutralised (i.e. stable) cognitive dissonance: on the one hand, there is the perception that there is something wrong with the system in which s/he lives - and something that affects, directly or indirectly, their quality of life; on the other hand, respect for order, fear of sanctions or perceived lack of momentum (e.g. others protesting) convince them that change is not likely or possible in the current circumstances. This balancing of wildly opposed diagnoses produces a psychological foundation of grudging inertia that is relatively hard to alter, not least because the diagnosis itself is not constantly reassessed in the light of any objective shifts, which more often than not are not instantly or clearly apparent even to the perceptible observer. It is, however, the acknowledgement that the situation has changed at a particular moment which kick/starts the process of 'cognitive liberation'. A fundamental change in perception may ensue from the awareness (accurate or not - this is not the point) of a changing balance between the two dissonant sets of beliefs mentioned earlier. This may happen in a number of different ways: the legitimacy of the system may have suffered a recent strong blow; or the fear of sanctions may have for some reason subsided (possibly through observing the 'successful' mobilisation of others around or through evidence of weakening commitment of those supporting the existing system); or the strength of the opposition forces may have started to appear substantially strengthened, as a result of domestic or external factors; or a combination of the above. The result of this process of observation and acknowledgement that the initial balance of opposites has change is a (subjective but convincing) sense of acute timeliness of protest action - a 'window of (political) opportunity' for change that is now regarded as possible and more likely to be 'successful'.

To stay within the Egyptian context, let me briefly refer to an earlier, no less important but notably less 'successful' protest movement. In the spring of 2008 a combination of existing, organised opposition networks (political groups and trade unions) and informal, self-organised online activism created what became known as the 'April 6' movement. Seizing the opportunity provided by the scheduled strike of a group of workers in the northern Egyptian city of El-Mahalla El-Kubra, the 'April 6' group launched a web campaign (mostly via Facebook) and called for protests in the streets of Cairo and elsewhere, in addition to actively supporting the action of the striking workers. Through a combination of immediate state repression and lack of substantial popular mobilisation in the capital, the protests came to very little. The Mubarak regime's customary intimidation machinery showed excellent reflexes: the two organisers of the 'April 6' online initiative were arrested at different stages; one of them later denounced the initiative and disappeared from the public sphere altogether; the Facebook page that the organisers had set up for the protest was easily taken down and access of the tens of thousands of online supporters was gradually cut off. A attempt to revive the flagging movement on 4 May (the day of Mubarak's birthday) was even less 'successful' in terms of actual mobilisation and presence on the streets. It did not create a 'wave' or a 'domino effect'. It did not cause state officials to lose much sleep over it.

Yet, 'success' is always a subjective and relative indicator, usually not appreciated in the short term. The 'April 6' initiative exposed both the strengths and the limitations of this new makeshift strategy of online activism as an antechamber to street protest. On the one hand, for a few days and hours before the actual protest, the message indeed 'went viral'. It appealed to a very different audience - very young in age, 'connected' and technologically savvy, aware of how the virtual social media channel operated but overwhelmingly unfamiliar with classic political activism. Because it did not emanate from an organised, visible dissident political centre (in spite of the loose association with the liberal El-Ghad party), the online activists operated largely independently), it was extremely hard for state authorities to track down the source of the initiative or map effectively the channels of diffusion. Moreover, given the instantaneous nature of the diffusion itself and its invisible, unpredictable nodes, the campaign effectively bypassed the regime's censorship mechanisms and other restrictions on protest while involving very little initial risk - at least for the 'repeaters' (as opposed to the 'instigators') of the message. The Mubarak regime was, of course, not illiterate in this news ways of communication. It was following closely a number of dissident bloggers; it was already experienced in orchestrating online 'jam-

ming' campaigns; it could easily fall back on its intimidation techniques once the source of the information had been detected; it also knew how to 'take a page down' and thus starve the online chain reaction of its necessary virtual fuel. It did all these things very effectively on that occasion. But it failed to correctly 'read' an alarming sign, entirely courtesy of the way the new social media had been used: for those few hours before the clampdown, the diffusion of the message effected a powerful, if short-lived and limited, wave of 'cognitive liberation' amongst the group's spontaneous support base. It had a powerful, unprecedented transformative effect on the consciousness of tens of thousands of people (the page acquired more than 75,000 members within only a few days; a veritable 'viral' pattern...), the overwhelming majority of whom (like most of Egypt's vast in numbers but - pre-2008 - politically disengaged youth) lacked either political affiliation or experience in organised protest. For those few hours, a spectacular mass protest took shape in a different, largely invisible and de-centred space that had nothing to do with geography, traditional community or classic affiliation. That it proved so easy to 'cognitively liberate' those individuals who, a few days before, would not have even thought of the mere possibility of political activism and protest - let alone of them being at the forefront of it -, was truly remarkable.

And yet, the momentum of the online protest was lost in its translation into street presence or longer-term traction. The only place in which mass protest on the streets did occuwafer a short period of time was the city of the striking workers; very, very little happened in Cairo, Alexandria or elsewhere on the 6th of April. The majority of people in Egypt did not even notice what had happened, apart from the coverage of the rioting that followed the workers' march, served in the heavily censored and 'massaged' way that the official state media were used to, as 'gatekeepers' of the only 'truth'. However impressively fast the spread of internet and Facebook or Twitter in Egypt, the country's online 'community' does not even today exceed 15% of the population. The mere fact of access to the gateway could not be taken for granted for most people, even more so back in 2008. Not having a concrete action plan or enough time to gain traction and diffusion also through more traditional channels (clandestine print publications, word of mouth, rumours, other social and political organisations etc), the online protest was de facto asymmetrical: young, inexperienced, previously unconnected individuals, bound together through access to, and particular knowledge of, the medium but otherwise cut off from other channels of mobilisation that were far more capable of transforming the online momentum into street mass protest.

The bold 2008 precedent contained critical lessons for both the protesters and the regime authorities. First, it was possible to bypass (for a time at least) the state's authoritarian, heavy-handed grip on information, very

effectively, swiftly, and - more crucially for the situation in Egypt - at limited cost and (initial) risk for those involved when compared to the classic forms of activist association and protest. This was particularly important both in preparation for a protest event and during its course. The transmission power of this kind of mobilisation was further highlighted when, in the aftermath of the arrest of one of the two instigators' of the 'April 6' initiative, news spread via the internet across Egypt and beyond, in spite of the regime's attempt to conceal the event. Second, the new channel could tap into human resources previously inaccessible by organised, political and social opposition networks. It could find them (or rather they could find it), appeal to them, mobilise them psychologically, transform them almost instantly (though not necessarily lastingly) into activists, and depend on them as instant nodes of further diffusion. Third, the number of people who could be easily 'liberated' cognitively, who were just a short nudge away from changing their perception of the situation (a requirement for revisiting their inaction vis-a-vis a situation that they nevertheless recognise as unjust and needing change), who were willing to register their disaffection with the regime and even take some calculated risks, was potentially much higher and easier to activate than previously thought. Fourth, online activism was perhaps unpredictable and usefully 'chaotic' in its operation but had a critical weakness: it depended on 'access' that could be literally restricted or even switched off centrally on the regime's whim. Fifth, while getting a significant number of people to support an initiative online was relatively easy, the protest's enduring power also depended on the production, diffusion, and psychological entrenchment of a powerful counter-narrative - a different wider 'framing' of diagnosis and prognosis that could echo beyond the spur of a particular protest, a particular place or a particular cause. Sixth - and perhaps most crucially -, the translation of online mobilisation into street protest was both of critical significance and of an inherently problematic nature. As mentioned before, the only place in which the protest did gain temporary traction was on the streets of El-Mahalla El-Kudra, where striking workers came out in force after the morning prayer. The 'clicks', 'tweets', 'hash tags', and 'likes' of online protest did not suffice to bring people out in force; where this did happen, it was mainly because streets and squares started filling up and others saw it, experiencing a momentary diminution of fear, carried out by the numbers of their protesting 'neighbours', feeling protected inside the larger group. The proverbial 'tipping point' would be confirmed on the physical space of protest - not across the invisible, virtual space of near-instant, trans-local communication.

Midan Al-Tahrir, January & February 2011:
The 'Coupling' of Protest Spaces and Dynamics

Fast-forward thirty-three months. Unlike the '6 April' short-lived movement back in 2008, by any standards and benchmarks the mass protest of last winter in Egypt was a fascinating, remarkable, and hugely inspiring 'success' story. People of all ages, backgrounds, and persuasions came out in splendid force, filled up squares and streets in Cairo, Alexandria, Suez, and elsewhere - and stayed there until Mubarak's regime finally imploded. During the days of protest, mobilised people kept coming back almost every day, fitting protest into their everyday lives and accommodating it effectively against fear or in the face of intimidation by the regime; new protesters were joining in, swelling the crowd and convincing others that this was the moment they dared not speak its name a few weeks before; and the world did notice, spectacularly so.

The internet hosted a mass movement of protest that mobilised people across the country and the world; but its contribution to the 'success' of the movement lay also in sustaining, feeding, and re-igniting the mobilisation once the regime decided to fight back - sometimes by directly attacking the protesters, sometimes by sending helicopters hovering over the crowd or using police for 'kettling' the masses, positioning snipers in nearby buildings or mobilising their 'supporters' to attack the protesters on the regime's behalf. Above all, the space of virtual protest - which predictably 'went viral' and continued to operate in this remarkable fashion for the entire duration of the revolution - worked in synergy with the numerous physical spaces of protest: the streets and the squares of big cities and small towns across the territory of Egypt. Judged by either process (diffusion, physical presence, international exposure) or outcome (Mubarak's resignation and collapse of the regime), the movement - a spontaneous amalgam of newly self-organised and traditionally organised social-political actors - ticked all the boxes of 'success'.

Experts and analysts cannot agree on the single most significant factor behind this 'success'. While the overwhelming majority praise the innovative use of the internet (and of the repertoire of social media in particular) as significant contributing factors, some go as far as labelling them the critical ingredient of victory; while others see them as secondary to the physical (and enduring) presence of protesters on the streets. To be sure, neither the ubiquity of Facebook or Twitter nor the visual immediacy of YouTube could match the psychologically empowering and politically unmistakeable

influence of the gathering, swelling crowd on the major squares and streets across Egypt. At any rate, a large number of the people who participated in the protest last January and February did not even use the internet. In addition, when the Mubarak regime threw the dice for one last time by ordering the national internet providers to turn off access to web communication, for more than two days protests largely (for there were exceptions - see below) fell back on more traditional methods of mobilisation without seriously endangering the momentum of the movement.

Yet, by the time that the panic-stricken Mubarak regime ordered the shutdown of the internet 'backbone' infrastructure (apparently in a series of phone calls to the Internet providers, all within a very short period of time just before midday on 28 January), something of enormous significance had already happened: the 'coupling' of the virtual and the physical spaces of protest. This was one of the reasons why, during the five days of effective net silence, protest activity maintained (and actually increased) its momentum, primarily on the streets and (through roundabout ways) on the internet as well. The Mubarak regime initially misread the emerging situation of web- and social media- based mobilisation by targeting known political organisations and high-profile net activists. By the time that state authorities had fully comprehended that the mobilisation had indeed 'gone viral' and, courtesy of the new channels of information flow, was overwhelmingly non-hierarchical, 'horizontal', de-centred, and indeed international, they resorted to the most desperate but also extreme measure of closing down 14 out of the 15 national internet service providers (by the 30th of January the only remaining active provider, Nour, also went down). The effect was chilling: web activity - which had wildly spiked in the preceding days and hours - suddenly flatlined. But this came too late to stop the chain reaction of 'cognitive liberation' amongst large sectors of the Egyptian population. While it temporarily disrupted newly established electronic networks and nodes of information flow, it did not stem the tide. If anything, it proved in the end counter-productive.

Why? For a start, news of the internet outage reached an already formed, sizeable, and mobilised protester mass through traditional channels of information flow. As a dramatic and unprecedented step, it was instantly interpreted as a sign of panic - which it definitely was. If anything, it strengthened the resolve of those already mobilised. It also reinforced (psychologically and in terms of perception if not in actual terms) the protesters' emerging counter-narrative of a regime on its last legs, with political change nudging closer by the hour and the window of 'political opportunity' widening. But one of the most significant developments that helped the protesters weather this sudden, unpredictable storm so impressively was the way in which the

'coupling' between the cyber, the organised, and the physical spaces of protest had already happened and been consolidated. However disparate in composition, background, and long-term expectation the gathered crowds were, the effective combination of the multiple channels of information flow and activist mobilisation forged a narrative of immediate, achievable, and complete change that those taking part in the protests had already 'owned'; in other words, whatever that protest was, whatever forms it was taking at different stages and places, however people had arrived psychologically at the stage of mobilisation and physically at the spaces of protest, they were convinced that this was their protest. This is why they were transformed into new, rather unlikely political actors on the spur of the moment; and this is why, when news of the shutdown (which, incidentally, would not have otherwise reached the majority of the Egyptian population who did not have access to the internet in the first place) travelled fast across the square, across the country, and in the end across the world, it acted as a trigger for more protests and protesters in the physical space, for the additional reason that this space could be used to compensate for the sudden act of deprivation of virtual information flow and networking.

There was, however, a further factor that underlines how misguided and counter-productive from the Mubarak regime's point of view the decision to shut down internet access really was. While internet as an infrastructure in itself is indeed supremely vulnerable not just to surveillance but also to the national 'access denied' blocks - and authoritarian regimes in particular have a surprisingly easier access to this resource (as the case of Syria has clearly shown) -, its capacity for trans-local/trans-national network building and horizontal self-organisation is theoretically unlimited and essentially unpredictable. By ordering the Egyptian internet providers to turn off access, the Mubarak regime targeted the diffusion of information and the grassroot capacity building inside its national jurisdiction. Yet, this betrayed a blatantly old-fashioned, static and 'territorial' way of thinking about human networks in the age of cyber communication and social media. What happened on 28 January was that a desperate government reverted to the old formula of reasserting its flagging 'gatekeeper of truth' prerogative, first by banning foreign media from reporting independently from within the country and then by attempting to sever information flows from and to Egypt. Once the internet had gone down, nodes based in Egypt simply vanished and the rest of the network forgot that the country even existed as a destination, apart from the one network that was allowed for two more days to transmit. But this sudden lack of 'noise', coming immediately after days of extraordinarily rich and extensive activity, was instantly noticed - and became deafening. For in the

last two weeks of January the protest movement about Egypt had achieved not one but essentially two kinds of 'coupling'. In addition to the convergence of web and physical protest spaces within Egypt - and to the 'cognitively liberating' effect of this organic synergy-, traditional news coverage and online activity had also 'coupled' Egypt to the rest of the world. Regardless of space and time, culture and language differences, the global net had hosted a constantly expanding and mutating network of involvement and activism that translated a very specific local/national situation into something akin to a universal (in reach and significance) concern and cause. For so many people across the world - as unlikely new political actors as many amongst the crowd on Tahrir square -, this had become 'their' protest too; and it became even more so in the wake of the internet shutdown on 28 January.

Within hours from the pulling of the proverbial net plug, ad hoc global synergies had already started to ingenuously circumvent the ban: old-fashioned dial-up access was revived; proxies were setup; IRC made a dramatic reappearance after years of technological oblivion; software was made available to bypass the DNS 'access denied' hurdle; finally, voice communication (not affected by the regime's shutdown) was harnessed to re-establish an easy way to restore information flow from Egypt to the emerging global network. What was missing at that stage was translation - both literally and metaphorically. The language barrier (most messages coming from Egypt in those critical days after the net outage were in Arabic) had become a genuine problem, as the number of receivers and multipliers of those messages coming out of the country had been drastically dwindled. In other words, while the protest 'noise' soon started to flood again the internet wires, it did not feed properly into the global networks of information flow because it needed translation and then new avenues of re-channeling. This is where SpeakToTweet and SmallWorldNews - spontaneous, self-organised services coming together - played a truly decisive role, reconnecting the information flow from Egypt to the rest of the world, albeit in a temporarily more restrictive one-way pattern.

Internet in Egypt started to come back just before midday on 2 February - almost as suddenly and inexplicably as it had gone silent a few days before. For a while after that, violence on the street intensified - it was as if the Mubarak regime abandoned the - impossible essentially - task of suffocating the virtual space of protest and resorted to the more traditional techniques of physical intimidation and raw violence. But, in hindsight, time had run out. On 11 February, at 6pm, the official announcement came that Mubarak had resigned - and this was the bit of news that protesters on the streets, international activists, and so many people across the world celebrated in-

stantly (the most eloquent evidence of the 'coupling' between space and virtual space, as well as between Egypt and the world), in their very own (real or imagined) Tahrir square. In hindsight, the Mubarak regime never really came to grips with the innovative and resilient 'coupling' of the cyber, organised dissident, and self-organised protest spaces. It did resort to the standard tactic of violence (apart from the attacks on protesters and the wide repertoire of intimidation techniques, the net shutdown was the cyber equivalent of violently dispersing a demonstration with far superior forces and then fencing off the physical space of congregation, only on a national scale) but did so in a knee-jerk and essentially illiterate way. Courtesy of Egypt's complex position in the regional and global systems of communication and market capitalism, the regime realised that it could not shut down the internet for long - and that in the end it did not possess the proverbial 'kill switch', because the various tools and agencies operating throughout the internet could circumvent almost any restrictive initiative, given time, a sufficient level of global interest, and the ingenuity of a few, über-savvy individuals anywhere in the world. On 28 January the Egyptian authorities attempted to recast the protest on their own terms by clumsily and desperately re-asserting their 'national' prerogative on communication and 'truth'; but - in a similar way to the problems encountered by Soviet-backed regimes in central and eastern Europe in the summer-autumn of 1989, even without the benefit of internet communication then - they realised that it was impossible to effectively disconnect their intended audience from alternative, dissident sources of 'truth' and opportunities for counter-mobilisation. When they reverted to street intimidation and violence tactics in early February, they were faced with an impressive volume of protesters, entirely 'liberated' and emboldened, nurtured by restored internet communication and a sense of being watched closely by a global civil society, having reached a new kind of overpowering self-organisational stability very fast and against all odds.

That kind of 'coupling' between the local, the national, and the global; between the physical and the cyber spaces of protest; between the seasoned dissidents and the spontaneously self-organised; between the streets and the panoply of net-based services and information flows, was unique and unprecedented. To seek to elevate the importance of one over the other would be to misconstrue their special mutually enforcing relationship and agency. If internet was crucial in tapping into previously invisible or disengaged forces desirous of change, in mobilising them at the crucial stage of capacity-building, and in transforming the live image of Midan Al-Tahrir into a symbolic battlefield of essentially universally intimate values, it was the volume and passion of protesters on the streets in the end that brought

Mubarak down. Yet the result of this synergy was cumulative - an unfolding, multiple 'confirmation effect' that propped up psychologically the newly 'cognitively liberated' mass of protesters even when they were faced with systematic state intimidation and the ghosts of violence.

It would be inaccurate to state that social media deposed Mubarak - at least not without some important qualifications. Less than two years earlier, the role of new social media as a channel of mass protest was highlighted in the case of the demonstrations against the result of presidential elections in Iran. In a country with a far more sophisticated mechanism of internet surveillance and less interest in its international image, the summer of 2009 witnessed a dramatic upsurge in mass protest activity, largely and crucially propped up by the innovative use of social media (Twitter in particular, hence the colloquial reference to 'Iranian Twitter Revolution'). Unlike the Egyptian 'April 6' initiative, the Iranian protests had both staying power (they lasted until at least August, with more demonstrations taking place in the following autumn) and significant support by social constituencies not all that different to those self-organised masses that filled the urban squares of Egypt, alongside seasoned political activists, in 2011. The Iranian protests rattled the regime and gained very high international visibility; yet, they failed to usher in change - whether reform or the disintegration of the regime itself. By contrast, in 1978-79 the protest movement possessed none of the high-tech tools that we have witnessed in mass political mobilisations of the last five years; tapes with Ayatollah Khomeini's recordings could be circulated only through face-to-face contact and at significant personal risk for those involved. Flows of information and alternative 'truths' could (and did) only circulate through physical contact and, to an extent, wires - again, a relatively slow and very risky processes in an authoritarian context. And yet, unlike the eminently sophisticated 2009 protests, the 1978-79 protests led to the successful Iranian revolution, forcing Mohammad Reza Pahlavi to eventually flee the country. Meanwhile, while the uprising in Libya appears - at the time of writing... - to have succeeded in toppling the Gaddafi regime across most of the country, it was fought largely on the military domain of insurgency and made even more difficult to assess by a rather peculiar form of NATO intervention; and in Syria, in spite of the lasting power and apparent volume of the protest movement, the situation remains largely stuck in a vicious circle of waves of defiant protests dispersed with unwavering brutality by the army and the police. In both these two cases (Libya and Syria), the use of internet and social media in particular has been rather limited, both due to lower internet penetration amongst the population (a question of primary 'access') and apparently more effective government techniques

of filtering, disrupting or even shutting down internet access (in the case of Syria, the action has involved also cellular voice communication). Similar observations can be made about Yemen and, to an extent, Bahrain, where protests have ebbed and flowed, punctuated by violent repression and raw intimidation.

History never truly repeats itself. Every event or outcome, however similar to others, however apparently connected to precedents and, in hindsight, antecedents, is unique. This statement contains perhaps an intolerable cliche - but one that needs to be usefully qualified in the case of the revolution in Egypt. The entire history of mass protest movements is an unfolding saga that combines behaviour and structure, psychology and process, the subjective and the objective. The latter has determined to a crucial extent the capacity building dynamic of the movement, its staying power, its diffusion momentum, in the end its composition and ability to launch a powerful challenge to the targeted status quo. Yet the former is the crucial component for the creation of a community of trust - a community that is bound together by a sense of common grievance and (broadly) similar horizons of expectations, a community that is formed because its initially disparate members experience a profound cognitive transformation together, share in a powerful new counter-narrative, and embrace the vision of a protest that is intrinsically 'theirs' - not in the exclusive sense of the word but as an indication of deep, simultaneous empathy. The dynamic, volatile synergy of these two elements (and of their various discrete components) determines the unique footprint of each historical case of mass protest.

To summarise the 'uniqueness' of the Egyptian revolution of 2011, I would use the following statement:

An extraordinarily resilient, profound, and tight-knit 'coupling' between an extremely sophisticated and active (if comparatively modest in volume and population access) virtual space of protest and an equally resilient but significantly more sizeable physical one that was almost instantly translated by a rapidly forming virtual global 'social capital' into an infinitely symbolic, yet strangely immediate and intimate, battle in support of values and against predicaments that were recognised as both local/national and global.

But this brief statement pays insufficient attention to two further 'unique' factors of the Egyptian revolution. One was historical-contextual - but, in my opinion, underpins much of the spectacular mobilising capacity of the January-February protests in the country: namely, the perception of a 'wave' in the making, following so soon after the collapse of the Zine El Abidine Ben Ali regime in neighbouring Tunisia. The effect of this perception at the

time was different for local/regional and international audiences. The former experienced Tunisia as a powerful precedent that charted a viable strategy of radical change and embedded psychologically the perception that this was the moment of critically enhanced 'political opportunity' in Egypt too. They could experience a mobilising empathy, derived from an already existing common diagnosis (regime illegitimacy, lack of freedom, corruption etc) made easier by the geographic and cultural proximity of the two countries and societies. In addition, the apparent 'success' of the mass protest movement in Tunisia had a powerful liberating effect on the consciousness of many people in Egypt - overcoming or negotiating fear, nudging previously non-organised and indeed non-political actors into the forefront, and aligning them to the counter-narrative of change - now. The latter (international) audience built on an already impressive very recent legacy of interest and net activism (in the loose sense of the word) regarding Tunisia, feeding into the emerging narrative or 'Arab spring' and expanding 'virally' as hours went by with both protester crowds and state repression gaining momentum.

The second 'unique' factor in Egypt was altogether different - and entirely objective, although not necessarily apparent as such at the time. The determination of significant pillars of the Mubarak regime to stand by their ruler at any cost was wavering and in the end waning, whether out of conviction or pressure from the crowds and the enormous international exposure. Something similar happened in Iran during the protests of 1978-79: it was not the perception of regime weakness that brought people out on the streets but in the process the armed forces and other state institutions started to become more reluctant to turn against the protesters, before many amongst their members switched actively their allegiances. The crucial transformative process happened very quickly in Egypt, with the army in the end avoiding a direct, violent encounter with the protesters. This is perhaps the single most critical factor that distinguishes the eventual 'success' of the protest movements in Egypt, Tunisia, and 1979 Iran from (otherwise very 'successful' in mobilising terms) mass protests in Syria, Yemen, and Bahrain. But even to reach this stage of final encounter, to even begin to talk of enduring mass protest in an authoritarian political setting and in the face of everyday violence (or the ubiquitous, paralysing threat thereof), is a momentous 'success' in its own right, requiring a myriad of other agencies and actions from people, both on and behind the scene.

Conclusions

If we think of mass protest in the second decade of the 21st century as a 'coupling' of physical and virtual; of organised and self-organised; of local,

national, regional, and global; then we begin to understand the multiple crucial significance of access to, and sophisticated, extensive usage of, ICT and new social media. Neither Facebook nor YouTube or probably anything else amazing that is yet to come can bring down directly a regime - particularly one whose survival rests not on its legitimacy but on fear, repression, and the dearly purchased loyalty of the few. But if 'successful' mobilisation of human social capital on and off the street (and eventually together) has always been the critical foundation of any mass protest, then the retooling of the entire process through the sophisticated and extensive use of ICT is the most powerful and fascinatingly versatile medium that allows protesters to be a step ahead of repression. Its use may not directly weaken a regime (objectively) or its legitimacy (subjectively), but it intervenes powerfully in the process of 'cognitive liberation' by nudging individuals into action, subverting the state media's claimed monopoly of truth, and generating surprisingly swift, resilient, and extensive forms of popular self-organisation. Fear - the single most powerful disincentive to mobilisation even if someone is convinced that an authority has become illegitimate - can be mediated through both new, less risky forms of collective agency and visible capacity-building that makes willing bystanders feel less frightened and new participants feel less vulnerable. In addition, international visibility and instant information flow may easily function as channels of awareness building (and pressure on authorities) on a global scale. They may embarrass political regimes and exercise indirect pressure on them to avoid the path of violence against the protesters. This explains why authoritarian state authorities resort to measures of partial web filtering or occasionally to a total internet shutdown; the enforced veil of secrecy is aimed at forcibly exercising their national prerogative, both as 'gatekeepers of truth' when it comes to their own citizens and as exclusive nodes of information flow from inside to the outside world. Their standard, tried and tested, strategies of intimidation and violent repression can be pursued far more easily and in more brutal, extreme ways under the blanket of imposed information blockage than under the full watchful eye of an international public - for a time...

But, more importantly from the point of view of civil society, the current uses of the internet (social media included) in mass protests highlights the unique dynamics as well as the objective limits of the medium. On the one hand, speed of communication/information flow, immediacy of community-building, efficiency of utilised resources, capacity for more innovative ways of social involvement, and ability to host multiple processes of mobilisation and self-organisation, have had a powerful effect on the production and strengthening of civil society. The significance of this contribution can be

appreciated more fully when observing the current impact of ICT in those contexts (dominated by authoritarian state structures and repression) where civil society cannot operate in an ample, open, independent space of its own; where fear demobilises potential social actors; and where existing channels of political organisation could not 'cognitively liberate' a large number of individuals beyond the narrow (and at any rate, under constant surveillance) circle of members and immediate nodes of diffusion. The virtual civil society is of course no substitute for physical, local and national networks of human organisation and agency; but it can assist them crucially by tapping into previously inaccessible social capital and supplying new, more effective (at least in the short term and definitely in the first crucial formative phase of developing a civil society) channels of mobilisation. It also has an inherent translocal and transnational dynamic, spreading 'virally' and transcending objective structural limitations. On the other hand, authoritarian (and not only) governments learn fast and adapt: increasingly sophisticated internet filtering/jamming techniques and the last resort of web shutdown have been used more or less effectively by some state authorities across the world, including very recent examples from Egypt, Syria, and Libya, not to mention China. Both access to, and freedom of, the internet have become critical indicators of the strength and prospects of civil societies in different countries and political regimes. In their current formats, ICTs do not generate civil societies by themselves, as they do not cause magically mass protest movements; but they assist in defining new spaces of free(er) communication, enhanced social participation, and new, relevant and empowering types of human agency.

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The Protest Movements in the Egyptian Academic and Educational Institutions Critical Analytical Study

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Introduction

In the recent five years, and since the beginnings of the 21st century, various political, social, economic, cultural and educational movements have taken place. Such movements were reactions to various variables, whether in relation to the past, the present or the form that the near or far future shall take.

Furthermore, technology is still the main agent and drive of such movements in all fields. And the virtual world has become an entity that is well-recognized all over the world. It strongly imposes itself due to its postulated theses, discussion forums on social networking sites and cultural and social forums in which many youth discuss various political, social and cultural topics as well as educational programs and courses that are internationally-oriented, innovated and corresponding with the age of knowledge and informatics[1].

In the midst of such long-term technological breakthrough, there increased the need to protest against traditional ways of thinking pursued by governing regimes whether for ideological reasons or due to their inability to cope with the age and to innovate new instruments through which the gap between backwardness and progress in technology and knowledge cab be bridged.

In addition, the academic protest movements, throughout the ages, starting from 1908 with the emergence of civil university, and until our present day, had a great impact upon the formation of the awareness of societies and further upon those with power and influence, in achieving the hopes

and aspirations of people, through the population of youth with culture and awareness, who engaged into various intellectual battles and ideological disputes, and who experienced detention and torture in prisons for the sake of defending an idea, achieving the human aim and giving priority to public interest to the detriment of personal interests of the elite[2].

The Egyptian society has experienced three stages of protest movements. The first one is the political mobility stage with the outbreak of the Aqsa Intifada in 2000 and its consequent million demonstrations condemning the Israeli blockage of Ramallah and Janine. The second one is the Kifaya political protest stage and the like that came as a reaction to the American war against Iraq and the American pressure upon the Egyptian society. Then, various the political movements followed, including the 9th of March movement and popular movement for change as well as various demonstrations let by educated and cultured university youth in condemnation of corruption, tyranny, domination and poverty and in demand of the existence of democracy and justice in the presidential elections. The third one is the social protest stage. In this aspect, we should refer to the role of youth political movements in opening the road to the creation of the culture of protest and objection against way of life, poverty and low cultural and social level of many of the Egyptians. These include the 6th of April movement, youth for justice and freedom movement (we'll change) and youth of various parties including Wafd party, Muslim Brothers, Coptic youth and free student union. These movements are supported by daily communication and meetings on Facebook and Twitter in order to plan for route of such movements and how they can achieve their objectives[3].

Similar revolutionary movements have also broken out with the beginning of the 21st century in the United Kingdom, when university students revolted in October and November 2010 against the ruling regime calling for justice, democracy, change and freedom of expression. In this revolution, youth of Britain, who are in the middle of the second decade of their age, claimed for the necessity of being integrated in political and social life and having a role in the wheel of development in order to eliminate the unemployment with the rationale that contemporary youth are more capable and aware and can give their minds and time to the society more than the population of the old-aged who occupy a lot of positions.

Lurie Benny, Middlesex's University, Philosophy Department argues that we are in need of having the sense of professional competence, the right to education, the right to housing and the right to enter into political life as well as the world of technology and technological welfare enjoyed by the elder

in all aspects of life. We need a true change and not just reform. We are against the idea of reform and we support change for social mobility[4].

Following the youth protest movements, various sit-ins have occurred, after the 25 January revolution, starting from March 2011 and until this moment, inside all the Egyptian universities, which claim for the resignation of university presidents, as they had been appointed with presidential decrees of the NDP and not through free and independent elections by university faculty members, employees and students, the matter which contradicts with academic freedom and university independence.

Such revolutionary protest movements inside the university also claimed against the appointments of deans and department heads appointed by the university president without any elections or voting. In addition, various staff assistant bodies have objected to the professional promotion method and the size of administrative works including examination control rooms and monitoring as well as department works and low salaries.

All the Egyptian universities have agreed that the salary of university professor and assistant staff inside the Egyptian universities is the least in comparison to salaries of their counterparts in universities in Arab and European countries. Therefore, a claim has been made to modify the provisions of the regulating law of Egyptian universities 49/1972 to change all leaderships.

In addition, there appeared teachers without syndicate and dignity of Egyptian teacher movements in all governorates after the 25 January revolution in which teachers claimed for having an actual and effective syndicate and for having syndicate funds paid to teachers and educational process as many teachers argued that they have been paying for the syndicate for educational process requirements. Teachers without syndicate movement have further claimed for raising the minimum teacher wages to 1200 LE per month and raising the end-of-service reward to 500 days[5]. This moved many teachers to compose the independent teacher syndicate that mobilizes many teachers in all governorates.

The independent teacher syndicate has faced various pressures from the current syndicate and from Ministry of Education in order to prevent its meetings and to prevent it from expressing its ideas freely. Therefore, the current study attempts to analyze reasons behind such protest movements through making deep analysis of the economic, political, cultural and educational dimensions that have given the rise to such protest movements. The current study further attempts to have an optimistic view of the future of the Egyptian society, in a more cautious manner, due to reality that is full of contradictions, in order to have a comprehensive vision of the protest map inside the Egyptian society as well as its implications in the near and far future.

Main concepts

Protest Movements

Protest movements are such performances practiced by individuals or groups in order to express their ideas and disagreements with the current regime. Such movements can take the form of peaceful demonstrations and expressive chants like those practiced by protesters of the 25 January revolution or can take the form of violent actions, intimidation and terrorization in order to impose point-of-view by force like those practiced by proponents of the former regime in Egypt[6].

Educational Institution

Educational Institution is an institution that provides certain programs for acquisition of knowledge, information and skills necessary for behavior development, performance assessment, acculturation, education and refinement[7].

Academic Institution

It is a higher institution that provides educational programs and scholarships for learners in all professional fields and specialties. It is considered an advanced educational opportunity[8].

Teacher Syndicate

It is an institution that is composed of a group of individuals with a corporate personality that aims at achieving interests, demands and future projects of individuals belonging to a certain governmental authority and providing them with all guarantees necessary for leading a decent life[9].

Student Union

The idea of student union is based upon variation within the framework of unity. In other words, it is based upon the idea of solidarity in order to provide a more justice and stable environment, achieve developmental aims

and support the climate of freedom[10]. Student unions are composed of a group of students for whom a chairman is elected by student elections taking place inside the Supreme Council of Universities. After that, rules and regulations are established with regard to the course of action of the student union and its political, scientific, artistic, cultural and recreational activities on both college and university levels[11].

Research Methodology

The current research shall use the philosophical analysis method that is characterized by criticism and deep qualitative analysis of distant rationales behind the issue under discussion. The current research shall further use the gap analysis method in order to analyze current practices of society including its institutions and individuals as well as requirements that need to be fulfilled by institutions and individuals. This means to analyze the existing gap between reality and what needs to be achieved according to established objectives[12].

The purpose of gap analysis method is to establish societal and institutional capacity and to raise their productivity. Therefore, the gap analysis method is a futuristic approach that starts with current reality and analyzes it in order to reach the future and the handling mechanisms it requires[13].

Literature Review

The current study is based upon various related studies and researches. However, due to the novelty of many student movements and educational practices as a result of 25 January revolution, the current study shall make use of studies with similar topics that express the purpose of the current research.

For example, the study of Mohammad Abdelraouf entitled “An Evaluation Study of the Academic Movement in the Egyptian Universities”[14] deals with the stages of historical development of academic freedom, basic implications of its concept, the reality of academic freedom of faculty members of Egyptian universities since their establishment till this day and the contemporary global changes in the academic freedom system of universities. It ends with establishing a proposed notion to modify the concept and practice of academic freedom by Egyptian university faculty members.

In addition, the study of Alberto Martin entitled “From Revolutionary War to Democratic Revolution” deals with roots of violence in Salvador, emer-

gence of revolutionary movements, ways of political exclusion, emergence of resistance movements, mechanisms of negotiation and the democratic transformation stage[15].

The study of Maxwell C. Stanford entitled "Revolutionary Movements, a Case Study of European Revolutionary Movement of Western Capitalist Societies"[16] presents a detailed analysis of the history of the emergence of revolutionary movements in European societies, the emergence of revolutionary organization and its aims, the emergence of revolutionary protest movements in the European society from 1900 – 1960 and the effect of such movements upon the emergence of capitalism in the European society especially the United States and Latin America.

Moreover, the study of Dan Hancox entitled "Feedback on Fight Back"[17] deals with revolutionary movements that have taken place until this day as well as their impact upon the future all over the world, the role of universities in mobilizing such revolutions, the emergence of revolutionary movements, their anti-movements and the impact of technology.

And the study of Bin Mazrich entitled "The Story of Facebook as a Revolution and Wealth"[18] deals with the emergence of Facebook and the revolution it made in the world of technology, which enabled people to socially communicate via networks and made a wide-range jump in the world of internet that generated various intellectual and political revolutions. The study of Mohammad Farrag entitled "Revolution of the People of 25 January, the Realities of Mubarak Family and the Ministers"[19] sheds the light upon the most important events that gave the rise to 25 January revolution within the Egyptian society as well as the corruption issues that spread out all over the country as a result of mating between power, wealth and influence and booting to absolute governing and hereditary of rule.

The study of Abdelghaffar Shokr entitled "Protest Movements from the Past Readiness to the Core of Revolution"[20] reviews previous struggle experiences that paved the way to the revolution and ends with establishing a political vision for the revolution. The study of Ali Leila entitled "Reflections upon some Social Phenomena during the Revolution"[21] represents the contribution of 25 January revolution to the formation of the awareness of individuals and their getting out from the state of being passive to the state of being active and positive, from the state of non-action and freedom restriction to the state of action and freedom of expression. The study further sheds the light upon some social behaviors of the revolution that highlight the fabric of human relations.

The study of Amani Qandil entitled "Revolution and Civil Society"[22] attempts to shed the light upon the importance of civil society in mobilizing societies and nations towards progress and development and argues that any attempt to marginalize or restrict them by oppressive authorities shall generate a state of chaos, delay and thus outbreak of protest movements for change and civil society participation and involvement. It further deals with how the virtual social network contributed to the convergence of civil society and its free expression of ideas with the absence of charismatic leadership. It ends with establishing a vision for the future of civil society in light of political and economic variables in the Arab region. Finally the study of Fatma Al-Zahraa Salem entitled "Features of the Desired Character of the Egyptian Citizen in the Future, the Challenges and Expectations"[23] illustrates the most important challenges faced by the Egyptian citizen as well as an optimistic and cautious vision of the works and the most important expectations of the desired features of the Egyptian citizen in the future.

Multiple Approaches to Protest Movements

Political Approach

The first months of last year have witnessed successive events and rapid developments, which made the process of change something inevitable in the majority of Arab countries starting from Tunisia and ending with Syria. And in most cases, the reasons were the same, and also the results, despite various events.

In addition, some communities were concerned with such rapid change and people started to talk more about citizenship, the topic which absorbed the interest and attention of thinkers and workers in the educational and social fields, especially as such revolutions are characterized by different values as well as intertwined interests, contradictory situations and divergence of references and approaches between their officials and agents.

What really attracts attention is that the generation and youth of 25 January revolution proved their awareness and that they have rational values and belief in civil country. The revolution from the first moments was characterized by the use of modern methods of communication for call and gathering and as well as adherence to certain slogans that reveal their commitment to civil values that believe in tolerance, pluralism, acceptance of the other and peaceful administration of dispute[24].

Most Arab countries raised the slogan of “dignity, freedom and social justice”. And such Arab revolutions, which are the revolutions of Arab identity, claimed for democracy, separation between executive, legislative and judiciary authorities, establishment of a new constitution that contributes to the activation of the principles of democracy, elimination of emergency law, activation of political freedoms, working with the principle of citizenship and elimination of all kinds of discrimination.

In addition, the Arab youth Intifada has stemmed from the population of educated and cultured youth, who are acquainted with the culture of the West and engaged in educational, cultural and recreational forums as well as partnership projects with the other and the whole world. They are the population of youth, who are the followers of Sawi Cultural Wheel, political, scientific, artistic and cultural forums and human development courses. They are the population of youth with the enlightened, conscious and critical opinion. And whether we are with or against those youth, it is a different matter. Such stagnant water was moved by a global and globalized generation, which is the generation of Facebook and Twitter, which was rejected by Arab societies because they did not recognize its creative, scientific, technical and technological potentials and capabilities. This is because most nations are still having an intellect that is prisoner of traditional instruments that do not cope with the spirit of the age of knowledge and information. But this generation was open to science, technology, knowledge and management. And the most important thing is that it marketed for itself in the whole world and succeeded with its unrestricted and unlimited skills. Therefore, such generation had the right to revolt against the current situation that does not recognize its scientific, knowledgeable, technological and communicative potentials and capabilities. Thus, we witnessed children talking about the revolution and existing in Tahrir Square. We further witnessed young students in the preparatory and secondary stages claiming for overthrowing their school principle for his arbitrariness with them. In addition, those who never had any political affiliations have started to configure their political thought, to join a certain political party or to establish a certain party in which they call for reform and democracy. Many officials, furthermore, have started to fear accountability not just from higher administrative bodies but also from the whole society.

Abdelghaffar Shokr further argues that the activities of political protest are not the spur of the moment. They are, however, the result of the previous 10 years in which the youth have acquired an experience of struggle and have crystallized a political vision with complete features that was translated into certain realistic goals that they attempted to achieve. They have

further acquired the experience of group field work, coordination and confrontation. And we can say that there are two main aspects of the drive of protest movements in Egypt:

a. Education in the sense of making use of the experiences of the past on both field and political levels.

b. Creativity in the sense of having the features of wisdom, flexibility, ability to act and rapid response to developments and variables in the face of security forces and opposition fronts[25].

The revolutions of dignity have continued to this day in order to have all requirements achieved. They have continued in a peaceful and civilized manner in order to give the rise to features of true progress and civilization in the two components of humanity that are indispensable in the field of satellite TV, technology of knowledge and telecommunications, which are *democracy and education*.

On the international level, we can find that the political scene has witnessed a lot of contradictions with regard to what happened in Egypt. The United States of America, for example, has oscillated between support of the former regime and the urgency of making a continuous dialogue and achieving a gradual transition of power. It has further oscillated between appointing Omer Suleiman as a vice president for the former Egyptian president Mubarak and supporting the revolution, stopping any repression actions against the revolution and supporting the youth of revolution. In the meantime, Israel stood worried and kept silence without showing any desire to comment on the course of actions in Egypt while Israeli Prime Minister expressed the necessity of leaving all matters to the Armed Forces. In addition, the Iranian position was clear from the beginning as Ali Khamenei, the Iranian Supreme Leader, declared his support of the revolution, as the former regime, represented by the former president Mubarak was supporting the Israeli entity. And with regard to the Arab position, most Arab countries kept silence with regard to the Egyptian events till the moment of step down. However, some countries like Saudi Arabia and Syria have oscillated between support and opposition[26].

Then the political events have followed. Israeli state provoked the national sense of the Egyptians, attacked the Egyptian soldiers on the Palestinian borders, killed 4 of them and refused to give an official apology, the matter which provoked the national sense of the Egyptian youth who declared an immediate discipline and reaction to the events against innocent soldiers on the borders. They immediately attacked the Israeli embassy in Egypt, broke into its offices in 9/9/2011, Friday of course correction, scattered its papers

and demolished the wall that had been built to protect the embassy. The protesters further removed the Israeli flag, the matter which resulted in the departure of the Israeli ambassador and his staff via an Israeli plane. By this, the Egyptian youth declared that there is no compromise in the dignity and rights of any Egyptian citizen.

What can we conclude from the political scene of the revolution?

a. The protest movements have emerged as a result of tyranny authoritarian regimes.

b. Youth are the drive of revolution and protest movements.

c. The political demands are clear and declared.

d. The oppression forces could not disperse the revolution objectives.

e. Representatives of protest movements have political and cultural awareness.

f. Political protests have ramified into categorical demands.

g.The international position has oscillated between supporting and rejecting the revolutionary movement in Egypt.,

Religious Approach

There emerged various religious approaches that supported and drove the revolution and the overthrow of the head of the regime in Egypt. And the Muslim Brothers have played a great role before the outbreak of 25 January revolution through 3 statements issued by them in preparation for demonstrations of 25 January. The first statement was in 19 January 2011 under the title of “Muslim Brothers and current events, Tunisia Intifada and Demands of the Egyptians”. The second statement was a rejection of the security threats aiming at preventing the Brothers from participating in the 25 January day. The third one was when the youth of the Brothers have actually participated in the demonstrations aiming at the fall of Mubarak regime, like all the Egyptians in this day[27]. It is noteworthy that the Muslim Brothers have suffered from persecution since their establishment in 1928 by Imam Hassan Al-Banna. And after the October 1973 – Ramadan 1393 H war, the Islamic work inside Egyptian universities has taken a wider dimension and the Islamic group managed to lead the student movement and win the confidence of the silent majority of student population in the student unions elections in nearly all the Egyptian universities.

The Islamic group further had various political positions, which were illustrated in its position from Camp David treaty and visit of the shah and some ministers of the Zionist entity to Egypt. It held conferences and walks and distributed publications outside the university walls to denounce such visits and claim for the application of Islamic "Sharia". This led to the interference of the government into the policies of student unions. So, it issued a new regulation for student unions that was known as Regulation 1979, which restricted student movements and increased media and security pressure upon the group leaderships. So, they have been chased heavily especially in the universities of Upper Egypt, where some of their leaders were arrested and dismissed from the university.

The Muslim Brothers have further expressed their interest in political activity since 2003 and various Islamic families have appeared inside governmental universities in Egypt where they attempted to have a role in the political movement inside universities and to attract the largest possible number of students in order to obtain the presidency of student union. However, the security forces inside the universities prevented the empowerment of Islamic groups from controlling the university life. In addition, the stress against female students wearing the niqab was intensified by security forces inside the university after the Supreme Council of Universities and former Minister of Higher Education Hani Helal had prevented women from attending the examinations wearing it. This deprived many female students from entering the exams of May 2010 semester, especially after Sheikh Al-Azhar Mohammad Sayed Tantawi had issued a decree to prevent female school students from wearing the" Niqab" inside schools.

It is noteworthy that the Arab nation has been subject to a harsh Islamic experience to say the least since the establishment of the neural state starting from the Umayyad state, passing through Abbassiya and ending with the Sultans of the Ottoman Empire. The history tells us the worst forms of political exploitation in the name of religion, the matter which had created a state in consciousness or unconsciousness that summons aversion to political systems of religious character. This might explain to us the existence of such regimes that rule with policies that are not based upon religion in their political project[28], since many Islamic movements and groups lack Islam in the spirit of the age, the matter which needs reinvestigation that exceeds the traditional vision that makes Islam a hostage of what had been produced by ancestors of the Islamic nation. There is a fundamental paradox between Islam established by the religious text and Islam in which notion is confined to historical experience[29]. In this regard, Abdulhamid Abu Suleiman argues that Islamic thinkers, Islamic leaders and Islamic nation must realize that

the renewal of nation energy, capacity and leadership role in the course of humanity cannot be achieved through a weak psychological structure and a poor intellectual and civilizational energy possessed by the generation of civilizational backwardness, deterioration and decline. Therefore, the main concern of nation must be the renewal of thought and the right Islamic vision and to consider that any front or battle that does not contribute to the achievements of such target are useless attrition ones[30].

What can we understand from the religious scene of the revolution?

a. Attempting to religionize the public field, to internalize the religious discourse in the political affair and to compose groups that might be extremist or militant that try hard to control the aggregate political, economic and cultural life through non-contextual and non-standardized evidences.

b. Attempting to put religion into a historical matrix without ant attempt to cope with the spirit of the age.

c. Attempting by some religious movements to reach the rule and govern through Islamic history and not through a comprehensive political agenda that aims at development of the nation.

Economic Approach

Throughout the last 10 years, the Egyptian society has entered into expansion projects with European countries that exhausted the Egyptian economy and led to the increase of debts upon the Egyptian government.

In addition, the growth rate was a reflection of the current of large-scale projects like Toshka, Suez and East Port Said. Such projects have exhausted huge investments that were reflected into an artificial inflation of the economic growth rate as a whole (it was planned to invest 120 billion USD in the projects, i.e. more than 100 times of what had been invested in the High Dam). The success of the first stage of privatization and the billion pounds it brought to the state treasury has created fake extensions with regard to the possibilities of economic growth. Such expectations have in turn led to an unprecedented expansion in the construction projects, whether in the field of tourism in Sinai, Red Sea coast and north coast or in the field of residential properties in Cairo. Such projects were funded through soft loans from banks. This resulted in offers of constructions that exceed very much the demand upon them. Besides, the expectations of construction companies were the flow of foreign investments on one hand and the increase of tour-

ism on the other hand. But the Egyptian market alone was not ready for such huge expansion in construction. And the Luxor terrorist massacre led to the collapse of the tourism market not only due to the decrease of the number of tourists but also due to the unwillingness of foreign adventurous tourism companies to pump investments into the Egyptian terrorism sector.

Therefore, social absence disappeared due to the lack of democracy and the number of those who are below the poverty line has increased to be 40%. In addition, Egypt got out of the development plan in the Gulf countries and was satisfied with either poor transactions like the QIZ or selling the most important commodity in the world, which is gas, to Israel with very low prices. In addition, officials were satisfied with signing contracts to their private companies or those of their sons. Add to this the absence of transparency in the NDP government, which exposed an unfavorable face of unfavorable practices of it, and the signature of the two sons of the ousted president, Alaa and Jamal, upon many contracts with private companies against allocation of profits to them from such companies under certain shares for them.

The grouping party has further declared many of the corruption aspects of the government and established its 3 principles, which are freedom for the nation, bread for the poor and work for the unemployed[31].

Such poor economic life was reflected into the Egyptian life in general and governmental universities in particular, since the university book has become the true student tragedy. The poor students have suffered from the high price of university book especially in faculties of commerce and law as well as many practical colleges in which private lessons spread out like faculties of medicine and pharmacology. Add to this the corruption of some presidents of Egyptian universities and their involvement in cases of wasting public money. The thinker Raouf Hamed further claimed for the application of the principle of accountability on all university presidents and leaderships since it was not objective to dismiss all leaders simply because they had occupied their positions during the former regime. However, fairness rules necessitate the investigation of the state of each university president through regulatory authorities, the assessment of his involvement in the committing any breaches, violations or corruption and the examination of complaints and appeals submitted against university presidents to verify them. On this basis, we can dismiss the delinquents who took advantage of their leadership positions through issuing immediate decisions with dismissal by the military board and refer them for investigation. In this way, universities can be purged of corrupt elements that harmed it and overthrew its values and

can maintain the clean ones whose only sin was to take responsibility honestly under the ruling gang[32].

Moreover, the teacher cadre test raised protest and objection of teachers since it did not measure their true level and it overlooked the long experience of senior teachers. Therefore, teachers decided to hold a million revolution in front of Ministry of Education on Saturday 10/9/2011 to obtain their demands of teacher dignity, equality, freedom and right of a good salary that is fit for the teacher profession as a mission that is respected in the whole world[33]. Add to this the sit-ins of parents to express the interests of their kids stolen by schools, administration or Ministry, in addition of the expensive books and high school fees of various private and language schools and private lessons, which are the only means of success due to the evaluation method that is based upon memorization rather than comprehension and connecting learning to real life and surrounding environment.

In addition, the 25 January revolution resulted in various economic losses including losses in Egyptian stock exchange, deterioration of the service sector due to lawlessness and curfews, losses in the tourism sector, credit problems, losses in the banking sector, deficit in the payment balance, problems in manufacturing and extracting sectors, problems in building and construction sectors and labor protests.

Besides, Minister of Finance, “Samir Radwan”, argues that the losses of the Egyptian economy after the 25 January revolution equal its losses as a result of global financial crisis. However, there is a concern that implications can be much more than the global financial crisis ones, since the impacts of the current crisis are related to the internal market rather than the external one[34].

What can we deduct from the economic scene?

a. Poverty participated in generating a wave of anger in the Egyptian people.

b. Teachers are deprived of their rights.

c. Rights are stolen inside universities as a result of the corruption of some university presidents.

d. Justice and equality are absent.

e. Transparency and accountability upon failure are absent.

f. Economic deterioration is due to thefts and corruption that spread out within the Egyptian society.

Social Approach

The poor economic conditions impacted the Egyptian society during the last 30 years. And all society populations protested against the absence of social justice within the Egyptian society. One of the revolution slogans was social justice, the matter which indicates the existence of a huge gap between society populations, between the rich and the poor and between popular will and will of the elite. This was the result of using various mechanisms of social exclusion, for which poverty, low income and poor economic level are among its reasons. In addition, unemployment was suffered by many graduates including educated youth, whether of medium or higher education. Everyone is waiting for the labor office in order to have a job. But this deprives them from the obtaining the fundamentals of leading a decent life and from entering into social legitimate relationship like marriage and having children. This gave the rise to many social segments indignant to society and the state, which constitute in their turn new centers of terrorism, violence, pressure and bullying in order to obtain their rights as citizens who belong to the society[35].

Dr. Samir Radwan, investment authority advisor and Minister of finance, revealed a study prepared by board of trustees of investment authority to which the NDP adhered in its claim for raising the minimum limit of labor wages. He said in his statements to Al-Masri Al-Youm newspaper that the study recommended that the minimum limit of wages should be parallel to the poverty line in Egypt. In other words, the minimum limit of wages should not be less than the poverty line rate determined by global standards. He further noted that the poverty line in Egypt is 1968 LE per year, i.e. 164 LE per month for the individual and 656 LE per month for the whole family, considering that the average family size is 4 people.

He further added that the minimum limit of wages should not be below the poverty line, illustrating that the wage of the 6th grade, which is the lowest career grades, as per official statistics, does not exceed 394 LE per month, which is the amount that if divided upon 4 people, the average family size, shall be 98 LE for each one, which is below the poverty line. On the other hand, the labor activities official in the Middle East of the International Labor Organization, Mr. Mohammad Al-Tarabulsi, asserted that Egypt breaches 7 global agreements on which it had signed in the Organization, and argued that the wage crisis in Egypt is due to the absence of justice in the distribution of wealth[36].

The International Bank report on works and projects, 2011, has further stated Egypt achieved investments rate of 94 of 183 in the economic field and that the state of Singapore is considered the pioneer in the east in economic investments for the year 2011[37]. Ali Leila further argues that the 25 January revolution was better valued by the middle class, as it is the class that suffered much from the corruption of the former regime. However, the security oppression prevented it from expressing its demands. But this was invaded by the youth mass, which therefore was a strong agent of revolution. Therefore, the revolutionary agent movement has expanded through 4 circles, which are the Facebook youth, the wider youth mass, the middle class and is margins with the upper class and finally the lower class, the marginalized and the rest of society[38].

What can we conclude from the social scene?

a. The absence of equality and equal opportunities.

b. The spread of illiteracy and moral corruption.

c. The strong emergence of upper classes and demise of lower ones.

d. The social exclusion and marginalization of lower classes.

e. The cultural and knowledge gap among society segments.

f. The inability to lead a social legitimate and safe life in light of price rise, unemployment and low individual income.

Educational Approach

The 25 January revolution inspired the spirit of resistance, determination and human will from the cultured, educated and conscious youth who asserted the necessity for education, awareness and right political socialization for the sake of claiming for rights and performing duties. So, various educational issues and problems have emerged, which contributed to the emergence of protest movements including independent teacher movement and the million of teachers in 10 September in which thousands of teachers from all governorates of Egypt participated in front of the Council of Ministers in order to declare their unified demands in all educational administration asserting that they were going to make a full sit-in in front of the Council of Ministers until their demands are fulfilled.

During their demonstration, teachers declared that their most important demands are the dismissal of Minister of Education and his advisors, the

purging of Ministry from all its corrupt officials and the remains of former regime, the disbursement of the incentive reward 200% without prejudice to the special cadre and the examinations reward, the execution of Article 89 of the Special Cadre Law, the fixation of temporary teachers as per Law 155 / 2007 of Contractors and Lesson under no conditions, Establishing a minimum limit for teacher salary of 1200 LE taking into consideration the differences of years of experience, asking the military board being the supreme authority in the country to issue a decision that establishes a timeline for assigning graduates of faculties of education in order to fill the great shortfall on the level of all schools, cancelling tests of teacher cadres totally upon a clear and decisive decree, complete supervision of Faculty of Education upon private education in all financial and administrative aspects in order to protect teachers from any breaches or arbitrariness by administrations of private schools against teachers, raising the end-of-service reward of teachers to 120 months based upon the last total salary like all the other ministries and acknowledgement of delayed financial degree for teachers immediately as per the provisions of the Law of State Employees. Teachers further asserted that if their demands were not fulfilled, there would be general strike on Saturday 17/9/2011, which was the first day of the school year, and there would be a million demonstration entitled "a school year without teachers"[39].

And on the level of universities, the Egyptian university faculty members conference declared full strike starting from the new academic year, which included refraining from instruction works as well as administrative and research works, examinations and control rooms. The conference holders considered that the existing university elections, with rules that had been established by Ministry of Higher Education, were invalid and recommended to completely boycott them. They further declared their organization of protest stands within the coming period in order to prevent university leaderships from reaching their offices, emphasizing that the conference was continuous until their demands are fulfilled.

The conference further asserted that all the existing university positions were vacant and decided to hold elections on them in order to choose new leaderships with direct elections, the matter which was approved by the vast majority of university faculty members. Furthermore, members of the conference declared the establishment of a timeline for increasing budget allocations of Egyptian universities and scientific research in order to make them approach the global rates as adequate to the status of Egypt and the composition of a committee of university faculty members, a member of Ministry of Finance and a member of Ministry of Higher Education in order to establish salary schedules. The conference further asserted its support

to the colleagues who raised lawsuits and declared a blacklist of those in cooperation with the former regime and State Security as well as those in breach of conference decision, claiming for quickly holding the elections of faculty members[40].

Dr. Samir Khalid, the spokesman for the Ain Shams University independence movement and the alliance of faculty members in Egyptian university, asserted that the movement decided in its meeting held in the evening of Wednesday 22/6/2011 to formally notify the university president claiming for disclosure of university budget for the last 3 years, especially with regard to salaries and rewards of university president and leaders as well as the sum of private funds and committees.

Dr. Samir further asserted the movement and alliance refusal of suggestions of the Minister, which prevent the independence of the university and do not exempt the existing leaders from their positions and which did not provide for full participation of the assistant body in the selection of those who could run the affairs of their universities. On the other hand, the 6th of April movement, the democratic front, in its statement in the evening of Wednesday, attacked Maged Al-Dib, president of Ain Shams University, for his implementation of his decision to deprive 4 students from the movement from entering the exams after they had participated in a university demonstration the year before. And no decision has been made for those students until now. The events of bullying in Ain Shams University go back to November of the last year, during a demonstration of university students, including political activists, demanding the Supreme Administrative Court to expel university guards, which was responded with assault on demonstrators with penknives and white weapons. After that, Maged Al-Dib decided to deprive 4 students from 6th of April movement from entering the exams. The statement asserted that the 4 students actually got adjudication with their right to enter the examinations from which they were deprived arbitrarily, as per statement description, due to their political activity inside the university. The statement further added that, despite the promise of Maged Al-Dib, university president, to cancel the decisions issued against them with regard to examination of first semester, his assertion that the university and the whole country were honored with those students and their activities, and his promise to them to enter the exams, the 6th of April movement declared that it would use all forms of escalation until the administrative court decree was implemented with their right in entering the exams and that if this did not happen, it would mean that the political situation in Egypt has not changed yet and the suppression of freedoms was still going on.

Tarke Al-Khuli, spokesman for the 6t of April movement, further stated that the movement had sent the statement to Prime Minister, Minister of Higher Education and Ain Shams University president and that if the depravation decision was not cancelled, the movement would organize a sit-in inside the university campus[41].

What can we deduct from the educational scene?

a. Education in Egypt is in a true corruption crisis.

b. The teacher situations are unsatisfactory.

c. The university faculty member situations are unsatisfactory.

d. The university independence is superficial.

e. The protest movements are unorganized in many schools and universities except through the pre-revolution organized movements like the 6th of April.

Critical Analysis of Protest Movements

Through the above presentation of the various approaches of protest movements, we find that we are in front of a true democratic transformation on the Arab nation level and not just on the Egyptian society level. Besides, the political and social agents resulted from social movements are moving the structure of Arab communities towards eliminating all forms of corruption, marginalization and exclusion of certain society segments that are far from power and protest against authoritarian practices. Social movements further contribute to the elimination of social differences through claiming for the achievement of equality and social justice and the activation of democracy and planning for the future.

Therefore, the protest movements, which were saturated with the spirit of science, culture and education, had the loudest voice and were the most organized and the most logical in their programs and demands, which revealed public interests rather than categorical demands with special agendas aiming at compromising social security of Arab entities in general and Egyptian entity in particular.

A lot of countries have played a major role in encouraging maintaining the revolution principles. Turkey in particular played a great and influential role in what occurs in the Arab region, including correction of various political, social, economic and security situations. The civilizational experience

of Turkey cannot be underestimated at all especially by the commander of vigor and determination, the Turkish Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who transformed Istanbul to become the beacon of the Middle East after it had been with deteriorating conditions, who managed to face Israel and put limits in dealing and who managed to draw the future of his country away from Zionist or European hegemony.

Being a strong political activist today in the Arab region, Turkey managed to correct the misconception of the Islamic world and to prove that it is a respectful entity whose existence can never be denied.


The Turkish nation had never been diplomatically activists to this degree in the Arab world since the days of Ottoman Empire (a standard number of dual visits to Arab countries have been recorded in the last months and Foreign Minister in particular held various visits to Lebanon, Syria and Egypt). In addition, the Turkish nation is a remarkable economic activist (it recorded the largest rise that can be achieved by any country in the size of trade within two years) and also a remarkable political activist (Turkey has joined the Arab League and presided the Islamic Conference Organization). This great heritage is still delivering its shadows to Turkish-Arab relationships. However, we can say that the interests of the present are likely to overcome the events of the past. The immediate intervention by Turkey and Qatar to reach settlement after the collapse of the government of Saad Al-Hariri indicated the interest of the two countries in establishing stability in the region. And the final discourse of Turkish Prime Minister, in which he addressed Mubarak to step down and take the necessary steps to satisfy his people, is considered a clear indicator or the new role played by Turkey as an influential political authority that impacts the selection of senior officials in the Middle East.

The Turkish Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, was warmly received in 13/9 by ten thousands of Egyptian people although it was midnight when he arrived at Cairo airport and despite security warning by the Military Board to the citizens not to crowd in the airport[42].

And we can review the intellectual approaches of protest movements inside educational and academic institutions as follows:

1) Revival approach towards radical change in education.
2) Revolutionary approach towards claiming for rights and not to give up attempts to achieve them and composing pressure groups on the state to achieve categorical interests.
3) Futuristic approach that views education as the desired hope in achieving ongoing development within society.

4) Liberal approach that gives advantage to negotiation and continuous dialogue in order to take out roots of corruption through working and development.
5) Religious approach in terms of religionization of public field and giving a religious character to change processes and political socialization inside schools and university and also in terms of using Brothers leaders to implement demands, like the meeting between Minister of Education and Muslim Brothers representatives of teachers alone.
6) Rational approach towards development that moves events and social movements towards analysis of weaknesses of the past, making use of civilizational achievements, mobilization of efforts and rational and effective management towards a better future for the society through work, production and common struggle. This is crystallized by the rational and balanced role of Turkey in initiating convergence partnerships and cooperation between countries of the region.
7) Chaotic unplanned or unorganized approach that attempts to make millions demonstrations without an aim, content, program or demands that can be achieved in the near future rather than the far one.



Analytical Findings and Future of Protest Movements

Through the above analysis, we find that Egyptian educational institutions need their own revolution, as per Zewail's quoting in his article in which he argues that the educational field must have new concepts and educational methods and that the revival of any society shall be through education and educational institutions[43].

Many university independence movements assert that tomorrow is better than yesterday in light of eliminating corruption figures inside the university campus, who exploit their authority to achieve their own personal interests.

Therefore, the independence movements emphasized the importance of taking out corruption figures from their locations as they were the mechanisms of former regime to achieve its demands and therefore they lack transparency, justice and the idea of academic freedom and university independence in its decisions.

Moreover, the university demands reached the limit of claiming for immunity for university professors and elections were held to establish a club for university faculty members.

Therefore, the future carries a lot of optimistic aspects as well as warnings. So, what are the features of the future?

a. Radical changes in the features of the Egyptian citizen.

b. Changes in many statements and cultural concepts.

c. Complete and comprehensive planning for the future.

d. Scientific and cultural projects with countries that respect cultural multiplicity.

e. Strong eminence of protest movements inside educational and scientific institutions.

f. Expansion and orientation towards globalism in performance and achievement of global quality.

g. Encouragement of scientific society and establishment of centers for excellence and creativity.

h.Strong growth and rise of the power of mind and science at the expense of the power of money and influence.

k. Democratic transformation towards the establishment of a wide-range civil country.

l. Protocols of scientific and cultural exchange and internationalization of education all over the world.

However, the future as it carries many achievements; it carries many warnings and precautions as well:

1) Rise of some populations talking in the name of religion in an attempt to religionize the educational and cultural field.

2) Growth of unorganized movements with categorical demands that require long years to be achieved, which attempt to obstruct the course of action of universities, schools and development.
3) Growth of some populations with western agendas that aim at dispossession of the awareness of many academics in order to achieve hidden demands.
4) Holding protocols and partnerships with European countries with announced and clear objectives.
5) Fearing the semi-cultured political agents who might occupy positions just because of being prominent in the revolution square, university elections, educational institutions and independence movements as a result of their ability of leadership and their charismatic personalities.

Therefore, the true salvation from such precautions comes from political awareness, right and planned political socialization, the ability to understand and the refusal of all forms of dispossessions or pursuing others without an aim only because they have an acceptable social personality, which is completely unacceptable within the scientific and cultural society as it influences the most serious body that orients the developmental processes within any society that seeks progress and change, i.e. *education*.

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The Egyptian Labor Movement and Social Change: an Analytic View

Nivien Zakaria Amin

Introduction

The labor movements worldwide emerge because of the exterior factors that imposed the application of the policies of Globalization and neo-liberalism[1]. Also, the global nature of the new economy is hostile to unionization, as mobile capital will either oppose unions or create conditions in which they cannot survive (Yates, 2001). And the interior factors are extended to include the governmental policies that increased the rates of poverty and oppression and led to encourage laborers to make continuing protests via focusing on economic and political demands for achieving social change in all aspects. Through the analysis of the Egyptian labor movement, it is essential to note that the scenario of the tactics, actions, and reactions of the Egyptian labor movement and the state-sponsored counter revolution is the real introduction to what happened in the 25th of January Egyptian Revolution, but on a limited scale.

Though some international scholars confirmed that Globalization offers opportunities but exacerbates risks, the World Bank (WB) acknowledged that such increasing international competition and 'free wheeling capital' will not only cut jobs and wages, but also wipe all nations and regions off the economic map! By the year 2000 less than (10%) of the world workers will be fully excluded from the global capitalist economy. Further, although some scholars, such as Andrew Herod argued that workers and unions have been actively involved in forming the processes of Globalization and the very possibilities of its activities, I think that the formulation and accelerating the processes of the Globalization are exclusively made by the Western politi-

cal regimes, not the international civil society which includes international unions and syndicates and guilds whose main roles are only restricted to how to deal with the serious consequences of the Globalization challenges!

This paper attempts to analyze the 6th of April labor movement including the international and domestic factors, waves of contention, its allies and adversaries, and the policing system in response to protestors' use of resource mobilization theory. Such analysis will lead the paper to delve deep into the nature of the relationship between the Egyptian revolution and 6th of April Movement as a real introduction -final rehearsal- for bringing about promising social change represented in the 25th of January Egyptian revolution. Before making our final findings and recommendations, the paper will determine the main similarities between the 6th of April labor movement and the Egyptian revolution.

This paper will tackle the following points:

1) The main characteristics of the labor movement
2) International and domestic factors led to bringing about labor movements everywhere in Egypt.
3) The labor movement worldwide:
4) The analysis of Egyptian labor movement in 6th of April 2008 in Mahalla
5) The main similarities between the 6th of April labor movement and the Egyptian revolution
6) The main findings and recommendations

1-The Main Characteristics of the Labor Movement

A- It is not static and monolithic, but progressive and revolutionary as a radical social movement, through which several individual networks and dissident movements in the American society can challenge the ideological thought provided by labor unions.

B-Through analyzing its dimensions and practices, the labor movement is not only previously institutionalized, but institutionalizing as it consists of interactive organizations and that unions also can negotiate with the employers, regulate economic activity, and stabilize labor markets. Thus, vital unions are the central channel for controlling social confrontation and collective actions. In this context, it is clear that the Tunisian strikes reflect the institutionalizing character through fair labor unions' support to these legal practices (Edwards. Bob, 2007).

In this context, and seeking to the improvement of the *Tunisian's governments' performance* in the development and employment aspects, the new wave of strikes first erupted on December 17 in 2010 0n Sidi Bu-Zid city is a result of both: the declaration of the Tunisian labor unions for organizing a peaceful march in the capital Tunis city, and its tendency to hold demonstrations in front of the local authority for employment at Mednin, with hundreds of demonstrators carrying banners reading "We need work" and "Shame on the government."

C- A fluid and multidimensional social formation that is produced and reproduced relationally between direct action and institutionalized power, and between democracy and bureaucracy and this has much more to do with Bourdieu's penetrating approach of analyzing social practices that has a radically relational perspective (Ibid, 2007).

Nowhere does this become more evident than in the case of *the Egyptian labor movement in Mahalla* in 6th April 2008 as the workers produced their own relations of interaction to go on strike at the huge Misr Spinning and Weaving Co and they called on a strike on 6th April 2008 to prompt their company to fulfill their promises. Then, Egyptian workers enhanced their relationship with not only themselves, but also with their trade union and the political system when some workers opposed the organizing committee, and participated in the crowd of young boys and women in the main square of Mahalla. This action taken by these workers against their allies –the members of the committee -stems from the fact that the combination of National Council on Wages and the state- sponsored Egyptian Trade Union encourage the committee to call off the strike after the inadequate increase in salaries they recommended.

Moreover, the confrontation between the workers of the strike and their opponents (the political system) continued two days (6-8 April) -in which security forces detained 331 people, beat up hundreds, wounded nine, and killed 15-year-old adult with a bullet on his head- and that lead the previous Egyptian Prime minister Ahmed Nazif to meet workers' demands and announce a bonus of a month's pay for Misr workers and (15) days for all other textile workers and that the minister of investment offers other significant services and facilities! Such transformation from overdose violence to cooperation by governmental responses to laborers demands reflects the positive impact of changeable and flow set of tactics, decisions, interactions and struggles the labor movement employs whether within the movement itself or between labor and employers and the related unions, which represent them (Beinin, Joel, 2008).

The nature of institutional and institutionalizing relations in the labor movements as the relationship between bureaucracy and social movement reflects a dynamic (the extent of differentiation and progress) relationship within unions (between workers and the union leadership) and in society (between labor and capital). And in contrary to the social movement which has not have institutionalized channels, the labor movement, through unbiased union representation, can have institutional powers that can enable them to confront their everyday lives' problems and pressures. (Edwards. Bob, 2007). But is that really the case in Egypt? I can argue that the Egyptian labor union, during the previous political system was embodied in the corrupted political system as the high seniors in the union's hierarchy can be described as state's employers who express and execute the governmental illegal desires and targets, which do not reflect even the workers' labor basic requirements! And that leads the Egyptian current minister of workforces under the Egyptian incumbent military ruling council to call on the workers' rights to establish parallel unions and syndicates in each Egyptian Corporation and he gives the workers the free choice to financially subscribe in the Egyptian Union relying on the voluntary nature of these unions.

Though the main opponents of the US workers that lead them to escalate their labor movement are the employers and unions, the Egyptian labor movement- based-strikes' main enemy is the Egyptian political system that conducted Egypt's Economic Reform and Structural Adjustment Program agreements. These agreements managed to privatize 190 firms by mid-2002 and left the economic portfolios to Gamal Mubarak, the previous president's son, since 2004, who resume the selling of other 17 without national vision. All these irrational political practices lead to manipulation of such selling processes, increasing unemployment and retirement rates, and worsening the settings of not only Mahalla's workers, but also all workers over Egypt.

2- International and Domestic Factors contribute to emergence of Labor Movements Everywhere in Egypt

At the beginnings of 1970s and 1980s, there is a noticeable escalation of workers' demands as a consequence of neo-Liberalism, open-door policy which leads, according to Ahmed Bahaa, to economic crisis, the state withdrawal from provision of services to Egyptian workers, especially those involved in the sectors, which were privatized, early-pension which dismantled or disregarded broad sectors of labor movements. El-Mergany proceed

that the government claimed that the administration of the public sector is weak, and the private sector can be responsible for the process of the privatization. The government will sell the lost companies but what was sold the gained companies and with less value in comparison with its original value.

International Factors

A - The application of globalization policy that helped to entrench poverty, cut the wages, and reduce the health insurance. This application includes erasing the borders among nation states, declining the state as an autonomous decision-making body, and rising Multi National Corporations (MNCs), which controlled (70%) of the world's trade (Faulks: 1999). MNCs by themselves are unable to provide stability and regulation necessary for continued economic growth, and are reliant upon states to manage global change. This international nature of economic system under globalization devalues the importance of unionism and thus it does not give any legitimate channels for laborers to defend their rights and implement their demands.

B - Implementing New-Liberalism (NL) policies, encompassing the formation of international economic organizations such as: the World Bank (WB), and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which advocated the idea of "structural adjustment" as a cure to the economic problems of the developing countries (Faulks: 1999). In 1981, the World Bank produced the Berg Report, which claims to what was called the "structural adjustment" of African states for enabling them to lessen their debts. This kind of adjustment led the nation state, which tended to go with this respect, to decline its intervention in industrial zone, to apply the privatization, to erase borders and facilitate the world trade, and disintegration the regulations of workplaces.

Domestic Factors

The transfer from the imminent use of power into the manifest one via making protests, according to Fantasia and Norris, is a result of some stimulus events, which may be a new work rule that makes the job more arduous, a new technology that can constitute an obstacle to the customary practices, an imposed austerity, or any such assault that passively affects their collective dignity. I think that all these pressures were practiced on all the Egyptian

workers on their jobs without reservation whereas the irrational execution of the economic reform and structural adjustment program which declined the workers' wages, decrease the employment rates among them, encourage the workers to quit, and limit the pension outcomes.

To conclude, the stimulus events that encouraged laborers to resort to make several movements are both the application of open door policy in the 1970s under Sadat regime, and the random implementation of structural adjustment programs in the 1990s. On focusing on the privatization policies, the coordinator of workers' rights said that by 2002, 190 companies were privatized and that other 14 were privatized in 2004 via entrepreneurs who had a closed relationship with Gamal Mubarak, the son of Mubarak. The application of privatization process in Egyptian companies led to the following: reduce laborers wages, reduce the employment rates, encourage laborers to leave their works, apply the early pension policy, withdraw of the state from providing basic services to laborers, sell the profitable companies, not the loss ones, sell via the documentary, not the market value, and neutralize the roles of Egyptian labor syndicates and unions (Interview with Mr. Elhamy El Mergany the coordinator of workers' rights).

In addition to open door in 1970s and privatization policy in 1990s, political pressures accelerate the motion and size of labor movements. These pressures include insisting on the inheritance of power, the principle of devolution of power, sustaining the emergency law and other laws that prohibit freedoms.

3-The Labor Movement Worldwide

As a result of the economic stagnation struck most of the world's advanced capitalist economies, beginning in the mid-1970s, capitals decided that the best way to increase the profit in a period of slow economic growth is to cut labor costs. A list of actions taken by labor's class enemies as follows: slashed wages and benefits, lean production (the increase in injuries and health problems, seldom addressed these days by public agencies), closed plants and ruined communities, successful ideological warfare by the right, the dismantling of the social welfare state, privatization of public services, structural adjustment programs, deregulation, regressive taxation, outsourcing of work, anti-worker trade agreements, and direct violence against workers.

The formation of a strongly neo-liberal "Washington Consensus" among the leaders of the World Bank, IMF, Inter-American Development Bank, and

the US Agency for International Development (all located in Washington, D.C.) introduced yet another ingredient into Latin American politics. As national political leaders felt increasing international pressure to adhere first to structural adjustments and then to neo-liberal dictates from these financial institutions, they found that they were often being obliged to implement policies that caused a further deterioration of living conditions for the masses and some segments of the middle class, leading in turn to severe problems in governance. This process would end the neo-liberal experiment in Argentina under Carlos Moneim and pave the way for the financial meltdown that country experienced at the end of 2001 and in 2002.

Previous attempts in Latin America to enfranchise the masses and gain a greater degree of autonomy from external economic and political domination led to various revolutionary upheavals, such as in Mexico (1910), Cuba (1959), and shorter-lived experiments in Bolivia (1952) and Nicaragua (1979). In Brazil, before a developing radical movement could gain any momentum, conservative forces coalesced to facilitate a US-tolerated (some might say sanctioned) coup in 1964. Elections were cancelled, the legislature and traditional parties were disbanded, leftists were repressed, imprisoned, tortured and killed, and rule by decree from the military junta was enacted. Military rule lasted till 1984, when Brazil began to democratize anew.

Zapatistas Movement in Mexico

Zapatistas were peasants, most of them Indians, tzeltales, tzotziles, and choles, from the communities established since the 1940s in the Lacandon rainforest on the Guatemalan border. These communities were created with government support to find a way out of the social crisis created by the exclusion of acasillados (landless peasants working for landowners) from the farms and ranches owned by mestizos. For centuries, Indians and peasants have been abused by colonizers, bureaucrats, and settlers. In 1972, president Echeverria decided to create the “bio-reserve” of Montes Azul and to return most of the forests to 66 families of the original Lacandon tribe, and ordering the relocation of 4000 families after their exclusion from their original communities. Most settlers refused to relocate, and began a 20-year struggle for their right to land, which was still lingering on when Salinas assumed the presidency in 1988. In 1992, a new decree denied the legal rights of the Indian communities that had resettled for the second time.

As a consequence of Rio conference on environment and the need to protect the rainforest, a cattle feeding in the area was curtailed. In 1992

and 1993, peasants mobilized peacefully against the policies of the full manipulation of individual property and the privatization in accordance with the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and when they found that their powerful march of Xi' Nich, which brought thousands of peasants from palenque to Ciudad de Mexico, received no response, they changed their tactics via not planting corns, leaving coffee on the bushes, withdrawing children from schools, and selling cattle to buy weapons. The headline of the insurgents' manifesto was "Today, we say enough" (2).

The Landless Movement in Brazil

In Brazil, a movement of landless peasants combined with a national workers party not only to liberate land for the landless but to propel Lula da Silva into the country's highest political office. A separation has occurred in the Workers' Party, with the more left-leaning elements in near revolt over the failure of the government of Lula da Silva to more fiercely oppose neoliberalism.

The election in 2002 of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva in Brazil can be seen as part of this trend, a strong popular reaction against the neo-liberal policies advocated by Brazilian elites and supported by Washington and global financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the Inter-American Development Bank. It was also an indication of a movement away from traditional authoritarian politics and minimal popular engagement to new forms of democratic participation (Vanden).

To conclude, and like the circumstances in Egypt, Latin America passed by international and local passive stages as the structural adjustments and neo-liberal reforms advocated by the Washington Consensus have threatened their security and wellbeing. And locally, its political systems have been unable to provide basic security in food, housing, education, employment, or monetary value and banking. That is, wide sectors of the population have been marginalized from the national project, and the governing institutions have been unable to provide solutions to their situations. Their insecurity and dissatisfaction thus drive them to adopt new forms of protest and to seek new and different political structures that might better respond to their needs while traditional political parties and governments are increasingly seen as unable to respond to or even comprehend their needs. Such parties, if not the political systems themselves, were rapidly losing their legitimacy.

4-The Egyptian Labor Movement on 6th April in Mahalla

For describing what happened in 6th of April movement, it will be honest to say that labor movements in Mahalla occurred from 1970s. According to Shabaan and El –Mergany, the protests happened from 1974 as a reaction to open door policy and applying the foreign-Arab capital law in April 1974. In 1975, laborers established deputies of departments and constituted general committee under the censorship of socialists. Then, the law n: 35 in 1976 was issued and led to decrease the laborers' awareness and personalities as well and the public syndicate for industry was established. It was composed of National Democratic Party's members, police, and security apparatus for preventing laborers' protests. In response, laborers selected some members, especially from the left, for reconstructing laborers' awareness. In this respect, labor magazine was issued (1982-1985) entitled "the voice of the laborer" for entrenching the principle of the diversity of syndicate's thought. In other words, the magazine's thought creates a different school of thought in the syndicate movement that diverted from the passive thought of the formal syndicate, which goes with the state's interests against laborers' rights

When the Egyptian government randomly applied the privatization policy and made a tangible change in the labor class's structure, the policy was resisted by the laborers via forming a defense committee for supporting the public sector. Beside this support, this committee, which is composed of (70-80) from syndicate's leaders prepared files of companies that were sold. Also, searching for a practical way of rejecting the law 100 in 1993, the laborers tend to formulate a coordinated committee for labor and syndicate's rights in about 13 governorates, and hold monthly meetings, particularly in Hisham Mubarak Centre for the law from 2001 and till now. For fear of not getting their rights in solidarity boxes, most laborers do not accept on the idea of establishing independent syndicates. In 2004, social insurances were privatized and pensions' committee was formulated. In 2005, the Ministry of treasury took 200 billion pounds from laborers' pensions claiming that it will restructure them in collaboration with the World Bank! In 2006, the medical insurance was shifted to central (dominant) corporation and constituting a committee for defending the health issues. According to such sudden changes from the government towards its laborers, they organize several protests and claim that the recent syndicate elections held in 28 June 2006 was manipulated and from this time the protests continued and escalated without stop! (An interview with Shabaan and El- Mergany).

There is a closely connected relationship between the workers' strikes in Mahalla and the neo-liberal agenda, and the personal interests of the powers of the presidency, and the inefficiency of some civil society associations.

Before recognizing the domestic factors that led to bringing about Egyptian labor movements, several conditions should be existed in laborers themselves for making a movement: at first, workers inhabit many localities: workplaces, communities, extended families, civic and religious organizations. As a consequence of such diverse cultures of solidarity, the demands and then the tactics will be changed. Second, the workers with the highest level of class consciousness must be central to the organizing. These workers have the ability to explain events and realize them through local and international relations. Third, ways must be available to connect the stable and the unstable sectors of the working class. There must be broad labor movement organizations, broader than ordinary labor unions, to encompass entire labor movement. Fourth, the complete awareness of the labor movement's main principles and goals should be existed.

The main parts of 6th of April labor movement in 2008 as follows: A-Kefaya movement and its main effect in all governorates. B-6th of April movement constituted a group in Facebook and the number of participants reached 160.000 in 6th of April 2008. C-The workers of Spinning and weaving companies are the main component in the protest. D- The whole categories and classes of societies.

According to Kamal Abbas, a general coordinator to syndicate services center, what was happened in 6th of April is a result of the protests of 7th December 2006 taken place in Gazel el-Mahalla as 25.000 workers hold protests for increasing their profits after the syndicate elections in 28th of June 2006 that show a noticeable manipulation. Also, this protest coincided by the protest of Helwan Cement workers at the same date who rejected the main items of the administration's agreement and that the administration rejected to make any modification. For the first time, the labor protests are covered by the media. This is the beginning of the labor movements occurred in Egypt and covered by the media.

The movement was established in 2008 to support textile workers in the industrial town of Mahalla El-Kubra who were organizing a strike to demand higher wages and better work conditions. They were the first to use Facebook to urge the public to take action against deteriorating living conditions, organizing a campaign of civil disobedience in April 2008. They called for more strikes on Labor Day, 1 May, and became one of the main players behind the 25 January Revolution (Fathi, 2011).

The specification of the event comes when the youth was involved in the event and the formation of 6th of April 2008 and the excessive and unjustified use of power and that reflects the fear of the political system from the labor movement. Also, it is clear that the founders of the Egyptian Federation of Independent Unions in formulating their demands mingled between the economic and political ones as they call on the necessity of the following: a- getting rid of ministers associated with the Mubarak regime. b- Determining fair wages and independent unions. c- Setting a maximum wage for government employees. d- Refusing the agreement of supplying natural gas to Israel for one ninth of the market price. e- Stopping subsidizing big companies run by Mubarak's companions. This relationship was also discussed via the article entitled "Work is Politics" by Joel Benin, which asserts the dynamic and inevitable relationship between politics and workers (Abu-Aita, 2011).

As happened in 1977, Egyptian citizens, in 2008, went down to the streets protesting an increase in bread prices. State officials hoped would help in the reduction of the budget deficit. The protests have warned officials that Egyptians will not remain quiet when their most basic needs are made inaccessible to them. Fearing a further escalation of kind of protests that occurred in early April, officials have announced price controls, an increase in salaries and a channeling of export of food and cement towards domestic consumption. The Egyptian president ordered the army to bake bread using the army ovens to respond to the food shortages. These measures have been taken at a time when Egyptian workers are faced with the lowest levels of wages. Egyptian workers earn (92) percent less than workers doing similar work in Israel, (81) percent less than in Turkey, and (65) percent less than in Tunisia, (40) percent less than in India and (15) per cent less than in Pakistan). Meanwhile, food prices have more than doubled since 2007 while rents and costs of transportation have experienced sharp increases. Even with two jobs and over 12 hours of work, Egyptian workers are incapable of paying the minimum rent for a small flat which costs around LE 300 per month (because of the rise in cement and steel prices).

The Main Factors Leading to 6Th of April Mahalla's Labor Movement

From the political and juridical perspective, it is noticed that the Egyptian political system is illegitimate as it allowed Mubarak to run for re-election in 2005, that it planed –in collaboration with the Egyptian National Democratic party to make his son Gamal his next successor in the presidency, and increased the powers of the presidency via holding the constitutional amendments in March 2007.

The personal decisions concerning the economic setting through the full execution to the neo-liberal agenda which is creating a new Egypt for 10% of the population while excluded industrial workers and white collar employees, especially those in the diminishing public sector and adopting Egypt's Economic Reform and Structural Adjustment Program agreements, Law 203 of 1991 stipulated that 314 public sector enterprises were eligible for privatization. By mid-2002 190 had been privatized. Then, in July 2004, the economic portfolios were entrusted to western-educated PhDs or businessmen close to Gamal Mubarak whose followers sold other 17 firms in its first fiscal year in office. These irrational changes had bad impact on employment rates, raised the rates of retirement, declined the real wages, and widened the gap between the rich and the poor to the extent that the common estimate is that 40% of Egyptians live below the poverty line.

Furthermore, the increase of the workers' strikes as a result of the noticeable fragility of NGOs, Laborers syndicates, and the political parties that lead The workers' movement - even more than the demonstrations of the intelligentsia organized by Kefaya – has popularized a culture of protest and is contributing to consciousness of citizenship and rights far more successfully than the moribund secular opposition political parties or the most active NGOs.

Most syndicate members claimed that syndicates were ineffective at providing fair wages and their desire for forming independent unions. Such basic demands were ignored by syndicate leaders for purpose of protecting their relationship to government and business groups. As a consequence of (ETUF) monopoly of workers' representation, the Ghazel el-Mahalla workers called for dissolving their factory's union committee, which they deemed "undemocratic and unrepresentative."

The Essence of 6th of April Labor Movement under Unequal Resources

6Th of April labor movement take this focus as Mahalla city is the largest industrial city in Egypt that has a significant history and the size of the participants exceeded 50.000 protesters. And eventually, several Egyptians were killed and injured.

There is, as Joel Benin asserts, dynamic and inevitable relationship between politics and workers. Such link leads to what happened on 6 April in Mahalla al-Kubra. The appropriate theory that can explain the protests' emergence in Mahalla is the resource mobilization theory, which is based on the fact that the extent of the availability of resources is closely connected

to the ability of creating collective actions. Also, the theory considers human time, effort, and money are the most important elements that are more or less available to collective protestors. In contrary to strain and breakdown theories that are closely connected to traditional collective behavior paradigm, resource mobilization one exceeds the conventional understanding to include the elements of agency, rationality, politics, and organization that lead to provide deep and systematic analysis and evaluation to modern social movements. As long as the resource mobilization theory connects between formulating collective actions and the availability of resources, it is the best framework for illustrating strikes in Mahalla for increasing their salaries and services provided.

In this context, the Misr workers called for a national strike to demand a rise from $21 in 1984 to $222 a month because they suffer from the sharp increases in foods' prices, where food prices rose (2005-2008) by 33% for meat and more than 146% for chicken, in addition to bread and this increasingly rocket rise does not match to their inferior salaries. The most crucial point that lead to such strikes and implicated in resource motivation theory is the uneven distribution of resources within our Egyptian society and that the Egyptian political system is the driving factor to such inequality. So, the organization of strikes by the workers and their allies from social movements such as Kefaya and other political parties tried –through their considerable series of strikes from 2004-2006 to mix between the economic and political demands to overcome dominant patterns of resource inequality to pursue social change goals.

Eventually, though these workers and their allies do not have adequate material resources, they are bombarded with other moral, cultural, socio-organizational and human ones as they succeeded to embody legitimacy to their strikes demands that lead to the expansion of these movements to include all parts of Egypt**.** Also, the skilled and experienced workers with their intellectuals from other social movements and political parties managed to executing missions such as: holding new conferences, organizing meetings, setting-up organizations, and designing webs. Such awareness represents a driving force not only for facilitating their movement activities but also for paving the way to the 25th Egyptian revolution.

The Protest in Mahalla and the Waves of Contention

Though there are three main waves of contention, which are the waves of expansion, transformation, and contraction, the strike in Mahalla depend-

ed on two specific waves of contention: the expansion and transformation ones. The first wave is the expansion of contention, which emerging out everywhere, and then hastily overwhelms various geographical areas and sectors of society. This expansive mechanism includes expanding political opportunities, diffusion and innovation that Mahalla's workers make to challenge the political system in novel ways, reactive mobilization that successful mobilization affect or threaten to actualize the interests of another group and that happened when some workers followed the crowd in opposition to their committee and burned the slogans of ruling National Democratic Party candidates for the municipal elections. In application on what Benin mentioned, there is unprecedented development of the size of strikes in Egypt since 2004. There were 74 collective actions in the first half of 2004 and 191 after the fixing of the Nazif government in July.

On 2 March 2008 the liberal daily newspaper (Al-Masri al-Youm) reported 222 strikes, factory occupations and protests during 2006. Egyptian Workers and Trade Union Watch reported more than 580 episodes of industrial action in 2007. During 2007, strikes spread from the textile and clothing industry to workers in building materials, transport, the Cairo metro, food processing, bakeries, sanitation, telecommunications, oil workers in Suez, the Helwan Iron and Steel Mills, the National Cement Company in Helwan and many others. Private sector industrial workers were a significant part of the labor movement for the first time in many decades. In summer 2007 the movement broadened to include white-collar employees, civil servants and professionals. The workers' movement -even more than the demonstrations of the intelligentsia organized by Kefaya– has popularized a culture of protest and is contributing to consciousness of citizenship and rights far more successfully than the moribund secular opposition political parties or the most active NGOs.

The second wave is the transformation of contention that shows shifts between conflictive and accommodating interactions, in other words, radical modifications in the balance of power between groups, and significant repositioning of patterns of coalition and opposition among actors. This wave includes the strategic anticipation, strategic adaptation, and environmental selection, and also represents making rooted changes in humans' strategies, identities, and structures. And that was proven when some workers goes against the committee of the 25.000 workers at Misr Spinning and Weaving Co., which represent their demands, and participated in the crowd of young boys and women in the main square of Mahalla. This action taken

by these workers against their allies –the members of the committee -stems from the fact that the combination of National Council on Wages and the state- sponsored Egyptian Trade Union encourage the committee to call off the strike after the inadequate increase in salaries they recommended (strategic anticipation). Moreover, the Egyptian Prime minister accepted workers' demands and announced a bonus of a month's pay for Misr workers and 15 days for all other textile workers and that the minister of investment offers other significant services and facilities! Such transformation from overdose violence to cooperation by governmental responses to laborers demands leads to other demands that expand the size of protestors in all positions and at all levels.

The Protestors between Their Allies and Adversaries

The is no unified background between the protestors and their adversaries, however, the negotiation between both parts is the most successful way that leads both of them to reach a compromise and such way cannot come without holding a series of strikes. Such compromise happened when the confrontation between the Strikes' workers and their opponents (the political system) continued to two days (6-8 April) and that lead the Egyptian Prime minister to subject to workers' demands and announce an increase in a month's pay for Misr workers and 15 days for all other textile workers, besides, the minister of investment offers other significant services and facilities! Also, the deep gap between the protestors and adversaries can enforce some waged persons to disregard and devalue such practices of these movements, for instance, Khaled Ali Omar, a lawyer at the Hisham Mubarak Law Centre, who criticized the call for a general strike as a "premature act on behalf of the leaders of ineffective political parties and groupings".

Concerning the relationship between the supported allies of the labor movement, and as long as they stick to the same general principles and goals and direct their contention toward the same opponent, the cooperation relationship becomes the dominant feature among them. Besides, the Egyptian Movement for Change – Kefaya, a multi-tendency pro-democracy coalition, the Islamist Labor Party, the Nasserist Karama Party and the Bar Association in added to the Facebook backed The Mahalla workers' plan for a national labor strike.

The Protest in Mahalla and Policing Reactions

Definitely, "Total control" type is the appropriate one for describing the events in Mahalla because the police used the direct and intentional compulsive power of arresting, beating, detaining, and killing against all the Egyptian categories of society to include workers, citizens, and intellectuals of social movements[2]. Such practices were demonstrated through Benin's article: At first, when some workers goes against the committee of the 25.000 workers at Misr Spinning and Weaving Co., and participated in the crowd of young boys and women in the main square of Mahalla against the political system. Such confrontation lasts for two days (6-8 April) in which security forces arrested 331 people, beat up hundreds, wounded nine, and killed 15-year-old adult with a bullet on his head as he was standing in the balcony with his family! Second, When the Mahalla workers call for a general strike sponsored by the Egyptian social movement "Kefaya" and some other political parties, the general strike was aborted by the arrest of nearly 100 political activists on the eve of 6 April. As a consequence of Kefaya's support for a general strike on 6 April was considered so threatening and that on 9 April George Ishak, a founding member of Kefaya, was arrested followed by 50 others. The charges against Ishak were typical of the fabricated accusations the Mubarak regime directs against opponents. Third, though twenty-five academics traveled to Mahalla on 11 April to visit families of the injured via Kefaya movement, they were detained 20km from the city and prevented from entering (Joya, 2008). This leads to conclude that Mubarak regime is intentionally accustomed to use repressive measures against unarmed Egyptian civilians[3].

Neutralizing the state's political and security apparatuses has been the key political tactic of the labor movement in Egypt. Although the regime has occasionally dealt with its traditional mechanisms of cracking down on workers via arrest, intimidation, or suspension from work, it has nevertheless tolerated labor protests to an extent not seen in its treatment of either the Muslim Brotherhood or the smaller secular Kefaya Movement and Al-Ghad (Tomorrow) Party. The regime most likely recognizes that cracking down on workers inside factories could be extremely costly in human and financial terms (Phelps, 2011).

To sum up, there is a specificity in the labor movement occurred in 6th of April 2008 comes as a result of a- using the means of technology such as: Facebook, e-mails…b- the connection between economic and political demands. c- including all categories and classes of society. d- using of police system repressive forces.

5-The Egyptian Labor Movement as a Practical Introduction to 25th Egyptian Revolution (Possible Similarities):

Ahmed Maher, initiator of 6 April Movement, said "We considered what happened in Mahalla a rehearsal for the revolution." And "We learned how to organize a political event after that." This uprising is considered was the first to break the barrier of fear all over Egypt. Murad said "No one can say that Egypt was the same afterward."

Hassan Nafaa, the professor of politics, said that the 6 April movement began a "new trend" in Egyptian politics, specifically for their savvy use of telecommunication devices and social networking sites and that it came hot on the heels of the Kefaya Movement, which began the fight for change in 2005 (Lee. Panthea, 2011).

6th of April labor movement and 25th of Egyptian revolution: (possible similarities): as collected through six interviews

A- Both events were determined previously via Facebook. As usual, the international revolution should be implemented in confidentiality; however the Egyptian revolution date was released two-months before the revolution.

B- Police brutality: as the police system dealt with both events by sticks, teargas, and rubber bullets. According to Abbas, Related to the investigation conducted that express the excessive usage of power; anyone can smell the teargas three kilometers before reaching Mahalla.

C- Incorporation of all categories of social classes in both movements as there are the social and political movements, the working class, laymen, and middle class.

D- The idea of invitation via Facebook and the Egyptian people respond to such invitation. Both events relied on the technology and electronic means such as: Facebook and Twitter. Such technology assisted in directing, organizing, and arranging 6th of April and the 25th of Egyptian revolution.

E- The absence of the leadership in both events as there is no specific person, political party, or social movement. The Egyptian revolution is considered the first organized revolution over the world that succeeded without having a leader. It has a spontaneous leadership.

F- The lack of dynamic roles executed by Egyptian political parties in both events as such parties missed the real opposition perspectives. As the political parties dealt with online invitations by 6th of April and Khaled Said site by superficiality.

G- Muslim Brothers' effect in both events is significant compared to the roles of the political parties that accustomed in recent times to make deals with the previous political system.

H- The use of technology and the internet by inviting Egyptians to participate in 6th of April protest, tracking and covering the events by Mahalla's youth is a small scene of what was going on through 25th of January Egyptian Revolution.

I- Both events were peaceful from the beginning to the end. Though the revolutions worldwide showed that the protestors are the persons whom begin the violence with the policing system, the Egyptian protestors were so keen to keep this revolution non-violent.

J- Both uprisings aimed to step down the political system, not in favor of a specific political force (party), or a specific political program as a substitute. The Egyptian protestors, during the revolution, do not take in their considerations alternative political agencies.

K- The Egyptian revolution and the labor movement are considered Egyptian fabrication from the beginning to the end as the Egyptian protestors' need a sort of support comes from the other countries, but this revolution reflects the signature of all social categories of Egyptian society.

L- The involvement of the youth and the organizational and technological capacities they professionally provided and the 6th of April movement is the clear example in this context.

6- The Main Findings

A- A new labor movement should be aware that capitalism and market dependence were themselves unavoidable. Also, trade agreements, lean production, and unemployment are all products of human agency. It is significant to note the words of Gerald Mc Entee, president of the American Federation of State, in Seattle at the WTO protests: "it must name the system, and once it does this, it must struggle toward an alternative to this system. It must construct an anti-capitalist and pro-worker ideology and organize around it.

B- Though New economy claimed that unions are no longer necessary and that there is no use for the unions to reinvent themselves, which are considered inconvenient in the context of the new economy, liberals and social democrats claimed that elected unions will have to cooperate with employers –for serving their interests- especially under the support of

the state, to create an economy that can win the competitive struggle for markets. So, unions must help employers to shape a competitive advantage in global markets.

C- The labor protests was resumed after the Egyptian revolution 25th of January as there are several laborers and professional demonstrations were held everywhere over Egypt after the Egyptian Revolution such as the following: a- Transportation workers' demonstration outside the Nile-side TV to demand better pay. b- Ambulance drivers' demonstrations across the Nile River in the Giza district to demand better and permanent salaries and jobs. c- Police demonstrations in downtown Cairo to clear their reputation. d- Unemployed archeology graduates protest outside the Supreme Council for Antiquities in the upscale district of Zamalek. e- Airport officials demonstrated for more bonuses and pay.

D- Like the circumstances in Egypt, Latin America passed by international and local passive stages as the structural adjustments and neo-liberal reforms advocated by the Washington Consensus have threatened their security and wellbeing. And locally, its political systems have been unable to provide basic security in food, housing, education, employment, or monetary value and banking. That is, wide sectors of the population have been marginalized from the national project, and the governing institutions have been unable to provide solutions to their situations. Their insecurity and dissatisfaction thus drive them to adopt new forms of protest and to seek new and different political structures that might better respond to their needs while traditional political parties and governments are increasingly seen as unable to respond to or even comprehend their needs. Such parties, if not the political systems themselves, were rapidly losing their legitimacy.

E- Absolutely, that there is a legitimacy for the laborers and professionals to set up peaceful demonstrations in order to actualize all their legal demands, however, I completely differ in the timing of holding such demonstrations, especially after the occurrence of the Egyptian Revolution and I agree with what Egyptian ruling military council vision that offers a final warning for holding these categorical, not national, demonstrations before its intervening to impose an outright ban on gatherings, strikes, and sit-ins. Really, it is a time of supporting stability and resuming work for exceeding the temporary unsettled settings and reproducing new Egypt by Egyptians' own thoughts and will.

F- The role of female workers in Spinning and weaving companies was significant in 6th of April movement as they raised the banner "Where men,

the women are here!" as they have a spirit of escalating the events in Mahalla. When the police tried to use compulsive power against them, the workers strongly participated. They realized the manipulation of the political system as the government is not accustomed to fulfill its promises.

Recommendations

A- Policy makers should take in their considerations the main demands of laborers, which are, according to Yates, the following: (a) employment as a right; (b) significant work with maximum integration in every job; (c) a good deal of consumption fully socialized, including education, health care, transportation and recreation; (d) maximum democratic control of production, either by workers, or the communities or both. (e) Hours of work as low as possible; (f) work as nondestructive of nature as possible; (g) no discrimination of any kind; (h) equality in the full sense.

B-There is an urgent need for activating the law of freedom for professional syndicates that can facilitate establishing independent syndicates. The number of informal labor syndicates after the revolution reached 350 including (250. 000) from all professional areas. For example, there is about (40) informal labor syndicate in Port Said.

C- The development of the labor movement is the result of the development of the socio-economic settings of Egyptian society after the revolution. If the Egyptian economic, social and political settings are still instable, the cycle of violence will increase in all categories of workers.

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Interview

- Conducting an interview with Mr. Abd al-Ghaffar Shukor The prominent member in El- Tagamu' party's consultancy committee and the expert in the political culture in Tagamu' Party since 1964.
- Conducting an interview with Ahmed Maher the coordinator of 6th of April Movement.
- Conducting an interview with Ahmed Bahaa El-Deen Shabaan, A historical leader at Kefaya Movement and one of the main founders of National Association for Change and one of its general secretary's members. And currently he is a deputy of Egyptian Socialist Party under construction.

- Conducting interviews with Sayed Abd El-Al, the general secretariat of El-Tagamu' party and the director of the Freedom Committee at El-Tagamu party.
- Conducting interviews with Elhamy El Mergany: A member in coordinate committee in syndicate and workers' rights, one of the main founders in Socialist Party.
- Conducting interviews with Kamal Abbas, a general coordinator to syndicate services center

Endnotes

1 According to Odekon, there are three main reasons labor could not resist corporate-led globalization: First, post 1980 globalization caught organized labor in a weak position, especially in industrial countries. The economic recessions of the 1970s diverted public opinion to personal survival as the lack of popular support for trade unions and labor in general manifested itself during the Reagan era in the replacement of unionized air traffic controllers by non-unionized ones. Second, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, liberal intellectual support for labor movements dwindled. Competitive political concerns, such as gender and ethnicity issues, diverted intellectual attention. Third, workers distanced themselves from the trade union movement under the grand illusion that, as consumer-citizens, they are better off (Odekon, 2005).

2 Della Porta classified four types of protest policing as follows: 1- cooperation (collaboration between the police force and demonstrators) 2- negotiation (the existence of the police as mediators between demonstrators and non-demonstrators) 3- ritualistic stand-off (more aggressive police presence) 4- total control (massive presence of police forces).

3 In the recent April 2008 Mahalla protests, the state police prevented and/or arrested journalists from reaching out and reporting stories of people whose relatives were detained. Over 150 people were detained during the protests. At the same time, the state controlled media depicted the two day uprising in Mahalla as destruction of public property and vandalism by thugs just as the 1977 bread riots were labeled as 'the revolution of the thieves' by the state. There continued to remain a dominant presence of state security police (30 security trucks) in Mahalla even after the protests were suppressed.

The Role of Civil Society in the Syrian Uprising: From Intelligentsia to Policymakers?

Ignacio Álvarez

This paper analyses the role of civil society in the uprising against the Syrian regime that began on 15 March 2011. The disturbances, which broke out in the outlying rural city of Deraa, have spread across almost the entire country, triggering mass demonstrations in the main population centres (including Aleppo and the outskirts of Damascus, until recently believed to be government strongholds). The population, no longer fearing the regime, is demanding an end to authoritarianism and the fall of President Bashar al-Assad. Given the absence of any organised opposition inside the country, a small group of opposing intellectuals and critics has taken on an unprecedented leading role, styling themselves as spokespersons for the uprising in Syria. In the future, their role as respected intelligentsia could evolve into that of true policymakers.

Article 8 of the Syrian constitution establishes the Baath party as "the leading party in the state and society," which has prevented any independent parties from emerging since the 1963 military coup. Given this situation, the effort made by these critics and intellectuals has been and continues to be central to understanding the demands of a significant part of Syrian society. Well-known because of their participation in the Declaration of the 99, the Declaration of the 1000, the Damascus Declaration and the Beirut-Damascus Declaration, their opinions – despite systematic repression – are valued and respected by Syrians who desire the end of the regime, respect for civil liberties and the establishment of a true democracy.

Although Local Coordination Committees carry the burden of mobilising the population, the proclamations, manifestos, articles and declarations produced by these independent figures and broadcast via the major Arab and

international media are followed by an important segment of the demonstrators. They may have even more clout than the traditional political parties in exile, despite the fact that none of them have a broad social base.[1] Indeed, both the National Salvation Council and the National Transitional Council, both created in conferences held in Istanbul with Turkish support, contain a large pool of representatives from this group.

A Long-Standing Commitment to Freedom

Authoritarian regimes have always been disinclined to accept the consolidation of any political or social opposition and hostile to the development of an independent civil society that, "by constituting a sphere of citizen activity beyond their direct control can form a counterweight to state power."[2] The Baath party's half-century of absolute control in the country prevented the emergence of any political alternative to the current single-party system from arising and led to a widespread atavistic complex among the people regarding any type of anti-government political activism. As a result of this repression, the opposition was decimated and the population depoliticised.

These circumstances explain why it fell to a small group of opposition intellectuals and critics (which included Haytham al-Malih, Anwar al-Bunni, Michel Kilo, Suhair al-Atassi, Arif Dalila, Riad Seif and Riad al-Turk) to demand openness and change after Bashar al-Assad became president in September 2000. During the Damascus Spring dozens of discussion forums and associations for the defence of human rights were created, all calling for political liberalisation and democratic openness.

This sector of Syrian civil society announced its presence with the Declaration of the 99[3] (27 September 2000), signed by numerous intellectuals including Burhan Ghalioun, Sadiq al-Azm, Michel Kilo, Abdul Rahman Munif, Adonis and Haydar Haydar, who concurred that the "establishment of a democratic national regime is the basic approach to the plan for change and political reform. It must be peaceful, gradual, founded on accord, and based on dialogue and recognition of the other." This declaration also called on the government to "abolish all forms of exclusion in public life, by suspending the emergency law; and abolish martial law and extraordinary courts, and all relevant laws, including Law 49 for the year 1980; release all political prisoners; [allow] the safe and honourable return of all those wanted and those who have been voluntarily or involuntarily exiled with legal guarantees; and ending all forms of political persecution, by settling grievances and turning a new leaf in the history of the country."

On 1 January 2001, a group of Syrian lawyers demanded a complete reform of the constitution, the lifting of emergency laws and the concession of full civil liberties. On 10 January, the civil society committees published their founding charter – better known as the Declaration of the 1000[4] – signed by, among others, Kilo, al-Azm and Dalila. One day later, the Jamal al-Atassi Forum for Democratic Dialogue was established with the participation of communists, Nasserists, socialists and Baathist critics of the regime, months before the independent deputy Riad Seif founded the Forum for National Dialogue.

Three months later on 7 March, authorisation was given to create independent organisations for the defence of human rights (which like the Committee for the Defence of Human Rights advocated releasing political prisoners and the end of arbitrary detention and torture) as well as cultural and social associations made up of moderate Islamists (including the Islamic Studies Centre, headed by Mohammad Habash, a progressive scholar opposed to the Muslim Brotherhood with a seat in parliament). On 3 July, the Human Rights Association of Syria was established with lawyer Haytham al-Malih as president.

However, one of the results of the Damascus Spring was that it highlighted both the inability of the Syrian intelligentsia to form a united front and the regime's reluctance to tolerate its activities. As Caroline Donati has noted, "the weakness of the secular opposition, intensified by years of repression and emigration, undermined by personal rivalries and exploited by the authorities"[5] was soon revealed.

In light of the proliferation of spaces where the future of Syria was being freely debated (in just a few months, two hundred discussion clubs and forums were created), the regime decided to react, invoking the need to maintain national unity in the face of external threats. During this reactionary phase, which began in September 2001, deputies Riad Seif and Mamoun al-Homsi, economist Arif Dalila, lawyer Anwar al-Bunni and Atassi Forum spokesman Habib Issa were arrested. Later, Kamal al-Labwani and Haytham al-Malih were also imprisoned. All were sentenced to between three and twelve years in jail on charges of weakening the psychology of the nation and sowing religious and sectarian discontent. Other important figures from civil society like Redwan Ziyyade (director of the Damascus Centre for Human Rights Studies), and Suhair al-Atassi (director of the Jamal al-Atassi Forum for Democratic Dialogue) were forbidden from leaving the country.

In an open challenge to the regime, these prominent figures persisted with their demands for reform when they issued the Damascus Declara-

tion[6] on 16 October 2005, calling for the establishment of a fully democratic government, the suspension of emergency laws and full equality for all citizens regardless of their ethnicity. The declaration was the result of efforts made by journalist Michel Kilo to unify the main political forces, including the banned Muslim Brotherhood;[7] Kilo had met with group's leader in Morocco, where they agreed on a programme based on nonviolence, democracy, opposition unity and political change.[8] After the Beirut-Damascus Declaration[9] (6 April 2006), which called on Syria to recognise Lebanon's independence, establish full diplomatic relations and demarcate the borders between the two countries, a second wave of arrests took place during which Kilo and al-Bunni were imprisoned. With this example, the regime tried to put a stop to its opponent's efforts and to ensure that their demands did not awaken Syrian society from its political lethargy.

The Syrian Uprising

The fall of Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali in Tunisia and Hosni Mubarak in Egypt and the popular demonstrations in Yemen, Libya and Bahrain had a contagious effect across the Arab world, which, facing a deteriorating economic situation and the perpetuation of their autocratic regimes, is in a similar state of malaise. It is clear that the people in Syria are fed up with the governing elite's abuse and impunity. The regime is not only repressive, but has also consolidated its drift towards authoritarianism over the last decade to quiet any voices calling for greater democratic freedoms.

Most Syrian dissidents saw the Arab uprisings as the long-awaited occasion to introduce major changes inside the country. In an article published in the Lebanese newspaper *al-Safir*, Michel Kilo wrote that he believes that what occurred in Egypt and Tunisia has a 'before' and an 'after': "We are entering a new historical stage based on the primacy of citizenship, freedom, justice, equality, secularism and the rights of men and citizens."[10] After spending five years in prison, Anwar al-Bunni stated that "an event like this only happens once every 200 years and it is clearly going to bring about a radical change[11].

On 15 March, calls were made for a mass demonstration against the regime. Most of the dissident intellectuals and critics called on the people to mobilise and demand democratic openness. A few days earlier, former deputy al-Homsi had appealed to the Syrian people, beginning thus: "After fifty years of tyranny and oppression, we are beginning to see the sunlight of freedom approach."[12] He also accused the regime of resorting to repression, corruption and sectarian division to remain in power.

Despite these appeals, few expected Assad to follow the path taken by Ben Ali and Mubarak. Rather, they trusted that the new situation in the region would force the regime to abandon its stubborn resistance to change and, in the face of pressure from the street, introduce reforms. The unambitious nature of this agenda can be explained by the fact that the more politicised elements in Syrian civil society had been decimated by continual waves of repression and were aware of how little power they had to mobilise the masses. For this reason, the outbreak of popular rage surprised everyone, including the members of Syrian civil society themselves.

Suhair al-Atassi, who is in hiding at this time, expressed this surprise recently in an interview with the newspaper *al-Sharq al-Awsat*: "We have been subject to suppression and murder for merely calling for freedom, democracy, general freedoms, the release of all prisoners of conscience, an end to the state of emergency, and the return of all political exiles. At the time, we said that any suppression would cause the volcano to erupt…we knew that we were working slowly but surely towards freedom, but we did not dream of a revolution like this breaking out. It was the Syrian youth who made this dream a reality."[13]

The protests held before 15 March brought together a few hundred people at most. In the opinion of Laura Ruíz de Elvira, "these acts of protest, whether by individuals or groups, directed against the Syrian regime remained merely marginal activities carried out by a small elite in the minority, numerically speaking, and cut off from the rest of the people."[14] Indeed, one of the most important limitations for this group of activists has been their weak social base, the result of both the repression they have been subject to and their inability to get their message to the people (since freedom of opinion, expression and the press are severely restricted).

In an interview granted in 2005, Kamal al-Labwani provided an accurate, prophetic diagnosis of the situation when he cautioned that "the problem is that there is no politically mobilised street. When that happens, everything will change. Today, the opposition is purely symbolic and this sort of opposition is incapable of uniting because it is based on personalities, on the capability of single individuals to confront the authorities…Society is watching and when the masses begin to move, they will move behind those who represent them…So right now, we are reserving space in that arena so that when the day comes that people move to the street – either because of foreign or internal pressures – we will be ready."[15]

The popular revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt were the spark that set fire to the Syrian uprising once and for all. It began in the southern city of

Deraa and then gradually and progressively spread across almost the entire country. The demonstrations, which at first mobilised a few thousand people at best, began to enjoy great prestige (in large part because of the bloody crackdown, but also because the people no longer fear the regime). Anwar al-Bunni spoke about the drastic change in the distribution of power: "In the past, only a few of us dared to call for freedom and human rights. We used to feel isolated, as the majority of people avoided us out of fear of retribution from the authorities. After my release, I have realised that my demands became the demands of all the Syrian people"[16].

Initially, important sectors of the population demanded some reforms, but the brutal repression raised the bar. Appearing before parliament on 30 March, President Assad made it clear that any reforms would not be the result of popular pressure and that the process of political liberalisation would not be hurried. Some members of civil society believed that the regime would not be able to introduce reforms without collapsing. As al-Labwani had stated so many years before: "But we all know that the authorities lie and it won't permit anyone to speak out because the authority is corrupt and dictatorial and corruption and dictatorship fundamentally contradict transparency and freedom of opinion because the first opinion that anyone would express would be opposition to the corruption and tyranny and the crimes the authorities have committed. And then they'll face arrest, interrogation, and a trial. They say we enact a party law, we'll implement reform but its all lies because these authorities are incapable of it."[17]

As the uprising spread, the Syrian regime blamed the violence on armed radical elements seeking to destabilise the country. Assad told parliament that Syria was facing a conspiracy (*mu´amara*) intended to provoke a sectarian war (*fitna*). The regime tried to use this tactic to play for time in the midst of a rebellion that had taken it by surprise, as well as to justify the high number of civilians killed by the security services and pro-government armed groups (*shabbiha*). As Michel Kilo noted, the problem stemmed from "trying to use a security solution to solve a non-security problem: the people calling for freedom and justice."[18] The Syrian journalist believes that "Syria today is experiencing an existential crisis related to the distribution of wealth, social justice, freedom and political participation and this is not going to be resolved with repression. The police should be arresting killers, thieves and smugglers, but not hungry people with nothing to put in their mouths."[19]

The repression intensified in the following months and spread to most of the cities, but did not succeed in putting down the popular uprising. Faced with the success of the demonstrations, the Syrian regime was forced to

back down and adopt a series of cosmetic reforms to try to quell the unrest, including establishing a national dialogue. Syrian civil society roundly declared both measures both insufficient and clearly designed to buy some time.

Now that several months have passed since the Syrian uprising began, most of the activists believe that they are witnessing a revolution that will bring about the fall of the regime sooner or later. From his place in hiding, Suhair al-Atassi summarised the spirit of the demonstrations: "It's a revolution…it was triggered by the Syrian people wanting to stand up and say that we are citizens and not subjects, and that Syria is for all its people not just the al-Assad family. This is a revolution of the youth who are demanding freedom and who are being confronted by violence and murder…Today Syria is witnessing a battle for freedom, a battle between unarmed civilians who are calling for the ouster of a regime that has utilized methods of brutal and inhumane suppression. They have brutally attacked and killed the protesters, whilst [in response to this] the demonstrators have nothing but their words to defend them."[20]

The Agenda of the Syrian Activists

Over the last fifty years, the Syrian regime has prevented any opposition from emerging at national level and hindered the development of civil society for fear of its becoming a political alternative some day. Since Assad's rise to power, "the most critical and politicised components of civil society have been constantly repressed, imprisoned and marginalised. For that reason, in part, and because of the clampdown in politics, there is no solid organised political opposition in Syria. No social, union or political force is capable of launching and framing a protest movement at national level."[21]

For this reason, it is not surprising that the uprising against the Syrian regime was an ensemble movement that counted on contributions from different players. Omar Dahi has identified five clearly differentiated groups:[22] traditional opposition parties (socialists, Nasserists and communists); dissident intellectuals (including Kilo, Dalila, Tayeb Tizini, and Fayez Sara); the youth movement, which has forced the revolution (including the leaders of the Local Coordination Committees or LCC) and includes all sectors of society; a disorganised civil society made up of conservative Muslims who are usually incorrectly referred to as Islamists; and finally, armed Salafi groups who represent a minority.[23] Most of these groups (with the exception of the Salafi elements) agree about the need to avoid violence, reject sectarianism and prevent foreign intervention.

The opposition's demands were thoroughly revised after the popular uprising broke out. Initially, a quite unambitious agenda was put forth based on the introduction of reforms by the regime (lifting emergency laws, releasing political prisoners, a multi-party system, etc.). Only when the demonstrations spread across the country and the repression intensified did the group extend its agenda to consider the fall of the regime.

One of the first demands made by this group of opposition intellectuals and critics was the need to create a new social contract between the rulers and the ruled. Michel Kilo called for "a new national contract for a peaceful and negotiated end to the crisis."[24] Earlier, in his constitutional reform project, Anwar al-Bunni had advanced the idea of "a new social contract" to construct "a new Syria for all Syrians" in a clear allusion to the multitude of ethnicities and religions in the country.[25] This new contract would abrogate the old one "by which the state was to effect development, ensure social justice, satisfy the basic needs of its citizens, consolidate political independence, and achieve other national aspirations (for example, Arab unity, the liberation of Palestine). In return, their peoples were to forgo, at least for a while, their quest for liberal participatory politics."[26]

The activists also expressly rejected the use of violence to force Assad from power. Al-Bunni defended "a peaceful solution to all the problems."[27] To "discover how credible and serious the government is when it comes to carrying out reforms," al-Bunni demanded that all political prisoners be released. Michel Kilo agreed, arguing that 'a bloody conflict' must be prevented, given that exacerbating the sectarian tensions could lead to 'chaos': "None of the parties is interested in a *fitna* breaking out."[28] Kilo called for an end to violence 'everywhere'. At the beginning of August, the journalist warned: "There are some who have chosen to take up arms against the regime, but they only represent a minority of the demonstrators. But if the authorities persist in using violence, then they will become a majority."[29]

At first, national dialogue was also defended, but as the uprising has advanced and the repression intensified, most of the members of the opposition have rejected this option given the regime's low credibility. In the early days of the uprising, the intellectual Burhan Ghalioun (later named president of the Syrian National Transitional Council), warned that "to get out of the crisis, the whole crisis, the use of weapons must be rejected and political logic must be accepted. In other words, serious and credible negotiation. The logic of negotiation and political dialogue requires credibility and

the recognition of the other," an attitude that he does not detect in Assad, who continues "to dream about formal reforms within the existing regime, a regime with only one ruler, one party and one authority."[30]

One month after the uprising began, Kilo was still considering the possibility of "a full national dialogue" during the course of which the legitimacy of the demonstrators' demands would be recognised and a 'peaceful and negotiated' transition undertaken by "the leaders of the regime."[31] Despite the intensification of the repression, in mid-June Kilo still trusted that the regime had room to manoeuvre: "President Bashar al-Assad can play a historic role in resolving the situation and meeting the demands of the people, satisfying all parties."[32] Other figures, on the contrary, radically rejected this possibility.

Facing external and internal pressure, the regime itself indicated that it was in favour of national dialogue to lay the foundations for a new Syria. It even authorised a historical encounter between members of the opposition at the Semiramis Hotel in Damascus on 27 June in which Michel Kilo, Louai Hussein and Hassan Abbas participated (but which the Damascus Declaration coalition boycotted). Many opponents believe that the group gathered there was not representative and did not have the right to speak on behalf of the demonstrators. In Hussein's interpretation, the main goal of the meeting was "to organise a safe, peaceful transition from tyranny to freedom."[33] Walid al-Bunni, for his part, thought that the meeting would be exploited by the regime and used "to cover up the arrests, murders and tortures that continue to take place on a daily basis."[34] Be that as it may, the meeting revealed the fissures between the different groups and opposition figures, given that some sectors believed that the meeting would send out the wrong message, suggesting that the regime favoured dialogue.

On 9 and 10 July, the regime sponsored a comprehensive national dialogue meeting in Damascus boycotted by almost all opposition leaders. The LCC, which has been leading the Syrian uprising, refused to participate in the conference. Razan Zeitouneh, a lawyer and LCC member in Damascus said: "While the regime is meeting – and that is what today was – there are funerals in other cities and people continue to be killed and arrested."[35] Haytham al-Malih also declined the invitation, saying: "Whoever attends a dialogue like this one, with an authority who commits these crimes, is a traitor to the people. After 200 martyrs, 1,500 missing and 15,000 refugees, what is there to talk about? How can you have a dialogue with a person who is holding you at gunpoint?"[36]

The meeting, which was attended by 200 delegates (most of them intellectuals and politicians with close ties to the regime), was presented as a

step to lay the foundations for the transition to democracy.[37] Vice President Farouk al-Sharaa opened the meeting with this statement: "We hope that it will lead to...the transformation of Syria into a pluralistic, democratic state where its citizens are equal." In a surprising development, the final communiqué went far beyond what was expected when it raised the issue of releasing all political prisoners, including those arrested since the uprising began (with the exception of those involved in crimes). It also argued that "dialogue is the only way to end the crisis in Syria" and strongly rejected any foreign interference under the pretext of defending human rights. Furthermore, it called for deeper reforms and stronger efforts to combat corruption. Finally, it requested that the constitution be amended to make it coherent with the rule of law, a multi-party system and democracy.

Most of the Syrian activists agreed that the offer to engage in dialogue came too late and that the regime had lost all of its credibility. Speaking on the issue, Suhair al-Atassi said, "It has been contaminated by the blood of our people! How could we accept this [national dialogue]? It came too late! This is not to mention the lack of trust between the people and the regime. The best example of this was the arrests of the artists and intellectuals who decided to take to the streets in solidarity with the legitimate demands for greater freedoms in Syria. The Syrian regime was merely trying to buy time with this national dialogue…The Syrian opposition is united, which can be seen in its joint position to boycott the so-called 'dialogue' with the authorities that have been killing and suppressing the people."[38] In their communiqué dated 7 September, the LCC emphasised: "Syrians, who have already been killed and tortured in their thousands, will not accept any proposals or arrangements that leave Bashar Assad, the intelligence service and the death squads in control of their lives."[39]

As the uprising intensified and the dissidents' demands grew, the need to form a transition government, given the possible collapse of the regime, was considered. In April, Kilo requested the formation of a "transitional regime: a government of national unity" establishing the bases for a free and democratic system.[40] In mid-July, al-Malih went even further, calling for a shadow government made up of 'independent experts' noting that "it will not be an effective government, but rather a shadow government. It will be a regional government and each minister will have his role."[41] The goal of this government would be to unify the opposition movements and prepare for the post-Assad era.

Turkey's Role

The Turkish government has observed the Syrian crisis with concern. In the earliest phases of the uprising, President Abdullah Gul, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Foreign Affairs Minister Ahmet Davutoglu advised the Syrian regime to end the repression and democratise the country. Assad ignored these petitions, producing a profound uneasiness in Ankara, accentuated by the arrival of thousands of refugees fleeing the besieged town of Jisr al-Shughour.

The possibility of a civil war troubles Turkey, which believes that the intensification of violence could increase the number of refugees on their territory. In an interview with the Qatar newspaper *Al-Sharq*, Erdogan stressed the importance of the ties between the two countries: "For Turkey, Syria is not just another country, it's a neighbour that we share 910 kilometres of border with and have shared interests that cannot be ignored…We know very well that stability there is part of our national security and we are afraid that the situation will lead to the outbreak of a civil war between Alawis and Sunnis."[42]

The widening gap between Ankara and Damascus also means the end of Davutoglu's 'zero problems with neighbours' policy. The premise of this policy is the idea that Turkey must maintain the best possible relationships with its neighbouring countries and diversify its alliances to achieve more strategic depth, thus increasing its clout. This requires strengthening political, trade and cultural ties in the region, allowing Turkey to turn its attention back to the Middle East, a region that formed an integral part of the Ottoman Empire for four centuries, and thus fill a vacuum that no Arab power could or has wanted to occupy.

Facing the changes in the Syrian regime, the Turkish government warned that trade relations between the two countries (which amount to around 2.5 billion dollars annually) could be in danger. It also hosted various opposition group meetings inside Turkey with the goal of creating a roadmap for the post-Assad era. In mid-July, Istanbul hosted the National Salvation Conference (NSC), which elected Haytham al-Malih as its president. During the meeting, al-Malih rejected any dialogue with the regime: "The Syrian regime has declared war on its people, who will not go back home until the regime has fallen."[43] The final communiqué from this meeting called for the formation of a shadow government, but not before the fall of the regime, and expressed its will to reach "a unified approach" between the opposition and the young demonstrators.

In a new meeting held in Istanbul on 23 August, the Syrian opposition agreed to create a National Transitional Council (NTC) to coordinate the campaign to force Assad from power and create a plan for a post-Assad Syria. This council is made up of opposition members both inside and outside the country and presided over by Burhan Ghalioun, a Syrian academic residing in France. Clearly, the intensity of the repression brought the opposition members together to establish this council despite their differences. Basma Qadmani, their spokesperson, told the media that "the NTC represents the major forces: political parties and independent figures who symbolise the Syrian opposition." The names of the members of the NTC living inside the country have been kept secret to prevent reprisals.

Foreign intervention?

Although the opposition members initially rejected any foreign intervention, little by little voices have emerged – still in the minority – which favour it. During the Istanbul conference, al-Malih called for UN participation to put at end to the bloodshed via political and diplomatic pressure, but he soundly rejected any military intervention. Kilo also declared in an interview with the newspaper *al-Arab al-Yawm*: "I would like to see an exclusively Syrian solution be reached based on a broad, complete national understanding."[44]

However, and given the worsening situation, the opposition has begun to consider different scenarios to bring the dictatorship to an end. Some favour following the Libyan example, where the rebel uprising combined with military intervention by NATO brought about the collapse of the regime. Ashraf al-Miqdad, the head of the Damascus Declaration living in Australia, stated in an interview with the newspaper *Al-Sharq al-Awsat* that "the Syrian regime will never stop the repression and murders, meaning that there are only two options: foreign intervention or arming the revolutionaries… International military intervention has become the only possible solution. The other alternative would be to divide the army, which would avoid having to arm the people."[45] Although these voices still represent a minority, they reflect the desperation of the Syrian opposition, which believes that the uprising may lose its muscle if none of the objectives are reached soon.

The Local Coordination Committees have tried to nip this debate in the bud. In their communiqué dated 29 August, they stated: "While we understand the motivation to take up arms or call for military intervention, we specifically reject this position as we find it unacceptable politically, nationally, and ethically."[46] At least for now, then, it seems that a Libya-style progres-

sion is being rejected: "The method by which the regime is overthrown is an indication of what Syria will be like post-regime. If we maintain our peaceful demonstrations, which include our cities, towns, and villages and our men, women, and children, the possibility of democracy in our country is much greater. If an armed confrontation or international military intervention becomes a reality, it will be virtually impossible to establish a legitimate foundation for a proud future Syria." NSC president Haytham al-Malih fully agrees with this diagnosis: "any foreign intervention would destroy Syria, just like what has happened in Libya…revolution in Syria will prevail and the regime will be brought down by peaceful means." He added that "the revolutionaries will not fall into the trap" of militarising the uprising.[47]

An eventual militarisation would have devastating effects, given that it would be exploited by the regime to present itself as the guarantor of internal stability and thus try to recover part of the territory lost to its traditional allies. The mere possibility of an outbreak of civil war would demobilise the people on the streets of Syria, who thoroughly oppose an ethnic-religious confrontation that would be taken advantage of by extremists on both sides. This would also have unforeseeable effects in the very sensitive Middle East, since Syria shares borders with Israel, Lebanon, Turkey, Iraq and Jordan. As Arab League Secretary General Nabil al-Arabi recently said, "Syria is not Libya…Syria plays a central role in the region and what happens there has a direct impact on Lebanon and Iraq."

Conclusion

A series of structural deficiencies limits the influence of the opposition intellectuals and critics in Syria. These include the systematic repression they have been subject to, the lack of a social base, ideological heterogeneity, internal divisions, their lack of coordination and the limited influence that they have in Syrian society as a whole. Repression hit this part of Syrian civil society particularly hard; they were persecuted, repressed and ostracised for calling for more freedoms and democracy. The regime considered their petitions regarding the need to release political prisoners, suspend the state of emergency and end the single-party system as a declaration of war.

None of the members of this small group can count on a broad social base. None of them are from Syrian families boasting great fortunes or long lines of politicians (with the notable exception of Suhair al-Atassi). Given the absence of freedoms (of the press, opinion and expression) and the regime's absolute control of the media, they have not been able to get their

message into the hands of the Syrians or to mobilise them, a task that now falls entirely to the Local Coordination Committees. Their audience is, therefore, limited. Interestingly, most of them are now in Damascus, historically one of the regime's strongholds, which has been relatively quiet so far.

Another key limitation is ideological heterogeneity. A good part of the members are Nasserites, communists or socialists, options that are in decline and lack any significant popular backing in Syria today. Their support for secularism also weakens them among traditional Islamist sectors. The respect expressed towards them by the people is essentially due to the Herculean task they have taken on against the regime over the last three decades, which they have paid for with long prison sentences.

Internal divisions have also taken their toll. Some of these figures differ regarding central questions for the future of Syria like whether it is possible to have a dialogue with the regime, the relationship with foreign powers and the creation of a transitional government. These differences have made themselves apparent over the last few months. Another structural weakness is the lack of coordination between members of this group, especially due to the persecution to which they have been subject. In fact, many of them are now in prison completing long sentences (such as Arif Dalila, one of the most representative figures; two others – Haytham al-Malih and Anwar al-Bunni – were released after the uprising began).

Despite all of these structural deficiencies, however, their opinions are followed by an important segment of the demonstrators and they have even more influence than the traditional political parties due to their proven commitment to the defence of civil liberties over the last thirty years. This could result in their forming a respected intelligentsia in the future and becoming real policymakers. Indeed, this group of intellectuals and critics is solidly represented in both the Committee for National Salvation and the National Transitional Council. In the words of Haytham al-Malih, "The opposition and the Syrian intellectuals did not create the revolution. The revolution is the work of the youth. Now they need political support and we want to be by their sides in this revolution."[48]

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Hizbullah's Military Wing: Initial Catalysts and Prospects for Disarmament

Bilal Hamadeh

"On May 8th 2008, clashes erupted in Lebanon between pro-Syrian and anti-Syrian forces. Approximately two weeks later, the Hizbullah-led pro-Syrian forces succeeded in settling the conflict in their favour. Although the post-conflict settlement broke Lebanon's 18-month political deadlock, Hizbullah's use of arms internally to advance political objectives garnered considerable attention, reviving public concern about Hizbullah's military wing and its compatibility with democracy. On one side, there are those who argue that the presence of a non-state military actor undermines Lebanese democracy because it confiscates the monopoly of violence from the state. On the contrary, it is argued that Hizbullah's military wing is compatible with democratic principles as long as the state consents to its deployment. This paper takes a more comprehensive approach to the charged debate by foregrounding the historical, religious, and sociopolitical crisis conditions that led to the creation and militarization of the "Party of God", to consequently assess whether such factors persist today. In order to accomplish that, a backdrop of the actor's ideology and environment is presented beginning with an overview of Shiite political thought and the history of the Shiite community within the Lebanese political system. Next, the relation of Hizbullah with the Lebanese state is studied using theories on the democratic transition of resistance movements. Finally, the paper will conclude with an assessment of the party's commitment to a Lebanese democratization process and the prospects of Hizbullah's disarmament. This study offers an examination of the relation of an evolving Shiite non-state actor with the state in a versatile environment.

Introduction

The relation of Islamic non-state actors with the state is often contentious. This discord is mainly connected to the perceived incompatibility of political Islam and democratic governance. In the Middle East, this acquires another layer of complexity with the presence of "illiberal" democracies, or even plain monarchies (Zakaria 1997). Analysis of Islamic parties reaches new heights in the context of Lebanon's multi-sectarian power-sharing system. As the most influential Lebanese non-state actor today, Hizbullah participated in the political process for more than two decades while keeping its military wing. The controversial ideology of the party is rooted in Ayatollah Khomeini's doctrine of Wilayat al-Faqih (The Guardianship of the Jurisonsult) - A religious doctrine that requires the complete obedience from its followers. The many destabilizing factors of the region and Lebanon put the intentions of this Islamic non-state actor into question. This paper attempts to assess the future of Hizbullah's arms, as well as the party's relation with the Lebanese state within the new reality, bearing the following questions in mind: Have the catalysts that caused the genesis and the militarization of the party cease to exist? Is the Lebanese Shi'ite community and the Party of God innately subordinate to a transnational religious identity? How can the relation of Hizbullah with its environment be described, and what are the prospects for its disarmament?

Undertaking to answer these questions, many scholars argue that Hizbullah is weakening Lebanese democracy because its military wing is confiscating the monopoly of violence away from the state. This paper takes the subject discussed beyond general theoretical claims of democratization that often overlook crucial realities, and studies the political and socio-economic roots of the party and its militarization within the context of the Lebanese Shi'ite community. Nizar Hamzeh's model suggests four catalysts that led to Hizbullah's creation and militarization: identity crisis of the Lebanese Shi'ite community, structural imbalance in the Lebanese system, military defeat, and demonstration effect of the Iranian revolution (Hamzeh 2004). I will apply this model in the first section where I present these catalysts against a backdrop of Shi'ite political thought. The second section assesses the relation of Hizbullah with the Lebanese state in theory and in practice, with the help of Rudolph and Van England's four variables model. The last section will provide a comprehensive analysis that attempts to answer the aforementioned questions that this paper raises about the future of Hizbullah and its arms in the Lebanese state. The paper concludes that Hizbullah

will not disarm until the catalysts that led initially to its creation are appeased by the presence of a strong civic and democratic state that Hizbullah itself participates in building.

Shi'ites in Lebanon: a Sect's Struggle Within a Chaotic Political System.

Studying a non-state actor such as Hizbullah is somewhat of a challenge to say the least. This is due to the nature of its composition: an Islamic-National resistance movement and a political party at the same time. As such, understanding the environment that shaped Hizbullah's identity is altogether crucial to grasp the variables that govern the relation of this non-state actor to the state and the wider society. This section explores this environment within the catalysts presented in Nizar Hamzeh's model. The first two catalysts- structural imbalance and foreign intervention- are first presented with a backdrop of the history of the Lebanese Shi'ite community and an overview of the Lebanese confessional system. The third and fourth catalyst- identity crisis and the demonstration effect of the Iranian revolution- are subsequently presented with a focus on the Shi'ite political thought and its influence on the Lebanese Shi'ite political thought. For easier understanding, these catalysts were divided into the two aforementioned subsections; however they are not to be taken as separate or mutually exclusive elements. The material presented will be used later in the paper to understand Hezbollah's political ideology and the mechanisms behind its decision to keep its arms.

The Shi'ites in The Lebanese System: Historical Persecution, Chronic Structural Imbalance, and Military Defeat.

The history of the Shi'ites in the Levant area is one of Instability, persecution, and discrimination. Levant's Shi'ites were often caught in the power struggles and wars between great powers, against which they were helpless. On one hand, forces such as the Mamluks and the Ottomans took them for heretics and surrogates of the Safavid Empire, thus persecuting them accordingly. On the other hand, Christian and Druze forces exploited the absence of a foreign protector for the Shi'ite sect and thus chased them out of Mount Lebanon**.** After the end of the First World War, the Lebanese Shi'ite community took a firm stand against the colonizers, acting in favour

of a greater Syria, in accordance with the Muslim mainstream political aspirations at the time. After colonial France declared the state of Grand Lebanon in 1920, the Shi'ite community was targeted for the stand they took. French authorities encouraged and supported Christian forces to subdue Shi'a rebels in the south of Lebanon. The punishment of Lebanese Shi'ites at the hands of the French colonizers continued with the new power-sharing system (Salibi 2003, 3-14). Muslims in general perceived the new state with suspicion, since France gave the upper-hand to the Christians. The new constitution assigned the position of the president to Christians, that of premiership to Sunnis, and finally that of speakership to Shi'as, a relatively weak position.

The transformation of Lebanon to a nation state in 1920, led to the adoption of the 1860 power-sharing arrangement known as Le *réglement organique*. The new political system is based on the theory of Consociationalism which is a form of negotiated democracy applied in deeply divided societies to manage power and resource distributions between different groups (Bogaards 2000, 396). The consociational democratic system in its sectarian version ("confessionalism") is founded upon a feudal system that existed during the Ottoman Empire called Iqta'. During the Iqta' period political authority was distributed among powerful families within their respected district. This system depended more on personal loyalty than on coercive obedience. The feudal lords (Za'im) had clienteles that vowed allegiance to them in exchange of socio-economic profits (Hamzeh 2001., 172). The institutionalization and constitutionalisation of sectarianism and clientalism persisted even after the country's independence in 1943. The divisions within the state were the most flagrant in its foreign policy, this is directly linked to the phenomenon of "rentierism**",** whereby the Lebanese politicians receive diplomatic, military, and financial assistance from foreign countries to expand their power base and in return they accommodate the patron state with political positions that eventually reshapes the Lebanese state policy (Hajjar 2009, 272). Sectarianism, Rentierism, and clientalism has resulted in a weak Lebanese nationalism that contested itself in the system breakdowns in the period following Lebanon's independence, in 1958 and 1975.

The institutional and developmental imbalance in the Lebanese system affected the Lebanese Shi'ite community directly. Disproportional to their numerical size, the Lebanese Shi'ite community was under-represented in state institutions even after Lebanon's independence in with the new National Pact between the Lebanese (a gentleman's agreement between the Sunni prime minister and the Maronite President). Studies made on the state's bureaucracy in 1946 showed that Shi'ites occupy only 3.2% of civil

servants' high posts (As cited in Hamzeh 2004, 9). The condition of the Lebanese Shi'ites was so grevious that their nickname, "Metwellite", was often associated with misery (Weiss 2010, 1.). Despite all this, the Shi'ite community was one of the last sects to participate in the confessional system that they rejected at first. Shaykh Muhammad Jawad Mughniya, an independent religious intellectual, reflects the view of Lebanese Shi'ites regarding sectarianism at the time. In a speech to Parliament in1962, objecting the continued marginalization of the Shi'ite community, he explains:

> "…Yes, the Shi'a don't believe in sectarianism as an end in itself, but they believe in Lebanon and its constitution, so if they speak of sectarianism, and make demands in its name, they do so as means of applying the constitution that stipulates it". (As cited in Weiss 2010, 2).

In the period between 1945 and 1982, the numbers of the Shi'ite community increased substantially to form one third of the country's population, surpassing those of the Sunnis and the Maronites (Maktabi May 1999). However, the economic and institutional imbalance between the groups stayed the same. The hope of the Lebanese Shi'ites to redress the imbalance through joining the Pan-Arabist and leftist parties soon proved illusory. The Palestinian factions, the major force in Lebanon during the 1970s, used South Lebanon to attack Israel. Sympathizing with the Palestinians, the Shi'ite community soon found itself caught in the crossfire of the PLO and the Israelis, pushing many to migrate to Beirut, creating "misery belts". The problems only augmented with the Israeli invasion of the south in 1978, and the invasion of Lebanon in 1982. Many Lebanese factions filled the void that was left by the PLO; one of them was the main Shi'ite militia AMAL. Hizbullah's creation soon after further empowered the Shi'ite community. By the end of the civil war and the Taef accord, the Shi'ites were fully participant in the Lebanese confessional system. The Taef accord revived hopes of redressing the imbalances of the Lebanese confessional system.

The Taef accord redistributed the powers among the sects in hope of creating a balance. The new shifting of powers that had occurred diminished the space of maneuvering for the political players since no one could gain a majority in the House of Commons or the cabinet (Vizoso 2008, 120). The three presidents had an equal say in most of what was happening in the country and were the main representatives of their sects. They used the cabinet to govern the country, but often surpassed its role to solve issues between them, becoming the "effective decision-making body" (Makdisi 2004, 91). Aside from reducing the stature of the council of ministers, Makdissi argues that this informal kind of governance coupled with sectar-

ian, political and business interests have contributed to the corrosion of the quality of political governance (ibid,.). This was also coupled with lack of administrative reforms that worsened the corruption in the country. By the end of the 1990's the country's debt was equal to its GDP, with no tangible outcomes (Springborg and Denoeux 1998, 169). With unaccountable governance, rarely any corrupt officials were tried and they were well protected behind their sectarian shields (Ibid., 167). In the Post-Taef era the Christians became the new Shi'ites, with their three major Christian parties and their leaders either exiled or imprisoned, and their followers persecuted and tortured. The electoral law at the time did not provide fair representation of all Lebanese, but it mainly served the pro-government parties. Taef didn't go in detail in the electoral law, but it stipulated that the change of the 1960 law that ended the use of qada'a (electoral districts), and redrew the boundaries into six large Muhafazate (provinces), where sectarian majorities (mainly Muslims) dominated (Kerr 2006, 166) . Currently, attempts are still being made to introduce a proportional electoral system; however the prospects do not look promising.

Many Scholars consider the Taef accord as another attempt to patch the confessional system that was once effective in the early stages of state formation, and consequently it will lead to another failure. It is considered a return to the flawed consociational system of governance that continues to operate with the same confessional logic, trapped by the necessity to distribute public offices among Lebanon's denominational communities according to their numerical strengths (Jabra and Jabra 2002, 83). But even numerical strengths were not the real yardstick here since the Shi'ites were not given more seats relatively to their growing demographics, but it was rather the equilibrium that will provide a sense of security for all sects and especially the minorities (Seaver 2000, 258). The confessional system on one side and clientalism and rentierism on the other are mutually reinforcing forces. If the elites do not initiate a transformation process, the country's cyclical breakdowns are bound to continue.

The Lebanese Shi'ite community was often the victim of this confessional system for the longest period of time. Their distrust in this system incited them to look elsewhere to find an identity that can appease their fears. Until the late 1970s this was done through adopting Palestinian or Pan-Arabic causes. The 1980s provided another dimension to the Lebanese Shi'ite identity mainly brought by the demonstration effect of the Iranian revolution.

The Demonstration Effect of Modern Shi'ite Political Thought on The Lebanese Shi'ite Identity.

The Shi'ite Political Thought: An overview.

The success of the Iranian revolution in 1979 was empowering for Shi'ites in Arab countries, and reshaped their relationship with their environments. It can be argued that the newly emergent Shi'ite political thought had the most influence on the Lebanese Shi'ite community, and still does until today. Hizbullah was, and still is, called an Iranian artifact by some (Chasdi 2002, 96). Consequently, any analysis of present or future action of Hizbullah within the Lebanese "democratic" system has to go through a complete comprehension of the Shi'ite political thought. The following lengthy explanation can serve not only as a framework to understand the Lebanese Shi'ite political thought, but also to make sense of the behavior of different Shi'ite political groups found in the Middle East today.

The attempts to marry Shi'a doctrine to new democratic forms of governments took off at the turn of the 20th century. It primarily relied on the historical experiences of the twelve Shi'a Imams and their interpretations of the Quran and Sunna of the prophet Muhammad. As such, the the minority status that Shi'ites had along their history, and their sensitivity towards persecution is thoroughly reflected in their political thought. In most of the Shi'ite canonical pieces relating to politics, Haqq (the right) of subjects against their rulers is emphasized. Ideals such as just rule, avoidance of tyranny, accountability, and fair treatment, are instrumental to the Shi'ite political thought. Additionally, Shi'ites put a lot of emphasis on the quality of the rule, rather than its form—what Sreeram Chaulia calls an "important congenital characteristic that would resonate with the evolution of democracy in modern times" (Chaulia 2007). Two currents, a quietist and a proactive one, are the most influential today in reinterpreting core Shi'a beliefs to modernize it with concepts of democracy and nation state.

The most popular of the Shi'a political thought today is that of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini brought by the Islamic Revolution in Iran in1979. The demonstration effect it had on Shi'ites around the world was very influential. The success of the unprecedented form of popular theocratic regime held the aspirations of the Shi'ites, and encouraged them to claim their civic rights in their respective societies. Muslims in general abandoned ideologies of nationalism and were more sympathetic to Islamic activism, Khomeini-style. Indeed, the Islamic regime supported the demands of Shi'ites across the Middle East, providing financial, military and clerical support they could count on (Nasr 2006).

Ayatollah Khomeini, a theologian and a philosopher, left an everlasting mark on the Islamic political thought by dressing Plato's republic in an Islamic robe, envisioning an Islamic state where clerics would rule, in the capacity of Plato's philosopher kings. Khomeini argued that Islamic theologians are God's viceroys on earth; as such they should establish God's Shari'a (religious law of Islam) once circumstances permit (Milani 2005, 23). By reinventing the relation of obedience between God, his prophets, Imams, and religious leaders, the people have a religious duty to obey Wali al-Faqih, (The Jurisconsult) which, according to Twelver Shi'ite belief, represents God's testimony on earth during the period of the Occultation (The interim period that precedes the Mahdi's return). Nevertheless, Khomeini's proactive ideas that champions political activism in the intersession period are unorthodox to Shi'a Islam.

The theocratic orientations of Khomeini's Wilayat al-Faqih faced many objections from inside and outside the clerical circle. The traditional political thought had more of a quietist nature to it. It was initiated by Ayatollah Na'ini of Najaf during the time of the Iranian constitutional revolution of 1906. Na'ini argued that in the interim period waiting for the Mahdi, no form of Islamic government can be established, since only an infallible can lead the government and such characteristic cannot be found in mere men. Therefore, he continued, the best form of governance compatible with Shi'ism is "democracy-shaped and defined by a popularly ratified constitution" (Milani 2005, 27). Furthermore, Ayotallah Khoei, Khomeini's Nemesis, had constantly attacked the jurist guardianship concept as being alien to Islam and to Shi'a Political thought. In the contemporary clerical circle, the quietist school is represented by Ayatollah Sistani who is residing in Iraq. He called for clerics not to participate in politics in Iraq post-Saddam., he also encouraged the adoption of the "one man one vote" electoral law (Chaulia 2007).

To better comprehend the activism and the ideologies of non-state Shi'a political actors, it is crucial to keep the aforementioned two currents of Shi'a political Islam in mind. The quietist current and the proactive current- provide a theoretical framework to analyze different Shiite non-state actors alongside historical, social and economic contexts. As we will see next, the Lebanese Shi'a clerics and intellectuals, and certainly Hizbullah, have benefited from the variety offered by the Shi'ite political thought to tailor religiopolitical prescriptions to fit the Lebanese reality.

Imam Musa Al Sadr is considered to be the father of Shi'a political mobilization in Lebanon. His reformist ideology combined traditional values and modern concepts, continuing in the footsteps of the aforementioned Shaykh

Muhammad Jawad Mughniyeh. Imam Sadr challenged the traditional quietist, interpretation of Islam promoted by some clerics rendering indifference and submission to the miserable realities in place an inescapable reality for the community. He reinterpreted main Islamic events such as Ashura - Event commemorating the martyrdom of Hussein, the grandson of the prophet, in Karbala- in a way to reiterate political activism against injustice as a duty of a Muslim. He also challenged the traditional political leadership or Zu'ama, which exploited the confessional system through feudalistic practices, thus blocking the Shi'ite middle class from gaining political power.

Imam Sadr also introduced the concepts of "positive sectarianism" and "negative sectarianism". The first type of sectarianism encompassing the notion that "every sect is interested in the affairs of their people, raising their moral, cultural, and social levels", while negative sectarianism refers to situations where members of a sect 'try to limit the lives to the people of their sect, in isolation from the other sects, this meaning of sectarianism can be deemed as social segregation and creates a barrier in the road of the development of the society" (As cited in Weiss 2010, 3). Imam Sadr went on to establish the Supreme Islamic Shi'ite council, the first such organization in the community's history, an organization democratically elected, and responsible for managing the religious and political affairs of the community. The "movement of the deprived" (Harakat al-Mahrumin) followed; later on it developed into a military organization (AMAL) that is today the second most influential Shi'a party after Hizbullah. Although he was proactive in changing the conditions of the Lebanese Shi'ites, he did not call for adopting a transnational identity. The commitment to the Lebanese identity was central to his political thought. He saw the Shi'ite community as an integral part of the Lebanese multi-sectarian landscape (Nasr 2006, 113). As such, Sadr was the first in Lebanon to combine proactive and quietist currents of Political Islam to accommodate the sect's sociopolitical and economic conditions.

After Imam Sadr's disappearance in Libya in 1979, the political leadership was factionalized and divided between different views. The Islamic Revolution added another dimension to the identity of the Lebanese Shi'ites. For the first time in history, they had a foreign protector that adopted their causes and shared the same religious background. Khomeini's revolutionary interpretation of Islam and his concept of Wilayat al-Faqih provided the Shi'ites with the option of adopting a transnational identity. The Israeli invasions of 1978 and 1982 enacted the political potential of these pan-Islamic ideologies to radicalize the discontent Shi'a population in an environment ravaged by civil war and foreign occupation.

In the post-Sadr era, opinions regarding the Lebanese identity started diverging on the clerical and political levels. Sheikh Shamsuddine continued Sadr's legacy, calling for further integration of the Shi'ites into the Lebanese society and system (Hamzeh 2004, 23). Adversely, Ayatollah Fadlallah, encouraged by the success of the Iranian Revolution, championed the view of a transnational Shi'ite identity before the end of the civil war (in the last two decades he became a promoter for integration). He theorized about the relation of Islam and violence by setting down the circumstances in which force can be used against Islam's enemy. This converged with Khomeini's calls to fight the usurpers and the "satanic forces". Ayatollah Fadlallah was one of the proponents that called for the establishment of an Islamic state (Hamzeh 2003, 23).

The question of identity for the Shi'ite community became pressing after the end of the Lebanese civil war (1989-1990). AMAL, the original militant Shi'a faction, agreed to downsize their military role in return for a place at the table of Lebanese confessionalism. They carry an integrationist view towards Lebanese nationalism, following in the footsteps of their founder, Imam Sadr, but they have very little to show for it. With the occupancy of the Speaker of the House position by AMAL Leader Nabih Berri extending from 1992 to the present day, the faction offered mere lip service in the way of abolishing sectarianism. Furthermore, Hizbullah's adherence to Khomeini's concept of the Guardianship of the Jurist and its call of an Islamic state has raised a lot of controversy regarding their allegiance to Lebanon. Both parties talk about abolishing sectarianism today, while promoting Sistani's approach of "one man one vote" (Nasr 2006, 231). However, many see the two parties' call for such an electoral system as a peaceful tactic employed by the Shi'ites to change the system in their favour democratically, as they possess strength in numbers. Therefore, analyzing the way religious, historical, and socioeconomic factors come into play can serve as an indicator of the Shi'ite community's parties' future commitment to democratization.

Hizbullah and Democracy in The Lebanese System: in Theory and Practice

Hizbullah in The Post-Taef Era: a Brief History.

During the period following the end of the Lebanese civil war and the Taef agreement, Hizbullah remained the sole resistance force to the occupation in the south, under the umbrella of an Iranian-Syrian arrangement. In

post-Taef Lebanon, Hizbullah's Political agenda and electoral programme revolved around the fight against Israel (Alagha 2006, 43). On the executive state level, Hizbullah and the Lebanese state had formed a unique partnership, one rarely seen between a state and a non-state actor; it was called the two-track resistance policy. This policy can be described as a "*marriage de convenance"* whereby a state that does not have the means to protect itself transfers this duty to the civil society, while still maintaining a functioning diplomacy.

After more than twenty years of resistance against Israel and the South Lebanon Army (SLA), Hizbullah became a formidable force, not only in Lebanon, but also in the Arab and Muslim worlds. After the Israeli withdrawal from most territories in south Lebanon in 2000, pressures for it to disarm augmented from the international community under the pretext that, with the Israeli withdrawal, the party's continuing hold of arms could no longer be justified. The UN Security Council Resolution 1559 called for the withdrawal of the Syrians as well as for the disarmament of Lebanese and Non-Lebanese militias, in clear reference to Hizbullah. These pressures were no longer confined to the international arena after the assassination of the Lebanese Prime Minister, Rafiq Hariri, in 2005.

The dramatic change that Hariri's murder brought to Lebanon had considerably affected Hizbullah. With the Syrian withdrawal that followed the assassination, Hizbullah lost a critical ally that had helped maintain a resistance-friendly environment inside Lebanon (Saab Fall 2008, 94). Right-wing Christian forces under the March 14th alliance (an anti-Syrian alliance that is named after a massive demonstration on March 14th 2005 leading to Syria's withdrawal from Lebanon) emerged and started calling for the disarmament of the party; this call had a spillover effect to forces that were historically supportive of Hizbullah's arms, such as the Future Movement (Hariri's mainstream Sunni movement) and the Progressive Socialist Party (PSP), the main Druze party, both of which adopted Pan-Arabism and resistance rhetoric for the most part of their history. The confrontation between the two forces reached its peak in 2008, with the Lebanese government (led by the March 14th coalition) issuing orders to dismantle Hizbullah's telecommunication network. Hizbullah and its allies responded with a military operation that aimed at "cleansing" Beirut and other areas from March 14th–sprung militias and eventually forcing the government to retract its decisions. This move on the part of Hizbullah raised questions in political and academic realms about its relationship and loyalty to the state. Some asked if Hizbullah had become a state within a state, while others questioned the allegiance and the agenda of the party.

Hizbullah's Ideology and Its Compatibility With Democracy

The suspicions around Hizbullah's arms do not only emanate from the 2008 tour de force, but they go back to the controversial religious and ideological composition of the party. While Hizbullah always asserts that they are an indigenous Lebanese party, they still adopt concepts that commit to pan-Islamism and a transnational Shiite identity. Indeed, Hizbullah's open letter to all Lebanese in 1985 called for the establishment of an Islamic state, which would comprise, in their opinion, the best form of governance. The crux of the matter lies in the concept of obedience that the Guardianship of the Jurisconsult (Wilayat al-Faqih) advances. Hizbullah follows this principle strictly. Its leaders have pledged allegiance to the Jurisconsult, be it Khomeini or Khamenei after him. They attribute the success of their party to the obedience brought by this concept on both the leadership and populace levels. Hizbullah's leader Hassan Nasrallah further argues that Hizbullah's strength comes from the obedience that emanates from Wilayat al-Faqih, describing the concept as the "spinal cord of Hizbullah" (Hamzeh 2004, 33-34).

The party's promotion for the establishment of an Islamic state in Lebanon and their complete adoption of the Wilayat al-Faqih doctrine, have split scholarly opinion about their political agenda and allegiance. Some scholars, such as Norton, Abu Khalil, and Zisser, see the goals of the party as contradictory. They argue that "Party of God's" commitment to Shiite doctrinal concepts is a barrier to the party's complete "Lebanonization" (full integration into the Lebanese system). Eventually, the Islamic view of the state will overcome the commitment of the party to a diverse and multi-religious Lebanese state (Abu Khalil 1991, Zisser 1997, A. Norton 1999). Ranstorp and Jaber go even further, arguing that the party is completely dependent on external factors, from the military, financial and ideological Iranian support to the political Syrian influence (Ranstorp 1997, Jaber 1997). A third current asserts that Hizbullah's choice between militancy and political pragmatism depends on the circumstances and does not contradict the party's ideology. Subsequently, Hizbullah is looking to establish an Islamic state through non-violent means (Hamzeh 2004). In their response to these contentious issues, Hizbullah leaders smartly use the flexibility of political Shi'a thought to overturn the accusations.

In addressing the matter of Wilayat al-Faqih, Sheikh Naim Qassem, Hizbullah's deputy Secretary General, explains that accepting the religious authority of the Iranian Supreme Guide does not mean that the party be-

comes subordinate to Iranian state interests if it contradicts the party's own interests. While it is subject to the Supreme Guide's orders in terms of the "undisputable implementation of the doctrinal Shari'a principles", Khomeini himself has sanctioned the autonomy of every Shi'a entity by recognizing "the objective conditions of every group or country". This acknowledgement gives Hizbullah "substantial independence at the practical level not necessitating direct and daily supervision by the Jurist-Theologian" (Qassem 2005, 56-57). As for The other controversial matter, namely the establishment of an Islamic state, Hizbullah's ideologues again used the flexibility of the Shi'a doctrine to reconcile it with the Lebanese realities. Hizbullah promotes the Islamic order (al-dawla al-Islamiyya) as the mode of governance that can best bring social justice, liberty, and security to all people. Nevertheless, the authors emphasize that this system should not reign by force but by the consent of the whole populace. As Qassem argues, as long as the populace refuses such a system, Hizbullah will coexist with others "on the basis of mutual understanding, using peaceful and political means to reach peaceful solutions" (Qassem 2005, 38-39). In this vein, Hizbullah's dream of establishing an Islamic order in Lebanon will remain a dream unless an extreme demographic change takes place in Lebanon, or all Lebanese abide collectively to the concept of Wilayat al-Faqih.

Hizbullah in Practice: Political Programme and Democratic Participation

Drawing from Qassem's argument that Hizbullah committed to use peaceful and political means to reach peaceful solutions within the Lebanese system, I contrast the party's words to their actions to evaluate whether they committed to the rules of the Lebanese "democracy". Since Hizbullah is a resistance movement and a political party, the degree of the shift from the first to the second should be an indication of the party's willingness to embed itself fully into the political system. I will apply Rudolph and Van England's four variables model to assess the success of Hizbullah's transition process to political party from resistance movement. These four variables include: ideology and programme, political will, policies, and internal recognition by the masses (Van Engeland and Rudolph 2008).

Ideology and programme refer to "the set of ideas by which groups posit, explain and justify ends and means of political action" (Van Engeland and Rudolph 2008, 8.). Hizbullah's political programme in 1985 had two main objectives: liberating the occupied territories through resistance, and es-

tablishing an Islamic republic; in the period that followed, Hizbullah experienced a shift from religious ideology to a more political ideology. The party has evolved ever since to downplay their Islamic rhetoric in favour of a more socialist, inclusive view of the state. Between 1991 and 2010, Hizbullah changed its accent from a political ideology to a political program. They included principles of Lebanonization and Infitah ("opening up"), aiming for tighter integration within the Lebanese political system (Alagha 2006).

Political will corresponds to the desire for participation in the life of the state, a.k.a., political power (Van Engeland and Rudolph 2008, 9). Since the end of the Lebanese civil war, Hizbullah has participated in successive parliamentary and municipal elections. Their military resistance has continued in accordance with the state. Until today, no government has ruled without accepting the armed resistance as part of Lebanon's defense strategy. Since 2005 when Hizbullah decided to take part in the executive power of the Lebanese state, it has been represented in every government, with the exception of the temporary withdrawals that occurred between 2006 and 2008.

Policies refer to plans or courses of action that intend to influence and determine state decisions and actions. From 1985 to 1990, Hizbullah became a fully-fledged social movement. Since the end of the war, it started promoting infitah and Lebanonization, advocating integrationist policies within the state (Alagha 2006, 15). Today, Hizbullah champions policies of a democratic flavour, such as the introduction of a proportional electoral law and the abolition of the sectarian system (Van Engeland and Rudolph 2008, 9). On the political non-state level, Hizbullah has engaged in alliances and agreements with all Lebanese parties (an alliance with the Lebanese Forces was achieved in 2005 elections). Their February 6th 2006 agreement with the main Christian party, FPM (Free Patriotic Movement), headed by Michel Aoun (a once staunch opponent of the party's military wing), established a reconciliatory atmosphere between the two communities and gave assurances for suspicious Christians' vis-à-vis Hizbullah and its weapons (Wiegand 2009, 677). These policies are very expressive of the party's integrationist orientation it adopted after 1990.

"Internal recognition by the masses" refers to the degree of acceptance of an outsider into the governance system, and in this case applies to the acceptance of Hizbullah into the Lebanese system. Hizbullah receives sizeable recognition both inside and outside of Lebanon, and their popularity considerably exceeds that of any other Lebanese political party. Nevertheless, this popularity has become increasingly constrained to its Shiite con-

stituents after the party engaged further in domestic politics post-2005 and the rise of sectarian strife). Furthermore, since 1992, both municipal and parliamentary elections have seen Hizbullah win a steadily increasing number of seats. Hizbullah interprets this win as national-political referendum to keep its arms, since "protecting the resistance" is the first article of the electoral program (Alagha 2006, 61).

The malleability of Hizbullah's ideology provides a margin of maneuverability, which allows the party to postpone or neutralize their vision of the Islamic order depending on the circumstances. Since Hizbullah does not promote violence in achieving this vision, their policies have reflected a great deal of consciousness. Their awareness of the many barriers that prevent them from establishing an Islamic order in Lebanon might leave their dream unrealizable for a long period of time. The abstention of Hizbullah in using their formidable military force to alter the status quo was another sign of such awareness, especially after 2005. However, Hizbullah's tour de force in Beirut in 2008 has raised many questions regarding the party's willingness to use its arms internally to advance political objectives. The mini civil war that lasted for almost two weeks in May 2008 had strongly posed the question of the necessity of the state's monopoly of violence. The following analysis will explore all of these issues.

Analysis

Hizbullah, The State, and The "*Monopoly of Violence*"

Following an 18-month political crisis during which Lebanon was ran by a anti-Syrian government where the Shi'ite sect was not represented, clashes between March 8th and March 14th forces erupted. After giving the government the chance to rescind such decisions, March 8th forces, led by Hizbullah, forcefully seized Beirut in less than two weeks, encountering resistance from some March14th armed forces. During these events the Lebanese army did not interfere, fearing a split in its ranks. The crisis ended with the government ultimately withdrawing the decisions after a successful mediation by Qatar. The new arrangement called the Doha agreement resulted in a new national government with a March 14th majority, a commitment of Hizbullah not to use its arms internally, and the election of Michel Suleiman as the president of the republic.

The use of arms in domestic politics had surprised sympathizers as well

as enemies of Hizbullah. For 18 months preceding the clashes, the party and its allies were protesting non-violently against the government—what, then, was so threatening about these two decisions that pushed Hizbullah to use violence internally for the first time since the end of the Lebanese civil war? This can only be fully understood by making sense of the critical sectarian balances in the Mozaique country that we explored earlier. In this fragile balance, any majority sect has the veto power over any decision that it deems threatening to its viable interests. This decision was seen by the Shiite main forces as an existential threat because first it jeopardizes the operational capacities of the resistance against Israel, and second it puts Hezbollah against the Lebanese army that is obliged to carry out the governmental decisions, with all the disastrous repercussions that this could entail.

As many analysts argue, Hizbullah did have the power to forcefully overtake Lebanon. However Hizbullah's limited 2008 military operation, the restoration of order soon after, and the formation of a representative government, do reflect Hizbullah's understanding of the importance of and respect for the state. In a speech for Hizbullah's leader after the president's election on May 25, 2008, Hassan Nasrallah promised: "We don't want to have control over Lebanon, or to have governance over Lebanon or to impose our ideas over the people of Lebanon, because we believe Lebanon to be a special and diverse country that needs collaboration of everyone" (As cited in Wiegand 2009, 678).

All Lebanese governments in the post-Taef era (1989-present) have openly and officially endorsed the right of a legitimate resistance against the Israeli occupation, as a clear nod to Hizbullah, as did the Fouad Seniora's government that took the controversial decisions that preceded the May 2008 events. The logic behind this public endorsement rests on the premise that Hizbullah, as a unconventional resistance force, is better equipped and more willing to accept casualties than the Lebanese army (Saab Fall 2008). Political demands supported by academic opinions have intensified after 2005 against this two-track policy, arguing that Hizbullah's arms are incompatible with democracy and subsequently weaken the Lebanese state. These voices are mainly inspired by Weber's argument that, "a state is a human community that (successfully) claims the *monopoly of the legitimate use of physical* force within a given territory" (Weber, Gerth and Tuner 1948, 78). However, Weber continues to say that, "specifically, at the present time, the right to use physical force is ascribed to other institutions or to individu-

als only to the extent to which the state permits it" (Weber, Gerth and Tuner 1948, 79). In other words, if the state is incapable of protecting its citizens, it can transfer this role to the civil society. In its turn, when the civil society finds itself unprotected in the absence of the state, it will galvanize to protect itself. Edmond N'im- a Maronite MP elected in 2005 with the right wing Lebanese forces, as well as a judicial, constitutional, and international law expert- went even further to give Hizbullah's disarmament a regional dimension. N'im argued that from an international law stance, in light of the Arab-Israeli conflict, Hizbullah should not give up its arms before Israel withdraws from the territories occupied since 1967, as any group or state has a responsibility to protect the weaker party (As Cited in Alagha 2006, 67).

In his concept of the monopoly of violence, Weber does not seem to be very stringent on who is the entity that will provide the security of the citizens, as long as the state consents to its deployment. In Lebanon, the civil society took arms to protect itself when the state was absent during the civil war, which led to the creation of Hizbullah and tens of other similar groups. When the state was being reconstructed in the 1990's, its army was incapable of protecting all of its citizens, especially the Lebanese southerners, from Israeli occupation, so it consigned this task to Hizbullah. Although many political and social factors influenced this choice, they do not undermine the reason that created this critical situation in the first place. Today, an assessment of the capability of the Lebanese state to protect its citizens has to be questioned more than just Hizbullah's disarmament: Can the Lebanese army replace Hizbullah's role in deterring any threat by its enemy Israel, not only to the Shiite community but also to the greater Lebanese populace? Have the catalysts that led to the creation of Hizbullah initially ceased to exist? Answering this question will be the focus of the next section.

Have The Original Catalysts Cease to Exist?

As has been explained above using Rudolph and Van England's four variables model, Hizbullah is organizationally ready to make the transition to the post-Islamist phase and becoming a full political party (Ayoub 2008, 112). It possesses the needed policies, political will, internal recognition by the masses, and an evolving ideology and political programme. The question that remains is whether the party has the political will to carry out the transition. Such a decision is directly linked to a cost/benefit analysis. Would embracing the alternative status, a full political party as opposed to a hybrid

military/political party, be more beneficial for Hizbullah, its constituents, and its country? There is no evidence that points in this direction—only hopes spread by western and Lebanese Politicians that Hizbullah's disarmament will bring democracy to the country. How this can be in the absence of a democratic civic state or a well-equipped army, is not clear at all. At this time, a close examination will warrant that the catalysts that led to the creation of Hizbullah have not yet disappeared.

The historical persecution that the Lebanese Shiite community endured seems to have weakened with the protective roles that Hizbullah and Iran played, especially after 1990 (Nasr 2006, 112-113). However, this persecution seems to have transformed in nature from a sectarian/domestic one to a political/international one. In the 2006 war Israel with an American political and military support, targeted directly and selectively Shi'ite populated areas, which was perceived as a punishment the sect's full endorsement of Hizbullah's military wing. Nevertheless, most Lebanese sects have experienced similar persecution at some point in the country's history; not long ago (1990-2005) the Christians were persecuted under the Syrian tutelage of Lebanon. This persistent problem stems from the confessional political system in place, which continues to create imbalances, encourage foreign intervention and hinder the emergence of a strong national identity

The absence of any programs and policies in sight especially in the education curriculums is an indication that a strong Lebanese national identity is a farfetched dream. In this context, the Lebanese Shi'ite community will not have the incentive to adopt a weak national identity that is unlikely to deliver the security provided by a well established Shiite identity, mostly influenced by the demonstration effect of the Iranian Islamic revolution. This logic is not particular to the Lebanese Shi'ite sect but to all sects, as explained earlier with the phenomena of rentierism. As Sami Hajjar argues, the persistence of this phenomenon takes away from the ability of Lebanese politicians to be independent and thus frame policies that would benefit the Lebanese national interest which consequently puts in doubt the identity of Lebanon as a state (2009, 272). The watershed effect that the subordination to external powers entails also extends to ideological and religious affiliations, making it a nearly impossible task to create a strong Lebanese nationalism. Although this argument is of a slippery slope character, it reflects the complex, see irrational, nature of Lebanese identity. In the absence of a common civic identity that can provide security for all Lebanese, the Shi'ite community will continue looking at Hizbullah's arms as the guarantor of their rights in the confessional system.

The structural imbalance is a main feature of the Lebanese confessional system. Resources are distributed to sects "proportionally" according to their numbers. Even though the Taef accord gave more resources and political representation to the underrepresented Shi'ites, they still hold that the allotment is disproportional to their actual, numerical size. The critique mainly advanced by many scholars and parties, including Hizbullah, is that the Taef agreement did not adequately or appropriately fix the imbalance; it only merely patched it up. In the absence of a civic state and a clear mechanism for resource and power distribution, every sect in Lebanon is plunged in a rat race to maximize their share of resources, in any way possible. The socio-economic problems, which emerged naturally as a result of resource mismanagement and state corruption, have become common to all sects in Lebanon. This reality has not yet apparently reached intolerable levels necessary to push the elite to effect reconstructive change in the system. As Omar Encarncion argues, the transition to democratic rule in any society occurs when the cost of maintaining the status-quo system outweighs its benefits, especially for the political elite (Encarnacion 2000). In Lebanon, after the end of the civil war, the same power-sharing system was modified to accommodate some sects at the expense of others. Lebanese leaders have paid lip service for the abolition of sectarianism from state affairs. Any serious attempts for reconciliation and uprooting sectarianism from the society have been conspicuously absent. Today, the sectarian tensions have reached unprecedented levels in the country.

Foreign military intervention is directly linked to the capability of the state to protect its citizens. The main challenges that face Lebanon today revolve around deterring direct threats (mainly the Israeli threat), protecting the nation's natural resources, and maintaining domestic security. In the first two challenges, the state needs to have deterrence capabilities to deter infringements on its rights to its lands (i.e., the Sheb'a farms) and resources, namely its water and the newly discovered gas fields in 2010 off the shores of Lebanon. Maintaining internal stability will also require the commanding presence of the state, with the growing armament of different parties, and the rise of Islamic extremism, especially among Palestinian refugee camps. The Nahr al-Bared battle in May/2007 exemplified the immediate relevance of these challenges, during which the army struggled for over for months to take over the Palestinian camp from a few hundred fighters of the Fath al-Islam organization (an Al-Qaeda affiliate) (Knusden 2010, 100). The losses that the army incurred during the confrontation (150+ deaths) were mainly attributed to the army's poor preparation and equipment (the army ran out of ammunition half-way through battle, and had to rediscover its 1950's Hawker Hunter air fleet) (LebaneseAirForce 2007).

In order for the state to monopolize violence, it will need a national-defense strategy with a modern army that can defend Lebanon's airspace, deter any foreign intervention, patrol the borders, and secure its waters. No signs in sight indicate a will or a capability of the Lebanese government to revamp the army. Aid from the West had largely been mainly logistical and did not include any air defense systems or warfare equipment (Saab Fall 2008, 101). Moreover, a Russian free endowment of MIG jet fighters was actually turned down by the Lebanese government, which caved to American pressure (Lamb 2011). In Hizbullah's view, because Lebanon is forced in a position to defend itself against such security challenges without the presence of a strong army, it is suicidal to surrender the resistance's arms, thus giving up the only deterrence capability that Lebanon has against its main enemy, Israel. Another dimension of this argument is Hizbullah's unwillingness to sacrifice the security of those of their Shiite constituents who have suffered directly from foreign intervention, in return of promises by the international community to secure Lebanon's safety—promises that continuously collapsed under Israeli and American pressures (Ayoub 2008).

Conclusion

That the catalysts that led to Hizbullah's creation have not yet disappeared testifies to the impotency of the Lebanese sectarian political system. The clientalism and rentierism ravaging the political system, coupled with regional instability, often undermines the original purpose of Consociationalism, which is balanced and proportional power sharing amongst a nation's constituent groups. Alternatively, shifts in excessive power from one sect to another become the main feature of confessionalism. No sect will give up the power it has accumulated with the absence of the incentives to do so. This system is incapable of providing any assurances.

In the near future, it is unlikely to see Hizbullah disarm without an effectual game-changer similar to the 1975 civil war, which ended political Maronism—something that Hizbullah is careful not to engage in, fearing a fate for the Shi'a Lebanese community similar to that of the Maronite community after the war in 1990. The party seems to be aware of such realities, and their pragmatic political program promotes democratic policies such as the electoral law and abolishing political sectarianism, in hope that this change will allow the Lebanese to escape the curse of the cyclical deadlock and collapse of their system. On the doctrinal and ideological level, the party has been reshaping its political thought according to the circumstances, trying to distance itself from the sectarian rhetoric that has swept the Arab world after the U.S.-led Iraq invasion. They have done so with the use of a flexible

political thought rooted in Shiite doctrine that equivocally carries the seeds of an Islamic order but condemns usurping power. In this respect, Hizbullah's view of an Islamic state will probably remain a mirage facing the many barriers created by the complex Lebanese and regional realities.

The Lebanese Shi'ites have been undergoing successive transformations, in order to survive within an unstable sociopolitical environment —an experience relatively common to most Lebanese sects. However, the community did not find a more productive and lasting alliance than the one provided by the revolutionary political thought brought by Ayatollah Khomeini. Hizbullah is the product of this complex reality. Its controversial military wing is more than just a symbol for national or Islamic resistance; it is an incarnation of fears and insecurities of the Lebanese Shi'ite community generated by a political system that failed to respond to the needs of any of its groups. Until these fears are appeased, Hezbollah is unlikely to willingly disarm in the near future.

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Conclusion

The so-called Arab Spring process which has led to great and unexpected transformation in the Greater Middle East area over the last couple of years has caught many global and regional actors unprepared. The idea that there was no basis for such popular uprisings through which political and social transformation was sought due to lack of dynamics and agents of change in the region proved wrong. The most important factor behind this idea was lack of serious social demand and ambition towards democracy and of an organized civil society in these nations. The waves of the Arab Spring partially proved this assumption wrong. The Orientalist perspective suggesting that Arab societies did not want democracy, and that even if they did, they did not have adequate political experience and social dynamics to accomplish this was challenged by the social movements and upheavals in the region.

It has been almost two years since the first incidents of the Arab Spring process. The set of revolutions and uprisings in the MENA region reveals mixed results. However, it is obvious that the process has strong influences in the domestic dynamics of the countries in the region and in the overall outlook of the international system. It is also apparent that the popular movements against the repressive regimes in the region will create radical changes in the new global political order. However, whether this change will lead to radicalization or democratization or create new Iraqs remains mystery. In addition, the political actors involved in regional politics in the Middle East were apparently caught unprepared by the events culminating in an Arab Spring. The tectonic shifts and the magnitude of the people's rise in a very short period of time were the primary reason for the unpreparedness. Similarly, despite eagerness to offer bright analysis on how the process is and will proceed, politicians and academics are "understandably coy about appearing definitive in their analysis" on the Arab Spring.

Whereas the popular uprisings have led to serious changes and to visible progress in terms of democratization and promotion of human rights in some of the Arab spring countries, the overall situation still remains shaky in some others. Tunisia is a good example of success and smooth transition as evidenced by swift change of power and emergence of democratic institutions. The situation in Egypt is still precarious, suggesting that there is still a lot to be done for a proper democratic order. Libya, on the other hand, is still suffering from tribal conflicts and thus has not fully resolved its internal disagreements and achieved a working power-sharing scheme of compromise among the different groups. The uprising in Syria has not led to the results similar to those observed in Tunisia or Egypt; instead, the popular movement has over the time turned into an internal warfare between the opposition groups and the Assad administration. Whether or not it deserves to be defined as a proper revolution is a whole different matter; but it appears that the situation in Syria will require strong involvement of external actors.

This in fact suggests that the success of the Arab Spring process may not always depend on the strength and effectiveness of the internal dynamics, sometimes requiring concerted and decisive action that would involve all regional stakeholders responsible for the betterment and stability of the region. This suggests that all actors in the MENA region, regardless of whether they are influenced by the Arab Spring process, have responsibility to do their part for stability and prosperity subsequently to the popular uprisings in some of the countries in the region. Turkey is of course no exception. Like others, it is also responsible to contribute to achievement of political and economic stability. A few points could be underlined in this regard:

Above all, the unfolding events in the region demonstrate that the political sphere is not the privileged area of the elites or strong individuals and politicians anymore. The non-state actors are also able to influence the political domain in the Middle East. This is unusual for the region considering that people, whether in strong institutional form or as grassroots movements, have rarely attempted to make their voice heard in this region. However, they now rise up and express their demands for further freedom and democracy. Regardless of the perils involved in civic action, this is a strong point to make.

Secondly, it should be noted that the non-state actors have a lot of issues and problems to resolve in order to become more influential and gain legitimacy in their political action. They should clarify their stance; to this end, they need to declare and convince the people that they will not rely on violent methods in their action. And they should also make sure that they will

not be sponsored by or aligned with the state institutions. Most importantly, they should have normatively uncontestable cause and agenda to promote. It is imperative to recall that these are the minimum standards for recognition as a true civil society organization. Without meeting these criteria, the activities of non-state actors would become questionable.

The case studies reviewed in this volume are of course not exhaustive; there are many other non-state actors in the Middle East region able to influence course of politics that deserve greater attention and scholarly analysis. However, even this eclectic work suffices to demonstrate that the non-state actors in the region have a lot more to do and to achieve in order to act as proper actors on the political stage. They have a lot of problems to resolve for genuine contribution to the betterment of the people and advancement of their demands for further freedom and democratization.

Above all, they need to learn how to create broader coalition and network for greater influence and develop more attractive strategies to reach out the people. Lack of expertise is also a significant problem; considering that their legitimacy will rely on their ability to replace the state where it proves inadequate, the non-state actors should be prepared to fill the void and political vacuum in case there is any. Otherwise, temporary successes will not secure a proper and justified place for them in the political stage.

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